tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-65015860179749868512024-03-18T21:59:44.628-07:00CHOPPERTECHInformation on research for a book I wrote about the experiences of a helicopter Technician/Gunner who flew operational sorties in Alouette Gunships on Fireforce during the Rhodesian Bush War. (Second Chimurenga war)Beaver Shawhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15092980697221951142noreply@blogger.comBlogger481125truetag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6501586017974986851.post-10351558539524690992011-07-28T06:28:00.001-07:002011-07-28T06:28:44.578-07:00BLOOD THE INK FOR MY AUTOPSY<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on"><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: 'lucida grande', tahoma, verdana, arial, sans-serif; font-size: 11px; line-height: 14px;">BLOOD, THE INK FOR MY AUTOPSY<br />
<br />
By Kudakwashe KANHUTU<br />
<br />
The plan had been hatched by a very far sighted person. As the struggle for liberation intensified there was an urgent need for able bodied men to join the fight. This led to acceptance of hardened criminals and those who habitually traversed the borders of sanity, into the fighting ranks of ZANLA. The exigencies of recruiting for a war already underway did not allow the set up of a Criminal Records Bureau, to painstakingly vet all cadres joining the struggle. However, one commander in the Dare reChimurenga (the War Council for ZANLA), had anticipated this problem with extra-ordinary foresight and countered it with equal cunning.<br />
<br />
For the uninitiated I am taking you back to the colonial period in the Southern African country formerly called Rhodesia, specifically between 1972 and 1980. This is the time when the black nationalists’ demand for a release from the yoke of white minority oppression reached its apex. The main form of the demand was an armed struggle called Chimurenga II, which saw black people leave their country for training in neighbouring Mozambique and Zambia then return to talk to the white oppressor in terms which were unequivocal. The two main fighting groups were ZANLA, which was dominated by the Shona tribe, and ZIPRA which was smaller owing to it being composed of the minority Ndebele tribe. We were fighting a war of liberating the whole black population from the indignity of being disenfranchised in our own land by foreigners. The leader of the white minority was that rabid racist, Ian Smith.<br />
<br />
I insist that the greatest compliment I ever received as a combatant in this war came from our sworn enemy, Ian Smith, in briefing his regular JOC meetings, he is said to have uttered that “Mabhunu’s fighting force shortens our projection for a thousand year rule”. I had adopted the nom de guerre Mabhunu Muchaendepi and the grudging respect of my enemy was not so much a source of pride, but confirmation that our methods were effective.<br />
<br />
I must say I was initially averse to what I perceived as a waste of scarce resources when I was informed I would be part of a unit, charged with terminating comrades on the battlefield who were compromising the war by being cruel to the black population we were fighting to free. It was a terrible anti climax, hearing that my engagement with the white enemy would only be coincidental. I found it hard to believe I had shared caves with pythons, walked barefoot across game parks in the middle of the night to reach Mozambique, tottering, on legs swollen to twice their size, to fight, not the enemy; but my own fellow combatants.<br />
<br />
It felt like a betrayal of the spirit of Liberation, a betrayal of the nation of Zimbabwe, but any qualms I had were laid to complete rest once we began our training. Basic training was administered to all who arrived at Chimoio, this involved political education, weapons and physical training. Our commanders then assigned us to different fields we would man, based on their assessment and judgement of our abilities, an essential division of labour for any effective fighting force.<br />
<br />
It was in training I came into contact for the first time with the criminals who were to be my comrades in liberating Zimbabwe. I remember the vacant look in the eyes of some of these cadres, the inordinate eagerness to get weapons and return to the theatre of war. If I were to say today that I knew instinctively that these people were sadistic, any decent magistrate would throw me in jail owing to the paradigm shift since, but in a time of war, this instinct was indispensable and invaluable an attribute.<br />
<br />
Vindication for that instinct would come of course from a reading of the brutal massacre of black civilians between Chipinge and Wedza which took place in such a short time after our pass out from Chimoio. It evoked despondency to watch on the news while we were at advanced training in Libya, the hacked off legs, burnt corpses, pregnant women stabbed by bayonets lying lifeless in row after row, murdered by their supposed liberators.<br />
<br />
Ian Smith’s government of course to win the battle of hearts and minds allowed reporters from all over the world to have a field day when such massacres occurred. Extreme double standards because when the Rhodesian Army, frustrated by how cunning the genuine liberators were, massacred civilians in the hundreds, reporters would be banned from these areas. I would also venture that the reason Ian Smith began to doubt his government’s resolution for a thousand year white domination of the majority blacks was – has to be – the existence of a unit in ZANLA charged with protecting civilians from wayward liberators. Was this not a clear example of the advanced political acumen he was telling the world blacks inherently lack? Furthermore the atrocities visited on civilians by Smith’s army went unpunished even when it was so obvious and undeniable.<br />
<br />
To be able to shed light on why my autopsy is being written in this sort of ink, let me posit that my death is imminent as I have chosen to let out the most closely guarded secret of Chimurenga II. The secret is that the black liberation fighters lost the war; we lost the war the day when Comrade Josiah Magama Tongogara died. The Kaguvi Sector, my unit in the armed struggle and a brain child of Comrade Tongogara, evolved to become an army within an army, fighting a war within a war. The Sector developed its own ethos which bordered on a preference to actually lose the war than gain leverage by terrorising civilians. Unfortunately this sentiment was not shared across the board, even in Dare reChimurenga Comrade Tongogara was an isolated figure as the other members were proponents of the scorched earth policy. It is a fact that some people in high positions of government today actually instructed the other guerrillas to be ruthless against the black population, summary executions were endorsed, cruel and unusual punishments shamelessly promoted, an all is fair in war doctrine.<br />
<br />
Of the Kaguvi Sector numbering 85 at the end of the armed struggle, I am the only one left. 30 of my comrades were detained in Chimoio during the Lancaster House talks and were massacred on the same day that Comrade Tongogara died in a bizarre accident. 20 more comrades did not make it alive from Dzapasi Assembly Point. Over the years the other 34 remaining combatants of the Kaguvi Sector have met ignominious ends over the course of their lives in independent Zimbabwe, in very suspicious circumstances, so it is left to me to honour the memory of the foremost liberation unit by letting the truth be known instead of the myth that has been perpetuated that we won the war of liberation.<br />
<br />
Do not waste your pity on me, better people have already died; Comrades Mandebvu, Elliot Hondo, Comrade Mabhunu Muchapera, Hokoyo, Zvaipa, Tafataona, Dragon, Tichafa… </span></div><div class="blogger-post-footer"><!-- Start Bravenet.com Service Code -->
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<!-- End Bravenet.com Service Code --></div>Beaver Shawhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15092980697221951142noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6501586017974986851.post-2847704878225230872011-07-28T06:26:00.000-07:002011-07-28T06:26:30.482-07:00HERBET CHITEPO ASASSINATION INFO<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on"><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: 'lucida grande', tahoma, verdana, arial, sans-serif; font-size: 11px; line-height: 14px;"> </span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: 'lucida grande', tahoma, verdana, arial, sans-serif; font-size: 11px; line-height: 14px;">author/source:Zimbabwe Standard</span><br />
<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: 'lucida grande', tahoma, verdana, arial, sans-serif; font-size: 11px; line-height: 14px;">published:Sun 30-Sep-2001<br />
posted on this site:Mon 1-Oct-2001<br />
<br />
Article Type : News<br />
<br />
Josiah Tongogara, Rugare Gumbo, Henry Hamadziripi, Kumbirai Kangai, Mukudzei Mudzi named in 1975 report into Chitepo's murder<br />
<br />
Staff Writer<br />
<br />
Top Zanu commanders from the Dare Rechimurenga and the Zanla High Command killed former Zanu chairman, Herbert Chitepo, in Zambia in 1975, a special report by a Zambian commission into the late leader's mysterious death reveals. This is the first time that the report has been made public since the lawyer-cum-politician's assasination 26 years ago. Chitepo died when a car bomb planted under the driver's seat in his VW Beetle detonated as he was trying to reverse the car from the garage at his Zambian house. The Standard this week reveals for the first time the contents of the report. The report puts paid to claims from within Mr Mugabe's party that Chitepo had been killed by agents of the Ian Smith regime. The late chairman's widow, Victoria Chitepo, is on record as saying it was common knowledge that the leader was killed by fellow party members.<br />
<br />
The Report of the Special International Commission on the Assassination of Herbert Wiltshire Chitepo, which was commissioned by former Zambian president, Kenneth Kaunda, in Lusaka, 1976, cites the late Zanla commander, Josiah Tongogara; current deputy minister of home affairs, Rugare Gumbo, who was secretary for information and publicity; Henry Hamadziripi, secretary for finance; Kumbirai Kangai, secretary for public and social welfare; and Mukudzei Mudzi, secretary for administration as the people responsible for assassinating the Dare chairman, Chitepo.<br />
<br />
The report said the late chairman was a victim of a tribal power struggle within the party. Said the report, in the possession of The Standard: "The members of Dare and the High Command decided on March 1975 to kill Chitepo for reasons already stated. On that day, Dauramanzi and Mpunzarima were sent to collect a bomb from Rex Nhongo. They returned on Monday 17 March when Chimurenga handed the bomb to Sadat Kufamazuba for safe keeping until midnight when Chimurenga, Rudo, Short and Sadat planted the bomb on the driver's seat of Chitepo's car. The four men were acting under the directions of Tongogara. On the same night, Tongogara sent Robson Manyika to Chitepo's house to go and check whether Chimurenga, Rudo and Short had carried out the mission. Manyika said he did all this and reported back to Tongogara. This account is consistent with the corroborative evidence of the members of Dare and the High Command before the Commission and with their demeanour when they appeared before us."<br />
<br />
The report continues: "The members of Dare and the High Command could all therefore be indicated as principals to the murder of Chitepo because jointly and severally they actively desired to bring this about and did in fact bring it about. Although only one individual may have completed the final act to consummate the crime and though some may not have been present as in the case of Hamadziripi and Chigowe, who claim to have been in Malawi at the material time, they could all be charged for Chitepo's murder."<br />
<br />
The report says members of the High Command who gave evidence admitted that on hearing rumours some of them were to be arrested, scattered and ran away from Zambia instead of being eager to assist Zambian Police. "So the whole evidence both circumstantial, as well as direct with regard to the Chitepo assassination, points inevitably and clearly to his colleagues in the Dare and the High Command, especially Tongogara, Chigowe, Mudzi, Gumbo, Kangai and Hamadziripi," says the report.<br />
<br />
The commission was chaired by Reuben Chitandika Kamanga and Mathias Mainza Chona, both Zambians, representatives of African countries from Botswana, Congo, Ivory Coast, Libya, Malagasy, Morocco, Mozambique, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Tanzania and Zaire. Its terms of reference was to inquire into the events and circumstances leading to death of Chitepo on 18 March 1975. It was to investigate and establish "whether any racists or imperialists agents, or any racists or counter-revolutionaries or saboteurs were directly responsible for the said death." It was to investigate and establish the identity and the motive of the person or persons responsible for the said death. The commission was tasked to: "Make recommendations with regard to the measures or any additional measures that ought to be taken for the security of persons engaged in any political activities aimed at the attainment of freedom and independence of the people of Zimbabwe and any other country in Africa still under colonial or minority rule."<br />
<br />
Said Kaunda on Zambian national radio on 31 March 1975: "We are shocked. We are still grieved and angered. We remain bitter against the murderous act, bitter against the murderers - the enemies of Zambia and Africa. Many Zambians are, to say the least, very dismayed and justifiably irritated by statements made by some Zimbabwe nationals, some, even nationalist leaders, have shown no concern whatsoever for the assassination of Mr Chitepo. To them, Mr Chitepo has been assassinated and that must be the end. Instead of calling upon the party and government to track down the killers of this gallant fighter, they are either completely silent, while others virtually demand that we stop the investigation altogether and thereby shelter the assassins."<br />
<br />
Twenty-fours years later, Kaunda was still bitter as he told The Standard in 1999 when he came to visit the grave of the late vice president, Joshua Nkomo: "Chitepo was a committed leader. And some day we will talk about how he died. It is one blot in the history, a sad reflection of the whole liberation of this region. Some of the Zanla leadership left Zambia soon after the burial. I didn't expect them to leave immediately...this was their death. It was our death too, and it required all of us to work together on it," said Kaunda.<br />
<br />
At the Review Conference of September 1973, the following were elected to the Dare: Herbert Chitepo - chairman (Manyika); Mukudzei Mudzi - administrative secretary (Karanga); Noel Mukono - secretary for external affairs (Manyika); Kumbirai Kangai - secretary for labour, social services and welfare (Karanga); Rugare Gumbo - secretary for information and publicity (Karanga); John Mataure -political commissar (Manyika); Henry Hamadziripi - secretary for finance (Karanga); Josiah Tongogara - chief of defence (Karanga). Apart from being an astute politician, Chitepo made history by becoming the first black advocate in southern Africa.<br />
<br />
EXCLUSIVE - The Standard will, from next week, serialise the Report of the Special International Commission on the Assassination of Herbert Wiltshire Chitepo which was commissioned by former Zambian president, Kenneth Kaunda. The report is the most authoritative account into events surrounding the cold-blooded murder of the former nationalist leader. Standard editor, Mark Chavunduka, said yesterday that not a single sentence of the entire report will be edited out.</span></div><div class="blogger-post-footer"><!-- Start Bravenet.com Service Code -->
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<!-- End Bravenet.com Service Code --></div>Beaver Shawhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15092980697221951142noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6501586017974986851.post-24230675964387359822011-04-09T02:06:00.000-07:002011-04-09T02:06:33.918-07:00FIRST COPY OF CHOPPERTECH PRINTED<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">Well there it is the first copy of Choppertech... get your orders in as it is a limited print<br />
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEit_A9PmWaq5PkCF_yozpc7yTua-2kxtYQaaKrP8c32SVCeAj1UjfXdsHRKaMm-mvDAiuI3ES8Mqw2-28OymAQ53_635-Vy8pgkRaC_3y1910Kb4mAhGQuLZaOEQ_EvuklEg9q7nRZ2CXq3/s1600/005.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="212" r6="true" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEit_A9PmWaq5PkCF_yozpc7yTua-2kxtYQaaKrP8c32SVCeAj1UjfXdsHRKaMm-mvDAiuI3ES8Mqw2-28OymAQ53_635-Vy8pgkRaC_3y1910Kb4mAhGQuLZaOEQ_EvuklEg9q7nRZ2CXq3/s320/005.JPG" width="320" /></a></div>Wonder how many stones the book will upturn?</div><div class="blogger-post-footer"><!-- Start Bravenet.com Service Code -->
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<!-- End Bravenet.com Service Code --></div>Beaver Shawhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15092980697221951142noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6501586017974986851.post-14972284636793622092011-03-12T00:55:00.000-08:002011-03-12T00:55:13.918-08:00ANC ZIPRA BATTLE AGAINST RHODESIANS IN WANKIE AREA<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">The Wankie and Sipolilo campaigns of 1967-8 had a significant impact internationally and within the country, demonstrating to the people of South Africa that the ANC's armed struggle was very much alive, writes Sandile Sijake, an ex-cadre of Umkhonto Wesizwe. <br />
<br />
<br />
When the ANC and the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) agreed on close cooperation in relation to guerrilla operations, it was understood that the activity was taking the existing solidarity a step further. The relationship between the peoples of South Africa and those of Zimbabwe had from then onwards to be tempered in the fires of the common experiences in the struggle for social, economic, political and cultural emancipation.<br />
<br />
In the ANC there had been a long period of unplanned attempts at infiltration of Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) members back to South Africa. These attempts were mainly focused on finding a route through Botswana. To facilitate the crossing we established a bone milling facility in one of the farms outside Livingstone. The facility worked very well for some time.<br />
However the process of infiltration involved very small groups of one or two at a time. The rate of arrests and interception by the Botswana Paramilitary Police led some of us to suspect that there was a serious leak of information. The second concern was that whatever weapons the cadres carried along ended up in Botswana and there was no way that these could be recovered.<br />
A number of frank discussions were held, mainly with then ANC President OR Tambo. In his absence these meetings would be chaired by Moses Kotane. Moses Mabhida and JB Marks were charged with finding routes other than Botswana. They set up a number of networks that became promising, and were operational.<br />
There was an apparent tendency that some individual leaders placed more emphasise on commercial interests than the struggle for social, economic and political emancipation. These interests manifested themselves in the fact that these leaders set up factories and operated commercial farms mainly in Zambia. Bitter arguments also related to the fact that cadres sent to South Africa were given a mere five pounds to see them through operations, food, transportation and accommodation, to give but a few requirements of any political-military operation.<br />
Members of MK appealed to the leadership that they be part of the planning of routes home. The joint operations with ZAPU's armed wing, the Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA), evolved out of this process. We agreed to have a combined venture with the specific understanding that we were to be on our way to South Africa. This took place after MK tried to have similar arrangements with FRELIMO in 1966. This could have been feasible given that at that stage FRELIMO was still operating up to Tete Province north of the Zambezi River.<br />
<br />
The operations<br />
Once the political strategic levels accepted the rationale of undertaking a form of combined operations, a number of corresponding structures had to be put in place to ensure implementation of the agreement. <br />
<br />
Sijake has a high regard of Dabengwa as a great soldier. A Kenyan newspaper once described Dabengwa as the most trained soldier in the entire African continent.<br />
A joint intelligence-cum-reconnaissance structure was established with Eric Manzi (MK) and Dumiso Dabengwa (ZIPRA) as respective leaders. There was also set up a Joint Headquarters (JHQ) consisting of the Overall Commanders, Commissars, Chiefs of Staff, Chiefs of Operations, Chiefs of Logistics and Supplies and a limited involvement of medical officers.<br />
Each of these components of the JHQ had its particular teething problems, some of which it was possible to address, others were to be placed in abeyance, while some had to be wished away. In reconnaissance these challenges led to a form of ad hoc and autonomous activity. All the moves and steps taken were to be balanced to ensure all parties were happy with the process. When the structure of the detachment was assembled each level of authority had to be given serious consideration. It was finally agreed that John Dube of ZIPRA be the detachment commander and Chris Hani the detachment commissar.<br />
<br />
In August 1967 a combined force of MK and ZIPRA freedom fighters were seen off across the Zambezi River by Tambo. The force numbered about 96 men with no maps, and limited dependence on ZIPRA cadres who, although Zimbabweans, had no better clue about that part of their country. The detachment had to rely on compasses for a general direction of march.<br />
<br />
When this detachment was to cross into then Rhodesia there were two clear directives. The ZIPRA comrades were to establish themselves in their country as a guerrilla force. The ANC cadres were to head to South Africa and without any particular intention that they should engage the enemy inside Rhodesia except when necessary and as means of self-defence.<br />
Inside Rhodesia the detachment was going to split into two main groups and a third part was going to be a group of two cadres using a train. One company was to head east towards the Matopo Hills, Paul Petersen and two other comrades were to go to the nearest railway station and take a train towards the midlands, and the main body was to move on the western part heading south.<br />
The MK contingent intended to use Rhodesia as a passage home and not to conduct any operations in that country. No one among us knew that the first clashes with the enemy would take place in the vicinity of Wankie.<br />
The members of this first detachment had to learn on their feet as they could not avoid blunders associated with undertaking such an operation without sufficient means and equipment. The situation was tense. On crossing the Zambezi river the detachment set up its own reconnaissance section. Some of the functions of reconnaissance were to move forward and backwards finding the routes to follow, water points, food, and information on the activities of the enemy.<br />
The going was never smooth. On certain occasions arguments would be sparked by the issue of who must lead the detachment to the point identified by reconnaissance. Most times the ZIPRA cadres in reconnaissance would insist that they wanted to lead. Every time one of them had been given the opportunity to lead, the detachment would end up going astray and never linking up with that small contingent of reconnaissance left ahead to secure a new temporary base.<br />
On the second day inside Rhodesia, the detachment ran out of food, bullets were in short supply and most, if not all, the MK members had about five pounds and not much water. There was no information about the quantities of rations each was going to get until they were on the banks of the Zambezi River and ready to cross.<br />
The detachment reached the first village on the second day. The small community there gave valuable information to the guerrillas. They indicated that the previous day some soldiers came to their village and said they were looking for guerrillas. They could not remember the number of trucks or soldiers. The leader in that community was a ZAPU supporter and told the detachment that the soldiers did patrols during the day and at night; and their camp was on the other side of the next village. This man was willing to go to a shop owner at the next village and arrange for the purchase of food. The community gave some food to the reconnaissance group for the rest of the detachment.<br />
The reconnaissance group discovered that the shop owner at the second village was also a ZAPU supporter. He gave valuable information about the enemy activities. He told them that all the passable routes converged near the soldiers' camp. After leaving his place the reconnaissance group established that there was a small enemy contingent at that camp. They were seated next to a fire and now and then one of them would go and look along the road intersection and return to the fire. The detachment decided to walk past the camp as they believed they would easily overwhelm the enemy. On seeing the detachment the soldiers ran away, abandoning the camp.<br />
The detachment marched the whole night before deciding to have a long rest. After some rest we noticed that one member from Charlie Company was missing. We searched for him and after about two hours the search was called off and the detachment moved on.<br />
<br />
On about day six, the detachment ran out of the food they had bought from the village shop. However, they arrived at a game reserve on the Shashi River valley where they shot a zebra for a meal and provisions. They had some water after having dug in the sand for about one and half metres.<br />
Company B was now to move east in the general direction of Matopo Hills. Their immediate task was to see Paul Petersen to a train station at Dede. They parted with the rest of the detachment that now numbered about eighty guerrillas, heading in the general direction of Wankie.<br />
Early the following day, radio news reports on some battles involving Company B started to filter through to the rest of the detachment. It was reported that one of the battles took more than six hours until the comrades ran out of ammunition. Some were arrested and many died there. Putting the pieces of information together, it appears that when Company B were at Dede station one of them was seen drinking water at a public tap. The enemy got an alert signal and the upshot was that the company was followed until the point of battle.<br />
Similarly, Paul Petersen was followed as he travelled by train. He travelled over Tsholotsho area towards Plumtree. He apparently realised that he was being followed and got off the train, using a sub-machine gun he cleared the first road block he encountered. From that roadblock he took a motorbike and carried on southwards towards Plumtree. Riding on along the road, he found himself at an even bigger roadblock than the previous one. He opened fire, fighting his way and finally fell there.<br />
<br />
On hearing the news of the fighting, the main body of the detachment decided to keep our radio sets on continuously, listening to the news. We moved more in the open with an aim of attracting the enemy, in the hope that they would not concentrate on Company B alone.<br />
In the early morning of the ninth day while comrades Wilie, Modulo and Christopher Mampuru were conducting reconnaissance they spotted a large herd of animals. They followed the animals at a distance of about 200m. This led them to a big pond ahead. They were now cautious and had to consult with the rest of the detachment before shooting any of the animals. Wilie left Modulo and Christopher who decided to remain watching the animals while he went back to consult. They were not going to meet again.<br />
Before Wilie could give any report to the detachment two spotter planes began circling the area of the pond. The detachment took up positions in battle formation as the enemy patrols in the air intensified and ground forces appeared in trucks from the direction we came. The enemy trucks passed the positions of the main body and headed for the direction of the pond. After a few moments gun fire sounded in that direction, apparently Christopher and Modulo engaged the enemy.<br />
The following day, while the detachment was having a rest, it was hurled into action by the sound of an exploding hand grenade. The grenade exploded at the position occupied by members of a section consisting of comrades Berry, Baloi, Manchecker, Sparks and Mhlongo. Baloi and Berry died on the spot. Sparks got a bullet through the abdomen and Mhlongo was critically wounded. The enemy was busy shouting: "surrender there is nothing you are going to do".<br />
The detachment engaged the enemy. Their remnants fled from the battlefield leaving behind their dead, maps, supplies and radios. There was one casualty on our side, Charles Sishuba. The members of the detachment got food supplies, fresh clothing, watches and water bottles and used the radios to mislead the enemy. From the maps members of the detachment were able to know about the plans of the enemy and routes they were using.<br />
The disinformation attempts by the detachment proved to be effective, as the enemy acted on the information they received. They ended up one evening shooting at each other near a water pond. After that incident they changed their radio wave band.<br />
<br />
The detachment reached the area of Manzamnyama, and they had a brief encounter with some members of the Rhodesian Rifles, who were predominantly black soldiers. After Manzamnyama the detachment was supposed to veer away from the Wankie Game Reserve. The terrain in the intended direction was sparse and any movement would be easily detected. The enemy was still pursuing the detachment.<br />
<br />
During the day, while the detachment rested, the silence was broken by the sound of Halifax bombers pounding the bush area about a kilometre away from the isolated trees where the detachment rested. The bombings started a yellowish fire, characteristic of napalm bombs. After the bombers, the ground forces arrived in their trucks and started to conduct a mop-up operation.<br />
Late the following evening the detachment fought its last major battle with a combined force of South African and Rhodesian soldiers. The enemy was routed and the detachment's casualties include comrades Donda and Jackson Simelane.<br />
The detachment proceeded in the general direction of Plumtree. As they moved they did not realise they had strayed into Botswana. They were arrested by Botswana paramilitary police in small groups as they came across them.<br />
The arrest of the last group more or less ended the Wankie part of the campaign and triggered the Sipolilo phase.<br />
Sipolilo<br />
The JHQ undertook a general review of the Wankie battles and as the news reached Lusaka through Rhodesian citizens working in Zambia and other numerous sources, the main talk in both the ANC and ZAPU circles was that of sending reinforcements. This remained in the heads of the members of the JHQ after the fighting had died out and all survivors had been arrested. The second phase was to follow a different belief and thinking.<br />
The plan for the second phase was based on the assumption that it was important to have a sustainable base inside Rhodesia before starting operations in South Africa.<br />
The second detachment crossed to Sipolilo between October 1967 and January 1968. At the end of December 1967 there were over 150 guerrillas in the bushes of the eastern part of Rhodesia. The number fluctuated as more people joined and a few returned to Zambia.<br />
The second detachment was instructed to establish guerrilla bases inside Rhodesia. They were to identify a place to set up an internal headquarters with all the necessary components, as well as alternative bases in case of need. Timeous communications with Morogoro and Lusaka (linking to ANC HQ) was going to be maintained by means of a long range multi-functional radio acquired from Germany. The radio was to be powered by means of a generator. The fuel for the generator was to be acquired from Zambia and stores were to be established by the detachment itself.<br />
The detachment was expected to establish a number of arms caches, assisted by a supply group assembled for the purpose. The weapons, rations and uniform replenishment were supplied from Lusaka. Some of the reasons behind supplying the detachment with food and clothing was to ensure that they did not get involved in extensive hunting as that would attract the enemy.<br />
The JHQ in Lusaka left all the main decisions to the command structure of the detachment. Teams visited the front from Lusaka and Tanzania, taking photographs to show that we had a presence behind the enemy lines. At the same time enemy activities started to grow in the general vicinity of the game reserve.<br />
Early one morning in April 1968 the main bases that had been established in the area were the target of intensive bombing. The enemy ground forces followed the bombing. The enemy had learnt from the previous operations the importance of combining air and ground firepower. This attack triggered the clashes that were to last for more than a week, as pockets of the detachment fought in different directions, with the main force fighting towards Salisbury.<br />
A number of comrades died in the battles that ensued, some were arrested and a few ended up in South Africa. There were then two routes to South Africa; some comrades found their way home and finally got arrested, while others were brought home through an agreement between Rhodesian and South African officials.<br />
April 1968 was the climax of what has come to be known as the Wankie campaigns. The significance of these campaigns internationally is that they led to countries like the USA reshaping their policies on Southern Africa. Internally, the South African regime formulated the notorious Terrorism Act. The masses of our people became aware that the ANC was very much alive and still the main political vehicle for social, economic, political and cultural emancipation. Pan African Newswire<br />
<br />
SANDILE SIJAKE was a member of the Luthuli Detachment of Umkhonto we Sizwe.<br />
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<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEilKMjKXPl8OgozOxLpAZd1vfTTGrJjyy5qSNIzziIJFAp19LnNrXAkiJLczCTeyJ9OQe5fNkHJBKQQBH4X0ATcTMMrWIDLFguDukKHrQau_d0vDYYp-fWRBjSOJjiXjgsReMJjbqVMteh_/s1600/unnmitled.bmp" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="198" q6="true" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEilKMjKXPl8OgozOxLpAZd1vfTTGrJjyy5qSNIzziIJFAp19LnNrXAkiJLczCTeyJ9OQe5fNkHJBKQQBH4X0ATcTMMrWIDLFguDukKHrQau_d0vDYYp-fWRBjSOJjiXjgsReMJjbqVMteh_/s320/unnmitled.bmp" width="320" /></a></div></div><div class="blogger-post-footer"><!-- Start Bravenet.com Service Code -->
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ALSO WHY ARE YOU INTERESTED IN THIS SUBJECT ?<br />
Email me at shawzie@hotmail.com <br />
<br />
</div><div class="blogger-post-footer"><!-- Start Bravenet.com Service Code -->
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<br />
Reliving my pre-loss of innocence youth. I found this a long time back, and added a bunch of penciled notes. Cleaned it up a while ago, and just found it again while clearing files. Sending to a few who might understand.<br />
<br />
A lot of this is inside stuff.<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span><br />
<br />
1. Helicopters are cool!<br />
2. A wallet in your trouser pocket can be a real pain in the arse.<br />
3. Decisions made by someone over your head will seldom be in your best interest.<br />
4. Once you are in the fight, it is way too late to wonder if this is a good idea.<br />
5. There is no such thing as a small contact.<br />
6. A frozen area has nothing to do with economics.<br />
7. Happiness is a belt-fed weapon especially if it is 20mm.<br />
8. NEVER get into a fight without more ammunition than the other guy.<br />
9. When you shoot your gun, clean it the first chance you get.<br />
10.White phos can make a dull day fun.<br />
11. The terms "Protective Armor" and "Helicopter" are mutually exclusive.<br />
12. "Chicken Plates" are not something you order in a restaurant.<br />
13. If you are wearing a flak jacket, the incoming will probably miss that part.<br />
14. Dying can hurt a lot. So can Living.<br />
15. It hurts less to die with a uniform on than to die in a hospital bed.<br />
16. A sucking chest wound may be God's way of telling you it's time to go home.<br />
17. Prayer may not help . . . but it can't hurt.<br />
18. Flying is better than walking. Walking is better than running.<br />
Running is better than crawling. All of these however, are better than extraction by a Cas-Evac, even if this is technically a form of flying.<br />
19. It is a fact that helicopter tail rotors are instinctively drawn toward trees, stumps, rocks, etc. While it may be possible to ward off this natural event some of the time, it cannot, despite the best efforts of the crew, always be prevented. It's just what they do.<br />
20. The engine RPM, and the rotor RPM, must BOTH be kept in the GREEN. Failure to heed this commandment can affect the morale of the crew.<br />
21. If everything is as clear as a bell, and everything is going exactly as planned, you're about to be surprised.<br />
22. Loud sudden noises in a helicopter WILL get your undivided attention.<br />
23. The BSR (Bang Stare Read) Theory states that the louder the sudden bang in the helicopter, the quicker your eyes will be drawn to the gauges.<br />
24. The longer you stare at the gauges, the less time it takes them to move from green to red.<br />
25. If something hasn't broken on your helicopter, it's about to.<br />
26. The farther you fly into the mountains, the louder the strange noises become.<br />
27. Running out of pedal, fore or aft cyclic, or collective are all bad ideas. Any combination of these can be deadly.<br />
28. It is a bad thing to run out of airspeed, altitude, and ideas all at the same time.<br />
29. Gravity: It may not be fair, but it is the law.<br />
30.Landing in Buffalo Beans is not a good idea.<br />
31. Eat when you can. Sleep when you can. Visit the loo when you can.<br />
The next opportunity may not come around for a long time. If ever.<br />
32. Combat pay is a flawed concept.<br />
33. Medals are OK, but having your body in one piece at the end of the day is better.<br />
34. Thousands of Rhodesians earned medals for bravery every day. A few were even awarded.<br />
35. Hot FAF food is better than hot rat packs, which, in turn is better than cold rat packs, which is better than no food at all. All of these, however, are preferable to cold Sadza (given to you by the RAR) even if they do have the little pieces of fish in them.<br />
36. Always make sure someone has a 9 mm Star.<br />
37. Girlfriends are fair game. Wives are not.<br />
38. Everybody's a hero on the ground in the pub after the fourth drink.<br />
39. Do not fear the enemy, for your enemy can only take your life. It is far better that you fear the media, for they will steal your HONOUR.<br />
40 Pilots always ask you to keep your eyes open?</span></span></div><div class="blogger-post-footer"><!-- Start Bravenet.com Service Code -->
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</span><br />
<span class="Apple-style-span" style="-webkit-border-horizontal-spacing: 1px; -webkit-border-vertical-spacing: 1px; font-family: arial; font-size: 12px;">Extracted from new zim situation.com </span><br />
<span class="Apple-style-span" style="-webkit-border-horizontal-spacing: 1px; -webkit-border-vertical-spacing: 1px; font-family: arial; font-size: 12px;"><br />
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<span class="Apple-style-span" style="-webkit-border-horizontal-spacing: 1px; -webkit-border-vertical-spacing: 1px; font-family: arial; font-size: 12px;">In<b> <a href="http://newzimsituation.com/topix/bulawayo.html" style="text-decoration: none;" title="Bulawayo ... Latest News and Pictures">Bulawayo</a> A group of <a href="http://newzimsituation.com/topix/zipra.html" style="text-decoration: none;" title="ZIPRA ... Latest News and Pictures">ZIPRA</a> liberation war veterans has toured <a href="http://newzimsituation.com/topix/mkushi.html" style="text-decoration: none;" title="Mkushi ... Latest News and Pictures">Mkushi</a> war-time guerilla <a href="http://newzimsituation.com/topix/camp.html" style="text-decoration: none;" title="Camp ... Latest News and Pictures">Camp</a> in Zambia, to pay homage to more than 420 of their colleagues killed by a <a href="http://newzimsituation.com/topix/rhodesian.html" style="text-decoration: none;" title="Rhodesian ... Latest News and Pictures">Rhodesian</a> bombardment on the <a href="http://newzimsituation.com/topix/camp.html" style="text-decoration: underline;" title="Camp ... Latest News and Pictures">Camp</a> on <a href="http://newzimsituation.com/topix/october.html" style="text-decoration: none;" title="October ... Latest News and Pictures">October</a> 19, 1978. On arrival following a two-day Zambian expedition, the <a href="http://newzimsituation.com/topix/mkhushi.html" style="text-decoration: none;" title="Mkhushi ... Latest News and Pictures">Mkhushi</a> camp survivors broke into war-time <a href="http://newzimsituation.com/topix/zipra.html" style="text-decoration: none;" title="ZIPRA ... Latest News and Pictures">ZIPRA</a> revolutionary songs. They toyi-toyed, they chanted <a href="http://newzimsituation.com/topix/zapu.html" style="text-decoration: none;" title="ZAPU ... Latest News and Pictures">ZAPU</a> slogans, there were also prayers and choruses – in all languages – reverberated through the dense forests, and should have awaken the spirits of the dead cadres sleeping in the mass graves and defence pits. The atmosphere was really somber. Even the crocodiles in Mkushi River should have noticed that this was a different day. Two buses full of ex-fighters who survived the bombing endured a two-day journey from <a href="http://newzimsituation.com/topix/zimbabwe.html" style="text-decoration: none;" title="Zimbabwe ... Latest News and Pictures">Zimbabwe</a> to Mkushi. The trip was the veterans’ own initiative and was funded from their own pockets, with assistance from some well-wishers. Mafela Trust, an organization that researches and documents the political and military activities of ZIPRA during the liberation war, sent some of their officers on the trip to assist with records and other information. "Mafela" was the liberation war name of the last ZIPRA commander <a href="http://newzimsituation.com/topix/lookout-masuku.html" style="text-decoration: none;" title="Lookout Masuku ... Latest News and Pictures">Lookout Masuku</a> (late). The <a href="http://newzimsituation.com/topix/trust.html" style="text-decoration: none;" title="Trust ... Latest News and Pictures">Trust</a> was registered in 1992 and has<a href="http://newzimsituation.com/topix/made.html" style="text-decoration: none;" title="Made ... Latest News and Pictures">Made</a> remarkable progress in researching and recording the role of ZIPRA during the war of liberation. Mkushi camp was exclusively for female ZIPRA cadres. Female guerillas administered and commanded the camp. <a href="http://newzimsituation.com/topix/mafela-trust.html" style="text-decoration: none;" title="Mafela Trust ... Latest News and Pictures">Mafela Trust</a> national coordinator, <a href="http://newzimsituation.com/topix/zephaniah-nkomo.html" nkomo.html"="" style="text-decoration: none;" title="Zephaniah <a href=" topix="">Nkomo</a> ... Latest News and Pictures">Zephaniah Nkomo said the trip was successful from the point of view that it enabled the ex-guerillas to fulfill their long-standing desire of going back to the camp to pay homage to their departed colleagues. He said while the ex-fighters appreciated efforts by the <a href="http://newzimsituation.com/topix/department-of-museums-and-national-monuments.html" style="text-decoration: none;" title="Department Of Museums And National Monuments ... Latest News and Pictures">Department Of Museums And National Monuments</a> in looking after the place, they felt more could be done to improve the shrine. Mafela Trust urges the department to also erect sites at ZIPRA camps in Tanzania, <a botswana.html"="" href="http://newzimsituation.com/topix/angola-and-botswana.html" style="text-decoration: none;" title="Angola And <a href=" topix="">Botswana</a> ... Latest News and Pictures">Angola And Botswana where hundreds of other freedom fighters were killed in bombings by the Rhodesian <a href="http://newzimsituation.com/topix/regime.html" style="text-decoration: none;" title="Regime ... Latest News and Pictures">Regime</a> during the struggle. "We appreciate the efforts of the department of museums to construct shrines in <a href="http://newzimsituation.com/topix/zambia.html" style="text-decoration: none;" title="Zambia ... Latest News and Pictures">Zambia</a> and Mozambique, Mafela Trust feels the exercise must move to erect similar shrines at camps in <a href="http://newzimsituation.com/topix/tanzania.html" style="text-decoration: none;" title="Tanzania ... Latest News and Pictures">Tanzania</a> and Angola," Nkomo said. He added that there was also need to recognize Botswana’s role in facilitating the struggle through their invaluable support with transit camps, <a href="http://newzimsituation.com/topix/food.html" style="text-decoration: none;" title="Food ... Latest News and Pictures">Food</a> and other utilities. Mkushi camp was raided by the Rhodesian forces on the 19th October 1978, killing hundreds of trainees and trained cadres, leaving hundreds others injured. The raid was supported by helicopter gun ships, paratroopers and ground laid ambush enemy forces. The camp, located 130 km from <a href="http://newzimsituation.com/topix/kabwe.html" style="text-decoration: none;" title="Kabwe ... Latest News and Pictures">Kabwe</a> Mining Town North East in the savanna grassland along Mkushi river banks became a potential target in the height of the liberation war targeting ZIPRA Camps in Zambia. Those who survived the raid continue to <a href="http://newzimsituation.com/topix/live.html" style="text-decoration: none;" title="Live ... Latest News and Pictures">Live</a> with memories of the traumatic experience, 31 years after the incident. It is this sad memory that <a href="http://newzimsituation.com/topix/made.html" style="text-decoration: none;" title="Made ... Latest News and Pictures">Made</a> the survivors to undertake the historic memorial visit to Mkushi. Survivors of the Mkushi raid, Mrs. Gift A.Basutu and Mrs. Sebenzile A. Mazinyane among others, initiated the trip and mobilized others for the tour. Mafela Trust, an organization that documents <a href="http://newzimsituation.com/topix/zapu.html" style="text-decoration: none;" title="Zapu ... Latest News and Pictures">Zapu</a> and Zipra history, was brought in at the final stages of the trip, and assisted with some logistics. The National Museums and Monuments of Zimbabwe, the custodian of all shrines, and the <a href="http://newzimsituation.com/topix/zimbabwe.html" style="text-decoration: none;" title="Zimbabwe ... Latest News and Pictures">Zimbabwe</a> Broadcasting Corporation were taken on board. Report compiled by Zephaniah Nkomo Despite challenges with resources, transport, fuel and immigration issues, the trip succeeded. Two buses left Bulawayo and picked up other cadres in Gweru and Harare. The traveling party arrived on the 17th and put up for the night at the Zimbabwean Embassy in Lusaka, before proceeding to Kabwe. Zambian authorities provided police escort and security to the entourage to Mkushi Camp. We arrived at Mkushi Camp at 7 pm on the 18th of October 2009. On arrival, survivors marched to the fenced shrine gate in solemn files. War cries, songs, and traditional salutes were performed as a way of announcing arrival at the shrine. More war songs, church songs, toyi-toyi, slogans, prayers and choruses – in all languages – reverberated through the dense forests, and should have awaken the spirits of the dead cadres sleeping in the mass graves and defence pits. The atmosphere was really somber. Even the crocodiles in Mkushi River should have noticed that this was a different day. As it was getting dark, candles were lit amid ritual dances, heroes’ praises, poetry and sobs by some of us as we remembered our colleagues who <a href="http://newzimsituation.com/topix/lost.html" style="text-decoration: none;" title="Lost ... Latest News and Pictures">Lost</a> their lives at Mkushi. It was time for the survivors of the last Mkushi ZIPRA last detachment to give their personal experiences of the attack. Their tales were harrowing. Joshua Tsharu, a local Mkushi community resident told the touring party how he and fellow residents participated in the collection of skeletons and scattered bones of the bombing victims after Zimbabwe museums authorities promised that they would be paid for their efforts. <a href="http://newzimsituation.com/topix/tsharu.html" style="text-decoration: none;" title="Tsharu ... Latest News and Pictures">Tsharu</a> said that a Zimbabwean delegation that visited the camp 2002 identified him and other community leaders to search and collect human skulls in the Mkushi surroundings. For every skull they found, they would be paid 50 thousand kwacha, they were made to believe. He said he collected five skulls from Camp B. His wife collected three skulls and another four along Mkushi river. Three 50kgs bag full of loose bones were collected. The Mkushi residents called off the search after no payment came from the Zimbabwean authorities. An emotional <a href="http://newzimsituation.com/topix/mr-tsharu.html" style="text-decoration: none;" title="Mr Tsharu ... Latest News and Pictures">Mr Tsharu</a> said he was bitter over the issue, and complained that no cleansing ceremony had been done, in line with tradition. In addition, the Mkushi community was further promised that a clinic and a school would be built as a thank you gesture for their support and suffering during Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle. This also has not been fulfilled. On the following day (19 October) a prayer and singing of the national anthem opened the day. The tour proceeded to inspect the grave sites, identification of memorial features at the Mkushi river banks, the old clinic site, kitchen, and defense pits. The tour revealed that bones and skeletons were still scattered in the defense pits and had not been removed for a decent burial. Mr Tsharu indicated more than 30 defense pits and shelters that have been covered by soil, where bones could be buried. These defense pits and shelters stretch on an area of more than 300 meters. The travelers were later addressed by ZRP Commissioner Nonkosi Ncube, a survivor of the bombings. She expressed profound gratitude to all stakeholders involved on the pilgrimage, in particular Mafela Trust and the <a href="http://newzimsituation.com/topix/government.html" style="text-decoration: none;" title="Government ... Latest News and Pictures">Government</a> for efforts to project the role of ZIPRA in the liberation struggle. Observations on Mkushi camp site The tour observed that the shrine has been mash-wire fenced enclosing 10 mass graves of bricks and cement. One mass graver has an inscription which says "411" lay there. A large quantity of expended cartridges litters the parade square zone. Another grave within the fenced area has not been properly marked and constructed. The biggest mass grave is outside the fenced area and has apparently not been properly identified and marked because the<a href="http://newzimsituation.com/topix/people.html" style="text-decoration: none;" title="People ... Latest News and Pictures">People</a> who constructed the shrine did not know about it, a museums official admitted. There is need to address this urgently. The official noted that efforts were in progress towards raising the shrine to accepted standards. He also admitted the anomaly on the mass grave left outside the fence and agreed to take up the matter with Head Office. He also concurred with the delegation that there was need to redo the boundaries of the shrine regarding findings in <a href="http://newzimsituation.com/topix/respect.html" style="text-decoration: none;" title="Respect ... Latest News and Pictures">Respect</a> of identified defence pits and shelters and the mass grave left outside the fenced area. The delegation also called for the inscription of the Mkushi Role of Honour with the assistance of Mafela Trust, which has the personnel and records. Mafela Trust has on numerous occasions discussed with the <a href="http://newzimsituation.com/topix/director-of-museums-and-monuments-of-zimbabwe.html" style="text-decoration: none;" title="Director Of Museums And Monuments Of Zimbabwe ... Latest News and Pictures">Director Of Museums And Monuments Of Zimbabwe</a> on the partnership projects as relating to the liberation war time archival material and information with a view to adopt user-friendly means and ways to strengthen partnership and hope the long awaited M.O.U. between the two parties will be signed and implemented soon. "Mafela" was the last <a href="http://newzimsituation.com/topix/zpra.html" style="text-decoration: none;" title="ZPRA ... Latest News and Pictures">ZPRA</a> commander Lookout Masuku’s (late) liberation war name. The trust was registered in 1992 to research and document the <a href="http://newzimsituation.com/topix/history.html" style="text-decoration: none;" title="History ... Latest News and Pictures">History</a> of Zapu and ZPRA.</b></span></div><div class="blogger-post-footer"><!-- Start Bravenet.com Service Code -->
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<!-- End Bravenet.com Service Code --></div>Beaver Shawhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15092980697221951142noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6501586017974986851.post-74859000612439615592011-03-09T01:02:00.000-08:002011-03-09T01:05:30.713-08:00303 BSAP BY MIMI CAWOOD<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on"><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgnEQ3CnxqMKMx-FHWqg2sEgyCKGP1bAGW0iK7S2UpP16y-W8PT4QnyQkaWgbrFb9ep1fkbFnImrfrVIJz5tFdRshRVpurIjfMIIBFFOd1APy1oB-QLiNRYdaSUbOa142zn_Keln8u1M138/s1600/182283_500398389670_570159670_6145490_1419176_n.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="320" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgnEQ3CnxqMKMx-FHWqg2sEgyCKGP1bAGW0iK7S2UpP16y-W8PT4QnyQkaWgbrFb9ep1fkbFnImrfrVIJz5tFdRshRVpurIjfMIIBFFOd1APy1oB-QLiNRYdaSUbOa142zn_Keln8u1M138/s320/182283_500398389670_570159670_6145490_1419176_n.jpg" width="200" /></a></div><span style="color: black; font-family: Verdana,Arial,Helvetica,Sans Serif; font-size: x-small;"><span style="font-family: Arial,Helvetica,Sans Serif; font-size: x-small;">So far, there has been no book that has been written by someone who was involved with one of the most important and vital key roles during the Rhodesian Bush War and that is the world of signals. Radio communications is an essential service especially in the army, airforce, and police and also where there are large areas without telephones, particularly the remote farming areas. The author served in the BSAP and was based in Beitbridge, on the south east border with South Africa. Mocambique is only 150km away and the region was a hotbed of terror and anti-terror activity. There, she liaised mainly with the quick reaction Fire Force based in the area comprising of RAF 7 Squadron (Alouettes) and the army's 1 Indep Company. Her call-sign was '303' and many in the area knew her as the 'Voice' or '303'. She took advantage of the fact she was female and would constantly be cheeky with the menfolk whilst being really strict and that kept everyone on their toes. There are many stories that will bring back memories - stories that will make you laugh, smile and bring tears to the eye. She was once overwelmed when a survivor who lost both his legs from a RPG7 incident was driven to Beitbridge to thank her for saving his life, a very emotional experience - she had intercepted a Mayday call several months earlier just by chance (her normal channel to Bulawayo was not working and so switched over to the Fort Victoria channel), an act which saved the victims' life. <br />
Mimi is keen to hear from anyone who recalls call-sign '303' and have stories to contribute. </span></span></div><div class="blogger-post-footer"><!-- Start Bravenet.com Service Code -->
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<!-- End Bravenet.com Service Code --></div>Beaver Shawhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15092980697221951142noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6501586017974986851.post-83455245165057355752011-02-23T03:49:00.000-08:002011-02-23T03:49:12.079-08:00FOREWARD OF CHOPPERTECH BY DON PRICE BCR OC 3 Cdo RLI<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on"><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhZGHr5qzS-czeIv_cf-YbmJqRomxr8A2vL-wFJfyO8QBByMK7L6SK-BZZYw8xkUnYwj6DrRR9u4YQPdcIbIJjfrqYl6uEd00kE1gqzA4TdmTMI2FbAj29pyOxUg3gVD7XHlKyjsznIYPfk/s1600/181697_10150421741340347_690145346_17686089_1811952_n.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="320" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhZGHr5qzS-czeIv_cf-YbmJqRomxr8A2vL-wFJfyO8QBByMK7L6SK-BZZYw8xkUnYwj6DrRR9u4YQPdcIbIJjfrqYl6uEd00kE1gqzA4TdmTMI2FbAj29pyOxUg3gVD7XHlKyjsznIYPfk/s320/181697_10150421741340347_690145346_17686089_1811952_n.jpg" width="230" /></a></div><br />
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjxISFDMS8_d4MCBmidTsqlUeZMZpi_UBxyZwtFuGTnDFLGQbAe5pwa5XBo4apEOkgf0v4K8p4lazsuSubDGGSsfLuAoDgT3YFHLJxuaidi5nM3f7DYnw4SZIuBtAluIJnln56Tu9HrjqR6/s1600/180599_10150421782030347_690145346_17686299_1740770_n.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="320" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjxISFDMS8_d4MCBmidTsqlUeZMZpi_UBxyZwtFuGTnDFLGQbAe5pwa5XBo4apEOkgf0v4K8p4lazsuSubDGGSsfLuAoDgT3YFHLJxuaidi5nM3f7DYnw4SZIuBtAluIJnln56Tu9HrjqR6/s320/180599_10150421782030347_690145346_17686299_1740770_n.jpg" width="230" /></a></div> <span data-jsid="text"><div class="text_exposed_root text_exposed" id="id_4d64f17cad1f69093443426">Someone asked me the other day, "Hey Don, did you know this guy Gordon Shaw? I think they called him Beaver. He was a blue job, a chopper tech. Did you know him? Did he see any action?" I do know Beaver Shaw and I did have the pleasure to o<span class="text_exposed_show">perate with him!<br />
<br />
<span>My mind wanders off and I remember........Fireforce,</span><wbr></wbr><span class="word_break"></span> a call-out, the wind in my face, the speed we were moving over the ground towards the target area.....and.......<br />
“One minute out," came the words from the pilot. We pulled up and the command, "Smoke! Now!" filled my headset. I lobbed the smoke canister out the open door and we banked sharp left, the blades chopping the air in a clatter of noise; there was that brief second, when time seemed to stand still as we waited for something to happen. Then it came............<br />
<br />
The chopper tech barked into his mouthpiece, "Roger, Gooks 10 o'clock......left, bank left, bank left now! K Car is firing!" Dum-dida-dum, the sound of the 20 mm cannon firing, dum-dida-dum and the action was on! You talk about an adrenalin rush, something to shove you to the edge of your seat, exciting stuff, all of this and more, much more! A time to pray, a time to laugh, sometimes to cry. All of these emotions come to you at different times in an airborne Fire- force assault. The experience is something once never forgotten. It is exhilarating, exciting, fast, often frightening but always, always..... magic!<br />
<br />
In the contact described above I have recollections of glancing to my left as we circled the contact area. The tech, K Car gunner, was crouched kneeling and firing the 20 mm gun with deadly effect. His crooked smile, calm demeanor and self confidence steadied and calmed my nerves as the battle unfolded! There are flashes of green and orange on the ground followed by the roar of incoming enemy ground fire. The Perspex shatters just to the left of my head and I am stung by the plastic and shrapnel which suddenly fills the cock-pit slams into my shoulder! It feels like a hefty punch and when I touch my shoulder it’s wet, sticky and hot. Apart from that I am fine and there is no time to worry about this now as things are happening and fast! The floor between my legs bursts upwards like thin silver paper being torn as rounds crash through the aircraft floor and green hornets whizz around I duck and feel vulnerable and stupid all at the same time as there is nowhere to take cover! Nowhere to hide or dodge the bullets! I look to my left once more.....the tech is still smiling, still firing and once more I relax. Beaver you biscuit sort them out, bud! You go Boy!!<br />
<br />
So the battle continues. The para Dak runs in over the target and deploys just off to the west. The paras seem to be ejected from the aircraft but then they steady to float and swing down towards the ground and the enemy below. All the time the K Car circles and the team watches; flashes all over the place and men running. Suddenly a billowing mushroom of white smoke makes us zero in on a contact taking place below. The radio crackles to life, "Contact, contact! Stop one we have a contact!" Beaver adjusts his position and shuffles left or right on his knees behind his gun, taking in the situation He looks, aims and a split second before firing he advises both the K Car team and the troops below, "K Car firing!" and the 20 mm once more spits out its deadly load.<br />
<span>There are yellow-white flashes and then a plumb of smoke as he makes a direct hit on a gook scrambling for cover behind a baobab tree. In an instance the gook disappears, vaporized. Everything is in slow motion now and the 20 mm spits again......Duda-doom....du</span><wbr></wbr><span class="word_break"></span>d -dum!<br />
<br />
Back in camp and safe on the ground I swing out of the chopper and onto terra-ferma. The chopper tech walks around and claps me on the shoulder, "Great stuff, Ishe! Wasn't that outstanding?" The pilot, Chas, unclasps his mouth-piece, "Good work, Beav! Spot on shooting, mate well done!" Chas and I saunter back to the Ops room for a debrief and some hot tea. For us the show is over for a while anyway. But for Sgt Beaver Shaw and the other chopper techs like him it has only just begun. He must now get to work and work quickly as there is no time to waste. The next call-out could come at any moment and he must re-arm, clean his gun to avoid stoppages, check everything on the aircraft, refuel, re-grease, check all oil levels and seals, all joints and blade tips as everything must be 100 % before the next siren blast signals another call-out!<br />
<br />
Later that evening in the troop’s canteen the lads relive the battle. Stories are told and retold.The drinks flow but eventually, rather quickly actually, the lads are finished, expired, too much adrenaline has been pumping; one by one they peel off but before they go each and everyone says , Hey Beav...thanks bro you were magic up there, man. You made that 20 mil sing boet.....thank you Beav, thank you!" There are high fives all around. Eventually only a few of us are left and we reflect one last time on the day’s action and punch-up! The swirl of the last swallow and one last look at the dying fire. "Good night you all.....good job Chas and great shooting Beav. Cheers everybody. See you tomorrow." So ends a normal Fire Force day; what will the morrow bring?<br />
<br />
Sgt Beaver (Gordon) Shaw was one of those dedicated chopper techs, a true professional who loved every minute of his work and calling. As a gunner both in the G Car and K Car he was unparalleled; apart from being a deadly shot with an uncanny knack of knowing the gooks next move before it happened he was also a great guy and a superb airborne soldier who always remained extremely modest. <br />
<br />
I met Beaver in 1978 when he was posted as part of Fire Force Delta to Beitbridge where I was OC 1 (Independent) Coy RAR. The area was tough, dry and very hot in both meanings of the word - temperature wise and gook action. Beaver worked with me as tech/gunner in the K Car on many a call-out and I can honestly say I was always impressed by this quiet often shy young man in olive green overalls. For me he was and will always be one of the Blue Job's (Air force’s) unsung heroes as during his time with 7 & 8 Squadron his accurate shooting accounted for hundreds of gooks killed. He spent day after day doing what I described in just one action, never bitching, whinging or finding fault in anyone....just quietly doing his job!<br />
<br />
Beaver went on to be actively involved in almost every operation where choppers were deployed as well as airborne assaults into Mozambique like the raid on Chimoio in Operation Dingo. In fact the list of his deployments is staggering.<br />
<br />
Beaver also accompanied pilots into neighboring hostile (enemy) countries on “hot extraction” missions playing an important role in rescuing soldiers from life threatening situations and bringing them back to safety. Tasks the normal soldier never spoke or heard about but which were very real. Again, chopper techs like Beaver were never praised for their part in these highly dangerous airborne mercy missions; to this day they remain unsung heroes!<br />
. <br />
Beaver’s memoires, “Chopper Tech” is a must read for both military historians and civilians alike. It is a wonderful record from a totally different perspective of the Rhodesian war and our fight against terrorism. <br />
<br />
I am honored to have been asked to write a foreword for this quiet totally unassuming and modest professional ….. Sgt Gordon (Beaver) Shaw.<br />
<br />
Major Don Price BCR<br />
OC 3Cdo<br />
1 RLI</span></div></span></div><div class="blogger-post-footer"><!-- Start Bravenet.com Service Code -->
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<!-- End Bravenet.com Service Code --></div>Beaver Shawhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15092980697221951142noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6501586017974986851.post-88996134432573755812011-02-11T01:00:00.000-08:002011-02-11T01:00:32.786-08:00AN INTERESTING LINK ON FIREFORCE<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">http://www.combatreform.org/RLIfireforce.htm</div><div class="blogger-post-footer"><!-- Start Bravenet.com Service Code -->
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<!-- End Bravenet.com Service Code --></div>Beaver Shawhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15092980697221951142noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6501586017974986851.post-66616194566301006912010-11-12T03:28:00.001-08:002010-11-12T03:31:32.175-08:00The Chimurenga war in a nutshell<h1 id="ctl00_Header">Rhodesian Bush War</h1><div class="spacer" style="height: 70px;"></div><div class="GreyArrowHeader"><div class="GenericBox"><img border="0" src="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/images/icons/greyarrow.gif" /></div><div class="GenericBox" style="font: bold 14px arial; padding-left: 7px; padding-top: 1px;">Encyclopedia</div></div>The <b>Rhodesian Bush War</b>—also known as the <b>Zimbabwe War of Liberation</b> or the <b>Second <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Chimurenga">Chimurenga</a><span class="hp" id="m42463"><div class="hpHeader">Chimurenga</div><div class="hpContent">Chimurenga is a Shona word for 'revolutionary struggle'. The word's modern interpretation has been extended to describe a struggle for human rights, political dignity and social justice, specifically used for the African insurrections against British colonial rule 1896–1897 and the guerrilla war...</div></span></b>—was a civil war in the former country of <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Rhodesia">Rhodesia</a><span class="hp" id="m91834" style="display: none; top: 508px;"><div class="hpHeader">Rhodesia</div><div class="hpContent"><div class="hpImage" id="i91834"><img src="http://image.absoluteastronomy.com/images/topicthumbs/r/rh/rhodesia.gif" /></div>Rhodesia , officially the Republic of Rhodesia from 1970, was an unrecognised state located in Southern Africa that existed between 1965 and 1979 following its Unilateral Declaration of Independence from the United Kingdom on 11 November 1965...</div></span> (now Zimbabwe) fought from July 1964 to 1979. The Rhodesian government under <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Ian_Smith">Ian Smith</a><span class="hp" id="m66520" style="display: none; top: 517px;"><div class="hpHeader">Ian Smith</div><div class="hpContent">----Ian Douglas Smith GCLM ID served as the Prime Minister of the British self-governing colony of Southern Rhodesia from 13 April 1964 to 11 November 1965...</div></span> and Zimbabwe-Rhodesian government under <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Abel_Muzorewa">Abel Muzorewa</a><span class="hp" id="m90577"><div class="hpHeader">Abel Muzorewa</div><div class="hpContent">Bishop Abel Tendekayi Muzorewa served as Prime Minister of Zimbabwe Rhodesia from the Internal Settlement to the Lancaster House Agreement in 1979...</div></span> fought against <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Robert_Mugabe">Robert Mugabe</a><span class="hp" id="m39949"><div class="hpHeader">Robert Mugabe</div><div class="hpContent">Robert Gabriel Mugabe is the second and current President of Zimbabwe. One of the leaders of the liberation movement against white-minority rule, he was elected into power as the head of government since 1980, as Prime Minister from 1980 to 1987, and as the first executive head of state since...</div></span>'s <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Zimbabwe_African_National_Union">Zimbabwe African National Union</a><span class="hp" id="m14635" style="display: none; top: 539px;"><div class="hpHeader">Zimbabwe African National Union</div><div class="hpContent">The Zimbabwe African National Union was a militant organization that fought against white minority rule in Rhodesia, formed as a split from the Zimbabwe African People's Union...</div></span> and <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Joshua_Nkomo">Joshua Nkomo</a><span class="hp" id="m64006" style="display: none; top: 538px;"><div class="hpHeader">Joshua Nkomo</div><div class="hpContent"><div class="hpImage" id="i64006"><img src="http://image.absoluteastronomy.com/images/topicthumbs/j/jo/joshua_nkomo.gif" /></div>Joshua Mqabuko Nyongolo Nkomo was the leader and founder of the Zimbabwe African People's Union and a member of the Kalanga tribe. He was affectionately known in Zimbabwe as Father Zimbabwe, Umdala Wethu, Umafukufuku or Chibwechitedza...</div></span>'s <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Zimbabwe_African_People%27s_Union">Zimbabwe African People's Union</a><span class="hp" id="m38692"><div class="hpHeader">Zimbabwe African People's Union</div><div class="hpContent">The Zimbabwe African People's Union is a once militant organization and political party that fought for the national liberation of Zimbabwe from its founding in 1961 until it merged with the Zimbabwe African National Union in December 1987....</div></span>. The war and its subsequent settlement ultimately led to the implementation of <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Universal_suffrage">universal suffrage</a><span class="hp" id="m88064" style="display: none; top: 560px;"><div class="hpHeader">Universal suffrage</div><div class="hpContent">Universal suffrage consists of the extension of the right to vote to adult citizens as a whole, though it may also mean extending said right to minors and non-citizens...</div></span>, the end of the white minority ruled Rhodesia and the short-lived government of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, and resulted in the creation of the Republic of Zimbabwe under the leadership of <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Prime_Minister_of_Zimbabwe">Prime Minister</a><span class="hp" id="m36179"><div class="hpHeader">Prime Minister of Zimbabwe</div><div class="hpContent">The Prime Minister of Zimbabwe is the head of government in Zimbabwe. From 1980 to 1987, Robert Mugabe was the first person to hold the position following independence from the United Kingdom. He took office when Rhodesia became the Republic of Zimbabwe on April 18, 1980...</div></span> <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Robert_Mugabe">Robert Mugabe</a><span class="hp" id="m90756"><div class="hpHeader">Robert Mugabe</div><div class="hpContent">Robert Gabriel Mugabe is the second and current President of Zimbabwe. One of the leaders of the liberation movement against white-minority rule, he was elected into power as the head of government since 1980, as Prime Minister from 1980 to 1987, and as the first executive head of state since...</div></span>.<br />
<h2>Background</h2><br />
The origins of the war in Rhodesia can be traced to the colonization of the region by white settlers in the late 19th century, and the dissent of black African nationalist leaders who opposed white minority rule. Rhodesia was settled by British and South African pioneers beginning in the 1890s and while it was never accorded full dominion status, Rhodesia effectively governed itself after 1923. In his famous "<a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Wind_of_Change">Wind of Change</a><span class="hp" id="m14814" style="display: none; top: 701px;"><div class="hpHeader">Wind of Change</div><div class="hpContent">"Wind of Change" is a 1990 power ballad written by Klaus Meine, vocalist of the Scorpions. It appeared on their 1990 album Crazy World, but did not become a worldwide hit single until 1991, when it topped the charts in Germany and across Europe, and hit #4 in the United States and #2 in the United...</div></span>" speech addressed to the parliament of South Africa in 1960, British Prime Minister <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Harold_Macmillan">Harold Macmillan</a><span class="hp" id="m89499" style="display: none; top: 727px;"><div class="hpHeader">Harold Macmillan</div><div class="hpContent"><div class="hpImage" id="i89499"><img src="http://image.absoluteastronomy.com/images/topicthumbs/h/ha/harold_macmillan.gif" /></div>Maurice Harold Macmillan, 1st Earl of Stockton, OM, PC was Prime Minister of the United Kingdom from 10 January 1957 to 18 October 1963....</div></span> stated Britain's intention to grant independence to British territories in Africa. As a consequence many Rhodesians were concerned at the possibility that decolonization and native rule would bring chaos, as had resulted when the Congo became independent . Britain's unwillingness to compromise on the policy of "<i>No independence before majority rule</i>" led to Rhodesia <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Unilateral_Declaration_of_Independence_%28Rhodesia%29">unilaterally declaring independence</a><span class="hp" id="m13558"><div class="hpHeader">Unilateral Declaration of Independence (Rhodesia)</div><div class="hpContent">The Unilateral Declaration of Independence of Rhodesia from the United Kingdom was signed on November 11, 1965, by the administration of Ian Smith, whose Rhodesian Front party opposed black majority rule in the then British colony. Although it declared independence from the United Kingdom it...</div></span> on 11 November 1965. Though Rhodesia had the support of neighbouring South Africa and Portuguese-ruled Mozambique, it never gained formal recognition from any other country. A common misconception is that blacks were subjected to extreme racism and this was the factor that led to the war; however, while some social services were segregated, voting was colourblind (with qualifications), and the white-run government provided health, education and housing services to blacks. The nationalists went to war over white rule and land dispossession.<br />
<br />
By contrast, most white Rhodesians viewed the war as one of survival with atrocities committed in the former Belgian Congo, the Mau Mau Uprising campaign in Kenya and elsewhere in Africa fresh in their minds. Many whites (and a sizable minority of black Rhodesians) viewed their lifestyle as being under attack, which both had considered safer and with a higher standard of living than many other African countries.<br />
<br />
Although the vote in Rhodesia was open to all, regardless of race, property ownership requirements effectively denied the franchise to most of Rhodesia's blacks. and the 1969 constitution provided for "Non-Europeans" (principally blacks) to elect representatives for 8 of the seats in the 66 seat parliament. A further 8 of these seats were reserved for tribal chiefs.<br />
<br />
Amidst this backdrop, black nationalists advocated armed struggle to bring about independence in Rhodesia. Resistance also stemmed from the wide disparities in wealth possession between blacks and whites. In Rhodesia, Europeans owned most of the fertile land whilst Africans were crowded on barren land, following forced evictions or clearances by the colonial authorities.<br />
<br />
Two rival nationalist organizations soon emerged: the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) and the <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Zimbabwe_African_National_Union">Zimbabwe African National Union</a><span class="hp" id="m36358"><div class="hpHeader">Zimbabwe African National Union</div><div class="hpContent">The Zimbabwe African National Union was a militant organization that fought against white minority rule in Rhodesia, formed as a split from the Zimbabwe African People's Union...</div></span> (ZANU), following a split in the former in August 1963, following disagreements over tactics as well as tribalism and personality clashes.. ZANU and its military wing ZANLA were headed initially by the Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole, and later Robert Mugabe, consisted mainly of the <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Shona">Shona</a><span class="hp" id="m11044"><div class="hpHeader">Shona</div><div class="hpContent">Shona may refer to:*Shona people, a Southern African people*Shona language, a Bantu language spoken in Zimbabwe and parts of Mozambique. It has several dialects which include Zezuru spoken by the people in the northern part of Zimbabwe, Manyika in Manicaland, and Karanga in southern part of...</div></span> speaking tribes. ZAPU and its military wing ZIPRA consisted mainly of Ndebele ethnic groups under Joshua Nkomo.<br />
<br />
<a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Cold_War">Cold War</a><span class="hp" id="m9787"><div class="hpHeader">Cold War</div><div class="hpContent">The Cold War was the continuing state of political conflict, military tension, proxy wars, and economic competition existing after World War II , primarily between the Soviet Union and its satellite states, and the powers of the Western world, particularly the United States...</div></span> politics played into the conflict also, with the Soviet Union supporting ZIPRA and Communist China providing support to ZANLA. Each group subsequently fought a separate war against the Rhodesian security forces, and the two groups sometimes fought against each other as well. In June 1979, the governments of <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Cuba">Cuba</a><span class="hp" id="m84472"><div class="hpHeader">Cuba</div><div class="hpContent">The Republic of Cuba is an island country in the Caribbean. It consists of the island of Cuba, the Isla de la Juventud, and several archipelagos. Havana is the largest city in Cuba and the country's capital. Santiago de Cuba is the second largest city....</div></span> and <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Mozambique">Mozambique</a><span class="hp" id="m59158"><div class="hpHeader">Mozambique</div><div class="hpContent">Mozambique, officially the Republic of Mozambique , is a country in southeastern Africa bordered by the Indian Ocean to the east, Tanzania to the north, Malawi and Zambia to the northwest, Zimbabwe to the west and Swaziland and South Africa to the southwest.The area was explored by Vasco da Gama in...</div></span> offered direct military assistance to the Patriotic Front, but Mugabe and Nkomo declined. Other foreign nations also contributed to the conflict, for instance <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/North_Korea">North Korea</a><span class="hp" id="m83216"><div class="hpHeader">North Korea</div><div class="hpContent">North Korea, officially the Democratic People's Republic of Korea , is a country in East Asia, occupying the northern half of the Korean Peninsula. Its capital and largest city is Pyongyang. The Korean Demilitarized Zone serves as the buffer zone between North Korea and South Korea...</div></span>n military officials taught Zimbabwean militants how to use explosives and arms in a camp near <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Pyongyang">Pyongyang</a><span class="hp" id="m57902"><div class="hpHeader">Pyongyang</div><div class="hpContent">Pyongyang is the capital of North Korea, located on the Taedong River. According to preliminary results from the 2008 population census, it has a population of 3,255,388....</div></span>. By April 1979 12,000 ZANLA troops were training in <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Tanzania">Tanzania</a><span class="hp" id="m7274"><div class="hpHeader">Tanzania</div><div class="hpContent">The United Republic of Tanzania is a nation in central East Africa bordered by Kenya and Uganda to the north, Rwanda, Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo to the west, and Zambia, Malawi and Mozambique to the south. The country's eastern borders lie on the Indian Ocean.The United...</div></span>, <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Ethiopia">Ethiopia</a><span class="hp" id="m81959"><div class="hpHeader">Ethiopia</div><div class="hpContent">Ethiopia is a landlocked country located in the Horn of Africa. Officially known as the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, it is the second-most populous nation in Africa with over 79.2 million people and the tenth-largest by area with its 1,100,000 km<sup>2</sup>. The capital is Addis...</div></span>, and <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Libya">Libya</a><span class="hp" id="m31331"><div class="hpHeader">Libya</div><div class="hpContent">Libya , officially the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya , is a country located in North Africa...</div></span>. On the other side of the conflict South Africa clandestinely provided both material and military support to the Rhodesian government. <br />
<br />
Inevitably the Bush War occurred within the context of regional Cold War in Africa, and became embroiled with a number of conflicts in several neighbouring countries as well. Such conflicts included the <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Angolan_War_of_Independence">Angolan War of Independence</a><span class="hp" id="m6017"><div class="hpHeader">Angolan War of Independence</div><div class="hpContent">The Angolan War of Independence began as an uprising against forced cotton harvesting, and became a multi-faction struggle for control of Portugal's Overseas Province of Angola with 11 separatist movements...</div></span> (1961–1975) and <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Angolan_Civil_War">Angolan Civil War</a><span class="hp" id="m80702"><div class="hpHeader">Angolan Civil War</div><div class="hpContent">The Angolan Civil War began in Angola after the end of the war for independence from Portugal in 1975. The war featured conflict between two primary Angolan factions, the communist MPLA and the anti-communist UNITA. A third movement, the FLEC, an association of separatist militant groups, fought...</div></span> (1975–2002), the <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Mozambican_War_of_Independence">Mozambican War of Independence</a><span class="hp" id="m55388"><div class="hpHeader">Mozambican War of Independence</div><div class="hpContent">The Mozambican War of Independence was an armed conflict between the guerrilla forces of the Mozambique Liberation Front or FRELIMO , and Portugal...</div></span> (1964–1974) and <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Mozambican_Civil_War">Mozambican Civil War</a><span class="hp" id="m30074"><div class="hpHeader">Mozambican Civil War</div><div class="hpContent">The Mozambican Civil War began in 1977, two years after the end of the war of independence. The ruling party, Front for Liberation of Mozambique , was violently opposed from 1977 by the Rhodesian- and South African-funded Mozambique Resistance Movement...</div></span> (1977–1992), and the <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Shaba_I">Shaba I</a><span class="hp" id="m79445"><div class="hpHeader">Shaba I</div><div class="hpContent">Shaba I was a conflict between the neighbouring states of Zaire and Angola in 1977, and was arguably a consequence of Zaire's support for the FNLA and UNITA factions in the Angolan Civil War....</div></span> (1977) and <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Shaba_II">Shaba II</a><span class="hp" id="m49104"><div class="hpHeader">Shaba II</div><div class="hpContent">Shaba II was an invasion of the Shaba separatist movement FNLC into the Zairian province of Shaba on 11 May 1978. The FNLC had its bases in eastern Angola and probably had the support of the Angolan government...</div></span> (1978) conflicts.<br />
<h3>Perceptions</h3><br />
The conflict was seen by the nationalist groups and the British government of the time as a war of national and racial liberation. The Rhodesian government saw the conflict as a fight between one part of the country's population (the whites) on behalf of the whole population (including the black majority) against several externally financed parties made up of predominantly black <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Radicalization">radicals</a><span class="hp" id="m73162"><div class="hpHeader">Radicalization</div><div class="hpContent">Radicalization is the process in which an individual changes from passiveness or activism to become more revolutionary, militant or extremist. Radicalization is often associated with youth, adversity, alienation, social exclusion, poverty, or the perception of injustice to self or...</div></span> and communists. The Nationalists saw their country as having been occupied and dominated by a foreign power, namely, Britain, since 1890. The British government, in the person of the Governor General, directly ruled the country from 1923, when it took over from the <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/British_South_Africa_Company">British South Africa Company</a><span class="hp" id="m70648"><div class="hpHeader">British South Africa Company</div><div class="hpContent">The British South Africa Company was established by Cecil Rhodes through the amalgamation of the Central Search Association and the Exploring Company Ltd., receiving a royal charter in 1889...</div></span>. In 1965, Ian Smith's <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Rhodesian_Front">Rhodesian Front</a><span class="hp" id="m94705"><div class="hpHeader">Rhodesian Front</div><div class="hpContent">The Rhodesian Front was a political party in Southern Rhodesia when the country was under white minority rule. Led first by Winston Field, and, from 1964, by Ian Smith, the Rhodesian Front was the successor to the Dominion Party, which was the main opposition party in Southern Rhodesia during the...</div></span> party took over the government when it <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Unilateral_Declaration_of_Independence_%28Rhodesia%29">unilaterally declared independence</a><span class="hp" id="m18764" style="display: none; top: 1484px;"><div class="hpHeader">Unilateral Declaration of Independence (Rhodesia)</div><div class="hpContent"><div class="hpImage" id="i18764"><img src="http://image.absoluteastronomy.com/images/topicthumbs/u/un/unilateral_declaration_of_independence_%28rhodesia%29.gif" /></div>The Unilateral Declaration of Independence of Rhodesia from the United Kingdom was signed on November 11, 1965, by the administration of Ian Smith, whose Rhodesian Front party opposed black majority rule in the then British colony. Although it declared independence from the United Kingdom it...</div></span>. The minority Rhodesian government believed they were defending Western values, <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Christianity">Christianity</a><span class="hp" id="m68135"><div class="hpHeader">Christianity</div><div class="hpContent">Christianity is a monotheistic religion based on the life and teachings of Jesus of Nazareth as presented in the New Testament....</div></span>, the <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Rule_of_law">rule of law</a><span class="hp" id="m66878"><div class="hpHeader">Rule of law</div><div class="hpContent">The rule of law is a legal maxim according to which no one is immune to the law.While the rule of law has been described as "an exceedingly elusive notion" giving rise to a "rampant divergence of understandings", a dichotomy can be identified between two principal conceptions of the rule of law: a...</div></span> and <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Democracy">democracy</a><span class="hp" id="m16250"><div class="hpHeader">Democracy</div><div class="hpContent">Democracy is a political form of government carried out either directly by the people or by means of elected representatives of the people...</div></span> by fighting Communists. They were unwilling to compromise on most political, economic and social inequalities. The Smith administration said the traditional chiefs were the legitimate voice of the black Shona and Ndebele population and that the nationalists were dangerous usurpers.<br />
<br />
In 1978-1979 the Smith administration attempted to blunt the power of the nationalist cause by acceding to an "Internal Settlement" which ended minority rule, changed the name of the country to Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, and installed the country's first black head of government, <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Abel_Muzorewa">Abel Muzorewa</a><span class="hp" id="m63108"><div class="hpHeader">Abel Muzorewa</div><div class="hpContent">Bishop Abel Tendekayi Muzorewa served as Prime Minister of Zimbabwe Rhodesia from the Internal Settlement to the Lancaster House Agreement in 1979...</div></span>. However, unsatisfied with this and spurred on by Britain's refusal to recognise the new order, the nationalist forces persisted. Ultimately the war ended when the white-dominated government of Rhodesia returned power to the British government with the 1979 <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Lancaster_House_Agreement">Lancaster House Agreement</a><span class="hp" id="m37794"><div class="hpHeader">Lancaster House Agreement</div><div class="hpContent">The negotiations which led to the Lancaster House Agreement brought independence to Rhodesia following Ian Smith’s Unilateral Declaration of Independence in 1965. The Agreement covered the Independence Constitution, pre-independence arrangements, and a ceasefire...</div></span>. The Rhodesian government did so at the behest of both South Africa (its major backer) and the United States. Britain recognised this new government, headed by Robert Mugabe, and the newly independent and internationally recognised country was renamed <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Zimbabwe">Zimbabwe</a><span class="hp" id="m87165"><div class="hpHeader">Zimbabwe</div><div class="hpContent">Zimbabwe is a landlocked country located in the southern part of the continent of Africa, between the Zambezi and Limpopo rivers...</div></span>.<br />
<h3>Rhodesian Security Forces</h3><br />
Despite the impact of economic and diplomatic sanctions, Rhodesia was able to develop and maintain a potent and professional military capability.<br />
<br />
The regular army was always a relatively small force, but by 1978-79 it consisted of some 10,800 regulars nominally supported by about 40,000 reservists - though by the last year of the war, perhaps as few as 15,000 were available for active service. While the regular army consisted of a professional core drawn from the white population (and some units, such as the Rhodesian SAS and the <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Rhodesian_Light_Infantry">Rhodesian Light Infantry</a><span class="hp" id="m35280"><div class="hpHeader">Rhodesian Light Infantry</div><div class="hpContent">The 1st Battalion, The Rhodesian Light Infantry was a regular airborne commando regiment in the Rhodesian army. The RLI was originally formed as a light infantry regiment in 1961, reformed as a commando battalion in 1965, became a parachute Battalion in 1977 and was disbanded at the end of the...</div></span>, were all-white), by 1978-79 the majority of its complement was actually composed of black soldiers. The army reserves, in contrast, were largely white and, toward the end of the war, were increasingly being called up to deal with the growing insurgency. The regular army was supported by the para-military <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/British_South_Africa_Police">British South Africa Police</a><span class="hp" id="m9966"><div class="hpHeader">British South Africa Police</div><div class="hpContent">The British South Africa Police was the police force of the British South Africa Company of Cecil Rhodes which became the national police force of Southern Rhodesia and its successor after 1965, Rhodesia...</div></span> with a strength of about 8,000 to 11,000 men (the majority of whom were black) and supported by between 19,000 to 35,000 police reservists (which, like their army counterparts, were largely white). The police reserves acted as type of home guard.<br />
<br />
The war saw the extensive operation of Rhodesian regulars as well as elite units such as the <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Selous_Scouts">Selous Scouts</a><span class="hp" id="m84651"><div class="hpHeader">Selous Scouts</div><div class="hpContent">The Selous Scouts was the name given to a special forces regiment of the Rhodesian Army, which operated from 1973 until the introduction of majority rule in 1980. It was named after British explorer Frederick Courteney Selous , and their motto was pamwe chete, which, in the Shona, roughly means...</div></span> and the Rhodesian SAS. The <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Rhodesian_Army">Rhodesian Army</a><span class="hp" id="m83395" style="display: none; top: 1916px;"><div class="hpHeader">Rhodesian Army</div><div class="hpContent">-Bush War:During the Bush War, the army included:*Army Headquarters Army HQ*Four Brigade HQs , two District HQs , and HQ Special Forces...</div></span> fought bitterly against the black nationalist guerrillas. The Rhodesian Army also comprised mostly black regiments such as the <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Rhodesian_African_Rifles">Rhodesian African Rifles</a><span class="hp" id="m3683"><div class="hpHeader">Rhodesian African Rifles</div><div class="hpContent">The Rhodesian African Rifles, or RAR, was the oldest regiment in the Rhodesian Army, dating from the formation of the 1st Rhodesian Native Regiment in 1916 during the First World War. This was followed by the creation of the Matabeleland Native Regiment, and the 2nd Rhodesian Native Regiment,...</div></span>. As the war went on, the frequent callup of reservists was increasingly utilized to supplement the professional soldiers and the many volunteers from overseas. By 1978 all white males up to the age of 60 were subject to periodic call-up into the army; younger men up to 35 might expect to spend alternating blocks of six weeks in the army and at home. Many of the overseas volunteers came from <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/United_Kingdom">Britain</a><span class="hp" id="m2426"><div class="hpHeader">United Kingdom</div><div class="hpContent">The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern IrelandIn the United Kingdom and Dependencies, other languages have been officially recognised as legitimate autochthonous languages under the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages...</div></span>, <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Ireland">Ireland</a><span class="hp" id="m26483"><div class="hpHeader">Ireland</div><div class="hpContent">Ireland is the third largest island in Europe and the twentieth largest island in the world. It lies to the northwest of continental Europe and is surrounded by hundreds of islands and islets. To the east of Ireland is Great Britain, separated from it by the Irish Sea. The Republic of Ireland...</div></span>, South Africa, Portugal, Hong Kong, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the United States of America with the latter three being held in high regard for their recent <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Vietnam_War">Vietnam War</a><span class="hp" id="m50540"><div class="hpHeader">Vietnam War</div><div class="hpContent">The Vietnam War was a Cold War military conflict that occurred in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia from November 1, 1955 , to April 30, 1975 when Saigon fell...</div></span> experience.<br />
<br />
The Rhodesian Army was, considering the arms embargo, well-equipped. The standard infantry weapon was the Belgian <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/FN_FAL">FN FAL</a><span class="hp" id="m74597"><div class="hpHeader">FN FAL</div><div class="hpContent">The Fusil Automatique Léger or FAL is a self-loading, selective fire battle rifle produced by the Belgian armaments manufacturer Fabrique Nationale de Herstal . During the Cold War it was adopted by many North Atlantic Treaty Organization countries, with the notable exception of the United States...</div></span> Rifle as produced in South Africa under license as the R1 Rifle and supplemented by the H&K G3 rifle that came from Portuguese forces. However other weapons such as the British L1A1 variant of the FAL and the older British <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Lee-Enfield">Lee-Enfield</a><span class="hp" id="m48027"><div class="hpHeader">Lee-Enfield</div><div class="hpContent">The Lee-Enfield bolt-action, magazine-fed, repeating rifle was the main firearm used by the military forces of the British Empire and Commonwealth during the first half of the 20th century...</div></span> bolt action rifle were used by reservists and the <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/British_South_Africa_Police">British South Africa Police</a><span class="hp" id="m46770"><div class="hpHeader">British South Africa Police</div><div class="hpContent">The British South Africa Police was the police force of the British South Africa Company of Cecil Rhodes which became the national police force of Southern Rhodesia and its successor after 1965, Rhodesia...</div></span>. Other weapons included the <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Bren">Bren</a><span class="hp" id="m96141"><div class="hpHeader">Bren</div><div class="hpContent">The Bren, usually called the Bren Gun, was a series of light machine guns adopted by Britain in the 1930s and used in various roles until 1991...</div></span> LMG, <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Sten">Sten</a><span class="hp" id="m45513"><div class="hpHeader">Sten</div><div class="hpContent">The Sten was a family of British 9 mm submachine guns used extensively by British and Commonwealth forces throughout World War II and the Korean War. They were notable for having a simple design and very low production cost....</div></span> SMG, Uzi, <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Browning_Hi-Power">Browning Hi-Power</a><span class="hp" id="m18943"><div class="hpHeader">Browning Hi-Power</div><div class="hpContent">The Browning Hi-Power is a single-action, 9mm semi-automatic handgun. It is based on a design by American firearms inventor John Browning, and later improved by Dieudonné Saive at Fabrique Nationale of Herstal, Belgium. Browning died in 1926, several years before the design was finalized...</div></span> pistol, Colt <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/M16_rifle">M16 rifle</a><span class="hp" id="m68314"><div class="hpHeader">M16 rifle</div><div class="hpContent">The M16 is the United States military designation for the AR-15 rifle. Colt purchased the rights to the AR-15 from ArmaLite and currently uses that designation only for semi-automatic versions of the rifle...</div></span> (very late in the war), <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/FN_MAG">FN MAG</a><span class="hp" id="m17686"><div class="hpHeader">FN MAG</div><div class="hpContent">The FN MAG is a Belgian 7.62 mm general purpose machine gun, designed in the early 1950s at Fabrique Nationale by Ernest Vervier. It has been used by more than 80 countries, and it has been made under licence in countries such as Argentina, Egypt, India, Singapore, the United Kingdom and the...</div></span> general-purpose machine-gun, <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/L16_81mm_Mortar">81 mm mortar</a><span class="hp" id="m92371"><div class="hpHeader">L16 81mm Mortar</div><div class="hpContent">The United Kingdom's L16 81 mm mortar is the standard mortar used by the British armed forces. It originated as a joint design by UK and Canada. The version produced and used by Australia is named the F2 81mm Mortar, whilst the version used by the U.S...</div></span>, and <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/M18A1_Claymore_Antipersonnel_Mine">Claymore</a><span class="hp" id="m67057"><div class="hpHeader">M18A1 Claymore Antipersonnel Mine</div><div class="hpContent">The M18A1 Claymore is a directional anti-personnel mine used by the U.S. military. It was named after the large Scottish sword by its inventor, Norman A. MacLeod. The Claymore fires shrapnel, in the form of steel balls, out to about 100 meters within a 60° arc in front of the device. It is used...</div></span> mines. After <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Unilateral_Declaration_of_Independence_%28Rhodesia%29">UDI</a><span class="hp" id="m41743"><div class="hpHeader">Unilateral Declaration of Independence (Rhodesia)</div><div class="hpContent">The Unilateral Declaration of Independence of Rhodesia from the United Kingdom was signed on November 11, 1965, by the administration of Ian Smith, whose Rhodesian Front party opposed black majority rule in the then British colony. Although it declared independence from the United Kingdom it...</div></span> Rhodesia was heavily reliant on South African and domestically-produced weapons and equipment, as well as international smuggling operations.<br />
<div class="thumb tleft"><img src="http://image.absoluteastronomy.com/images/encyclopediaimages/r/rh/rhodesia-gsmedal.jpg" /></div><br />
The Rhodesian Air Force (RhAF) operated a variety of equipment and carried out numerous roles, with air power providing the Rhodesians with a significant advantage over their enemy. When the arms embargo was introduced, the RhAF was suddenly lacking spare parts from external suppliers and was forced to find alternative means of keeping their aircraft flying. The RhAF was also relatively well equipped and used a large proportion of equipment which was obsolete, such as the <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/World_War_II">World War II</a><span class="hp" id="m65800"><div class="hpHeader">World War II</div><div class="hpContent">World War II, or the Second World War , was a global military conflict lasting from 1939 to 1945 which involved most of the world's nations, including all of the great powers, organised into two opposing military alliances: the Allies and the Axis...</div></span> vintage <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/C-47_Skytrain">Douglas Dakota</a><span class="hp" id="m40486"><div class="hpHeader">C-47 Skytrain</div><div class="hpContent">The Douglas C-47 Skytrain or Dakota is a military transport aircraft that was developed from the Douglas DC-3 airliner. It was used extensively by the Allies during World War II and remained in front line operations through the 1950s with a few remaining in operation to this day.-Design and...</div></span> transport aircraft and the early British jet-fighter the <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/De_Havilland_Vampire">de Havilland Vampire</a><span class="hp" id="m15172"><div class="hpHeader">De Havilland Vampire</div><div class="hpContent">The de Havilland DH.100 Vampire was a British jet-engine fighter. It was commissioned by the Royal Air Force during the Second World War, and was the second jet fighter to enter service with the RAF, after the pioneering Gloster Meteor...</div></span>. It also used more modern types of aircraft like the <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Hawker_Hunter">Hawker Hunter</a><span class="hp" id="m89857"><div class="hpHeader">Hawker Hunter</div><div class="hpContent">The Hawker Hunter was a British jet fighter aircraft of the 1950s and 1960s. The Hunter served for many years with the Royal Air Force and was widely exported, serving with 19 air forces. A total of 1,972 Hunters were produced by Hawker Siddeley and under licence.-Development:The origins of the...</div></span> and <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/English_Electric_Canberra">Canberra</a><span class="hp" id="m39230"><div class="hpHeader">English Electric Canberra</div><div class="hpContent">The English Electric Canberra is a first-generation jet-powered light bomber manufactured in large numbers through the 1950s. It proved to be highly adaptable, serving in such varied roles for tactical bombing, photographic, electronic, and meteorological reconnaissance...</div></span> bombers, the <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Cessna_Skymaster">Cessna Skymaster</a><span class="hp" id="m13916"><div class="hpHeader">Cessna Skymaster</div><div class="hpContent">The Cessna Skymaster is a United States twin-engine civil utility aircraft built in a push-pull configuration. Its engines are mounted in the nose and rear of its pod-style fuselage. Twin booms extend aft of the wings to the vertical stabilizers, with the rear engine between them. The horizontal...</div></span> as well as <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/A%C3%A9rospatiale_Alouette_III">Aérospatiale Alouette III</a><span class="hp" id="m63287"><div class="hpHeader">Aérospatiale Alouette III</div><div class="hpContent">The Aérospatiale Alouette III is a single-engine, light utility helicopter developed by Sud Aviation and later manufactured by Aérospatiale of France. The Alouette III is the successor to the Alouette II, being larger and having more seating...</div></span> helicopters until they were supplemented by the Augusta Bell 205. Very late in the war, the Rhodesian forces were able to obtain and use a very few smuggled in Bell <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/UH-1_Iroquois">UH-1 Iroquois</a><span class="hp" id="m12659"><div class="hpHeader">UH-1 Iroquois</div><div class="hpContent">The UH-1 Iroquois is a military helicopter powered by a single, turboshaft engine, with a two-bladed main rotor and tail rotor. The helicopter was developed by Bell Helicopter to meet the United States Army's requirement for a medical evacuation and utility helicopter in 1952, and first flew on 20...</div></span> helicopters.<br />
<br />
At the beginning of the war much of Rhodesia's military hardware was of British and <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Commonwealth_of_Nations">Commonwealth</a><span class="hp" id="m87344" style="display: none; top: 2348px;"><div class="hpHeader">Commonwealth of Nations</div><div class="hpContent"><div class="hpImage" id="i87344"><img src="http://image.absoluteastronomy.com/images/topicthumbs/c/co/commonwealth_of_nations.gif" /></div>The Commonwealth of Nations, normally referred to as the Commonwealth and previously as the British Commonwealth, is an intergovernmental organisation of fifty-four independent member states...</div></span> origin but during the course of the conflict new equipment such as armoured cars were procured from the South Africans. Several captured Soviet Bloc <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/T-55">T-55</a><span class="hp" id="m36716"><div class="hpHeader">T-55</div><div class="hpContent">The T-54 and T-55 tanks were a series of main battle tanks designed in the Soviet Union. The first T-54 prototype appeared in March 1945, just before the end of the Second World War. The T-54 entered full production in 1947 and became the main tank for armored units of the Soviet Army, armies of...</div></span> tanks were provided to Rhodesia by the South Africans, though only in the last year of the war. The Rhodesians also produced some of their own armoured vehicles, including unlicensed copies of the <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Mercedes-Benz">Mercedes-Benz</a><span class="hp" id="m11402"><div class="hpHeader">Mercedes-Benz</div><div class="hpContent">Mercedes-Benz is a German manufacturer of luxury automobiles, buses, coaches, and trucks. It is currently a division of the parent company, Daimler AG , after previously being owned by Daimler-Benz...</div></span> UR-416. The means with which the Rhodesian's procured weaponry meant that the arms embargoes had little effect on the Rhodesian war effort. During the course of the war most white citizens carried personal weapons, and it was not unusual to see white housewives carrying <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Submachine_gun">submachine gun</a><span class="hp" id="m60773"><div class="hpHeader">Submachine gun</div><div class="hpContent">A submachine gun is an automatic carbine, designed to fire pistol cartridges. It combines the automatic fire of a machine gun with the cartridge of a pistol...</div></span>s. A <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Siege_mentality">siege mentality</a><span class="hp" id="m10145"><div class="hpHeader">Siege mentality</div><div class="hpContent">Siege mentality is a shared feeling of victimization and defensiveness. It is a state of mind whereby one believes that one is being constantly attacked, oppressed, or isolated and make one frightened of surrounding people. This can cause a state of being overly fearful leading to a defensive...</div></span> set in and all civilian transport had to be escorted in convoys for safety against ambushes. Farms and villages in rural areas were frequently attacked.<br />
<br />
The Rhodesian government divided the nation into eight geographical operational areas: North West Border (Operation Ranger), Eastern Border (Operation Thrasher), North East Border (Operation Hurricane), South East Border (Operation Repulse), Midlands (Operation Grapple), Kariba (Operation Splinter), Matabeleland (Operation Tangent), <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Harare">Salisbury</a><span class="hp" id="m39409"><div class="hpHeader">Harare</div><div class="hpContent">Harare is the capital of Zimbabwe. It has an estimated population of 1,600,000, with 2,800,000 in its metropolitan area . Administratively, Harare is an independent city equivalent to a province. It is Zimbabwe's largest city and its administrative, commercial, and communications centre...</div></span> and District ("SALOPS").<br />
<h3>Rebel/Guerilla Forces</h3><br />
<div class="thumb tright"><img src="http://image.absoluteastronomy.com/images/encyclopediaimages/z/zi/zimbabwe-medal.jpg" /></div>The two major armed groups campaigning against <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Ian_Smith">Ian Smith</a><span class="hp" id="m14095"><div class="hpHeader">Ian Smith</div><div class="hpContent">----Ian Douglas Smith GCLM ID served as the Prime Minister of the British self-governing colony of Southern Rhodesia from 13 April 1964 to 11 November 1965...</div></span>'s government were: <br />
<ul><li>ZANLA (Zimbabwe National Liberation Army), the armed wing of ZANU (<a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Zimbabwe_African_National_Union">Zimbabwe African National Union</a><span class="hp" id="m38152"><div class="hpHeader">Zimbabwe African National Union</div><div class="hpContent">The Zimbabwe African National Union was a militant organization that fought against white minority rule in Rhodesia, formed as a split from the Zimbabwe African People's Union...</div></span>).</li>
<li><a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/ZIPRA">ZIPRA</a><span class="hp" id="m12838"><div class="hpHeader">ZIPRA</div><div class="hpContent">Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army was the armed wing of the Zimbabwe African People's Union, a political party in Rhodesia. It participated in the Second Chimurenga against white minority rule in the former Rhodesia....</div></span> (Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army), the armed wing of ZAPU (<a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Zimbabwe_African_People%27s_Union">Zimbabwe African People's Union</a><span class="hp" id="m87523"><div class="hpHeader">Zimbabwe African People's Union</div><div class="hpContent">The Zimbabwe African People's Union is a once militant organization and political party that fought for the national liberation of Zimbabwe from its founding in 1961 until it merged with the Zimbabwe African National Union in December 1987....</div></span>).</li>
</ul><br />
<br />
The fighting was largely rural, with both movements attempting to secure peasant support and to recruit fighters while harassing the administration and the white civilians. Unlike the town-dwellers, rural whites faced danger and many were killed but in 1979 there were still 6,000 white farmers. They were vulnerable every time they left the homestead.<br />
<h4>ZANLA</h4><br />
<br />
ZANLA was the armed wing of ZANU. The organization also had strong links with <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Mozambique">Mozambique</a><span class="hp" id="m62209"><div class="hpHeader">Mozambique</div><div class="hpContent">Mozambique, officially the Republic of Mozambique , is a country in southeastern Africa bordered by the Indian Ocean to the east, Tanzania to the north, Malawi and Zambia to the northwest, Zimbabwe to the west and Swaziland and South Africa to the southwest.The area was explored by Vasco da Gama in...</div></span>'s independence movement, FRELIMO. ZANLA, in the end, was present on a more or less permanent basis in over half the country, as evidenced by the location of the demobilisation bases at the end of the war, which were in every province except <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Matabeleland_North">Matabeleland North</a><span class="hp" id="m60952"><div class="hpHeader">Matabeleland North</div><div class="hpContent">Matabeleland North is a province in western Zimbabwe. It borders the provinces of Midlands and Mashonaland West to the east and northeast respectively, and the province of Matabeleland South and the city of Bulawayo to the south. Its northern border is defined by the Zambezi river, while its...</div></span>. In addition, they were fighting a civil war against ZIPRA, despite the formation of a joint front by their political parties after 1978. It was ZANLA's intention to occupy the ground, supplant the administration in rural areas, and then mount the final conventional campaign. ZANLA concentrated on the politicisation of the rural areas using force, persuasion, ties of kinship and collaboration with spirit mediums.<br />
<br />
ZANLA tried to paralyze the Rhodesian effort and economy by planting Soviet anti-tank <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Land_mine">land mine</a><span class="hp" id="m35638"><div class="hpHeader">Land mine</div><div class="hpContent">A land mine is usually a victim-triggered explosive device which is intended to damage its target via blast and/or fragments....</div></span>s on the roads. From 1972 to 1980 there were 2,504 vehicle detonations of land mines (mainly Soviet TM46s), killing 632 people and injuring 4,410. The mining of roads increased as the war intensified; indeed the increase from 1978 (894 mines or 2.44 mines were detonated or recovered a day) to 1979 (2,089 mines or 5.72 mines a day) was 233.7%. In response, the Rhodesians co-operated with the South Africans to develop a range of mine protected vehicles. They began by replacing air in tyres with water which absorbed some of the blast and reduced the heat of the explosion. Initially, they protected the bodies with steel deflector plates, sandbags and mine conveyor belting. Later, purpose built vehicles with V shaped blast hulls dispersed the blast and deaths in such vehicles became unusual events. <br />
<h4>ZIPRA</h4><br />
<br />
ZIPRA was the anti-government force based around the Ndebele ethnicity, led by <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Joshua_Nkomo">Joshua Nkomo</a><span class="hp" id="m33125"><div class="hpHeader">Joshua Nkomo</div><div class="hpContent">Joshua Mqabuko Nyongolo Nkomo was the leader and founder of the Zimbabwe African People's Union and a member of the Kalanga tribe. He was affectionately known in Zimbabwe as Father Zimbabwe, Umdala Wethu, Umafukufuku or Chibwechitedza...</div></span>, and the ZAPU political organization. In contrast to ZANLA's <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Mozambique">Mozambique</a><span class="hp" id="m7811" style="display: none; top: 3152px;"><div class="hpHeader">Mozambique</div><div class="hpContent"><div class="hpImage" id="i7811"><img src="http://image.absoluteastronomy.com/images/topicthumbs/m/mo/mozambique.gif" /></div>Mozambique, officially the Republic of Mozambique , is a country in southeastern Africa bordered by the Indian Ocean to the east, Tanzania to the north, Malawi and Zambia to the northwest, Zimbabwe to the west and Swaziland and South Africa to the southwest.The area was explored by Vasco da Gama in...</div></span> links, Nkomo's ZIPRA was more oriented towards <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Zambia">Zambia</a><span class="hp" id="m82496"><div class="hpHeader">Zambia</div><div class="hpContent">The Republic of Zambia is a landlocked country in Southern Africa. The neighbouring countries are the Democratic Republic of the Congo to the north, Tanzania to the north-east, Malawi to the east, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Botswana, and Namibia to the south, and Angola to the west. The capital city is...</div></span> for local bases. However, this was not always with full Zambian government support, and by 1979 ZIPRA's forces, combined with <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/African_National_Congress">ANC</a><span class="hp" id="m57182"><div class="hpHeader">African National Congress</div><div class="hpContent">The African National Congress has been South Africa's governing left-wing party, supported by its tripartite alliance with the Congress of South African Trade Unions and the South African Communist Party , since the establishment of non-racial democracy in April 1994. It defines itself as a...</div></span> and SWAPO forces in Zambia, was a major threat to Zambia's internal security. Because ZAPU's political strategy relied more heavily on negotiations than armed force, ZIPRA did not grow as quickly or elaborately as ZANLA, but by 1979 it had an estimated 20,000 combatants, almost all based in camps around Lusaka, Zambia.<br />
<br />
<a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/ZIPRA">ZIPRA</a><span class="hp" id="m29355"><div class="hpHeader">ZIPRA</div><div class="hpContent">Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army was the armed wing of the Zimbabwe African People's Union, a political party in Rhodesia. It participated in the Second Chimurenga against white minority rule in the former Rhodesia....</div></span> was responsible for two attacks on civilian <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Air_Rhodesia_Flight_RH825">Air Rhodesia Viscount airplanes</a><span class="hp" id="m78726"><div class="hpHeader">Air Rhodesia Flight RH825</div><div class="hpContent">Air Rhodesia Flight 825 was a scheduled flight from Kariba to Salisbury that was shot down on September 3, 1978 by ZIPRA guerillas using a SA-7 surface-to-air missile-Incident:...</div></span>, using a <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Strela_2">SAM-7</a><span class="hp" id="m90216"><div class="hpHeader">Strela 2</div><div class="hpContent">The 9K32 “Strela-2” is a man-portable, shoulder-fired, low-altitude surface-to-air missile system with a high explosive warhead and passive infrared homing guidance...</div></span> <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Surface-to-air_missile">surface-to-air missile</a><span class="hp" id="m64902"><div class="hpHeader">Surface-to-air missile</div><div class="hpContent">A Surface to Air Missile or ground-to-air missile is a missile designed to be launched from the ground to destroy aircraft. Development of surface-to-air missiles began in Nazi Germany during late World War II with missiles like the Wasserfall. It is one part of the anti-aircraft system...</div></span>s. Ten out of the eighteen civilians on board who survived the first crash were subsequently killed by the ZIPRA militants. Nkomo later spoke to the <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/BBC">BBC</a><span class="hp" id="m14274"><div class="hpHeader">BBC</div><div class="hpContent">The British Broadcasting Corporation is the largest broadcasting organisation in the world. The BBC is an autonomous public service broadcaster that operates under a Royal Charter...</div></span> of the attack in a way some considered gloating. In his memoirs, <i>Story of My Life</i> (1985), Nkomo expressed regret for the shooting down of both planes, claiming ZIPRA intelligence believed the plane was carrying General Walls and his aides.<br />
<br />
ZIPRA took advice from its Soviet instructors in formulating its version of popular revolution and its strategy for taking over the country. There were about 1.400 Soviets, 700 East German and 500 Cuban instructors deployed to the area. On the advice of the Soviets, ZIPRA built up its conventional forces, and motorised with Soviet armored vehicles and a number of small airplanes, in Zambia. ZIPRA's (i.e. ZAPU's) intention was to allow ZANLA to bring the Rhodesian forces to the point of defeat, and then to take the victory from the much lighter forces of ZANLA and the essentially defeated Rhodesians. ZIPRA kept a light presence within Rhodesia, reconnoitering, keeping contact with the peasants and sometimes skirmishing with ZANLA. ZIPRA's conventional threat actually distracted the Rhodesians from fighting ZANLA to an extent. By the late 1970s, ZIPRA had developed a strategy known as <i>Storming the Heavens</i> to launch a conventional invasion from Zambia, supported by a limited number of armoured vehicles and light aircraft. An operation by the Rhodesian armed forces to destroy a ZIPRA base near Livingstone in Zambia was never launched.<br />
<br />
The ZAPU/ZIPRA strategy for taking over Zimbabwe proved unsuccessful. In any event, the transfer of power to black nationalists took place not by the military take-over expected by ZAPU/ZIPRA, but by a peaceful and internationally supervised election. Rhodesia reverted briefly to real British rule, and a general election took place in early 1980. This election was supervised both by the UK and international forces. Robert Mugabe (of ZANLA/ZANU) won this election, being the only major competitor for the vote of the majority ethnicity, the Shona. Once in power, Mugabe was internationally recognised as Zimbabwe's leader and was installed as head of government, as well as having the backing of the overwhelming majority ethnic group. He was therefore able to quickly and irreversibly consolidate his power in Zimbabwe, forcing ZAPU, and therefore ZIPRA which was ZAPU's army, to give up hope of taking over the country in the place of ZANU/ZANLA.<br />
<h3>Civil disobedience (1957–1964)</h3><br />
In September 1956, bus fares in <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Harare">Salisbury</a><span class="hp" id="m88959"><div class="hpHeader">Harare</div><div class="hpContent">Harare is the capital of Zimbabwe. It has an estimated population of 1,600,000, with 2,800,000 in its metropolitan area . Administratively, Harare is an independent city equivalent to a province. It is Zimbabwe's largest city and its administrative, commercial, and communications centre...</div></span> were raised to the point at which workers were spending between 18% and 30% of their earnings on transportation. The <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/City_Youth_League">City Youth League</a><span class="hp" id="m63645" style="display: none; top: 3677px;"><div class="hpHeader">City Youth League</div><div class="hpContent">The City Youth League, later known as the African Youth League, is a defunct organization that participated in nonviolent resistance against British rule in Rhodesia from its founding in August 1955 until it merged with the old SRANC on September 12, 1957, becoming the new Southern Rhodesia African...</div></span> responded by boycotting the United Transport Company's buses and succeeded in preventing the price change. On 12 September 1957 members of the Youth League and the defunct ANC formed the <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Southern_Rhodesia_African_National_Congress">Southern Rhodesia African National Congress</a><span class="hp" id="m80162" style="display: none; top: 3702px;"><div class="hpHeader">Southern Rhodesia African National Congress</div><div class="hpContent">The Southern Rhodesia African National Congress was a short lived political party of Black Africans in what is now modern Zimbabwe, then Southern Rhodesia. Formed in 1957, the party lasted until its banning in 1960 by the white-minority government....</div></span>, led by Joshua Nkomo. The <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Edgar_Whitehead">Whitehead administration</a><span class="hp" id="m44794"><div class="hpHeader">Edgar Whitehead</div><div class="hpContent">Sir Edgar Cuthbert Fremantle Whitehead, OBE, was a Rhodesian politician. He was a longstanding member of the Southern Rhodesia Legislative Assembly, although his career was interrupted by other posts and by illness. In particular he had poor eyesight, and wore very thick glasses, and later...</div></span> banned the SRANC in 1959 and arrested 307 leaders, excluding Nkomo who was out of the country, on 29 February in <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Operation_Sunrise">Operation Sunrise</a><span class="hp" id="m91651"><div class="hpHeader">Operation Sunrise</div><div class="hpContent">Operation Sunrise may refer to:*Operation Sunrise , a 1962 test of the Strategic Hamlet Program*Operation Crossword or Operation Sunrise, a series of secret negotiations conducted in March 1945 in Switzerland...</div></span>.<br />
<br />
Nkomo, Mugabe, <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Herbert_Chitepo">Herbert Chitepo</a><span class="hp" id="m15710"><div class="hpHeader">Herbert Chitepo</div><div class="hpContent">Herbert Wiltshire Chitepo led the Zimbabwe African National Union until the Central Intelligence Organization of Rhodesia assassinated him in March 1975....</div></span>, and <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Ndabaningi_Sithole">Ndabaningi Sithole</a><span class="hp" id="m65081" style="display: none; top: 3764px;"><div class="hpHeader">Ndabaningi Sithole</div><div class="hpContent">Ndabaningi Sithole founded the Zimbabwe African National Union, a militant organization that opposed the government of Rhodesia, in July 1963. A member of the Ndau ethnic group, he also worked as a Methodist minister. He spent 10 years in prison after the government banned ZANU...</div></span> established the National Democratic Party in January 1960. Nkomo became its leader in October. An NDP delegation headed by Nkomo attended the constitutional conference in January 1961. While Nkomo initially supported the constitution, he reversed his position after other NDP leaders disagreed. The government banned the NDP in December 1961 and arrested NDP leaders, excluding Nkomo who, again, was out of the country. Nkomo formed the <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Zimbabwe_African_People%27s_Union">Zimbabwe African People's Union</a><span class="hp" id="m63824" style="display: none; top: 3827px;"><div class="hpHeader">Zimbabwe African People's Union</div><div class="hpContent">The Zimbabwe African People's Union is a once militant organization and political party that fought for the national liberation of Zimbabwe from its founding in 1961 until it merged with the Zimbabwe African National Union in December 1987....</div></span> which the Whitehead administration banned in September 1962.<br />
<br />
The <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/United_Federal_Party">United Federal Party</a><span class="hp" id="m87881"><div class="hpHeader">United Federal Party</div><div class="hpContent">The United Federal Party, previously known as the United Party and the United Rhodesia Party, was one of Southern Rhodesia's most successful political parties, and governed the country for over 30 years...</div></span>, campaigning on majority rule, lost overwhelmingly in the 1962 general election to the more conservative <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Rhodesian_Front">Rhodesian Front</a><span class="hp" id="m8169"><div class="hpHeader">Rhodesian Front</div><div class="hpContent">The Rhodesian Front was a political party in Southern Rhodesia when the country was under white minority rule. Led first by Winston Field, and, from 1964, by Ian Smith, the Rhodesian Front was the successor to the Dominion Party, which was the main opposition party in Southern Rhodesia during the...</div></span>. Nkomo, legally barred from forming a new political party, moved ZAPU's headquarters to <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Dar_es_Salaam">Dar es Salaam</a><span class="hp" id="m81597"><div class="hpHeader">Dar es Salaam</div><div class="hpContent">Dar es Salaam , formerly Mzizima, is the largest city in Tanzania. It is also the country's richest city and a regionally important economic centre...</div></span>, <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Tanzania">Tanzania</a><span class="hp" id="m55027"><div class="hpHeader">Tanzania</div><div class="hpContent">The United Republic of Tanzania is a nation in central East Africa bordered by Kenya and Uganda to the north, Rwanda, Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo to the west, and Zambia, Malawi and Mozambique to the south. The country's eastern borders lie on the Indian Ocean.The United...</div></span>.<br />
<br />
In July 1963 Nkomo suspended <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Ndabaningi_Sithole">Ndabaningi Sithole</a><span class="hp" id="m53770" style="display: none; top: 3927px;"><div class="hpHeader">Ndabaningi Sithole</div><div class="hpContent">Ndabaningi Sithole founded the Zimbabwe African National Union, a militant organization that opposed the government of Rhodesia, in July 1963. A member of the Ndau ethnic group, he also worked as a Methodist minister. He spent 10 years in prison after the government banned ZANU...</div></span>, <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Robert_Mugabe">Robert Mugabe</a><span class="hp" id="m28456"><div class="hpHeader">Robert Mugabe</div><div class="hpContent">Robert Gabriel Mugabe is the second and current President of Zimbabwe. One of the leaders of the liberation movement against white-minority rule, he was elected into power as the head of government since 1980, as Prime Minister from 1980 to 1987, and as the first executive head of state since...</div></span>, <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Leopold_Takawira">Leopold Takawira</a><span class="hp" id="m27199"><div class="hpHeader">Leopold Takawira</div><div class="hpContent">Leopold Takawira served as the Vice President of the Zimbabwe African National Union after supporting the National Democratic Party and later the Zimbabwe African People's Union.Leopold Takawira was also known by his Mhazi to totem as 'Shumba yeChirumanzi'Takawira was born at Chirumanzi, Victoria...</div></span>, and <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Washington_Malianga">Washington Malianga</a><span class="hp" id="m629"><div class="hpHeader">Washington Malianga</div><div class="hpContent">Washington Malianga is one of several leaders of the Zimbabwe African People's Union who left ZAPU in 1963 and founded the Zimbabwe African National Union. ZAPU leader Joshua Nkomo suspended their membership due to their opposition to his continued leadership. The other leaders were Ndabaningi...</div></span> for their opposition to his continued leadership of ZAPU. On 8 August they announced the establishment of the <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Zimbabwe_African_National_Union">Zimbabwe African National Union</a><span class="hp" id="m50000"><div class="hpHeader">Zimbabwe African National Union</div><div class="hpContent">The Zimbabwe African National Union was a militant organization that fought against white minority rule in Rhodesia, formed as a split from the Zimbabwe African People's Union...</div></span>. ZANU members formed a militant wing, the <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Zimbabwe_African_National_Liberation_Army">Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army</a><span class="hp" id="m74057"><div class="hpHeader">Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army</div><div class="hpContent">Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army was the military wing of the Zimbabwe African National Union, a militant African nationalist organization, and participated in the Rhodesian Bush War against white minority rule in Rhodesia....</div></span>, and sent ZANLA members to the People's Republic of China for training.<br />
<br />
In July 1964 ZANLA forces assassinated a Rhodesian Front official and the war began.<br />
<h3>First phase (1964–1972)</h3><br />
In July 1964 ZANLA ambushed and killed a white civilian, Petrus Oberholtzer, in the first act of war to occur in Rhodesia since the 1890s. The killing had a lasting effect on the small, close-knit white community, even though it was an isolated incident. The Smith administration subsequently moved to detain the ZANU and ZAPU political leadership in August 1964. The major political leaders imprisoned were <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Ndabaningi_Sithole">Ndabaningi Sithole</a><span class="hp" id="m47486" style="display: none; top: 4102px;"><div class="hpHeader">Ndabaningi Sithole</div><div class="hpContent">Ndabaningi Sithole founded the Zimbabwe African National Union, a militant organization that opposed the government of Rhodesia, in July 1963. A member of the Ndau ethnic group, he also worked as a Methodist minister. He spent 10 years in prison after the government banned ZANU...</div></span>, <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Leopold_Takawira">Leopold Takawira</a><span class="hp" id="m96857"><div class="hpHeader">Leopold Takawira</div><div class="hpContent">Leopold Takawira served as the Vice President of the Zimbabwe African National Union after supporting the National Democratic Party and later the Zimbabwe African People's Union.Leopold Takawira was also known by his Mhazi to totem as 'Shumba yeChirumanzi'Takawira was born at Chirumanzi, Victoria...</div></span>, <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Edgar_Tekere">Edgar Tekere</a><span class="hp" id="m46230"><div class="hpHeader">Edgar Tekere</div><div class="hpContent">Edgar Zivanai Tekere is a Zimbabwean politician. He was a president of the Zimbabwe African National Union who organised the party during the Lancaster House talks and served in government before his popularity as a potential rival to Robert Mugabe caused their estrangement...</div></span>, <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Enos_Nkala">Enos Nkala</a><span class="hp" id="m19659"><div class="hpHeader">Enos Nkala</div><div class="hpContent">Enos Nkala is one of the founders of the Zimbabwe African National Union. During the war, he served on the ZANU high command, or Dare reChimurenga. He was detained by the Rhodesian government at Gonakudzingwa....</div></span>, <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Maurice_Nyagumbo">Maurice Nyagumbo</a><span class="hp" id="m65260"><div class="hpHeader">Maurice Nyagumbo</div><div class="hpContent">Tapfumaneyi Maurice Nyagumbo was a Zimbabwean politician.Working in South Africa in the 1940s, he joined the South African Communist Party. He spent most of the years 1957 to 1979 in detention in Southern Rhodesia. During this time he wrote an autobiography, With the People...</div></span>. The remaining military leaders of ZANLA, consisted of Dare ReChimurenga, the barrister <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Herbert_Chitepo">Herbert Chitepo</a><span class="hp" id="m89317"><div class="hpHeader">Herbert Chitepo</div><div class="hpContent">Herbert Wiltshire Chitepo led the Zimbabwe African National Union until the Central Intelligence Organization of Rhodesia assassinated him in March 1975....</div></span>, and <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Josiah_Tongogara">Josiah Tongogara</a><span class="hp" id="m38689"><div class="hpHeader">Josiah Tongogara</div><div class="hpContent">Josiah Magama Tongogara was a commander of the ZANLA guerrilla army in Rhodesia. He attended the Lancaster House conference that led to Zimbabwe's independence and the end of white minority rule...</div></span>. Operating from bases in <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Zambia">Zambia</a><span class="hp" id="m12118" style="display: none; top: 4132px;"><div class="hpHeader">Zambia</div><div class="hpContent"><div class="hpImage" id="i12118"><img src="http://image.absoluteastronomy.com/images/topicthumbs/z/za/zambia.gif" /></div>The Republic of Zambia is a landlocked country in Southern Africa. The neighbouring countries are the Democratic Republic of the Congo to the north, Tanzania to the north-east, Malawi to the east, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Botswana, and Namibia to the south, and Angola to the west. The capital city is...</div></span> and later from <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Mozambique">Mozambique</a><span class="hp" id="m36176"><div class="hpHeader">Mozambique</div><div class="hpContent">Mozambique, officially the Republic of Mozambique , is a country in southeastern Africa bordered by the Indian Ocean to the east, Tanzania to the north, Malawi and Zambia to the northwest, Zimbabwe to the west and Swaziland and South Africa to the southwest.The area was explored by Vasco da Gama in...</div></span>, militants subsequently began launching attacks against Rhodesia.<br />
<br />
The conflict intensified after the <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Unilateral_Declaration_of_Independence_%28Rhodesia%29">Unilateral Declaration of Independence</a><span class="hp" id="m85547" style="display: none; top: 4177px;"><div class="hpHeader">Unilateral Declaration of Independence (Rhodesia)</div><div class="hpContent"><div class="hpImage" id="i85547"><img src="http://image.absoluteastronomy.com/images/topicthumbs/u/un/unilateral_declaration_of_independence_%28rhodesia%29.gif" /></div>The Unilateral Declaration of Independence of Rhodesia from the United Kingdom was signed on November 11, 1965, by the administration of Ian Smith, whose Rhodesian Front party opposed black majority rule in the then British colony. Although it declared independence from the United Kingdom it...</div></span> from <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/United_Kingdom">Britain</a><span class="hp" id="m33662"><div class="hpHeader">United Kingdom</div><div class="hpContent">The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern IrelandIn the United Kingdom and Dependencies, other languages have been officially recognised as legitimate autochthonous languages under the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages...</div></span> on 11 November 1965. <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/International_sanctions">Sanctions</a><span class="hp" id="m83033"><div class="hpHeader">International sanctions</div><div class="hpContent">International sanctions are actions taken by countries against others for political reasons, either unilaterally or multilaterally.There are several types of sanctions....</div></span> were implemented by the British government after UDI, and member states of the <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/United_Nations">United Nations</a><span class="hp" id="m7091"><div class="hpHeader">United Nations</div><div class="hpContent">The United Nations Organization or simply United Nations is an international organization whose stated aims are facilitating cooperation in international law, international security, economic development, social progress, human rights, and the achieving of world peace...</div></span> endorsed the British <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Embargo">embargo</a><span class="hp" id="m31149"><div class="hpHeader">Embargo</div><div class="hpContent">An embargo is the partial or complete prohibition of the movement of merchant ships into or out of a country's ports, in order to isolate it. Embargoes are considered strong diplomatic measures imposed in an effort, by the embargo-imposing-country, to elicit a given national-interest result from...</div></span>. The embargo meant the Rhodesians were hampered by a lack of modern equipment but used other means to receive vital war supplies such as receiving <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Petroleum">oil</a><span class="hp" id="m55206"><div class="hpHeader">Petroleum</div><div class="hpContent">Petroleum or crude oil is a naturally occurring, toxic, flammable liquid consisting of a complex mixture of hydrocarbons of various molecular weights, and other organic compounds, that are found in geologic formations beneath the Earth's surface.The term petroleum was first used in the treatise De...</div></span>, munitions, and arms via the government of apartheid-era South Africa. War material was also obtained through elaborate international smuggling schemes, domestic production, and equipment captured from infiltrating enemy combatants.<br />
<br />
Five months later on 28 April 1966, the Rhodesian Security Forces engaged militants in <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Chinhoyi">Sinoia</a><span class="hp" id="m2064"><div class="hpHeader">Chinhoyi</div><div class="hpContent">Chinhoyi is a large provincial town and is the capital of Mashonaland West province in Zimbabwe. Sinoia was established in 1906 as a group settlement scheme by a wealthy Italian called Lieutenant Margherito Guidotti who encouraged 10 Italian families to settle there.- Overview :Chinhoyi is located...</div></span>, during the first major engagement of the war. Seven ZANLA men were killed during the fighting and in retaliation the survivors killed two civilians at their farm near Hartley three weeks later.<br />
<br />
Prior to the collapse of Portuguese rule in Mozambique in 1974-75, the Rhodesians were able to defend their frontier with Zambia with relative ease and prevent many guerrilla incursions. The Rhodesians were able to set up a strong defensive line along the Zambezi River running from <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Lake_Kariba">Lake Kariba</a><span class="hp" id="m99550" style="display: none; top: 4377px;"><div class="hpHeader">Lake Kariba</div><div class="hpContent"><div class="hpImage" id="i99550"><img src="http://image.absoluteastronomy.com/images/topicthumbs/l/la/lake_kariba.gif" /></div>By volume, Lake Kariba is the largest artificial lake and reservoir in the world. It is located on the Zambezi river, about halfway between the river's source and mouth, about 1300 kilometers upstream from the Indian Ocean, and lies along the border between Zambia and Zimbabwe...</div></span> to the Mozambique border. Here 30-man camps were etablished at 8 kilometer intervals supported by mobile rapid reaction units. Between 1966 and 1970 these defences accounted for 175 insurgents killed for the loss of 14 defenders.<br />
<br />
In the latter months of 1971, the black nationalist factions united and formed a coalition which became known as the 'Joint Guerrilla Alliance to Overthrow the Government.' Regardless, the conflict continued at a low level until 21 December 1972 when ZANLA attacked Altena Farm in north-east Rhodesia. In response the Rhodesians moved to hit their enemy in their foreign camps and staging areas before they could infiltrate into Rhodesia.<br />
<br />
Secret cross-border operations by the Special Air Service began in the mid-1960s, with Rhodesian Security Forces already engaging in hot-pursuits into Mozambique. However three weeks after the attack on Altena Farm, ZANLA killed two civilians and abducted another who was subsequently taken into Mozambique and then Tanzania. In response SAS troops were inserted into Mozambique with the approval of the Portuguese administration, in the first officially sanctioned external operation. The Rhodesian government began authorizing an increasing number of external operations.<br />
<br />
In the first phase of the conflict (up until the end of 1972), Rhodesia's political and military position appeared to be a strong one. Nationalist guerrillas had been unable to make serious military inroads against Rhodesia and Britain's efforts to isolate Rhodesia economically had not forced major compromises from the Smith Government. Indeed, late in 1971 the British and Rhodesian Governments had negotiated a compromise political settlement which would have bowed to the Smith Government's agenda of postponing majority rule into the indefinite future. Nevertheless, when it was found that such a delayed approach to majority rule was completely unacceptable to most of Rhodesia's African population, the deal fell apart. It would take the collapse of Portuguese rule in Mozambique to create new military and political pressures on the Rhodesian Government to accept the principle of immediate majority rule.<br />
<h3>Second phase (1972–1979)</h3><br />
For Rhodesian Army counter-insurgency "Fireforce" tactics see: <br />
<br />
The black nationalists continued to operate from secluded bases in neighbouring <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Zambia">Zambia</a><span class="hp" id="m71722"><div class="hpHeader">Zambia</div><div class="hpContent">The Republic of Zambia is a landlocked country in Southern Africa. The neighbouring countries are the Democratic Republic of the Congo to the north, Tanzania to the north-east, Malawi to the east, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Botswana, and Namibia to the south, and Angola to the west. The capital city is...</div></span> and from FRELIMO-controlled areas in the Portuguese colony of <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Mozambique">Mozambique</a><span class="hp" id="m94523"><div class="hpHeader">Mozambique</div><div class="hpContent">Mozambique, officially the Republic of Mozambique , is a country in southeastern Africa bordered by the Indian Ocean to the east, Tanzania to the north, Malawi and Zambia to the northwest, Zimbabwe to the west and Swaziland and South Africa to the southwest.The area was explored by Vasco da Gama in...</div></span>, making periodic raids into <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Rhodesia">Rhodesia</a><span class="hp" id="m43895"><div class="hpHeader">Rhodesia</div><div class="hpContent">Rhodesia , officially the Republic of Rhodesia from 1970, was an unrecognised state located in Southern Africa that existed between 1965 and 1979 following its Unilateral Declaration of Independence from the United Kingdom on 11 November 1965...</div></span>. In April 1974, a left wing coup in Portugal heralded the coming end of colonial rule in Mozambique. FRELIMO formed a transitional government within months, and officially took over the country in June 1975. Such events proved beneficial to ZANLA but disastrous for the Rhodesians, adding an additional 800 miles of hostile border. Indeed with the demise of the Portuguese empire Ian Smith realised Rhodesia was surrounded on three sides by hostile nations and declared a formal state of emergency. Soon Mozambique closed its border, however Rhodesian forces continued to cross the border in "hot pursuit" raids, attacking the nationalists and their training camps.<br />
<br />
By 1976 it was clear that an indefinite postponment of majority rule, which had been the cornerstone of the Smith Government's strategy since UDI, was no longer viable. Late in 1976, Ian Smith accepted the basic elements of the compromise proposals made by US Secretary of State <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Henry_Kissinger">Henry Kissinger</a><span class="hp" id="m41382"><div class="hpHeader">Henry Kissinger</div><div class="hpContent">Henry Alfred Kissinger is a German-born American political scientist, diplomat, and recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize. He served as National Security Advisor and later concurrently as Secretary of State in the administrations of Presidents Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford...</div></span> to introduce majority rule within two years. The Smith Government then sought to negotiate an acceptable settlement with moderate black leaders, while retaining strong white influence in key areas. The Rhodesian military, in turn, had the job of eroding the rising military strength of the ZANLA and ZIPRA to the greatest extent possible in order "buy time" for an acceptable political settlement to be reached.<br />
<br />
The Rhodesian Security Forces called up part-time soldiers in preparation for a major counter-offensive on 2 May 1976. In August 1976, Rhodesian <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Selous_Scouts">Selous Scouts</a><span class="hp" id="m90753"><div class="hpHeader">Selous Scouts</div><div class="hpContent">The Selous Scouts was the name given to a special forces regiment of the Rhodesian Army, which operated from 1973 until the introduction of majority rule in 1980. It was named after British explorer Frederick Courteney Selous , and their motto was pamwe chete, which, in the Shona, roughly means...</div></span> destroyed a camp at Nyadzonya in Mozambique containing many hundreds of trainees, which they claimed was a military target. The Rhodesians reported more than 1,000 insurgents killed when they were caught by surprise on the parade ground , while the nationalists claimed the site was a refugee camp. The Rhodesians also operated into <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Zambia">Zambia</a><span class="hp" id="m14811"><div class="hpHeader">Zambia</div><div class="hpContent">The Republic of Zambia is a landlocked country in Southern Africa. The neighbouring countries are the Democratic Republic of the Congo to the north, Tanzania to the north-east, Malawi to the east, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Botswana, and Namibia to the south, and Angola to the west. The capital city is...</div></span> after Nkomo's nationalists shot down two unarmed <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Vickers_Viscount">Vickers Viscount</a><span class="hp" id="m38868"><div class="hpHeader">Vickers Viscount</div><div class="hpContent">The Viscount was a British medium-range turboprop airliner first flown in 1948 by Vickers-Armstrongs, making it the first such aircraft to enter service in the world...</div></span> civilian airliners with Soviet supplied SAM-7 heat-seeking missiles. In the first incident, <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Air_Rhodesia_Flight_RH825">Air Rhodesia Flight RH825</a><span class="hp" id="m36355"><div class="hpHeader">Air Rhodesia Flight RH825</div><div class="hpContent">Air Rhodesia Flight 825 was a scheduled flight from Kariba to Salisbury that was shot down on September 3, 1978 by ZIPRA guerillas using a SA-7 surface-to-air missile-Incident:...</div></span>, ten passengers who survived the crash landing were shot and killed at the crash scene. Militants bombed a railroad bridge over Matetsi River on 7 October 1976 when a train carrying ore passed over.<br />
As the conflict intensified, the United States and <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/United_Kingdom">Britain</a><span class="hp" id="m60412"><div class="hpHeader">United Kingdom</div><div class="hpContent">The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern IrelandIn the United Kingdom and Dependencies, other languages have been officially recognised as legitimate autochthonous languages under the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages...</div></span> attempted to negotiate a peaceful settlement. However this was rejected by the Rhodesian government insofar at it involved any potential surrender of power to the ZANLA or ZIPRA.<br />
<br />
By 1977 the war had spread throughout Rhodesia. ZANLA continued to operate from Mozambique, remained dominant among the Mashona peoples in eastern and central Rhodesia. Meanwhile ZIPRA remained active in the north and west, using bases in Zambia and Botswana, and were mainly supported by the Ndebele tribes. With this escalation came increasing sophistication and organisation. No longer were the guerrillas the disorganised force they had been in the 1960s. Indeed now they were well-equipped with modern weapons, and although many were still untrained, an increasing number had received training in Communist bloc and other sympathetic countries. Weapons fielded included AK47 and <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/SKS">SKS</a><span class="hp" id="m8527"><div class="hpHeader">SKS</div><div class="hpContent">The SKS is a Soviet semi-automatic carbine chambered for the 7.62x39mm round, designed in 1945 by Sergei Gavrilovich Simonov. SKS is an acronym for Samozaryadniy Karabin sistemi Simonova , 1945 , or SKS 45...</div></span> assault rifles, <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/RPD">RPD</a><span class="hp" id="m57898"><div class="hpHeader">RPD</div><div class="hpContent">The RPD is a 7.62mm light machine gun developed in the Soviet Union by Vasily Degtyaryov for the intermediate 7.62x39mm M43 cartridge. It was created as a replacement for the DP machine gun chambered for the 7.62x54mmR Mosin rifle round. It is a precursor of most SAW's -History:Work on the weapon...</div></span> and <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/RPK">RPK</a><span class="hp" id="m90932"><div class="hpHeader">RPK</div><div class="hpContent">The RPK is a 7.62x39mm light machine gun of Soviet design, developed by Mikhail Kalashnikov in the late 1950s, parallel with the AKM assault rifle...</div></span> light machine guns, as well as <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/RPG-2">RPG-2</a><span class="hp" id="m65618"><div class="hpHeader">RPG-2</div><div class="hpContent">The RPG-2 was the first rocket-propelled grenade launcher designed in the Soviet Union.-Development:The RPG-2 , was a man-portable, shoulder-launched rocket propelled grenade anti-armor weapon...</div></span> and <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/RPG-7">RPG-7</a><span class="hp" id="m40304"><div class="hpHeader">RPG-7</div><div class="hpContent">The RPG-7 is a widely-produced, portable, shoulder-launched, anti-tank rocket propelled grenade weapon. Originally the RPG-7 and its predecessor, the RPG-2, were designed by the Soviet Union, and now manufactured by the Bazalt company...</div></span> rocket propelled grenade launchers. Just how well equipped the nationalists had become only became evident from Rhodesian raids on guerrilla base areas which even revealed mortars as well as 12.7mm and 14.5mm heavy machine guns, and even heavier calibre weapons such as 122mm multiple rocket launchers towards the end of the war.<br />
<br />
On 3 April 1977, General <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Peter_Walls">Peter Walls</a><span class="hp" id="m14990"><div class="hpHeader">Peter Walls</div><div class="hpContent">Lieutenant General George Peter Walls served as the Commander of the Combined Operations Headquarters of the Military of Rhodesia, and later Zimbabwe, from 1977 until his retirement on 29 July 1980 during the Rhodesian Bush War. He lives in exile in Eastern Cape, South Africa.-Military...</div></span> announced the government would launch a campaign to win the "hearts and minds" of Rhodesia's black citizens. In May Walls received reports of ZANLA forces massing in the city of <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Mapai,_Mozambique">Mapai</a><span class="hp" id="m39047"><div class="hpHeader">Mapai, Mozambique</div><div class="hpContent">- History :In June 1976 a Selous Scouts attack from Rhodesia named Operation Long John was launched on the ZANLA transit camp in Mapai and Chicualacuala...</div></span> in <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Gaza_Province">Gaza Province</a><span class="hp" id="m37969"><div class="hpHeader">Gaza Province</div><div class="hpContent">Gaza is a province of Mozambique. It has an area of 75,709 km² and a population of 1,333,106 .Xai-Xai is the capital of the province. Located to the east is the Inhambane Province, to the north is Manica Province, and to the south is Maputo Province....</div></span>, <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Mozambique">Mozambique</a><span class="hp" id="m82314"><div class="hpHeader">Mozambique</div><div class="hpContent">Mozambique, officially the Republic of Mozambique , is a country in southeastern Africa bordered by the Indian Ocean to the east, Tanzania to the north, Malawi and Zambia to the northwest, Zimbabwe to the west and Swaziland and South Africa to the southwest.The area was explored by Vasco da Gama in...</div></span>. Prime Minister Smith gave Walls permission to destroy the base. Walls told the media the Rhodesian forces were changing tactics from contain and hold to <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Search_and_destroy">search and destroy</a><span class="hp" id="m50716"><div class="hpHeader">Search and destroy</div><div class="hpContent">Search and Destroy, Seek and Destroy, or even simply S&D, refers to a military strategy that became a notorious component of the Vietnam War. The idea was to insert ground forces into hostile territory, search out the enemy, destroy them, and withdraw immediately afterwards...</div></span>, "adopting hot pursuit when necessary."<br />
<br />
On 30 May 1977, 500 troops passed the border and travelled 60 miles to Mapai, engaging the ZANLA forces with air cover from the Rhodesian Air Force and paratroopers in C-47 Dakotas. The Rhodesian government said the military killed 32 ZANLA fighters and lost one Rhodesian pilot. The Mozambican government disputed the number of casualties, saying it shot down three Rhodesian planes and a helicopter and took several troops prisoner, all of which Minister of Combined Operations Roger Hawkins denied. The <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/United_Nations_Security_Council">United Nations Security Council</a><span class="hp" id="m48202" style="display: none; top: 5506px;"><div class="hpHeader">United Nations Security Council</div><div class="hpContent"><div class="hpImage" id="i48202"><img src="http://image.absoluteastronomy.com/images/topicthumbs/u/un/united_nations_security_council.gif" /></div>The United Nations Security Council is one of the principal organs of the United Nations and is charged with the maintenance of international peace and security. Its powers, outlined in the United Nations Charter, include the establishment of peacekeeping operations, the establishment of...</div></span> subsequently denounced the incursion of the "illegal racist minority regime in Southern Rhodesia" into Mozambique in Resolution 411, on 30 June 1977. Walls announced a day later that the Rhodesian military would occupy <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Mapai">Mapai</a><span class="hp" id="m97574" style="display: none; top: 5534px;"><div class="hpHeader">Mapai</div><div class="hpContent">Mapai was a left-wing political party in Israel, and was the dominant force in Israeli politics until its merger into the Israeli Labor Party in 1968....</div></span> until they had eliminated ZANLA's presence. <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Kurt_Waldheim">Kurt Waldheim</a><span class="hp" id="m72260"><div class="hpHeader">Kurt Waldheim</div><div class="hpContent">Kurt Josef Waldheim was an Austrian diplomat and politician. Waldheim was the fourth Secretary-General of the United Nations from 1972 to 1981, and the ninth President of Austria, from 1986 to 1992...</div></span>, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, condemned the incident on 1 June, and Rhodesian forces withdrew. The American, British, and Soviet governments also condemned the raid.<br />
<br />
Militants bombed Woolworth's department store in <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Harare">Salisbury</a><span class="hp" id="m96317"><div class="hpHeader">Harare</div><div class="hpContent">Harare is the capital of Zimbabwe. It has an estimated population of 1,600,000, with 2,800,000 in its metropolitan area . Administratively, Harare is an independent city equivalent to a province. It is Zimbabwe's largest city and its administrative, commercial, and communications centre...</div></span> on 11 August, killing 11 and injuring 70. They killed sixteen black civilians in eastern Rhodesia on 21 August, burning their homes on a white-owned farm. In November, 1977, in response to the buildup of ZANLA guerrillas in Mozambique, Rhodesian forces launched <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Operation_Dingo">Operation Dingo</a><span class="hp" id="m71003"><div class="hpHeader">Operation Dingo</div><div class="hpContent">Operation Dingo, also known as the Chimoio massacre was a major raid conducted by the Rhodesian Security Forces against the ZANLA headquarters of Robert Mugabe at Chimoio and a smaller camp at Tembue in Mozambique from November 23-25, 1977...</div></span>, a pre-emptive combined arms surprise attack on guerrilla camps at Chimoio and Tembue in Mozambique. The attack was carried out over three days, from November 23 to 25, 1977. While these operations reportedly inflicted thousands of casualties on Robert Mugabe's ZANLA cadres, probably blunting guerrilla incursions in the months that followed, a steady intensification of the insurgency neverthless continued through 1978.<br />
<br />
In order to disrupt FRELIMO's hold on Mozambique, the Rhodesian <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Central_Intelligence_Organization">Central Intelligence Organization</a><span class="hp" id="m99009"><div class="hpHeader">Central Intelligence Organization</div><div class="hpContent">The Central Intelligence Organisation is the national intelligence agency or "secret police" of Zimbabwe.-History:The CIO was formed in Rhodesia on the instructions of Prime Minister Winston Field in 1963 at the dissolution of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, and took over from the...</div></span> helped to create and support its own insurgency movement within Mozambique. This guerrilla group, known as RENAMO battled with FRELIMO even as Rhodesian forces fought the ZANLA within Mozambique.<br />
In May 1978, 50 civilians were killed in crossfire exchanged between Marxist militants and the Rhodesian military, the highest number of civilians to be killed in an engagement up to that point. In July Patriotic Front members killed 39 black civilians and the Rhodesian government killed 106 militants. On 4 November 1978 Walls said 2,000 Patriotic Front militants had been persuaded to defect and fight for the Rhodesian Security Forces. In reality only 50 militants defected.<br />
In 1978 450 ZANLA militants crossed the Mozambique border and attacked the town of <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Mutare">Umtali</a><span class="hp" id="m16784"><div class="hpHeader">Mutare</div><div class="hpContent">Mutare is the fourth largest city in Zimbabwe, with a population of approximately 170,106. It is the capital of Manicaland province.-History:...</div></span>. At the time ZANU said the militants were women, an unusual characteristic, but in 1996 <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Joyce_Mujuru">Joyce Mujuru</a><span class="hp" id="m40841"><div class="hpHeader">Joyce Mujuru</div><div class="hpContent">Joice Mujuru is a Zimbabwean politician, currently serving as Vice President of Zimbabwe. She has held this post since December 2004, and is also Vice President of ZANU-PF...</div></span> said the vast majority involved were men and ZANU concocted the story to make Western organizations believe women were involved in the fighting. In retaliation for these acts the Rhodesian Air Force bombed guerrilla camps 125 miles inside Mozambique, using 'fatigued' <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/English_Electric_Canberra">Canberra B2</a><span class="hp" id="m90212"><div class="hpHeader">English Electric Canberra</div><div class="hpContent">The English Electric Canberra is a first-generation jet-powered light bomber manufactured in large numbers through the 1950s. It proved to be highly adaptable, serving in such varied roles for tactical bombing, photographic, electronic, and meteorological reconnaissance...</div></span> aircraft and <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Hawker_Hunter">Hawker Hunter</a><span class="hp" id="m14270"><div class="hpHeader">Hawker Hunter</div><div class="hpContent">The Hawker Hunter was a British jet fighter aircraft of the 1950s and 1960s. The Hunter served for many years with the Royal Air Force and was widely exported, serving with 19 air forces. A total of 1,972 Hunters were produced by Hawker Siddeley and under licence.-Development:The origins of the...</div></span>s — actively, but clandestinely, supported by several of the more capable Canberra B(I)12 aircraft of the <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/South_African_Air_Force">South African Air Force</a><span class="hp" id="m63642"><div class="hpHeader">South African Air Force</div><div class="hpContent">The South African Air Force is the air force of South Africa, with headquarters in Pretoria. It is the world's second oldest independent air force, and its motto is Per Aspera Ad Astra...</div></span>. A number of joint-force bomber raids on guerrilla encampments and assembly areas in Mozambique and Zambia were mounted in 1978, and extensive air reconnaissance and surveillance of guerrilla encampments and logistical build-up was carried out by the <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/South_African_Air_Force">South African Air Force</a><span class="hp" id="m62385" style="display: none; top: 5926px;"><div class="hpHeader">South African Air Force</div><div class="hpContent"><div class="hpImage" id="i62385"><img src="http://image.absoluteastronomy.com/images/topicthumbs/s/so/south_african_air_force.gif" /></div>The South African Air Force is the air force of South Africa, with headquarters in Pretoria. It is the world's second oldest independent air force, and its motto is Per Aspera Ad Astra...</div></span> on behalf of the RhAF. In October, 1978 Rhodesian Air Force Canberra bombers, Hunter fighter-bombers and helicopter gunships attacked the ZIPRA guerrilla base at Westlands farm near Lusaka, Zambia while Zambian forces were warned by radio not to interfere.<br />
<br />
The increased effectiveness of the bombing and follow-up 'air mobile' strikes using <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/C-47_Skytrain">Dakota</a><span class="hp" id="m37071"><div class="hpHeader">C-47 Skytrain</div><div class="hpContent">The Douglas C-47 Skytrain or Dakota is a military transport aircraft that was developed from the Douglas DC-3 airliner. It was used extensively by the Allies during World War II and remained in front line operations through the 1950s with a few remaining in operation to this day.-Design and...</div></span>-dropped parachutists and helicopter 'air cav' techniques had a significant effect on the development of the conflict. As late as September 1979, despite the increased sophistication of guerrilla forces in Mozambique, a raid by Selous Scouts, with artillery and air support, on "New Chimoio" still reportedly resulted in heavy ZANLA casualties.<br />
However, a successful raid on the Rhodesian strategic fuel reserves in <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Harare">Salisbury</a><span class="hp" id="m86442"><div class="hpHeader">Harare</div><div class="hpContent">Harare is the capital of Zimbabwe. It has an estimated population of 1,600,000, with 2,800,000 in its metropolitan area . Administratively, Harare is an independent city equivalent to a province. It is Zimbabwe's largest city and its administrative, commercial, and communications centre...</div></span> also underscored the importance of concluding a negotiated settlement and achieving international recognition before the war expanded further.<br />
<br />
The larger problem was that by 1979, combined ZIRPA and ZANLA strength inside Rhodesia totalled at least 12,500 guerrillas and it was evident that insurgents were entering the country at a rate greater than the Rhodesian forces could kill or capture. In addition, 22,000 ZIPRA and 16,000 ZANLA fighters remained uncommitted outside the country. Joshua Nkomo's ZIPRA forces were preparing their forces in Zambia with the intent of confronting the Rhodesians through a conventional invasion. Whether such an invasion could have been successful in the short term against the well trained Rhodesian army and air force is questionable. However, what was clear was that the insurgency was growing in strength daily and the ability of the security forces to continue to control the entire country was coming under serious challenge.<br />
<br />
By putting the civilian population at risk, ZIPRA and the ZANLA had been particularly effective in creating conditions that accelerated white emigration. This not only seriously undermined the morale of the white population, it was also gradually reducing the availability of trained reserves for the army and the police. For a discussion see: The economy was also suffering badly as a result of the war with the Rhodesian GDP in consistent decline in the late 1970s.<br />
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Politically, the Rhodesians were therefore pinning all their hopes on the "internal" political settlement that had been negotiated with moderate black nationalist leaders in 1978 and its ability to achieve external recognition and support. This internal settlement led to the creation of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia under a new constitution in 1979.<br />
<h3>Resolution</h3><br />
Under the agreement of March 1978, the country was to be known as Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, and in the general election of 24 April 1979, Bishop <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Abel_Muzorewa">Abel Muzorewa</a><span class="hp" id="m59871"><div class="hpHeader">Abel Muzorewa</div><div class="hpContent">Bishop Abel Tendekayi Muzorewa served as Prime Minister of Zimbabwe Rhodesia from the Internal Settlement to the Lancaster House Agreement in 1979...</div></span> became the country's first black prime minister. The factions led by Nkomo and Mugabe denounced the new government as a puppet of white Rhodesians and fighting continued. The hoped for recognition of the internal settlement, and of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, by the newly elected <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Conservative_Party_%28UK%29">Conservative</a><span class="hp" id="m34557"><div class="hpHeader">Conservative Party (UK)</div><div class="hpContent">The Conservative and Unionist Party, more commonly known as the Conservative Party, is a political party in the United Kingdom that adheres to a right wing ideology of conservatism and British unionism...</div></span> government of <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Margaret_Thatcher">Margaret Thatcher</a><span class="hp" id="m9243"><div class="hpHeader">Margaret Thatcher</div><div class="hpContent">Margaret Hilda Thatcher, Baroness Thatcher, LG, OM, PC, FRS served as Prime Minister of the United Kingdom from 1979 to 1990 and Leader of the Conservative Party from 1975 to 1990...</div></span> did not materialize after the latter's election in May, 1979. Likewise, despite the fact that the US Senate voted to lift sanctions against Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, the Carter administration also refused to recognize the internal settlement.<br />
<br />
While Prime Minister Thatcher clearly sympathized with the internal settlement and thought of the ZANLA and ZIPRA leaders as "terrorists", she was prepared to support a push for further compromise if it could end the fighting. Britain was also reluctant to recognize the internal settlement for fear of fracturing the unity of the <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Commonwealth">Commonwealth</a><span class="hp" id="m7987"><div class="hpHeader">Commonwealth</div><div class="hpContent">Commonwealth is a traditional English term for a political community founded for the common good. Historically, it has sometimes been synonymous with "republic".More recently it has been used for fraternal associations of some sovereign nations....</div></span>. Thus later in 1979, the Thatcher government called a peace conference in London to which all nationalist leaders were invited. The outcome of this conference would become known as the <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Lancaster_House_Agreement">Lancaster House Agreement</a><span class="hp" id="m57358" style="display: none; top: 6542px;"><div class="hpHeader">Lancaster House Agreement</div><div class="hpContent"><div class="hpImage" id="i57358"><img src="http://image.absoluteastronomy.com/images/topicthumbs/l/la/lancaster_house_agreement.gif" /></div>The negotiations which led to the Lancaster House Agreement brought independence to Rhodesia following Ian Smith’s Unilateral Declaration of Independence in 1965. The Agreement covered the Independence Constitution, pre-independence arrangements, and a ceasefire...</div></span>. During the conference, the Zimbabwe-Rhodesian Government accepted a watering down of the 1978 internal settlement while Mugabe and Nkomo agreed to end the war in exchange for new elections in which they could participate. The economic sanctions imposed on the country were lifted in late 1979, and British rule resumed under a transitional arrangement leading to full independence. On 21 December 1979 a cease-fire was subsequently announced.<br />
<br />
The elections of 1980 resulted in a victory for Robert Mugabe, who assumed the post of prime minister after <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Zimbabwe_African_National_Union_-_Patriotic_Front">ZANU-PF</a><span class="hp" id="m6730"><div class="hpHeader">Zimbabwe African National Union - Patriotic Front</div><div class="hpContent">The Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front is a Zimbabwean political party that was the ruling government in Zimbabwe since independence in 1980, led by Robert Mugabe, first as Prime Minister with the party simply known as ZANU, and then as President from 1988 after taking over ZAPU and...</div></span> received 63% of the vote. Accusations of voter intimidation by Mugabe's guerrilla cadres, sections of which were accused of not having assembled in the designated guerrilla assembly points as required under the Lancaster House Agreement, may have led the Rhodesian military to give serious consideration to a coup d'etat in March 1980. This alleged coup was to have included the assassination of Mugabe and coordinated assaults on ZANLA guerrilla assembly points within the country. However, even in the context of alleged voter intimidation by ZANLA elements, widespread support for Mugabe from large sections of the black population (in particular from his own <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Shona">Shona</a><span class="hp" id="m56101"><div class="hpHeader">Shona</div><div class="hpContent">Shona may refer to:*Shona people, a Southern African people*Shona language, a Bantu language spoken in Zimbabwe and parts of Mozambique. It has several dialects which include Zezuru spoken by the people in the northern part of Zimbabwe, Manyika in Manicaland, and Karanga in southern part of...</div></span> tribal group which made up the overwhelming majority of the country's population) could not be seriously disputed. Moreover, the clear absence of any external support for such a coup, and the inevitable conflagration that would have engulfed the country thereafter, scuttled the plan.<br />
<br />
The result was that on 18 April 1980 the country gained independence and international recognition. Two years later the government changed the name of the country's capital from Salisbury to <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Harare">Harare</a><span class="hp" id="m5473"><div class="hpHeader">Harare</div><div class="hpContent">Harare is the capital of Zimbabwe. It has an estimated population of 1,600,000, with 2,800,000 in its metropolitan area . Administratively, Harare is an independent city equivalent to a province. It is Zimbabwe's largest city and its administrative, commercial, and communications centre...</div></span>.<br />
<h2>Aftermath</h2><br />
<br />
Following independence, Robert Mugabe acted incrementally to consolidate his power.<br />
<br />
Fighting between ZANLA and ZIPRA units broke out in 1981 and led to what has become known as Gukurahundi (Shona: "the early rain which washes away the chaff before the spring rains")) or the Matabeleland Massacres, which ran from 1982 until 1985. Mugabe used his North Korean trained Fifth Brigade to crush any resistance in Matabeleland. It has been estimated that 20,000 Matabele were murdered in these first years after the war.<br />
<br />
Beyond Zimbabwe's borders, as a result of Rhodesian aid and support for RENAMO, the Bush War also led to the outbreak of the Mozambique Civil War, which lasted from 1977 until 1992. That conflict claimed about 30 times the number of lives lost in the Rhodesian War and also led to some 5 million people being made homeless.<br />
<h2>See also</h2><ul><li><a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/British_South_Africa_Police">British South Africa Police</a><span class="hp" id="m4216"><div class="hpHeader">British South Africa Police</div><div class="hpContent">The British South Africa Police was the police force of the British South Africa Company of Cecil Rhodes which became the national police force of Southern Rhodesia and its successor after 1965, Rhodesia...</div></span></li>
<li><a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Grey%27s_Scouts">Grey's Scouts</a><span class="hp" id="m78901"><div class="hpHeader">Grey's Scouts</div><div class="hpContent">Grey's Scouts were a Rhodesian mounted infantry unit raised in July 1975 and named after George Grey, a prominent soldier in the Second Matabele War. Based in Salisbury , they were known for their participation in the Rhodesian Bush War...</div></span></li>
<li><a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Military_history_of_Africa">Military history of Africa</a><span class="hp" id="m53588"><div class="hpHeader">Military history of Africa</div><div class="hpContent">The military history of Africa is one of the oldest and most diverse military histories. Africa is a continent of diverse regions with diverse people speaking hundreds of different languages with many different cultures and religions...</div></span></li>
<li>Mozambique Civil War</li>
<li><a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Operation_Dingo">Operation Dingo</a><span class="hp" id="m52331"><div class="hpHeader">Operation Dingo</div><div class="hpContent">Operation Dingo, also known as the Chimoio massacre was a major raid conducted by the Rhodesian Security Forces against the ZANLA headquarters of Robert Mugabe at Chimoio and a smaller camp at Tembue in Mozambique from November 23-25, 1977...</div></span></li>
<li><a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Portuguese_Colonial_War">Portuguese Colonial War</a><span class="hp" id="m1703"><div class="hpHeader">Portuguese Colonial War</div><div class="hpContent">The Portuguese Colonial War , also known as the Overseas War in Portugal or in the former colonies as the War of liberation , was fought between Portugal's military and the emerging nationalist movements in Portugal's African colonies between 1961 and 1974...</div></span></li>
<li><a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Rhodesian_African_Rifles">Rhodesian African Rifles</a><span class="hp" id="m76388"><div class="hpHeader">Rhodesian African Rifles</div><div class="hpContent">The Rhodesian African Rifles, or RAR, was the oldest regiment in the Rhodesian Army, dating from the formation of the 1st Rhodesian Native Regiment in 1916 during the First World War. This was followed by the creation of the Matabeleland Native Regiment, and the 2nd Rhodesian Native Regiment,...</div></span></li>
<li><a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Rhodesian_Armoured_Corps">Rhodesian Armoured Car Regiment</a><span class="hp" id="m51074" style="display: none; top: 7217px;"><div class="hpHeader">Rhodesian Armoured Corps</div><div class="hpContent"><div class="hpImage" id="i51074"><img src="http://image.absoluteastronomy.com/images/topicthumbs/r/rh/rhodesian_armoured_corps.gif" /></div>The Rhodesian Armoured Corps was the last incarnation of various armoured military units in Rhodesia. Its initial incarnation was raised in 1941 for service in World War II...</div></span></li>
<li><a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Rhodesian_Light_Infantry">Rhodesian Light Infantry</a><span class="hp" id="m25760"><div class="hpHeader">Rhodesian Light Infantry</div><div class="hpContent">The 1st Battalion, The Rhodesian Light Infantry was a regular airborne commando regiment in the Rhodesian army. The RLI was originally formed as a light infantry regiment in 1961, reformed as a commando battalion in 1965, became a parachute Battalion in 1977 and was disbanded at the end of the...</div></span></li>
<li><a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Rhodesia_Regiment">Rhodesia Regiment</a><span class="hp" id="m446"><div class="hpHeader">Rhodesia Regiment</div><div class="hpContent">The Rhodesia Regiment was one of the oldest and largest regiments in the Rhodesian Army. It served on the side of Great Britain in the Boer War and the First and Second World Wars and served the Republic of Rhodesia in the anti-terrorist counter-insurgency war of the 1970s...</div></span></li>
<li>Rhodesian SAS</li>
<li><a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Second_Matabele_War">Second Matabele War</a><span class="hp" id="m77824"><div class="hpHeader">Second Matabele War</div><div class="hpContent">The Second Matabele War, also known as the Matabeleland Rebellion and in Zimbabwe as the First Chimurenga, took place from 1896–97....</div></span>, officially known within Zimbabwe as the First <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Chimurenga">Chimurenga</a><span class="hp" id="m52510"><div class="hpHeader">Chimurenga</div><div class="hpContent">Chimurenga is a Shona word for 'revolutionary struggle'. The word's modern interpretation has been extended to describe a struggle for human rights, political dignity and social justice, specifically used for the African insurrections against British colonial rule 1896–1897 and the guerrilla war...</div></span></li>
<li><a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Selous_Scouts">Selous Scouts</a><span class="hp" id="m27196"><div class="hpHeader">Selous Scouts</div><div class="hpContent">The Selous Scouts was the name given to a special forces regiment of the Rhodesian Army, which operated from 1973 until the introduction of majority rule in 1980. It was named after British explorer Frederick Courteney Selous , and their motto was pamwe chete, which, in the Shona, roughly means...</div></span></li>
<li><a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Security_Force_Auxiliaries">Security Force Auxiliaries</a><span class="hp" id="m76567"><div class="hpHeader">Security Force Auxiliaries</div><div class="hpContent">Security Force Auxiliaries were black armies who fought in Rhodesia during the Bush War for the Rhodesian Front. Ndabaningi Sithole, founder of the Zimbabwe African National Union, and Abel Muzorewa, the first and only Prime Minister of Zimbabwe Rhodesia, led the auxiliaries.In 1978 the Rhodesian...</div></span></li>
<li><a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/South_African_Border_War">South African Border War</a><span class="hp" id="m51253"><div class="hpHeader">South African Border War</div><div class="hpContent">The South African Border War, commonly referred to as the Angolan Bush War in South Africa and also known as the Namibian War of Independence, refers to the conflict that took place from 1966 to 1989 in South-West Africa and Angola between South Africa and its allied forces on the one side and...</div></span></li>
<li>ZANLA</li>
<li><a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/ZIPRA">ZIPRA</a><span class="hp" id="m27375"><div class="hpHeader">ZIPRA</div><div class="hpContent">Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army was the armed wing of the Zimbabwe African People's Union, a political party in Rhodesia. It participated in the Second Chimurenga against white minority rule in the former Rhodesia....</div></span></li>
</ul><br />
<h2>External links</h2><ul><li><a class="greylink1" href="http://www.newrhodesian.net/" rel="nofollow">Rhodesian Bush War historical research / discussion forum</a></li>
<li><a class="greylink1" href="http://members.tripod.com/selousscouts/fireforce_operations.htm" rel="nofollow">FireForce Operations: Helicopter Warfare in Rhodesia: 1962–80</a></li>
<li><a class="greylink1" href="http://members.tripod.com/selousscouts/" rel="nofollow">The Selous Scouts Home Page</a> a site with a lot of information on the war in general and in the Selous Scouts in particular</li>
<li><a class="greylink1" href="http://www.rhodesia.nl/" rel="nofollow">Rhodesian and South African Military History</a>: An extensive collection of histories and analysis of Rhodesian and South African military operations, to the early 1980s</li>
<li><a class="greylink1" href="http://www.specialforcesroh.com/browse.php?mode=viewc&catid=44" rel="nofollow">Rhodesian Special Forces</a> roll of honour, awards and images.</li>
<li><a class="greylink1" href="http://www.baragwanath.co.za/leopard/" rel="nofollow">The bush war Leopard</a>: Leopard, Rhodesian Bush War landmine resisting vehicle.</li>
<li><a class="greylink1" href="http://members.tripod.com/selousscouts/rhodesian_armoured_corps_.htm" rel="nofollow">The Black Devils</a>: the Rhodesian Armoured Car Regiment</li>
<li><a class="greylink1" href="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Vs7V_IBQcDg" rel="nofollow">Nyadzonya Raid</a>: Selous Scouts raid on the Nyadzonya Camp in Mozambique.</li>
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<!-- End Bravenet.com Service Code --></div>Beaver Shawhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15092980697221951142noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6501586017974986851.post-72816723411232940332010-11-12T03:23:00.000-08:002010-11-12T03:23:17.161-08:00Externals- SLATED BY TIME<div id="date2">Monday, Jun. 13, 1977</div><h1>RHODESIA: Smith Takes a Dangerous New Gamble</h1><br />
Even as Britain and the U.S. continue to press Prime Minister Ian Smith's regime in Rhodesia toward accepting black majority rule, "Smithy" lashed out at nationalist guerrillas operating from across the border in Mozambique. The incident could further diminish the chances of a settlement and inflame the situation in southern Africa. <br />
For weeks, Rhodesia's Supreme Military Commander, Lieut. General Peter Walls, had been receiving intelligence reports of a guerrilla force building up in southwestern Mozambique. Faced with a security problem that would further extend his hard-pressed troops, Walls asked Smith for permission to make a punitive raid on Mozambique's Gaza province, a key infiltration and supply route. Smith readily gave him the go-ahead. Last week the first columns of Rhodesian army trucks, carrying some 500 troops, rolled across the Mozambican border shortly after daybreak and headed toward the village of Mapai, 60 miles away. Overhead, Rhodesian air force planes provided cover, while low-flying C-47 Dakotas disgorged teams of paratroopers. <br />
This raid was significantly different from other search-and-destroy missions the Rhodesian military has mounted in its four-year war with the guerrillas. No sooner had the troops crossed the border than the Salisbury government announced the attack—and declared that they would stay in Mozambique as long as necessary to complete the job. <br />
News of the mission was received by many Rhodesian whites with satisfaction; successful or not, the raid was a way of venting their frustrations at living for so long with uncertainty and terror. The international response was anger and outrage. Washington publicly denounced both Smith's government and the raid into Mozambique as illegal. To emphasize the point, South Africa's ambassador to Washington, Donald Sole (who represents Rhodesia's interests), was informed of the Administration's displeasure by National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski. Britain also sent Smith a stern message, and the two countries began drawing up a resolution of condemnation to put before the United Nations Security Council. <br />
Mission Accomplished. Whether or not the warnings had their intended effect, the Rhodesians reported their mission accomplished after five days at Mapai, and packed up to return home. The joint operations command in Salisbury announced that 32 guerrillas had been killed and only one Rhodesian—a pilot who was shot down after taking off from the airstrip at Mapai. For its part, Mozambique reported that it shot down three Rhodesian planes and a helicopter, and engaged the Rhodesian forces in "heavy fighting." Minister of Combined Operations Roger Hawkins denied such claims, as well as Mozambique's announcement that a number of Rhodesian troops had been taken prisoner. <br />
Considering the size and scope of the operation, there was little evidence of any major gains. Even the cache of weapons displayed from the operation turned out to be unconvincing. TIME Correspondent William McWhirter, who landed at the dusty airstrip at Chiredzi in southeastern Rhodesia, reports: "Spread out on two canvas aprons on the brown grass were two small heaps that looked like the remains from a weapons picnic or the last leftovers from some outdoor arms fair. There were a couple of rocket launchers, several assault rifles and ancient carbines, some mortars with rounds. The sad little arrangements were all there was to show from the drama and bravado of the week. <br />
"The Communist-supplied weapons, mainly Soviet, were still wrapped in their wooden packing crates—a reminder of the fresh arsenals flowing into the frontline states. Among the prize exhibits was a deadly 14.5-mm. antiaircraft gun with glistening gold-and red-tipped bullets. There was also a Czech-made land mine of Bakelite, undetectable with any of the usual metal devices used by the army. Like the other arms on display, the weapons were newer than the Rhodesians' equipment." <br />
In an interview with McWhirter, Minister Hawkins insisted that the raid was purely a military operation stemming "from our inherent right of self-defense." But did Smith have political motives in authorizing the mission? Western diplomats noted that the raid began the same morning an Anglo-American negotiating team, headed by British Diplomat John Graham and U.S. Ambassador to Zambia Stephen Low, left Salisbury for the Mozambican capital of Maputo. Their mission: to discuss a possible settlement with Black Nationalist Leader Robert Mugabe, head of the Zimbabwe African National Union and co-chairman with Joshua Nkomo of the Patriotic Front, the joint guerrilla force that is recognized by the frontline states as the sole legitimate liberation movement. Smith opposes U.S.British demands that any settlement include the guerrilla leaders. He wants the negotiators to come around to his own "internal solution"—meaning turning power over to black moderate Bishop Abel Muzorewa, who leads the nonmilitary United African National Council. The timing of the raid, a top Whitehall source told TIME, was "a very strange coincidence. Our assumption [of Smith's sincerity] has been badly shaken." <br />
There was little doubt that Smith hoped the raid and its attendant publicity would boost flagging morale. More than 1,000 whites are leaving Rhodesia each month, fearful both of the expanding civil war and their doubtful future under majority rule. Others who want to stay are convinced that a quick and equitable settlement is necessary. Still, when word trickled out that "the boys" were returning from the supposedly successful raid, many whites were cheered. <br />
Lost Time. Rhodesian blacks were more apprehensive. They recall a similar search-and-destroy operation last August on a U.N.-sponsored refugee camp in Mozambique that reportedly killed some 700 civilians (the Rhodesians claimed to have killed 320 guerrillas). "We fear this place could become like Angola," said a black insurance salesman in Salisbury. "Why can't they all talk? We're frightened of what might happen next." Added a leading black lawyer: "It's an open invitation to [Mozambican President Samora] Machel to get someone to help him. The danger is getting the Russians and the Cubans in. I don't believe the Africans really want them. But Smith has exacerbated the problem, and every minute lost arriving at a settlement is a minute gained for Communism." <br />
Although the mission was humiliating evidence that Rhodesian forces can cross Mozambique's borders any time they choose, Machel's government downplayed the raid as "just another aggression." Mozambique officials believe that Smith was merely trying to up the ante by raising the stakes of Mozambique's support for the guerrillas—and perhaps forcing Maputo to seek outside help. That in turn, they theorized, would justify Smith's seeking help from South Africa. If Smith did have such a Machiavellian motive, he was apparently mistaken. A top aide said that South African Prime Minister John Vorster was "dismayed" by the raid, adding that "the last thing the Prime Minister wants is to see a full-scale Cuban or Nigerian or Somalian involvement to protect Mozambique." Already under fire from the U.S. and other Western powers for his government's apartheid policies, Vorster has enough trouble of his own.<div class="blogger-post-footer"><!-- Start Bravenet.com Service Code -->
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<!-- End Bravenet.com Service Code --></div>Beaver Shawhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15092980697221951142noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6501586017974986851.post-32476120511012017512010-11-12T03:13:00.001-08:002010-11-12T03:13:07.440-08:00ZAF raids into mozambique<span style="font-family: arial;"><h2>RAIDS ON GORONGOSSA<br />
<span style="font-size: medium;">Zimbabwe's Military Involvement in Mozambique1982 - 1992</span></h2><h3>by NORMAN MLAMBO</h3></span> <span style="font-family: arial;"><span>Norman Mlambo is a Zimbabwean PhD student in the Department of History at the University of Cape Town.</span> <br />
<span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>1: <a href="http://ccrweb.ccr.uct.ac.za/archive/defencedigest/defdigest03.html#1">Introduction</a></span></span><br />
<dt> <span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>2: <a href="http://ccrweb.ccr.uct.ac.za/archive/defencedigest/defdigest03.html#2">The Political Economy of Zimbabwe's Trade Routes</a></span></span></dt><br />
<dt> <span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>3: <a href="http://ccrweb.ccr.uct.ac.za/archive/defencedigest/defdigest03.html#3">The Three Corridors: Beira, Limpopo and Tete</a></span></span></dt><br />
<dd> <span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>3.1 <a href="http://ccrweb.ccr.uct.ac.za/archive/defencedigest/defdigest03.html#31">The Beira Corridor</a></span></span></dd> <dd> <span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>3.2 <a href="http://ccrweb.ccr.uct.ac.za/archive/defencedigest/defdigest03.html#32">The Limpopo Corridor</a></span></span></dd> <dd> <span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>3.3 <a href="http://ccrweb.ccr.uct.ac.za/archive/defencedigest/defdigest03.html#33">The Tete Corridor</a></span></span></dd><br />
<dt> <span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>4: <a href="http://ccrweb.ccr.uct.ac.za/archive/defencedigest/defdigest03.html#4">Raids on Gorongossa</a></span></span></dt><br />
<dd> <span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>4.1 <a href="http://ccrweb.ccr.uct.ac.za/archive/defencedigest/defdigest03.html#41">The First Raid on Gorongossa</a></span></span></dd> <dd> <span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>4.2 <a href="http://ccrweb.ccr.uct.ac.za/archive/defencedigest/defdigest03.html#42">The Second Raid on Gorongossa</a></span></span></dd><br />
<dt> <span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>5: <a href="http://ccrweb.ccr.uct.ac.za/archive/defencedigest/defdigest03.html#5">Other Operations 1986--1990</a></span></span></dt><br />
<dt> <span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>6: <a href="http://ccrweb.ccr.uct.ac.za/archive/defencedigest/defdigest03.html#6">The Air Element</a></span></span></dt><br />
<dd> <span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>6.1 <a href="http://ccrweb.ccr.uct.ac.za/archive/defencedigest/defdigest03.html#61">Routine Operations</a></span></span></dd> <dd> <span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>6.2 <a href="http://ccrweb.ccr.uct.ac.za/archive/defencedigest/defdigest03.html#62">Aircraft Accidents</a></span></span></dd><br />
<dt> <span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>7: <a href="http://ccrweb.ccr.uct.ac.za/archive/defencedigest/defdigest03.html#7">ZDF Expenditure in Mozambique</a></span></span></dt><br />
<dd> <span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>7.1 <a href="http://ccrweb.ccr.uct.ac.za/archive/defencedigest/defdigest03.html#71">The Zimbabwe Defence Budget</a></span></span></dd> <dd> <span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>7.2 <a href="http://ccrweb.ccr.uct.ac.za/archive/defencedigest/defdigest03.html#72">Army Expenditure</a></span></span></dd> <dd> <span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>7.3 <a href="http://ccrweb.ccr.uct.ac.za/archive/defencedigest/defdigest03.html#73">Air Force Expenditure</a></span></span></dd><br />
<dt> <span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>8: <a href="http://ccrweb.ccr.uct.ac.za/archive/defencedigest/defdigest03.html#8">Casualties</a></span></span></dt><br />
<dt> <span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>9: <a href="http://ccrweb.ccr.uct.ac.za/archive/defencedigest/defdigest03.html#9">Withdrawal of Zimbabwean Troops from Mozambique</a></span></span></dt><br />
<dt> <span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>10: <a href="http://ccrweb.ccr.uct.ac.za/archive/defencedigest/defdigest03.html#10">Conclusion</a></span></span></dt><br />
<dt> <span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span><a href="http://ccrweb.ccr.uct.ac.za/archive/defencedigest/defdigest03.html#Biblio">Bibliography and Footnotes</a></span></span></dt><br />
<br />
</span><br />
<h3> <span style="font-family: arial;"><a href="" name="1"></a><span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>1: Introduction</span></span></span></h3><span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>F</span><span>or ten years, the Zimbabwe Defence Forces (ZDF) were deployed in Mozambique helping that country's government in their fight against the Mozambique National Resistance Movement (Renamo). Although Zimbabwe's military involvement was formally requested by the Mozambican Government in 1985, Zimbabwean troops were already deployed along the Mutare - Beira route and along the Nyamapanda - Zobue route long before 1985. The Mozambican request therefore only served to regularise an already existing situation, and to legitimise the ZDF presence in Mozambique since 1982.</span></span> </span><span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>Although Zimbabwe's military involvement in Mozambique between 1982 and 1992 was mainly to protect Zimbabwe's trade routes through Mozambique, that involvement ended up having far-reaching political and military implications. The political and ideological twist that the war took has been explained in terms of the Cold War in which certain governments (e.g. USA, South Africa) supported Renamo while other governments (e.g. Soviet Union, China) supported the then Marxist regimes of Mozambique and Zimbabwe. This paper will concentrate on the military operations carried out by the ZDF in Mozambique because the political and economic aspects of the war have already been covered in another paper<sup> <a href="http://ccrweb.ccr.uct.ac.za/archive/defencedigest/defdigest03.html#Biblio">1</a> </sup>.</span></span> </span><br />
<span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>This paper will argue that from a military and operational perspective, the Mozambican operations overstretched the ZDF to the limit. While the Zimbabwean forces won a number of important military battles in Mozambique, they did not succeed in eliminating Renamo's threat along Zimbabwe's three main trade routes through Mozambique. The most important ZDF military successes were undermined by the inability of the Mozambican Armed Forces (FAM) to hold any of the bases captured from Renamo. Furthermore, the operations were also very expensive to the ZDF in terms of manpower, equipment and money, and there were a lot of incidents, which led to an unnecessary loss of life and equipment. The ZDF did not use proper accounting methods to evaluate the costs of the war effort, and no accurate financial records were kept detailing the amount of resources which were used. Thus, it is almost impossible to quantify the economic impact of Zimbabwe's military involvement in Mozambique during the period 1982 - 1992.</span></span> </span><br />
<h3> <span style="font-family: arial;"><a href="" name="2"></a><span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>2: The Political Economy Of Zimbabwe's Trade Routes</span></span></span></h3><span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>Z</span><span>imbabwe is a landlocked country, and her imports and exports therefore depend on trade routes through neighbouring countries, particularly South Africa and Mozambique. This situation has made the quest for easy access to the sea a dominant factor in determining Zimbabwe's geo - politics for over a century.</span></span> </span><span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>Efforts to secure the port of Beira as Rhodesia's outlet to the sea were started by Cecil John Rhodes in 1890<sup> <a href="http://ccrweb.ccr.uct.ac.za/archive/defencedigest/defdigest03.html#Biblio">2</a> </sup>. Mozambique was then under Portuguese rule and an Anglo - Portuguese Convention of 1881 did not allow an independent Rhodesian route through Beira. However, after a lot of lobbying Rhodesia was granted "freedom of transit" through Portuguese territory, and in 1892 Cecil John Rhodes started the construction of a railway line from Beira to Salisbury (now Harare)<sup> <a href="http://ccrweb.ccr.uct.ac.za/archive/defencedigest/defdigest03.html#Biblio">3</a> </sup>.</span></span> </span><br />
<span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>Rhodes also started the extension of the Cape railway line, which reached Bulawayo in November 1897 and Salisbury in 1902. These transport routes were further developed through the years not only to give Rhodesia easy access to the sea, but to serve the exploitative interests of the colonial power, Britain. The main aim was to make it easier for the colony to export raw materials to Britain, especially minerals and agricultural products.</span></span> </span><br />
<span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>In 1965, Ian Smith unilaterally declared Southern Rhodesia's independence from Britain (UDI), and the United Nations responded by imposing economic and other sanctions against the Smith regime. However, Mozambique, which was still under Portuguese rule, and apartheid South Africa, did not enforce these sanctions. Rhodesia preferred to use the Mozambican routes which were both shorter and much cheaper than the South African routes, and the Portuguese allowed the Rhodesians to maintain customs offices at both Beira and Lourenco Marques (now Maputo).</span></span> </span><br />
<span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>When it became obvious that Mozambique would soon gain its independence, there was a fear that the new Mozambican government would impose the United Nations sanctions against Rhodesia and close the country's two trading routes. This would leave only the South African routes open to Rhodesia. To reinforce the South African routes, in 1974 another railway line to Durban via Beit Bridge was constructed in only 93 days<sup> <a href="http://ccrweb.ccr.uct.ac.za/archive/defencedigest/defdigest03.html#Biblio">4</a> </sup>. By the end of 1974 Rhodesia had a network of transport corridors to the sea as shown in table 1.</span></span> </span><br />
<h5> <span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>Table 1: Rhodesia�s Transport Corridors, 1974</span></span></span></h5><table border="1" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"><tbody>
<tr> <td valign="TOP" width="57%"><b><i>Route </i></b></td> <td valign="TOP" width="21%"> <center><b><i>Length</i></b></center> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="23%"> <center><b><i>Year Opened</i></b></center> </td> </tr>
<tr> <td valign="TOP" width="57%">Harare - Beira </td> <td valign="TOP" width="21%"> <center>602km</center> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="23%"> <center>1898</center> </td> </tr>
<tr> <td valign="TOP" width="57%">Harare - Maputo via Chicualacuala </td> <td valign="TOP" width="21%"> <center>1 269km</center> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="23%"> <center>1955</center> </td> </tr>
<tr> <td valign="TOP" width="57%">Harare - Durban via Beit Bridge </td> <td valign="TOP" width="21%"> <center>2 066km</center> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="23%"> <center>1974</center> </td> </tr>
<tr> <td valign="TOP" width="57%">Harare - East London via Botswana </td> <td valign="TOP" width="21%"> <center>2 370km</center> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="23%"> <center>1897</center> </td> </tr>
<tr> <td valign="TOP" width="57%">Harare - Cape Town via Kimberley </td> <td valign="TOP" width="21%"> <center>2 657km</center> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="23%"> <center>1902</center> </td> </tr>
</tbody></table><center><span style="font-family: arial;"><i><span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>Source: Zimbabwe National Transport Study (Swedish International Development Authority, Stockholm, 1985), p.13.</span></span></i></span></center> <span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>In 1975 Mozambique became independent from Portugal, and as predicted, in 1976 closed its border with Rhodesia, and all Rhodesia's trade had to go through South Africa. The South African government never imposed sanctions against the Smith regime, and in fact South Africa became Rhodesia's "intermediary" in international trade. Rhodesia was already heavily dependent on South Africa as a trading partner, as a major investor, and as an ally in sanctions busting. The rerouting of all her trade via South Africa enforced Rhodesia's dependency on South Africa and made her economy more fully integrated into the South African economy.</span></span> </span><br />
<span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>When Rhodesia became independent as Zimbabwe in 1980, it was only logical that the country would move back to using the shorter and cheaper Mozambican routes. The new government decided to "disengage" from the South African trade routes by reintroducing the Beira - Mutare "corridor" for both economic and political reasons. The economic rationale for this decision becomes obvious when one compares the distances and prices of transporting various items to Zimbabwe from Beira and South African ports (see table 2)</span></span> </span><br />
<h5> <span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>Table 2. Comparison of Transport Costs: Durban/Beira to Zimbabwe</span></span></span></h5><table border="1" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"><tbody>
<tr> <td valign="TOP" width="37%"> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="16%"> <center>Durban Z$</center> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="16%"> <center>Beira Z$</center> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="16%"> <center>Saving Z$</center> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="16%"> <center>% Saving</center> </td> </tr>
<tr> <td valign="TOP" width="37%"><b>Exports</b></td> <td valign="TOP" width="16%"> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="16%"> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="16%"> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="16%"> </td> </tr>
<tr> <td valign="TOP" width="37%">Tobacco unit trains</td> <td valign="TOP" width="16%"> <center>2 732</center> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="16%"> <center>1 701</center> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="16%"> <center>1 031</center> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="16%"> <center>38</center> </td> </tr>
<tr> <td valign="TOP" width="37%">Tobacco non-unit trains </td> <td valign="TOP" width="16%"> <center>2 853</center> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="16%"> <center>1 618</center> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="16%"> <center>1 235</center> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="16%"> <center>43</center> </td> </tr>
<tr> <td valign="TOP" width="37%">Other cargo unit trains</td> <td valign="TOP" width="16%"> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="16%"> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="16%"> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="16%"> </td> </tr>
<tr> <td valign="TOP" width="37%"> <dir> <dir>Harare</dir> </dir> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="16%"> <center>3 036</center> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="16%"> <center>1 787</center> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="16%"> <center>1 249</center> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="16%"> <center>41</center> </td> </tr>
<tr> <td valign="TOP" width="37%"> <dir> <dir>Bulawayo</dir> </dir> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="16%"> <center>3 007</center> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="16%"> <center>N/A</center> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="16%"> <center>N/A</center> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="16%"> <center>N/A</center> </td> </tr>
<tr> <td valign="TOP" width="37%"> <dir> <dir>Mutare</dir> </dir> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="16%"> <center>3 155</center> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="16%"> <center>N/A</center> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="16%"> <center>N/A</center> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="16%"> <center>N/A</center> </td> </tr>
<tr> <td valign="TOP" width="37%">Other cargo non-unit trains</td> <td valign="TOP" width="16%"> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="16%"> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="16%"> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="16%"> </td> </tr>
<tr> <td valign="TOP" width="37%"> <dir> <dir>Harare</dir> </dir> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="16%"> <center>3 209</center> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="16%"> <center>1 629</center> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="16%"> <center>1 580</center> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="16%"> <center>49</center> </td> </tr>
<tr> <td valign="TOP" width="37%"> <dir> <dir>Bulawayo</dir> </dir> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="16%"> <center>3 180</center> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="16%"> <center>1 864</center> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="16%"> <center>1 316</center> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="16%"> <center>41</center> </td> </tr>
<tr> <td valign="TOP" width="37%"> <dir> <dir>Mutare</dir> </dir> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="16%"> <center>3 328</center> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="16%"> <center>1 325</center> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="16%"> <center>2 003</center> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="16%"> <center>60</center> </td> </tr>
<tr> <td valign="TOP" width="37%"><b>Imports</b></td> <td valign="TOP" width="16%"> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="16%"> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="16%"> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="16%"> </td> </tr>
<tr> <td valign="TOP" width="37%"> <dir> <dir>Harare</dir> </dir> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="16%"> <center>3 745</center> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="16%"> <center>2 034</center> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="16%"> <center>1 711</center> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="16%"> <center>46</center> </td> </tr>
<tr> <td valign="TOP" width="37%"> <dir> <dir>Bulawayo</dir> </dir> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="16%"> <center>3 613</center> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="16%"> <center>2 343</center> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="16%"> <center>1 270</center> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="16%"> <center>35</center> </td> </tr>
<tr> <td valign="TOP" width="37%"> <dir> <dir>Mutare</dir> </dir> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="16%"> <center>3 825</center> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="16%"> <center>1 526</center> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="16%"> <center>2 299</center> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="16%"> <center>60</center> </td> </tr>
</tbody></table><center><span style="font-family: arial;"><i><span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>Source: BCG Bulletin No.19 (August 1990)</span></span></i></span></center> <span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>The decision to "disengage" from the South African routes was also in line with the objectives of the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC), of which Zimbabwe was a member<sup> <a href="http://ccrweb.ccr.uct.ac.za/archive/defencedigest/defdigest03.html#Biblio">5</a> </sup>. SADCC was formed on the 1st of April 1980 when the nine founder members (Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe) signed the document entitled "Southern Africa: Towards Economic Liberation" in Lusaka, Zambia.</span></span> </span><br />
<span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>One of the objectives of SADCC was "the reduction of economic dependence, particularly, but not only on South Africa". The transport and communications sector was identified as a key area in the Lusaka Declaration and therefore, a Southern African Transport and Communications Commission (SATCC) was also established to co-ordinate regional transport projects<sup> <a href="http://ccrweb.ccr.uct.ac.za/archive/defencedigest/defdigest03.html#Biblio">6</a> </sup>. This regional transport co-ordination was necessary in view of the fact that six of the member states of SADCC are landlocked and were relying heavily on South African transport routes thus making them vulnerable to South Africa's acts of destabilisation.</span></span> </span><br />
<span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>Another crucial factor that influenced Zimbabwe's decision to "disengage" from South African transport routes was the apartheid regime's concerted efforts to use its economic power to try and bludgeon Zimbabwe into political and diplomatic concessions<sup> <a href="http://ccrweb.ccr.uct.ac.za/archive/defencedigest/defdigest03.html#Biblio">7</a> </sup>. As a result of the outspoken position against apartheid and the socialist rhetoric from the Zimbabwean government, by November 1980, more than 50 000 tonnes of Zimbabwean goods were being deliberately held at South African ports. In 1981 there was a fertiliser shortage in Zimbabwe while 300 000 tonnes of the country's freight was being held in South Africa, including three shipments of fertiliser. In April the same year, the South African Railways (SAR) announced the end of its trade agreement with the National Railways of Zimbabwe (NRZ), and demanded the return of 24 diesel locomotives leased to the NRZ. A transport crisis ensued and by the end of the year, more than Z$100 million worth of exports was being held up inside Zimbabwe for lack of transport to the ports<sup> <a href="http://ccrweb.ccr.uct.ac.za/archive/defencedigest/defdigest03.html#Biblio">8</a> </sup>.</span></span> </span><br />
<span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>The "maize train" was the first major freight to be re-routed via the Beira Corridor, but the line came under immediate attack from Renamo. Renamo was created by the Rhodesian Security Forces in the 1970s to destabilise the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA), the military wing of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), which was fighting against the Smith regime from Mozambique. After the independence of Zimbabwe, control of Renamo was taken over by the South African Defence Force (SADF) who used it to destabilise neighbouring countries<sup> <a href="http://ccrweb.ccr.uct.ac.za/archive/defencedigest/defdigest03.html#Biblio">9</a> </sup>. Since 1976, Renamo had managed to cripple Mozambique through acts of sabotage. In the 1980s, apartheid South Africa found another task for Renamo, that of sabotaging Zimbabwe's transport routes through Mozambique.</span></span> </span><br />
<span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>On 29 October 1981, the railway and road bridges over the Pungwe River were blown up together with Zimbabwe's oil pipeline, which runs under the road bridge<sup> <a href="http://ccrweb.ccr.uct.ac.za/archive/defencedigest/defdigest03.html#Biblio">10</a> </sup>. In December 1982, the oil storage depot at Maforga was also blown up. The resulting fuel shortage in Zimbabwe was so critical that road traffic was brought to a virtual stand still. Queues of vehicles at filling stations stretched several kilometres and at one point there was only one day's supply of petrol and two days' supply of diesel for the whole country<sup> <a href="http://ccrweb.ccr.uct.ac.za/archive/defencedigest/defdigest03.html#Biblio">11</a> </sup>. A national disaster was only averted by the clandestine movement of fuel by rail from Maputo via Komatipoort in South Africa to Beit Bridge. This line had been used as a sanctions-busting route for Rhodesia during the UDI era. When apartheid South Africa cut off that connection as well, the National Railways of Zimbabwe also blocked South African cargo to and from Zambia and Zaire. It was only then that Zimbabwean freight was released from South African ports and allowed to reach Zimbabwe.</span></span> </span><br />
<span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>In March 1981 South Africa gave one year's notice that it would abrogate the special bilateral trade agreement whereby Rhodesia had been allowed access at reduced duties to South Africa's protected market. The chronic state of uncertainty, which was created by that announcement, drove many South African buyers away from the Zimbabwean market even before the date of the end of the agreement<sup> <a href="http://ccrweb.ccr.uct.ac.za/archive/defencedigest/defdigest03.html#Biblio">12</a> </sup>.</span></span> </span><br />
<span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>The government of Zimbabwe therefore faced real economic and political pressures for the reopening of trade routes through Mozambique. Part of the economic rationale was that, even in a post - apartheid Southern Africa, there would still be a need to move away from South Africa both to reduce transportation costs and to try and balance economic benefits within the region in accordance with the aims of SADCC.</span></span> </span><br />
<h3> <span style="font-family: arial;"><a href="" name="3"></a><span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>3: The Three Corridors - Beira, Limpopo And Tete</span></span></span></h3><h4> <span style="font-family: arial;"><a href="" name="31"></a><span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>3.1 The Beira Corridor</span></span></span></h4><span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>T</span><span>his corridor contains four transport systems linking the Mozambican port of Beira on the Indian Ocean to the city of Mutare on the eastern border of Zimbabwe. The four systems are the railway line, the road, the oil pipeline and an electric powerline. The railway line was built by Cecil John Rhodes in 1898 and runs for 314 kilometres between Mutare and Beira. The oil pipeline from Beira to Feruka near Mutare was built by LONRHO in 1965. The pipeline runs parallel to the tarmac road that stretches from Machipanda on the Zimbabwean border to Beira. The electric powerline is a Mozambican line, which runs alongside the road from Chicamba Real Dam near Manica all the way to Beira.</span></span> </span><span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>The rehabilitation of the Beira Corridor was SADCC's highest priority programme, with SATCC publishing a ten-year development plan in May 1985. Control of the project was vested with the Beira Corridor Authority (BCA), a Mozambican parastatal body formed in 1985. The BCA worked hand in hand with the Beira Corridor Group (BCG), a user lobby and limited liability private company based in Zimbabwe. Technical assistance was obtained mostly from the Nordic countries and donor and soft loan funding was secured for capital and manpower by March 1986. The Beira Corridor was designated a protected area by the SADCC and security was to be maintained by Mozambican and Zimbabwean security forces.</span></span> </span><br />
<h4> <span style="font-family: arial;"><a href="" name="32"></a><span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>3.2 The Limpopo Corridor</span></span></span></h4><span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>T</span><span>his corridor comprises a rail link from Chicualacuala on the Zimbabwe - Mozambique border to the port of Maputo. The railway line was opened in 1955 and is 534 kilometres long. A road runs alongside the railway line, but by 1990 the road was only tarred between Barragem (where it crosses the Limpopo River), and Maputo, a very short distance. By 1974, this railway line carried 34 percent of Rhodesia's total exports. At its operational peak in 1974, Maputo was the largest port in Southern Africa after Durban. At Zimbabwe's independence in 1980, there was an increase in trade, but the line was effectively closed in 1984 due to increased Renamo attacks.</span></span> </span><span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>The rehabilitation of the Limpopo Corridor started in 1987 when the National Railways of Zimbabwe (NRZ) was contracted under a SADCC programme to replace the worn out wooden railway sleepers with concrete sleepers. The NRZ also had to replace the light 30-kilo-per-metre railway line for a 40-kilo-per-metre continuously welded line. The British Government provided the funding and a British company, Plessey, won the contract for the reinstallation of the radio and teleprinter links.</span></span> </span><br />
<span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>Security from Renamo attacks was to be provided by Mozambican and Zimbabwean armed forces. To this end, the British Government financed the training of five companies of Mozambican troops at Nyanga in Zimbabwe under the British Military Advisory and Training Team (BMATT) scheme. The British also provided funding to the ZDF and to the FAM, for "non - lethal" equipment for the units guarding the Limpopo Corridor.</span></span> </span><br />
<h4> <span style="font-family: arial;"><a href="" name="33"></a><span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>3.3 The Tete Corridor</span></span></span></h4><span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>T</span><span>his corridor is a tarred 263-kilometre road running from Nyamapanda on the Zimbabwean border through the Mozambican city of Tete to Zobue on the Malawi border. After UDI in 1965, this route carried Rhodesian goods to and from Malawi, which had not applied United Nations sanctions against the Smith regime. After the independence of Mozambique in 1974, the bulk of Malawi's trade with South Africa went through Rhodesia by road via Tete. It was only in 1984 that trade via this route declined because of Renamo attacks.</span></span> </span><span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>It was in the wake of these developments that in June 1984 the governments of Malawi, Mozambique and Zimbabwe formed a joint security committee<sup> <a href="http://ccrweb.ccr.uct.ac.za/archive/defencedigest/defdigest03.html#Biblio">13</a> </sup>. The aim of the committee was to monitor operations on a day - to - day basis and to attempt to remove all security threats along the Tete Corridor. Zimbabwe's First Mechanised Battalion was ordered to move into Mozambique and they established their headquarters in Tete thereby securing the strategic bridge crossing the Zambezi River. In 1985, President Samora Machel of Mozambique formally requested the governments of Tanzania and Zimbabwe to contribute troops for "the restoration of law and order" in Mozambique. Following this request, Tanzanian troops were deployed into Mozambique in the provinces north of the Zambezi River while Zimbabwe undertook to help restore law and order in the provinces south of the Zambezi River.</span></span> </span><br />
<span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>The decision to send Zimbabwean troops to help restore law and order in Mozambique was partly influenced by Zimbabwe's close relationship with the Mozambican government which dates back to Frelimo's assistance during Zimbabwe's war of liberation. There was also the underlying fact that Frelimo and ZANU shared a common Marxist ideology of scientific socialism. The South Africa-backed Renamo professed to be an anti - communist movement, just like Jonas Savimbi's Unita movement, which was fighting against the Marxist MPLA government of Angola. There was thus an ideological alliance of the Maputo - Harare - Luanda axis, with support for these governments from the Soviet Union. The fact that the United States of America was providing covert and overt support to opposition movements such as Unita in Angola and Renamo in Mozambique reflected the extension of the Cold War to Southern Africa. It was Zimbabwe's involvement in this complicated situation that deteriorated into what some critics have called "Zimbabwe's Vietnam"<sup> <a href="http://ccrweb.ccr.uct.ac.za/archive/defencedigest/defdigest03.html#Biblio">14</a> </sup>.</span></span> </span><br />
<h3> <span style="font-family: arial;"><a href="" name="4"></a><span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>4: Raids On Gorongossa</span></span></span></h3><span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>T</span><span>he first comprehensive intelligence on the importance of Renamo bases along the Gorongossa Mountains in Mozambique came from some Renamo elements that had been captured near Katiyo in north - eastern Zimbabwe. Some Renamo elements had crossed from Mozambique into Zimbabwe several times, had robbed some shops along the border and had burned down a timber factory. After several meetings with Mozambican officials it was agreed that the ZDF could pursue into Mozambique any Renamo elements that might have committed atrocities in Zimbabwe. This was the basis on which the ZDF started planning follow up operations which took them deep into Mozambique and all the way to Gorongossa.</span></span> </span><h4> <span style="font-family: arial;"><a href="" name="41"></a><span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>4.1 The First Raid on Gorongossa.</span></span></span></h4><span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span><b>Operation Lemon</b>. The first of these ZDF follow up operations was launched from Katiyo and Aberdeen and it was code named Operation Lemon. The operation lasted from the 5-9 December 1984. It comprised elements of 3 Brigade, the Para - Group, Special Air Service (SAS), and was supported by the Air Force of Zimbabwe (AFZ). Bad weather conditions and the difficult mountainous terrain reduced the use of aircraft, and all the trooping had to be done by helicopters. The movement of troops on the ground was also difficult. Four contacts were made and two Renamo bases were destroyed. However, most Renamo elements in the bases managed to escape and only eight were captured. The ZDF considered this operation as a major failure and the code word Lemon was corrupted to mean any failure in all subsequent operations. From the captured Renamo elements it was learned that one of the destroyed bases held approximately 100 Renamo elements. It was further established that there were no other permanent bases in the area, only some advance posts and temporary bases used by Renamo as launching pads for food raids into Zimbabwe. It was also revealed for the first time that the main Renamo bases were at Messinse, Chito, Nyazonia, Buetoni, Gorongossa, Central Base and Cassa Banana.</span></span> </span><span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>The captured Renamo elements also pinpointed the grid reference of Cassa Banana. They said that it was the headquarters of Renamo and that their commander, Afonso Dhlakama, stayed at that base with more than 400 Renamo elements. It was also revealed that some Zimbabweans were being trained at Cassa Banana and that this fact was a closely guarded secret. The report on Operation Lemon concluded that the only way of getting to the bottom of these claims was to attack the Renamo headquarters in the Gorongossa Mountains.</span></span> </span><br />
<span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span><b>Operation Grape Fruit</b>. The report for Operation Lemon was taken seriously by the commanders of the ZDF, and in July 1985 preparations for major offensive operations were started. Rehearsals for a FireForce operation were carried out at Inkomo Barracks near Harare. Three infantry brigades were mobilised together with the Para Group, One Commando Battalion and the AFZ. Men and equipment were moved to Chimoio in Mozambique, with a Forward Replenishment Point (FRP) being established at Grand Reef near Mutare. The Ministry of Defence set aside Z$40 million for the offensive. It was code named Operation Grapefruit, and the mission was "to annihilate the Renamo bandits and restore law and order in Manica, Tete and Sofala provinces"<sup> <a href="http://ccrweb.ccr.uct.ac.za/archive/defencedigest/defdigest03.html#Biblio">15</a> </sup>.</span></span> </span><br />
<span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>Intelligence sources had indicated that Renamo's main regional base in Manica province was at Muxamba and that Cassa Banana was the national stronghold of Renamo. Both bases had to be attacked and Muxamba was targeted first, being only 70 kilometres south of Chimoio. The most important consideration however, was the hope that activities around Muxamba might divert Renamo's attention from monitoring too closely the movement of the heavily armed three Zimbabwean infantry battalions marching from Chimoio towards the Gorongossa Mountains.</span></span> </span><br />
<span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>Muxamba was believed to hold at least 400 Renamo elements commanded by Major General Mabachi. The attack on Muxamba was launched on the 20th of August 1985 by elements of 3 Brigade, supported by the Para Group and the AFZ. The operation went on for four days with minor problems for the ZDF. One helicopter was riddled with small arms fire but managed to get back to Chimoio.</span></span> </span><br />
<span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>At the end of the operation, a head count of casualties revealed 40 Renamo and 30 civilian collaborators killed in the base. Captured documents revealed that Renamo had divided Mozambique into regions. In Manica and Sofala provinces these regions extended from the coast to the Zimbabwean border. Muxamba base was confirmed as having been the headquarters of Lion Region, which extended from Machipanda to Beira, and from Espungabeira to Nova Sofala. This Lion Region as a whole held a total strength of 2 000 Renamo elements who were organised into specialist units which included 40 paratroopers and 8 amphibious elements. Most of the weaponry captured at Muxamba was fairly old and mostly from the former Eastern Block countries.</span></span> </span><br />
<span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span><b>Raid on Cassa Banana</b>. Intelligence sources had indicated that Cassa Banana, Renamo's national headquarters had a strength of 400 elements. However, the organisation maintained a string of other smaller bases along the Gorongossa Mountains, which were considered as part of the main base. This raised the total estimated strength in the area to 1 000 elements. During the night of the 27th of August 1985, three Zimbabwe infantry battalions were established in their Form Up Points (FUP) with the help of the SAS and Commando elements. At Chimoio a FireForce was being given final briefing, and five AFZ planes were given orders for a first light take off for Gorongossa on the morning of the 28th of August.</span></span> </span><br />
<span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>Although the Renamo elements captured at Katiyo had given a grid reference for Cassa Banana, further intelligence had cast some doubt as to which of the several Renamo bases scattered on all sides of the Gorongossa Mountains was the actual headquarters of Renamo. It was because of this uncertainty that the FireForce was divided into three sections each with one helicopter gunship, two transport helicopters and two transport aircraft with paratroopers.</span></span> </span><br />
<span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>Each FireForce section was detailed to attack specific suspected Renamo positions around the Gorongossa Mountains. It was during this three pronged attack that one helicopter flew overhead Cassa Banana airstrip and the pilot noticed a green pickup truck disappearing into some bushes. It was then that the pilot recognised the place as that given at the briefing as Cassa Banana. The jets from ThornHill, which were already orbiting overhead a predetermined Initial Point (IP), were then talked on to the target, and the raid on Cassa Banana began.</span></span> </span><br />
<span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>The aircraft attacked the target, knocking out several Anti - Aircraft gun positions. Two helicopter gunships continued to hit suspected strategic positions and managed to flash out several pockets of resistance. A third helicopter was directing the dropping of the first wave of paratroopers. When the paratroopers had entered the base, the infantry battalions, which were close by, were ordered to move in and occupy strategic positions. The FireForce then moved on to deal with the several pockets of resistance from the smaller Renamo bases all along the Gorongossa Mountains. It took the whole day to silence all of these pockets of resistance.</span></span> </span><br />
<span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>There is no official Zimbabwean record of the number of casualties on the first raid on Cassa Banana. However, considering the amount of effort, the numbers of troops involved on both sides, and the time it took to capture the base, there must have been a lot of deaths and injuries on both sides. The leader of Renamo, Afonso Dhlakama, is said to have been deliberately allowed to escape by motorcycle in a northerly direction. He was believed to have been picked up the same day by an unidentified aircraft from an airstrip at Maringue north of Cassa Banana.</span></span> </span><br />
<span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>During the raid, a large quantity of weapons and documents were captured. The documents confirmed the fact that Renamo was receiving equipment and arms from South Africa, from the United States of America, and from Portugal. It was also revealed that Renamo was training some Zimbabweans who called themselves the Zimbabwe Resistance Army. Of the arms captured at Cassa Banana, most were of Eastern Block origin. The heavy field guns had all been captured from the FAM. It appears as if the South African forces on whom Renamo relied for weapons, were simply passing on to Renamo the arms they were capturing from Angola.</span></span> </span><br />
<h4> <span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>4.1.1. The Impact of the First Raid on Gorongossa</span></span></span></h4><span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>From August to December 1985, the ZDF continued to consolidate its position around the Gorongossa Mountains. The AFZ maintained three helicopters in the area with one transport aircraft for resupply and casualty evacuation.</span></span> </span><span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>During early November 1985, another clearing operation was carried out around Samacueza. This was a follow up to make sure that Renamo did not regroup after their flight from Cassa Banana, and also to show a military presence before the planned withdrawal of the ZDF from the area. On the 5th of November 1985, a small base was sighted near Samacueza and the FireForce was ordered to engage it. However, the canon of the helicopter gunship jammed on initial firing and the Renamo elements disappeared in the five minutes that it took to clear the gun from a safe distance. The search and destroy missions that followed prolonged the operations around Samacueza with grave consequences for the ZDF. Six days later, two Allouette helicopters crashed during night operations. Three crewmembers died and both helicopters were completely written off<sup> <a href="http://ccrweb.ccr.uct.ac.za/archive/defencedigest/defdigest03.html#Biblio">16</a> </sup>.</span></span> </span><br />
<span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>The two attacks on Muxamba and Cassa Banana, although tactically successful, could not be regarded as a strategic victory for the ZDF for various reasons. First, while these attacks destroyed Renamo's cached logistics and temporarily disorganised their command and control system, the manpower establishments were hardly affected. Of the 1 600 Renamo elements estimated to have been in the two headquarters, 200 were reported killed. This left an estimated 1 400 still at large including the leadership. After a nine-day period of radio communication confusion, Renamo appeared to have reorganised themselves and radio signals were being sent with more clarity<sup> <a href="http://ccrweb.ccr.uct.ac.za/archive/defencedigest/defdigest03.html#Biblio">17</a> </sup>.</span></span> </span><br />
<span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>All bases were instructed to cache their arms outside their resident bases to avoid a repetition of the losses incurred at Cassa Banana. Most Renamo bases in Manica and Sofala also changed their locations. However, intelligence sources in Zimbabwe were of the opinion that Renamo could not assume a truly mobile character because of the sparse nature of the rural population on which they depended.</span></span> </span><br />
<span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>While the idea was still that the FAM would occupy the areas attacked and neutralised by the ZDF, the ability of the Mozambicans to do so was doubtful. The raid on Cassa Banana released thousands of civilians who had been living in areas controlled by Renamo. These people desperately needed food, medical and other essential supplies. However, considering the fact that the Mozambican Government was finding it difficult to resupply their own troops with rations, medicine, clothing and ammunition, it was improbable that they could supply these civilians whom they considered to have been collaborating with the enemy. In the mean time however, the ZDF had to feed, cloth and treat these civilians to encourage them to stay within safe distances and not run away to rejoin Renamo in the bush. This was a very expensive exercise, one that the Zimbabweans could not maintain for any length of time.</span></span> </span><br />
<span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>Another factor, which undermined the Zimbabwean tactical successes, was that, while they had reduced Renamo's threat by a considerable degree in Manica and Sofala, Renamo operations had been going on unchecked in other provinces. The towns of Luabo, Chinde, Morrumbala, Mopeia and Caia were still under Renamo control, with Morrumbala, Caia and Mopeia having been captured by Renamo after the fall of Cassa Banana. A substantial quantity of arms and ammunition was also captured from the Mozambican forces that were stationed in these towns. The Renamo gains in ground and equipment from these latest moves could well have compensated for their losses in Sofala province. On the other hand, it can be said that the ZDF operations managed to neutralise Renamo operations in the two provinces of Manica and Sofala. Renamo movements across, in and out of areas adjacent to the Beira Corridor decreased dramatically. Movements after the raids indicated a northward flow into Zambezia and Tete provinces.</span></span> </span><br />
<span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>Also, Zimbabwe intelligence reports indicated that Renamo were abandoning their main base at Matenje in Tete province and were withdrawing to Malawi. Their flight from Matenje was believed to have been prompted by the advance of two FAM battalions with a Zimbabwean escort who were moving into Casula. However, this Renamo move could have been a redeployment to Zambezia, Niassa and the northern provinces. In the final analysis, the first raids on Gorongossa did not neutralise Renamo, as the Zimbabweans had believed.</span></span> </span><br />
<h4> <span style="font-family: arial;"><a href="" name="42"></a><span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>4.2. The Second Raid on Gorongossa</span></span></span></h4><span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span><b>Operation Octopus.</b> After the capture of Cassa Banana by the ZDF in August 1985, thousands of Renamo elements moved north towards the Zambezi River. Strategic towns along the Zambezi River such as Caia, Mutarara and Sena were captured by Renamo with very little resistance from the FAM. Generally, the area between Cassa Banana and Tete was not easily accessible and all roads and railway lines into the area had long been made unusable. The Zambezi River is navigable all the way from the Indian Ocean to Tete and the FAM were still strategically holding the town of Marromeu near the mouth of the Zambezi. The town of Marromeu boasted the largest sugar refinery in Southern Africa, and the sugar mills were still functioning. However, it was learned that Renamo was poised to attack the town and that the surrounding population was becoming sympathetic to the Renamo cause.</span></span> </span><span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>Based on the success of the raid on Cassa Banana, the ZDF Special Task Force (STF) commander at Chimoio, Col.Magama, planned an elaborate operation into the Marromeu area. The operation was code named Octopus. The plan was encouraged by the fact that the Zimbabwean and Mozambican commanders had made an agreement in December 1985 that the Air Forces of the two countries should operate jointly in any future anti - Renamo operation. Octopus was tipped to be the first operation to test such co-operation.</span></span> </span><br />
<span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>Some Zimbabwean SAS elements were moved from Chimoio to the town of Marromeu with the hope of reinforcing the FAM elements in the town. When they got near Marromeu the Zimbabweans learned that Renamo had already captured the town on the 9th January 1986. The 260 FAM elements in the area had abandoned their bases with little resistance, leaving all their stores, equipment, arms and ammunition for Renamo to take over. Renamo also took control of the only tarmac runway in the area.</span></span> </span><br />
<span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>When the news of the capture of Marromeu by Renamo reached the STF headquarters at Chimoio, Col. Magama flew to Beira where he received orders from the FAM General Mabote to recapture Marromeu with a joint FAM - ZDF force. A plan was quickly put into place and D-Day was set for the 24th January 1986. However, there was no detailed reconnaissance to confirm the Renamo positions plotted by the SAS from their places of hiding. There was no detailed knowledge of the deployment terrain and the SAS could not ascertain how many Renamo elements were in the area. The logistical backup, such as fuel for the helicopters, the resupply of troops and means of communication was not worked out in detail. The biggest mistake however, was the assumption that aircraft would be made available from Zimbabwe for the operation. As it turned out, the AFZ did not have a single aircraft serviceable for operations at that point in time.</span></span> </span><br />
<span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>On the 24th January 1986, a Casa transport aircraft on a routine resupply and troop -changeover mission landed at Chimoio from Harare. The STF Headquarters took the opportunity to use the aircraft to drop some Paras and Commandos near Marromeu. Their immediate task was to recapture and secure the runway at Marromeu for the coming operation. Two Mozambican helicopters (1x Mi 25 and 1x Mi 8) were available and it was decided that these would be used to conduct a forced reconnaissance on the town to determine the exact position of the Renamo elements. Col. Magama flew in with the Mi 25 helicopter in order to direct the operation from the air. The helicopter was shot down by Renamo while in orbit overhead the runway and it crashed into the Zambezi River. Col. Magama died on the spot including two SAS members and three Mozambican crewmembers<sup> <a href="http://ccrweb.ccr.uct.ac.za/archive/defencedigest/defdigest03.html#Biblio">18</a> </sup>.</span></span> </span><br />
<span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>The Mi 8 helicopter was also shot at but the pilot managed to fly it to Inhaminga. The Zimbabwean Casa transport aircraft only managed to drop troops but could not land to recover the victims of the Mi 25 crash because the runway had not been secured. The troops on the ground could not get near the crash site either, they could only watch from a distance as Renamo elements stripped the bodies of the victims of the crash of all clothing and equipment. They also looted everything that could be removed from the helicopter and the bodies of the victims were left to float on the Zambezi River.</span></span> </span><br />
<span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>For two days, frantic efforts were made to scramble aircraft for a rescue operation at Marromeu<sup> <a href="http://ccrweb.ccr.uct.ac.za/archive/defencedigest/defdigest03.html#Biblio">19</a> </sup>. However, no AFZ helicopters could be made serviceable. In the end, ZDF Headquarters in Harare sent a message to Chimoio instructing them to use Mozambican aircraft for the recapture of Marromeu. On the 26th January 1986, a FireForce section was assembled at Inhaminga under the command of Col. Dyck. It included 3 x Mi 25 helicopters, 1 x Mi 8 helicopter, 2 x Antonov transport aircraft, 2 x Dakotas, 1 x Casa 212 and elements of the Zimbabwean Para Group. There were no Zimbabwean helicopters available. The FireForce intended to attack Marromeu after a jet strike planned in detail by Col. Dyck<sup> <a href="http://ccrweb.ccr.uct.ac.za/archive/defencedigest/defdigest03.html#Biblio">20</a> </sup>. However, the weather was so bad both in Zimbabwe and in Mozambique that the jets could not take off. By the end of the third day there was still no action and the situation on the ground at Marromeu was becoming desperate.</span></span> </span><br />
<span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>On the morning of the 27th January, Col.Dyck decided to use the transport aircraft at his disposal for a dawn attack on Marromeu. When the Mozambicans refused to use their aircraft at Inhaminga, he loaded paratroopers into the two Dakotas and used the Casa 212 as his command aircraft for directing troops on the ground. The Paras were dropped right overhead the runway, capturing and securing it within a matter of minutes. The Dakotas flew several waves bringing in more troops, arms and ammunition from Inhaminga and Chimoio.</span></span> </span><br />
<span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>With this kind of reinforcements, the troops on the ground were able to move onto the town and flash out Renamo positions. They managed at last to get to the helicopter crash site and recovered the bodies of the victims. By that afternoon the town of Marromeu had been recaptured and more aircraft could land on the runway with safety. A Casa 212 landed to pick up the victims of the Mi 25 crash.</span></span> </span><br />
<span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>Besides the Mi 25 victims, two more Zimbabwean soldiers died during the assault and eight were injured. They were all evacuated by air. Of the 1 300 Renamo estimated to have been in and around Marromeu, 150 were said to have been killed. The rest fled further north into Zambezia province. A large assortment of arms and ammunition were captured, among which were 2 Main Battle Tanks and 4 Anti Aircraft guns that had been captured from the FAM<sup> <a href="http://ccrweb.ccr.uct.ac.za/archive/defencedigest/defdigest03.html#Biblio">21</a> </sup>. On the 28th January 1986, the ZDF was ordered to withdraw from both Marromeu and Inhaminga to Chimoio. The Zimbabweans were to hand over their positions to the Mozambicans. Other positions, which were also being held by the ZDF such as Fabrica, Cavalho, Canda and Cassa Banana, were also to be handed over to the FAM. The withdrawal was completed by the 31st January. By the beginning of February 1986, all Zimbabwean troops and aircraft were once again confined to the three corridors. Operation Octopus could not be sustained because of a lack of adequate air support.</span></span> </span><br />
<span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span><b>Operation Zero.</b> On the 10th February 1986, the STF Headquarters at Chimoio received an urgent signal from Villa Paiva De Andrada for air support at Cassa Banana. The message was originated by the FAM at Cassa Banana who reported that they were being attacked by a brigade size of Renamo troops. As there were no AFZ aircraft at Chimoio at the time, the message was further relayed to Beira. There was no reply from the FAM in Beira.</span></span> </span><br />
<span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>In the mean time, the Zimbabwean company at Villa Paiva De Andrada gathered that approximately 450 Renamo troops had recaptured Cassa Banana from the FAM, and were preparing to attack Canda and Villa Paiva De Andrada. A number of aircraft were also seen flying in and out of the area possibly resupplying Renamo. Some FAM soldiers who had fled from Cassa Banana arrived at Villa Paiva De Andrada and reported that at least ten of their number had been killed by Renamo, eight had been seriously injured and an unspecified number had been captured<sup> <a href="http://ccrweb.ccr.uct.ac.za/archive/defencedigest/defdigest03.html#Biblio">22</a> </sup>. The FAM also confirmed that they had left behind a lot of equipment, which Renamo was obviously going to use.</span></span> </span><br />
<span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>At a meeting held on the 5th February 1986, the ZDF commanders resolved to recapture Cassa Banana from Renamo and to change the ZDF method of operation. It was proposed that a StrikeForce be created to operate in a mode similar to the Rhodesian lightning cross border raids of the 1970s. The first such StrikeForce operation was therefore proposed for the second recapture of Cassa Banana. It took the ZDF exactly two months to put together the StrikeForce with the capacity to recapture Cassa Banana, which for the purpose of planning was code named Delta Base. The whole operation for the recapture of Cassa Banana was code named Operation Zero.</span></span> </span><br />
<span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>The planned D-Day for Operation Zero was Friday the 11th April 1986. However, on that day again the weather was bad with rain and thick fog around Mutare and Chimoio and visibility down to less than one kilometre. The operation had to be postponed to the next day. On the morning of the next day, the Zimbabwean StrikeForce attacked Delta Base, quickly seizing the northern and southern parts of the base. There was a lot of fighting in the northern sector, with one Zimbabwean killed and three injured in the first few minutes of their landing. On the southern sector there was also a lot of resistance especially from Panda Hills and along the river south of the runway. These resistance points were however neutralised by aircraft bombs.</span></span> </span><br />
<span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>However, fighting continued in the outer areas of Cassa Banana and Panda Hills was occupied by the middle of the day. The preparation of defensive positions and the dropping of supplies and reinforcement troops continued throughout the rest of the day. At Chimoio, the two Mozambican generals were still discussing plans when Major General Gava informed them that the ZDF had recaptured Cassa Banana for the second time. The Mozambicans expressed disbelief, but at 14:00Hrs Major General Die passed on the message to Maputo that Cassa Banana had been recaptured from Renamo.</span></span> </span><br />
<span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>The consolidation of captured positions was also a difficult task. The ZDF Commanders had decided that the StrikeForce should pull out of Cassa Banana as soon as possible and that there position should be occupied by No 1 Artillery Regiment. It was also decided that 32 Infantry Battalion should recapture and occupy Cavalho. A jet strike hit Cavalho at 13:00Hrs on the 14th April to soften the target for 32 Infantry Battalion. However, on their long march from Villa Paiva De Andrada, the battalion exhausted their first line of ammunition on minor skirmishes with Renamo elements along the way. When a Renamo rocket knocked out one of their vehicles, the whole battalion was grounded and could not proceed. It was only the next day that two companies of 32 Infantry Battalion occupied Cavalho, and the other two companies were uplifted by helicopters for reinforcements at Cassa Banana. By 14th April, Operation Zero's mission had been successfully accomplished.</span></span> </span><br />
<span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>On 15th April 1986, a high powered Zimbabwean delegation led by Major General Gava was able to survey the recaptured areas by helicopter. They flew from Chimoio through Machesi, Cavalho, Fabrica, round Panda Hills and landed at Cassa Banana. The briefing that they received was that Operation Zero had gone well, with all the air and ground troops executing their tasks as ordered. It was reported that 3 Zimbabwean soldiers had died during the attack, and that 7 were injured, one of them seriously. The dead and injured had all been evacuated by air to Chimoio and to Harare. One helicopter had received a small bullet hole, but no aircrew had been injured.</span></span> </span><br />
<span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>Among the captured equipment were 1x Anti - Aircraft gun and ammunition (one AA gun was blown up during the raid), 1 x vehicle, 1 x anti - paratrooper grenade launcher (the latest Soviet type 1982 model), 1 x armoured car, 1 x fully functional grader, and numerous bags of mealie - meal. The number of Renamo elements killed or injured could not be ascertained. The battleground was a gruesome sight with bodies scattered all over as a result of the aircraft bombing. Two Renamo bodies were recovered and buried. But, even allowing for the fact that, as a matter of principle Renamo never left their dead behind, the kill rate of Operation Zero appeared to be small considering the effort.</span></span> </span><br />
<h3> <span style="font-family: arial;"><a href="" name="5"></a><span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>5: Other Operations 1986 - 1990 <sup><a href="http://ccrweb.ccr.uct.ac.za/archive/defencedigest/defdigest03.html#Biblio">23</a></sup></span></span></span></h3><span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>O</span><span>peration Zero and the recapture of Cassa Banana was the end of the ZDF's initial involvement in Mozambique. It was also the beginning of a series of lightning strikes by the ZDF StrikeForce units comprising mostly Air Force, Para and Commando elements. These units became involved in a number of seek and destroy operations against Renamo bases all the way from Matenje in the north to Chokwe in the south of Mozambique.</span></span> </span><span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>These operations were a direct result of the success the ZDF had recorded with the StrikeForce concept during the recapture of Cassa Banana. The ZDF Commanders were convinced that the only way that the Beira Corridor could remain safe from Renamo attacks was by destroying Renamo bases. It was concluded that the only way these bases could be destroyed was by mounting relentless strike operations wherever a concentration of Renamo troops could be detected.</span></span> </span><br />
<span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>However, the StrikeForce was not expected to plan and execute their special operations as an entity by themselves. They were supposed to work in support of Zimbabwean infantry and mechanised battalions, which became semi - permanently based in Mozambique along the three trade corridors. Three blanket names were adopted for these semi - permanent "routine" operations being carried out by the Zimbabwean ground forces. These were Operation Grapefruit for the Beira Corridor, Operation Cobweb for the Tete Corridor, and Operation Open Way for the Limpopo Corridor.</span></span> </span><br />
<span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>In support of these semi - permanent "routine" operations, more than 40 StrikeForce operations were carried out covering the length and breadth of Mozambique. The tactics employed were the same as those used on the raids on Cassa Banana, but the scale of the air effort fluctuated a lot. All in all, more than 30 000 Zimbabwean troops were involved in these routine and special operations.</span></span> </span><br />
<span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>Operation Ndonga Chirenje, which was conducted around Mepunga and Djambe in June 1990 was a result of a follow up of Zimbabwean dissidents belonging to the Rev. Sithole who were said to be operating with Renamo assistance from bases around Mepunga and Djambe in Mozambique. Documents captured during the operation confirmed the suspicions and three Zimbabweans were captured<sup> <a href="http://ccrweb.ccr.uct.ac.za/archive/defencedigest/defdigest03.html#Biblio">24</a> </sup>. These were later used in the treason trials of Sithole.</span></span> </span><br />
<h3> <span style="font-family: arial;"><a href="" name="6"></a><span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>6: The Air Element <sup><a href="http://ccrweb.ccr.uct.ac.za/archive/defencedigest/defdigest03.html#Biblio">25</a></sup></span></span></span></h3><h4> <span style="font-family: arial;"><a href="" name="61"></a><span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>6.1. Routine Operations</span></span></span></h4><span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>W</span><span>hile the Commandos and the Para groups were engaged in their numerous StrikeForce operations, the infantry battalions and the mechanised group in the three corridors also required air support from the AFZ. The AFZ had to resuscitate long abandoned Forward AirFields (FAF) and mobilise the entire Supporting Services branch for the effort. Grand Reef, Buffalo Range and Kotwa Forward AirFields were brought back to life, and Tactical Command Units (TCUs) were established at Chimoio and Cassa Banana. Some wooden Temporary Field Accommodation (TFA) was constructed at Grand Reef, Buffalo Range and Chimoio while tents were erected at Kotwa and Cassa Banana.</span></span> </span><span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>On 24th March 1986, the AFZ detached 65 supporting staff from various sections to Chimoio. The men and equipment were to be under the command of the STF Commander at Chimoio. The reasons for this AFZ deployment included the following: first, Chimoio is 314 kilometres from Harare, which was two hours flying time by Allouette helicopter. The Allouette was the workhorse of the AFZ and it could be used for a variety of roles because of its versatility. AFZ reaction time to any foreseeable emergency in Mozambique would therefore be greatly improved if they operated from Chimoio.</span></span> </span><br />
<span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>Second, Zimbabwe's Eastern Highlands that border Mozambique are favourable for the formation of low, thick and rainy clouds that in many cases spread as far as Chimoio. It was difficult for aircraft to react to emergency calls in Mozambique even from border airfields like Kotwa, Grand Reef and Buffalo Range. The situation was compounded by the fact that the runway at Chimoio had no ground navigational beacons and that most AFZ aircraft had limited navigational instruments.</span></span> </span><br />
<span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>Third, the bureaucratic red tape involved in the requesting of aircraft to react to an emergency was such that in a number of cases the approval for the use of an aircraft would be given when it was already too late to attend to the emergency. In some cases soldiers who could have been saved died in the Mozambican jungle before an aircraft could be released, even though there were always some aircraft on standby in Harare. Because of all these reasons an AFZ detachment with three helicopters and a transport aircraft were semi - permanently stationed at Chimoio under the command of a Forward Field Unit (FFU) officer of the rank of Wing Commander.</span></span> </span><br />
<span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>The roles of these aircraft were various. The helicopters deployed troops, delivered supplies, evacuated casualties and gave close air support. They carried out search and rescue operations, visual reconnaissance, hot extraction, and also escorted trains from Beira to Mutare and back. The transport aircraft were used mainly for the dropping of troops and supplies, casualty evacuation to Harare, establishing communications with lost units, sky - shouting and the dropping of propaganda leaflets. Sometimes armed Agusta Bell 412 helicopters would escort the transport aircraft. The Agusta Bell was not used as a gunship but it fulfilled all the other roles played by the Allouette helicopter. In addition, the Bell was used to ferry Commanders and other VIPs on their routine inspections and tours of the operational areas to boost the morale of the troops.</span></span> </span><br />
<span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>The AFZ also experienced a lot of manpower problems in the 1980s. Most of the experienced former Rhodesian pilots had left the country after Zimbabwe's independence in 1980. The few who remained had their chances spoiled by one of their own. In 1987 Flight Lieutenant Garry Kane stole an AFZ Agusta Bell 412 helicopter and in co-operation with some South African Commandos, tried to free some South African 'spies' who were being held at Harare's Chikurubi Maximum Security Prison. The plot failed, but Garry Kane escaped to South Africa with his South African Commando friends. Afraid of being associated with Garry Kane, many former Rhodesian pilots who had remained behind also left the AFZ.</span></span> </span><br />
<span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>All AFZ squadrons were in the process of training pilots and technicians when the Mozambican campaign started. A lot of young pilots had received training in China, North Korea, Romania, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Greece, Libya and the former USSR. Their methods of operation and the types of aircraft they had been trained on were so different that they all needed to be retrained on local aircraft and on local Standard Operational Procedures (SOPs). The AFZ contracted flying and technical instructors from Pakistan but, although they did their job well, they were not familiar with local SOPs and some Zimbabwean aircraft were not available in Pakistan.</span></span> </span><br />
<span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>The squadron of C337 Lynx aircraft was grounded until 1985 because there were no pilots who could fly the Lynx. It was only in 1987 that one pilot qualified as a captain on the C337 and joined the operations in Mozambique. The fleet of Canberra aircraft remained grounded for the duration of the operation because there were no pilots, no technicians and no navigators for the Canberra. In 1986 some American flying instructors tried to retrain Zimbabwean pilots on the Bell 205 helicopter, but the aircraft was quickly withdrawn from the Mozambican operations because there were too many accidents involving the Bell 205. Also, there was only one technician who knew how to service the Bell 205 and he had since left the AFZ and was only being contracted from a civilian company, AIRWORK, on an hourly basis.</span></span> </span><br />
<span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>When the squadron of 12 Agusta Bell 412 helicopters became operational in 1987, there was such a shortage of pilots that some young newly arrived Libyan - trained pilots went into operations in Mozambique without doing any ground studies on the aircraft. Their Pakistani instructors just taught them how to start and fly the helicopter and how to perform the basic operational manoeuvres. They had no idea as to how any of the systems on the aircraft worked and how to handle technical emergency situations. Some of these pilots had to do some technical lessons at Grand Reef during the night after flying the aircraft in Mozambique for operations during the day.</span></span> </span><br />
<span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>As mentioned earlier, the Allouette 111 helicopters were so overused that by January 1986 they were all grounded for major services. The 12 Cassa 212 transport aircraft were also new in the system and most of the technicians were not sure of some of the aircraft's operational capabilities. At one time a number of Cassa 212 aircraft experienced oil filter problems which took the technicians weeks to figure out how to repair. Such time delays in making aircraft serviceable meant that the AFZ's operational demands could not be met.</span></span> </span><br />
<span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>With the Agusta Bell 412, pilots overestimated the maximum all up weight of the helicopter mostly because they did not know the technical limitations of the aircraft. In some instances they would load boxes of ammunition to the roof of the cabin and try to take off, of course without success. This caused a lot of stress on the airframes of the helicopters and this was reflected by increased vibrations, which sometimes caused the windshields of the aircraft to crack. By the end of 1988 at least 10 Agusta Bell 412 helicopters had to have their windshields changed at great expense to the AFZ. The fleet of DC-47 Dakotas was eventually retired from service because of age but one Dakota had killed 17 people, the biggest number of Zimbabweans to die in one accident in Mozambique.</span></span> </span><br />
<span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>There were no modern maps of Mozambique available for both the ground forces and for the AFZ. For the entire period of the war, the pilots had to use photostat copies of very old maps of Mozambique, some of which were printed in the 1960s. Getting lost was common among crews because almost all the pilots reported getting lost at some point or another. There were no ground navigational radio beacons to home onto and not a single AFZ aircraft had any Global Positioning System (GPS) which would have made navigation that much easier for the Zimbabwean pilots. Instead, the pilots had to rely on low level point-to-point navigation, which was very dangerous.</span></span> </span><br />
<span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>The AFZ also lacked senior representation in the field and this created a lot of problems. Ground force commanders were left to make important decisions concerning the use of aircraft, in most cases on the advice of an AFZ Flight Lieutenant and in rare cases a Squadron Leader. Most of these junior AFZ officers had no direct communications with Air Force Headquarters and had to request clearances for action via their squadrons which would request the Base Commander to get clearance from Air Force Headquarters in Harare. This caused a lot of unnecessary delays. Also, these junior officers never wrote any daily reports of occurrences so that a lot of what happened to the AFZ in Mozambique was never recorded.</span></span> </span><br />
<h4> <span style="font-family: arial;"><a href="" name="62"></a><span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>6.2. Aircraft Accidents</span></span></span></h4><span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>T</span><span>here were seven fatal aircraft accidents involving the AFZ in Mozambique between 1983 and 1990. These involved 4 x Allouette 111 helicopters, 1 x DC-47 Dakota, 1 x Casa 212, and 1 x Agusta Bell 412 helicopter. In these accidents, 26 Zimbabwean soldiers died and 12 were injured. All the aircraft concerned were completely written off. These aircraft were not replaced, first because insurance companies would not pay for damage resulting from an act of war, and second because the Zimbabwean Government did not have the money to buy replacement aircraft.</span></span> </span><span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>There were also 100 minor aircraft accidents/special occurrences (SOR) in which no one died but the aircraft were seriously damaged. The Allouette 111 helicopter experienced the largest number of accidents and SOR throughout the whole period. This was mainly due to the fact that the Allouette 111 was the most active aircraft in the war, and that the Allouette crew were almost always overworked and therefore more exposed to error inducing factors. Most of the accidents and SOR were classified by Boards of Inquiry as "Crew Error - Avoidable". However, other aircraft types and their crews experienced their share of accidents at one time or another. Out of the 100 SORs, 40 were classified as crew error, 34 were due to operational hazards that were unavoidable and 26 were a result of technical faults.</span></span> </span><br />
<h3> <span style="font-family: arial;"><a href="" name="7"></a><span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>7: ZDF Expenditure In Mozambique</span></span></span></h3><h4> <span style="font-family: arial;"><a href="" name="71"></a><span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>7.1. The Zimbabwe Defence Budget</span></span></span></h4><span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>A</span><span>lthough the ZDF's operations in Mozambique were extremely costly, their effect on Zimbabwe's defence budget tended to be overshadowed by other equally important factors. In order to place this expenditure in its proper perspective, it is necessary first to examine Zimbabwe's total defence expenditure in relation to the country's Total Government Budget and Gross National Product (GNP), as shown in table 3.</span></span> </span><h5> <span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>Table 3. Zimbabwe�s Defence Expenditure and Armed Forces, 1981-1994</span></span></span></h5><table border="1" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"><tbody>
<tr> <td valign="TOP" width="11%">Year</td> <td valign="TOP" width="16%">Current US$m</td> <td valign="TOP" width="16%">Constant 1994 US$m</td> <td valign="TOP" width="11%">Armed Forces</td> <td valign="TOP" width="16%">Defence/ Total Govt (%)</td> <td valign="TOP" width="13%">Defence/ GNP (%)</td> <td valign="TOP" width="18%">Armed Forces Per 1000</td> </tr>
<tr> <td height="16" valign="TOP" width="11%">1981</td> <td height="16" valign="TOP" width="16%"> <center>181</center> </td> <td height="16" valign="TOP" width="16%"> <center>307</center> </td> <td height="16" valign="TOP" width="11%"> <center>74</center> </td> <td height="16" valign="TOP" width="16%"> <center>19.2</center> </td> <td height="16" valign="TOP" width="13%"> <center>6.2</center> </td> <td height="16" valign="TOP" width="18%"> <center>9.8</center> </td> </tr>
<tr> <td height="17" valign="TOP" width="11%">1982</td> <td height="17" valign="TOP" width="16%"> <center>202</center> </td> <td height="17" valign="TOP" width="16%"> <center>319</center> </td> <td height="17" valign="TOP" width="11%"> <center>50</center> </td> <td height="17" valign="TOP" width="16%"> <center>15.6</center> </td> <td height="17" valign="TOP" width="13%"> <center>6.5</center> </td> <td height="17" valign="TOP" width="18%"> <center>6.4</center> </td> </tr>
<tr> <td valign="TOP" width="11%">1983</td> <td valign="TOP" width="16%"> <center>207</center> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="16%"> <center>314</center> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="11%"> <center>46</center> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="16%"> <center>16.7</center> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="13%"> <center>6.3</center> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="18%"> <center>5.7</center> </td> </tr>
<tr> <td valign="TOP" width="11%">1984</td> <td valign="TOP" width="16%"> <center>186</center> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="16%"> <center>257</center> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="11%"> <center>46</center> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="16%"> <center>15.0</center> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="13%"> <center>6.7</center> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="18%"> <center>5.5</center> </td> </tr>
<tr> <td valign="TOP" width="11%">1985</td> <td valign="TOP" width="16%"> <center>178</center> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="16%"> <center>237</center> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="11%"> <center>46</center> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="16%"> <center>14.4</center> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="13%"> <center>5.7</center> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="18%"> <center>5.3</center> </td> </tr>
<tr> <td valign="TOP" width="11%">1986</td> <td valign="TOP" width="16%"> <center>204</center> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="16%"> <center>266</center> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="11%"> <center>45</center> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="16%"> <center>15.6</center> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="13%"> <center>6.4</center> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="18%"> <center>5.0</center> </td> </tr>
<tr> <td valign="TOP" width="11%">1987</td> <td valign="TOP" width="16%"> <center>250</center> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="16%"> <center>315</center> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="11%"> <center>45</center> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="16%"> <center>16.1</center> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="13%"> <center>7.5</center> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="18%"> <center>4.8</center> </td> </tr>
<tr> <td valign="TOP" width="11%">1988</td> <td valign="TOP" width="16%"> <center>236</center> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="16%"> <center>287</center> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="11%"> <center>45</center> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="16%"> <center>15.0</center> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="13%"> <center>6.3</center> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="18%"> <center>4.7</center> </td> </tr>
<tr> <td valign="TOP" width="11%">1989</td> <td valign="TOP" width="16%"> <center>255</center> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="16%"> <center>296</center> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="11%"> <center>51</center> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="16%"> <center>15.0</center> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="13%"> <center>6.1</center> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="18%"> <center>5.1</center> </td> </tr>
<tr> <td valign="TOP" width="11%">1990</td> <td valign="TOP" width="16%"> <center>235</center> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="16%"> <center>262</center> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="11%"> <center>45</center> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="16%"> <center>13.0</center> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="13%"> <center>5.3</center> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="18%"> <center>4.4</center> </td> </tr>
<tr> <td valign="TOP" width="11%">1991</td> <td valign="TOP" width="16%"> <center>262</center> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="16%"> <center>281</center> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="11%"> <center>45</center> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="16%"> <center>14.0</center> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="13%"> <center>5.6</center> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="18%"> <center>4.3</center> </td> </tr>
<tr> <td valign="TOP" width="11%">1992</td> <td valign="TOP" width="16%"> <center>250</center> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="16%"> <center>260</center> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="11%"> <center>48</center> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="16%"> <center>11.9</center> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="13%"> <center>5.5</center> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="18%"> <center>4.5</center> </td> </tr>
<tr> <td valign="TOP" width="11%">1993</td> <td valign="TOP" width="16%"> <center>209</center> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="16%"> <center>213</center> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="11%"> <center>48</center> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="16%"> <center>15.0</center> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="13%"> <center>4.3</center> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="18%"> <center>4.4</center> </td> </tr>
<tr> <td valign="TOP" width="11%">1994</td> <td valign="TOP" width="16%"> <center>188</center> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="16%"> <center>188</center> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="11%"> <center>43</center> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="16%"> <center>N/A</center> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="13%"> <center>3.7</center> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="18%"> <center>3.9</center> </td> </tr>
</tbody></table><span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>The increase in defence expenditure in the early 1980s was due mainly to the increased number of personnel in the armed forces which jumped from the 38 000 Rhodesian Security Forces to 94 000 after the inclusion of the former ZANLA and ZIPRA forces. Defence expenditure further increased in 1983 mainly because of the "dissident" problem in Matebeleland and the increase in the number of military establishments as the army infantry brigades were increased from four in 1980 to six by 1990. However, part of the increase in defence expenditure after 1982 was due to the ZDF's operations in Mozambique.</span></span> </span><br />
<span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>In 1984 a decrease in defence expenditure was recorded when there was hope of peace due to decreased Renamo activity following the Nkomati Accord between Mozambique and South Africa. However, the Nkomati Accord was a failure and when the ZDF started raiding Renamo bases in Mozambique, Zimbabwe's defence expenditure went up again, reaching a peak in 1987 when ZDF activities in Mozambique were at their highest. In 1987 defence expenditure accounted for 7.5% of GNP, its highest level since 1981. From a peak in 1987 defence expenditure began to decline in real terms during the late 1980s and early 1990s, despite the fact that the ZDF became increasingly involved in United Nations peacekeeping operations in Rwanda, Somalia and Angola. The start of constitutional negotiations in 1990 between the African National Congress and the South African government aimed at ending apartheid, and the ending of South Africa's destabilisation tactics in the region also contributed to the declines in defence expenditure in the early 1990s.</span></span> </span><br />
<h4> <span style="font-family: arial;"><a href="" name="72"></a><span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>7.2. Army Expenditure <sup><a href="http://ccrweb.ccr.uct.ac.za/archive/defencedigest/defdigest03.html#Biblio">26</a></sup></span></span></span></h4><span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>B</span><span>etween 1982 and 1984 the Zimbabwe National Army did not calculate expenditure in Mozambique. A senior officer in the Army Finance Branch explained that during those days the Army did not keep any financial statistics because they did not expect to be reimbursed by the Mozambican Government. However Army Operations Branch had their own explanation for the lack of statistics. A senior OPS officer explained that before 1985, most operational information was top secret. No one told anyone else the nature and extent of their contribution to operations. The were still many white former Rhodesian Security Forces in the ZDF and they could not be trusted with information because some of them were known to be involved in acts of sabotage against the Zimbabwean Government.</span></span> </span><span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>The examples that the OPS officer gave included the incident on 16th August 1981 in which a series of massive explosions ripped through the armoury at Inkomo Barracks near Harare destroying Z$36 million worth of arms and ammunition. On 25th July 1982 a quarter of Zimbabwe's FGA jets, which were newly acquired from the United Kingdom, were burned to the ground in a hanger at Thorn Hill Air Base near Gweru. In both incidents, some white former Rhodesian Security Forces who were still serving in the ZDF were arrested for the crimes.</span></span> </span><br />
<span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>On the other hand, "integrated" former ZANLA and former ZIPRA guerrillas did not trust each other because of the "dissident" problem in Matebeleland in which some former ZIPRA guerrillas had taken to the bush in 1981 threatening to plunge the country into civil war. This situation necessitated the deployment of the Fifth Brigade into Matebeleland. The methods used by the Fifth Brigade to avert civil war received the highest level of criticism both nationally and internationally. As a result of mutual suspicions, said the OPS officer, commanders in the field whether internal or external did not make any reports whether on operational results or costs because they did not know who might get hold of such information and what they might use it for. From 1985 some internal costings were made of ZDF expenditure in Mozambique (see table 4).</span></span> </span><br />
<h5> <span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>Table 4. ZNA and AFZ Expenditure in Mozambique 1985 � 90</span></span></span></h5><table border="1" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"><tbody>
<tr> <td valign="TOP" width="19%">Year </td> <td valign="TOP" width="42%"> <center>ZNA Expenditure</center> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="39%"> <center>AFZ Expenditure</center> </td> </tr>
<tr> <td valign="TOP" width="19%">1985 </td> <td valign="TOP" width="42%"> <center>8 734 750</center> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="39%"> <center>not calculated</center> </td> </tr>
<tr> <td valign="TOP" width="19%">1986 </td> <td valign="TOP" width="42%"> <center>13 345 948</center> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="39%"> <center>2 309 611</center> </td> </tr>
<tr> <td valign="TOP" width="19%">1987 </td> <td valign="TOP" width="42%"> <center>24 645 575</center> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="39%"> <center>5 361 478</center> </td> </tr>
<tr> <td valign="TOP" width="19%">1988 </td> <td valign="TOP" width="42%"> <center>20 320 943</center> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="39%"> <center>3 479 816</center> </td> </tr>
<tr> <td valign="TOP" width="19%">1989 </td> <td valign="TOP" width="42%"> <center>22 223 472</center> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="39%"> <center>2 564 590</center> </td> </tr>
<tr> <td valign="TOP" width="19%">1990 </td> <td valign="TOP" width="42%"> <center>14 525 883</center> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="39%"> <center>8 776 348</center> </td> </tr>
</tbody></table><center><span style="font-family: arial;"><i><span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>Sources: ZNA file, FIN/25/6/1, 1990, Annex A-D (Totalled);</span></span></i> <br />
<i><span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>AFZ file, HQ/C2/6/1/Air, Vols.1-3, 1985-1990</span></span></i></span></center> <span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>The figures in table 4 must be viewed in light of the following explanations sent to the Secretary for Defence by the then Army Commander Lieutenant General Mujuru.</span></span> </span><br />
<ol type="a"><span style="font-family: arial;">
<li> <span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>Salaries are not included.</span></span></li>
<li> <span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>It must be emphasised that the figures presented are estimates only such that the actual costs have been much higher than is reflected in the Annexes.</span></span></li>
<li> <span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>Information on all damaged/destroyed equipment cannot be accurately ascertained because in most cases the units did not submit the figures when the costings had been done.</span></span></li>
<li> <span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>Depreciation of equipment has not been included because Logistics Branch and the respective corps have not come up with formula for calculating depreciation.</span></span></li>
<li> <span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>The cost of transportation of equipment and rations to the operational areas has not been calculated again because Logistics Branch has not advised the Finance Branch of the methods by which these costs could be measured.</span></span></li>
</span></ol><span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>The largest items on the Army expenditure list were rations followed by ammunition. The general rise in the prices of food items in the country due to inflation no doubt contributed a lot to the ever-increasing costs for rations. However, a sizeable amount of the rations found their way onto the black-market where they were sold in exchange for items that were scarce in Zimbabwe like whisky, rice and prawns. These and other items were often smuggled by soldiers into Zimbabwe. However, the majority of officials who investigated cases of smuggling by soldiers seem to think there were no serious cases of smuggling or blackmarketeering. This is despite the fact that a number of cases hit the headlines of many local newspapers showing some soldiers who were caught selling items that had been smuggled in from Mozambique.</span></span> </span><h4> <span style="font-family: arial;"><a href="" name="73"></a><span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>7.3. Air Force Expenditure</span></span></span></h4><span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>T</span><span>he AFZ did not make any estimates of expenditure before the launching of the first raid on Gorongossa. After the raid, no calculations were made as to how many aircraft hours were flown and how much aviation fuel was used. To these omissions must be added the cost of bombs thrown on targets, the cost of aircraft spares used in the operation, the cost of parachutes used and the value of those parachutes not recovered, and the rations for all the supporting staff that were deployed for the operation. A senior Air Force officer estimated that the operation must have cost the Air Force at least Z$5 million in 1985 prices.</span></span> </span><span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>Another senior Air Force officer suggested that perhaps the official thinking was that the war was going to be short, and that an evaluation of expenditure was going to be carried out once the operation was over. However, the war did not end that soon, and it was only in 1986 that some financial records of the Mozambican campaign were kept by the AFZ (see table 4).</span></span> </span><br />
<span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>Unfortunately, these figures do not tell the whole story, as there is a lot of information that was not included in official calculations. These include the cost of the seven aircraft that crashed in Mozambique and were written off. Also important is the cost of recovering the wreckage of all the aircraft that were involved in accidents in Mozambique. The Zimbabweans carried every scrap of metal from crash sites for the purposes of Boards of Inquiry, which could not be carried out in operational areas. There was also the unrecorded costs of repairing all those aircraft that recorded "special occurrences" in Mozambique.</span></span> </span><br />
<span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>The biggest error by Air Force Headquarters was the omission of data from Thorn Hill Air Base from all their calculations. The number of flying hours and the operational costs of jet and other fighter aircraft that operated from Thorn Hill does not appear on any report sent to the Ministry of Defence for the whole period. Yet, such expensive aircraft like Hunters, Hawks, C337 and SF-260 were used in almost every FireForce or StrikeForce operation, and a good number of them were damaged. The cost of the bombs and other ammunition that these aircraft used was not calculated, nor the amount and cost of aviation fuel that these aircraft used.</span></span> </span><br />
<span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>While there is no evidence that the ZDF deliberately contaminated their statistics in order to misinform the general public, there is no doubt that there was gross negligence in accounting for Zimbabwe's war effort in Mozambique. It is rather paradoxical that the Government was so keen to reduce national transport costs to the point of involving its armed forces in a neighbouring country's civil war and yet the forces involved in that economic war did not take the trouble of properly accounting for their expenses and losses.</span></span> </span><br />
<h3> <span style="font-family: arial;"><a href="" name="8"></a><span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>8: Casualties</span></span></span></h3><span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>T</span><span>he official number of ZDF members who died and those who were injured in Mozambique as a result of direct participation in operations are presented in table 5.</span></span> </span><h5> <span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>Table 5: ZDF casualties in Mozambique, 1984-1990</span></span></span></h5><table border="1" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"><tbody>
<tr> <td valign="TOP" width="20%"> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="20%"> <center><b><i>Army</i></b></center> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="20%"> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="20%"> <center><b><i>Airforce</i></b></center> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="20%"> </td> </tr>
<tr> <td valign="TOP" width="20%"><b><i>Year</i></b></td> <td valign="TOP" width="20%"> <center><b><i>Killed</i></b></center> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="20%"> <center><b><i>Injured</i></b></center> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="20%"> <center><b><i>Killed</i></b></center> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="20%"> <center><b><i>Injured</i></b></center> </td> </tr>
<tr> <td valign="TOP" width="20%">1984 </td> <td valign="TOP" width="20%"> <center>42</center> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="20%"> <center>N/A</center> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="20%"> <center>N/A</center> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="20%"> <center>N/A</center> </td> </tr>
<tr> <td valign="TOP" width="20%">1985 </td> <td valign="TOP" width="20%"> <center>61</center> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="20%"> <center>N/A</center> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="20%"> <center>2</center> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="20%"> <center>2</center> </td> </tr>
<tr> <td valign="TOP" width="20%">1986 </td> <td valign="TOP" width="20%"> <center>40</center> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="20%"> <center>130</center> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="20%"> <center>14</center> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="20%"> <center>7</center> </td> </tr>
<tr> <td valign="TOP" width="20%">1987 </td> <td valign="TOP" width="20%"> <center>33</center> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="20%"> <center>144</center> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="20%"> <center>4</center> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="20%"> <center>NIL</center> </td> </tr>
<tr> <td valign="TOP" width="20%">1988 </td> <td valign="TOP" width="20%"> <center>44</center> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="20%"> <center>110</center> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="20%"> <center>2</center> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="20%"> <center>3</center> </td> </tr>
<tr> <td valign="TOP" width="20%">1989 </td> <td valign="TOP" width="20%"> <center>31</center> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="20%"> <center>98</center> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="20%"> <center>2</center> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="20%"> <center>NIL</center> </td> </tr>
<tr> <td valign="TOP" width="20%">1990 </td> <td valign="TOP" width="20%"> <center>45</center> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="20%"> <center>141</center> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="20%"> <center>NIL</center> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="20%"> <center>NIL</center> </td> </tr>
<tr> <td valign="TOP" width="20%"><b>Total</b></td> <td valign="TOP" width="20%"> <center><b>296</b></center> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="20%"> <center><b>623</b></center> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="20%"> <center><b>24</b></center> </td> <td valign="TOP" width="20%"> <center><b>12</b></center> </td> </tr>
</tbody></table><center><span style="font-family: arial;"><i><span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>Source: Army - ZAPARC Records; Airforce - PARO Records</span></span></i></span></center> <span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>It is difficult to be accurate on the number of Zimbabwean casualties because operational casualty figures were never kept separate from other deaths and injuries records for both the Army and the Air Force. It appears as if this lack of concern for accurate records of casualties went as far as the Ministry of Defence itself. In a 1988 interview, the then Minister of Defence Mr Enos Nkala was quoted as saying,</span></span> </span><br />
<blockquote><span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span><i>"There is a war on and yes we have lost some people. But it is not really something that the nation should worry about, as the numbers are so insignificant" </i><sup><a href="http://ccrweb.ccr.uct.ac.za/archive/defencedigest/defdigest03.html#Biblio">27</a></sup></span></span></span></blockquote><span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>It is true that the ZDF's losses in Mozambique were relatively small, but to say that "the numbers are so insignificant" is an understatement, which shows a lack of respect for human life. Even the loss of one life should not be taken lightly. There are also some financial implications involved in the death of any soldier. First, the pensions and or compensation for those killed or injured become immediately due and payable by the Government and this amounted to millions of dollars. Second the dead and injured have to be replaced and the training of an individual for combat readiness requires a lot of resources in time, money and equipment.</span></span> </span><h3> <span style="font-family: arial;"><a href="" name="9"></a><span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>9: Withdrawal Of Zimbabwean Troops From Mozambique</span></span></span></h3><span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>P</span><span>eace in Mozambique was brought about not by victory from either side but by negotiation. The peace negotiations were organised by the Italian Catholic Community of Sant'Egidio, and they took place in Rome Italy between July 1990 and October 1992. By 1990 the Cold War had ended and with it ended the political standoff that had prevented the holding of talks between opposing forces in Southern Africa. The situation was well summed up by Cameron Hume:</span></span> </span><blockquote><span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span><i>"By the early 1990s, no external party was prepared to keep sustaining its chosen Mozambican ally; alliances were frayed (for example Zimbabwe wanted an exit from its intervention, and the Soviets and South Africans were disengaging), and donor fatigue had begun to appear; moreover, Mozambique had virtually no resources of its own to sustain the conflict. The impetus from Rome (both religious and official) found a receptive audience in Southern Africa - in part because U.S., British, and Portuguese attention was directed elsewhere" </i><sup><a href="http://ccrweb.ccr.uct.ac.za/archive/defencedigest/defdigest03.html#Biblio">28</a></sup></span></span></span></blockquote><span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>In November 1990, while the peace negotiations were still taking place, a partial cease-fire agreement was signed which paved the way for the withdrawal of Zimbabwean troops from Mozambique. The terms of the partial cease-fire required that Zimbabwean troops be concentrated into the Beira and Limpopo Corridors each twenty kilometres wide. Border operations were restricted to the Zimbabwe - Mozambique border and there were to be no AFZ overflights into Mozambique. Renamo promised not to attack the corridors and a Joint Verification Commission (JVC) chaired by the Italian Ambassador to Mozambique was set up to supervise the partial cease-fire<sup> <a href="http://ccrweb.ccr.uct.ac.za/archive/defencedigest/defdigest03.html#Biblio">29</a> </sup>. The JVC comprised members from Kenya, Portugal, the United States, Zambia, the Congo, France, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom.</span></span> </span><span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>The negotiations that followed resulted in the total cease-fire agreement signed in Rome in October 1992. The Rome agreement ended the Mozambican civil war. Zimbabwe withdrew its forces from Mozambique in April 1993. The end of the Zimbabwean withdrawal from Mozambique was marked by a farewell parade at Chimoio and welcome parades at Mutare and Chiredzi that were all held on the 14th April 1993. President Joaquim Chissano officiated and gave a farewell address to the Zimbabwean troops at Chimoio, while President Robert Mugabe gave a welcome address to the troops at the Mutare parade<sup> <a href="http://ccrweb.ccr.uct.ac.za/archive/defencedigest/defdigest03.html#Biblio">30</a> </sup>. Thereafter, a United Nations force comprising troops from Italy, Zambia and Botswana took over the guarding of the three corridors, Beira, Limpopo and Tete. Other UN forces later joined in to supervise Mozambique's first multi-party elections, which took place in 1994 and in which Renamo participated as the main opposition political party.</span></span> </span><br />
<h3> <span style="font-family: arial;"><a href="" name="10"></a><span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>10: Conclusion</span></span></span></h3><span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>A</span><span>lthough politics played a big role, the ZDF went into Mozambique mainly to protect Zimbabwe's trade routes, which were being sabotaged by Renamo. That military involvement was further justified by a formal request from the Frelimo government for a regional force that included Tanzania, Malawi and Zimbabwean forces and which was backed by the SADCC. The regional planners saw this as a continuing fight against the regional stranglehold by apartheid South Africa on regional trade routes for political reasons. It was also part of the Cold War between East and West in the sense that Renamo claimed to be fighting against Communism and for that reason received aid from western countries especially the United States of America.</span></span> </span><span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>In the process of protecting their trade routes, the ZDF literally joined the Mozambican civil war on the side of the Mozambican Government and ended up involving at least 30 000 Zimbabwean troops. They conducted military operations against Renamo throughout the length and breath of Mozambique. Sometimes these operations were conducted jointly with the FAM, but in most cases the Zimbabweans acted on their own. More than 40 FireForce and StrikeForce operations were conducted including the twice recapturing of the Renamo Headquarters at Cassa Banana in the Gorongossa Mountains in 1985 and 1986.</span></span> </span><br />
<span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>These operations stretched the ZDF's capabilities to the limit, literally halting all other military activities in Zimbabwe including training. The ZDF put in all available equipment and manpower. The operations were also very expensive in monetary terms, although there are no accurate financial records to quantify the total expenditure. There were a lot of accidents, some of which could have been avoided with proper training and strict adherence to standard operational procedures. The Army did not bother to count the equipment that they lost during operations. The Air Force lost seven aircraft, which were completely written off, and 100 aircraft accidents were recorded. The Army recorded 296 soldiers dead and 623 injured while the AirForce recorded 24 deaths and 12 injuries. The actual casualty figures are probably higher because records were not kept for the first three years of operations.</span></span> </span><br />
<span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>Even with such a heavy military commitment, the ZDF failed to destroy Renamo, and the war escalated into what some critics have called "Zimbabwe's Vietnam". Central to the ZDF failure to contain Renamo was the failure by the FAM, to hold any of the bases captured by the ZDF for any length of time. This was mainly because of the FAM's low level of training, lack of motivation and lack of adequate logistical support. It is also true to say that the Mozambican civil war could not have ended sooner than it did because of its Cold War and South African connections. Both the Cold War and apartheid ended almost at the same time, and by 1990 it was possible for the warring parties to pursue a negotiated settlement to the Mozambican crisis. The Rome agreement of October 1992 made possible the withdrawal of Zimbabwean forces from Mozambique, which started in November 1990 and ended on the 14th of April 1993.</span></span> </span><br />
<h3> <span style="font-family: arial;"><a href="" name="Biblio"></a><span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span>Bibliography And Footnotes</span></span></span></h3><span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span><sup>1</sup> See Mlambo,N. <i>The Costs of Reopening Zimbabwe�s Trade Routes through Mozambique: 1980-1990</i>, Unpublished B.A. Hons Dissertation (University of Zimbabwe, 1991).</span></span> <br />
<span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span><sup>2</sup> Blake,R., <i>A History of Rhodesia</i> (Methuen, London, 1977), p.83.</span></span> <br />
<span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span><sup>3</sup> Griffiths, I., �The Quest for Independent Access to the Sea in Southern Africa�,</span></span> <br />
<span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span><i>The Geographical Journal</i>, Vol.155(3) (November 1989), p.384.</span></span> <br />
<span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span><sup>4</sup> Hanlon,J., <i>Beggar your neighbours: Apartheid power in Southern Africa</i> (Catholic Institute for International Relations, James Currey and Indiana University Press, London, 1986), p.187.</span></span> <br />
<span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span><sup>5</sup> Pangeti,E., �Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference: The Art of the Possible?�, paper presented at the Tenth International Economic History Conference, Leuven, Belgium, August 1990.</span></span> <br />
<span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span><sup>6</sup> Nsekela,A., <i>Southern Africa: Towards Economic Liberation</i> (Rex Collings, London, 1981)</span></span> <br />
<span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span><sup>7</sup> Johnson,P. and Martin,D., <i>Apartheid Terrorism: The Destabilisation Report</i> (The Commonwealth Secretariat, James Currey and Indiana University Press, London, 1989).</span></span> <br />
<span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span><sup>8</sup> The Herald, 2 October 1981.</span></span> <br />
<span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span><sup>9</sup> The Washington Times, 1 July 1986 and Africa Confidential, 9 June 1989.</span></span> <br />
<span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span><sup>10</sup> Johnson,P. and Martin,D., <i>Destructive Engagement: Southern Africa at War</i> (Zimbabwe Publishing House, Harare, 1986), p.71.</span></span> <br />
<span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span><sup>11</sup> Johnson and Martin, <i>Destructive Engagement</i>, p.71.</span></span> <br />
<span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span><sup>12</sup> Hanlon, <i>Beggar your neighbours</i>, pp.185-192.</span></span> <br />
<span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span><sup>13</sup> The Herald, 19 July 1984.</span></span> <br />
<span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span><sup>14</sup> Stoneman,C. and Cliff,L., <i>Zimbabwe: Politics, Economics and Society</i> (Pinter Publishers, London, 1989), p.187.</span></span> <br />
<span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span><sup>15</sup> G/2/3, Report � Operation Grapefruit, Army HQ, Harare, August 1985.</span></span> <br />
<span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span><sup>16</sup> AFZ Board of Enquiry, December 1985.</span></span> <br />
<span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span><sup>17</sup> MI/5/3 Perintreps, Mozambique, December 1985.</span></span> <br />
<span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span><sup>18</sup> Report on the Attack on Marromeu, 4 February 1986.</span></span> <br />
<span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span><sup>19</sup> HQ/C2/6/AIR, Air Force of Zimbabwe file, 1986.</span></span> <br />
<span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span><sup>20</sup> Report on the Attack on Marromeu, 4 February 1986.</span></span> <br />
<span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span><sup>21</sup> Report on the Attack on Marromeu.</span></span> <br />
<span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span><sup>22</sup> Report, Operating Zero, 1986.</span></span> <br />
<span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span><sup>23</sup> HQ/C2/6/AIR, Mozambique Operations, 1986-90</span></span> <br />
<span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span><sup>24</sup> Report, Operation Ndonga Chirenje, June 1990.</span></span> <br />
<span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span><sup>25</sup> HQ/C2/6/AIR, Mozambique Operations, 1986-90.</span></span> <br />
<span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span><sup>26</sup> Fin/25/6/1, Costings: External Operations, 30 August 1990.</span></span> <br />
<span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span><sup>27</sup> The Herald, 18 April 1988.</span></span> <br />
<span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span><sup>28</sup> Hume,C., <i>Ending Mozambique�s War: The role of mediation and good offices</i> (United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington D.C., 1994), p.xi.</span></span> <br />
<span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span><sup>29</sup> <i>The United Nations and Mozambique 1992-1995 (UN Department of Public Information, New York, 1995).</i></span></span> <br />
<span style="font-family: arial,helvetica,geneva;"><span><sup>30</sup> A(PS)/1/1, Program of Events for the Withdrawal of Zimbabwean Troops from Mozambique, 7 April 1993.</span></span> </span> <span style="font-family: arial;"> <table border="0" cellpadding="3" cellspacing="0"><tbody>
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<!-- End Bravenet.com Service Code --></div>Beaver Shawhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15092980697221951142noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6501586017974986851.post-31222620741234922362010-11-12T03:06:00.003-08:002010-11-12T03:06:29.873-08:00UNCONVENTIONAL BUSH WARFARE<table align="center" border="0" cellpadding="6" cellspacing="0" class="tborder" id="post638484"><tbody>
<tr valign="top"><td class="alt1" id="td_post_638484" style="border-right: 1px solid rgb(0, 0, 0);"><div id="post_message_638484"> <span style="color: darkred;"><u><b>UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE LESSONS FROM </b></u><b><u>THE SELOUS SCOUTS</u></b></span><br />
<span style="font-size: small;"><b><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;"><i>By Leroy Thompson</i></span><br />
<br />
</b></span> To understand the Selous Scouts’ methods, one must first understand the Selous Scouts’ mission. The Scouts evolved to varying extents from the Tracker Combat Unit of the Rhodesian Army, the CIO (Central Intelligence Organization), and the Special Branch of the BSAP (British South Africa Police). When Major Ron Reid Daly was given the mission of forming the Scouts, Rhodesia’s borders were becoming less and less secure, as ZANLA and ZIPRA terrorists infiltrated in greater and greater numbers. Though the cover mission for the Selous Scouts remained the tracking of terrorists, in reality the unit was a pseudo-terrorist unit, using turned terrorists and Black soldiers from the Rhodesian African Rifles, as well as White soldiers in black face make-up from the Rhodesian SAS, Rhodesian Light Infantry and other units. These pseudo groups would infiltrate terrorist areas of operation, passing themselves off as terrorists and attempting to subvert the terrorist infrastructure.<br />
<div align="center"><img alt="" border="0" src="http://members.tripod.com/selousscouts/scout3.jpg" style="cursor: pointer; max-width: 500px;" title="Image Resized: Click to view full image" /></div>In many ways, the Selous Scouts learned from US counter- insurgency successes in Vietnam, drawing on the examples of the Phoenix Program, the Kit Carson Scouts and the Road Runner Teams. Even more did they resemble the successful pseudo teams which had been active earlier in Kenya. Constantly adding turned terrorists, the Scouts kept abreast of current terrorist terminology, identification procedures, and operations; often they were better informed about terrorist procedures than the terrorists themselves.<br />
<span> As the Selous Scouts evolved, they undertook other missions such as cross-border raids, assassinations, snatches, raids on terrorist HQs in Botswana or elsewhere, long-range reconnaissance, and various other types of special operations. One early raid typical of this kind of Scouts’ mission was the snatch of a key ZIPRA official from Francistown, Botswana, in March 1974. These direct action operations resembled in many ways the MAC V/SOG operations in Vietnam. The number of Vietnam veterans in the Rhodesian security forces, in fact, had a substantial influence on the conduct of the war and on slang that was</span> used. Terrorists, for example, were often called ‘gooks’. The Scouts lured terrorists into ambushes, from which few terrorists normally walked away; captured terrorists and then turned them to serve in one of the Scout pseudo groups; or turned them over to the BSAP for interrogation. The Scouts were very successful in gathering intelligence, at least in part from captured diaries and letters. This is an important element of counter*insurgency operations. Due to the fragmented nature of their operations, guerrillas rarely have ready access to communications equipment. As a result, they may rely on written communication, leaving much open to capture. Few guerrillas are sophisticated enough to use ciphers, either, so often captured communications are ‘in the clear’. Many politically inspired guerrillas are actually encouraged to keep diaries documenting their political development, and these also frequently include valuable intelligence information. Third World insurgents are generally much less security conscious than organized military forces about documents; hence, captured written material can be an excellent intelligence source, especially for order of battle data.<br />
The Selous Scouts’ training and operational doctrine inculcated audacity. At various times, for example, White Selous Scouts posed as the ‘prisoners’ of Black Selous Scout ‘terrorists’, and were escorted into terrorist strongholds, where White prisoners were highly prized. At the appropriate moment, the Selous Scouts turned their weapons on the terrorists, wreaking havoc from within. The classic example of audacity was the Selous Scouts raid on the large ZANLA terrorist camp at Nyadzonya Pungwe in August 1976. Using Unimogs and Ferrets painted in FRELIMO camouflage, eighty-four Selous Scouts penetrated Mozambique and drove directly into a large terrorist camp. Thousands of terrorists were in camp preparing for morning formations, when the Scouts opened up with 20mm cannons, .50 MGs, 12.7mm MGs, 7.62mm MGs and rifles. Estimates of the number of terrorists killed run as high as 1,000, all for five slightly wounded Selous Scouts. As the Scouts retreated to Rhodesia they blew up the Pungwe Bridge behind them, frustrating pursuit.<br />
Audacity does not, of course, mean foolhardiness, but the importance of <span>audacious small unit offensives has been proved again and again in counter*insurgency operations </span><span>by the SAS in Malaya, Borneo and Oman; by Special Forces in Vietnam; and by Selous Scouts in Rhodesia. Reportedly, some of the Soviets’ best successes against Afghan guerrillas were achieved by small Spetsnaz units carrying out similar operations. Because guerrillas tend to think of themselves as the aggressors who take the war to the capitalist fat cats, they are often themselves extremely complacent in their ‘safe’ areas. By showing the terrorists that they were never safe from the ‘Skuz’apo’ (as the terrorists called the Selous Scouts) the Scouts had a psychologically debilitating effect quite out of proportion to their numbers. It was not uncommon, for example, for two groups of terrorists to begin shooting at each other out of fear that the other group was the Selous Scouts.</span><br />
Various lessons can be learned from this aspect of Selous Scouts operations. First, calculated audacity will often allow a small counter-insurgency force to inflict casualties quite out of proportion to the numbers of men involved. Secondly, terrorists, who rely heavily on fear as a weapon, can themselves be rendered psychologically impotent through fear when <i>they </i>become the prey of an enemy who appears, hits hard, and then vanishes; who, in effect, turns their own weapons against them.<img alt="" border="0" src="http://members.tripod.com/selousscouts/monkeyskin.jpg" style="cursor: pointer; max-width: 500px;" title="Image Resized: Click to view full image" /><br />
<span> Selous Scouts relied heavily on unconventional selection and training procedures. Unconventional, but they worked and turned out some of the finest counter-insurgency warriors of all time. Selous Scouts couldn’t count on ready resupply, for example, so early on the fledgling Selous Scout had to learn to take his food how and when it came. During initial selection the Selous Scout was given one ration pack, but not told what to do with it. As the next days passed, that transpired to be the only food that would be provided. Some Scouts foraged around the training area to supplement that initial ration. Before long, an instructor shot a monkey and hung it in the middle of camp, where during the next few days of training it became riper and riper, its smell soon pervading the camp. Finally, after days of rigorous training the now ravenous trainee Selous Scouts were treated to the sight of the maggot-infested carcass being cooked to provide their first meal in days. Most managed to get it down, in the process learning that if one is hungry enough, protein can be provided from tainted meat, or even maggots. They also learned that even tainted meat is edible if thoroughly boiled, though it should not be reheated a second time. The obvious lesson here is that those being</span> trained to survive under harsh conditions must be trained harshly. <div align="center"><img alt="" border="0" src="http://members.tripod.com/selousscouts/scoutpeel.jpg" style="cursor: pointer; max-width: 500px;" title="Image Resized: Click to view full image" /></div>Selous Scouts weapons training was intense and practical. Because they operated as terrorists, the Scouts were normally armed with Eastern Bloc weapons. The AK-47, RPD light machine gun and SVD sniper’s rifle were all widely used. Since the Scouts often concealed pistols about their persons, a substantial amount of handgun training was included. CZ75s and Beretta 951s were popular, as were Makarovs due to their Warsaw Pact origins.<br />
Among the very practical training techniques used to make the Scouts proficient with their weapons was an extremely effective counter-ambush drill. Scouts were trained, when under fire from ambush, immediately to direct short bursts of fire at all likely places of concealment for ambushers within their arc of fire. The effectiveness of this maneuver could only be appreciated after seeing a well-drilled stick of Selous Scouts quickly sterilize 360 degrees of an ambush site. Fire discipline was important in this drill, but the Scouts had it. One Selous Scouts training officer also developed the technique of using mannequin targets dressed in terrorist attire and for ‘no shoots’-security forces uniforms. These mannequins incorporated a system of balloons (for head and torso), arranged so that a critical hit would cause the target to fall, while a non-critical hit had to be followed up to drop the target. The lesson to be remembered here is that military personnel likely to use their weapons in quick reaction ambush/anti-ambush situations must be trained to shoot in such circumstances. Obvious? Not to high-ranking officers in a lot of armies.<br />
Many Selous Scouts operations were actually what might be called ‘sting’ operations. The use of European Selous Scouts ‘kidnapped’ by Black Selous Scouts ‘terrorists’ to infiltrate terrorist camps has already been mentioned. The Scouts carried out other classic stings, such as snatching high-ranking ZIPRA officers in Botswana by posing as Botswana Defense Force soldiers there to arrest them. To be accepted by terrorist groups the Scouts often staged fake attacks on farms, or fake hits on Special Branch informers to establish their credentials. So convincing were they that some Selous Scouts pseudo groups became legendary among the terrorists for their ferocity against Rhodesia. On the individual level, Selous Scouts were not above running cons such as convincing a terrorist that a command-detonated claymore mine was a radio, and sending him into a nest of terrorists to radio a message. Only pieces got through! <span>Some of the really classic Selous Scouts’ cons must remain shrouded in secrecy, but even after Robert Mugabe assumed power and after the Selous Scouts were supposedly disbanded, a secret Scouts base continued to operate, from which much equipment and many weapons were evacuated to South Africa. Once again, the lesson to be learned from the Selous</span> Scouts’ sting operations is that sometimes audacity is both more deadly to the enemy, and safer for the operators, than caution in unconventional warfare.<br />
Under Chris Shollenberg, a former Rhodesian SAS officer, a reconnaissance troop was formed as part of the Selous Scouts. This recon unit proved what has been the case in virtually every war in history: small, highly-skilled recon units are among the most efficient and cost-effective intelligence tools in existence. After lying hidden near large terrorist camps for days, the Selous Scouts recon troops operated ahead of Selous Scouts raiding columns, or called in air strikes. The lesson here is simple: no matter how effective electronic intelligence devices become, LRRPs remain an extremely important element in modern warfare, especially counter-insurgency warfare.<br />
Another important element of the Selous Scouts experience which is less obvious is the necessity for a degree of egalitarianism in small elite units. Despite the underlying racism of Rhodesia at that time, the Scouts were a racially mixed unit, each member of which had to rely on the others, and were aggressively non-racist. Black Scouts were naturally aware of their differences in color and culture, as were White Scouts, but neither was treated as superior or inferior. Because of the nature of Scouts operations, all members of the units had to trust each other implicitly, especially when the added element of turned terrorists amongst the Scouts was added. Therefore there could be no hints of racism within the Scouts. Anyone displaying such an attitude did not become or did not stay a Selous Scout.<br />
One method of achieving the closeness and egalitarianism necessary for the Selous Scouts to function was requiring every aspirant Scout to learn the regimental songs during the final portion of the selection course. Sung a cappella, these functioned in lieu of a Selous Scouts band, but also, since the songs were traditional African songs <span style="font-family: Arial;">— </span>often terrorist songs at that, the words altered to fit the Selous Scouts <span style="font-family: Arial;">- </span>they formed a bond between Black and White.<br />
The Selous Scouts system worked. The closeness of the members of the unit -even the tamed terrorists was tested many times but rarely found wanting. In April 1975 a turned terrorist betrayed a pseudo group, resulting in the deaths of seven of them. This event is most noteworthy because it was so unusual. The closeness of the Selous Scouts continued even after the end of the war, when the White Scouts realized the danger their Black comrades in arms would face in Zimbabwe. When the White Selous Scouts went to South Africa they took many of the Black Scouts and their families along with them, and fought to have them incorporated into No. 5 Recce Commando by their sides.<br />
The lesson to be learned here is one that successful special operations units find obvious, but conventional military commanders can never grasp. Small, close-knit elite units function best when run in an egalitarian manner. David Stirling made this a precept of the SAS when he formed it, and it remains a key element in SAS successes today. There is a chain of command in good special operations units, but no one works hard at wielding power. Nevertheless, things get done and done right. That’s why the selection course is so important.<br />
Another important lesson to be learned from the Selous Scouts experience can be applied to police or military covert operations. So successfully did the Selous Scouts pass themselves off as terrorists that they were frequently in more danger from Rhodesian security forces than from real terrorists. As a result, when a Selous Scouts pseudo team was working an area it was ‘frozen’ and declared off limits to any other security forces operations. This same lesson can be applied to police undercover operations or military covert, false flag, ‘sheep dip’ or deception missions.<br />
<span> Unfortunately, the greatest lesson to be learned from the Selous Scouts is that no matter how competent and effective a military unit is, political considerations can render it impotent. As Rhodesia became Zimbabwe, the Selous Scouts, though never defeated on the battlefield, were defeated at the bargaining table. The con men of the Selous Scouts were, in fact, conned out of existence by the British, the Americans, the UN and Robert Mugabe. Of course, throughout the history of counter-insurgency warfare, the failure to establish political goals has rendered military operations ineffective.</span> <span style="font-family: Times New Roman;"><i>(END)</i></span><br />
<span style="font-family: Times New Roman;"><span style="font-size: xx-small;"><i><span style="font-family: Times New Roman;">***Source*** This article was obtained from the book: DIRTY WARS- elite forces vs. the guerrillas. By Leroy Thompson. Printed 1988.</span></i></span></span> </div></td> </tr>
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<!-- End Bravenet.com Service Code --></div>Beaver Shawhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15092980697221951142noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6501586017974986851.post-65800639051774138822010-11-11T23:22:00.000-08:002010-11-11T23:22:17.926-08:00CHITEPO INFO<div class="root"><strong>Herbert Wiltshire Chitepo</strong> (15 June 1923 - 18 March 1975) led the <a href="http://wapedia.mobi/en/Zimbabwe_African_National_Union">Zimbabwe African National Union</a> until he was assassinated on March 1975. Although to this day we still do not know the truth about who his murderer was, the <a href="http://wapedia.mobi/en/Rhodesian">Rhodesian</a> author Peter Stiff reveals that a former British <a href="http://wapedia.mobi/en/SAS">SAS</a> soldier, <a href="http://wapedia.mobi/en/Hugh_Hind">Hugh Hind</a> was responsible. <sup><small>[1]</small></sup></div><div class="root">Chitepo became the first black citizen of Rhodesia to become a <a href="http://wapedia.mobi/en/Barrister">barrister</a>. <sup><small>[2]</small></sup></div><div class="root"><br />
</div><h3 class="head1" id="1.">1. Early years</h3><div class="root">Chitepo was born in Watsomba village in the Inyanga District of <a href="http://wapedia.mobi/en/Southern_Rhodesia">Southern Rhodesia</a>, now <a href="http://wapedia.mobi/en/Zimbabwe">Zimbabwe</a>. His family came from the Manyika clan (Samanyika) of the <a href="http://wapedia.mobi/en/Shona_people">Shona people</a>. He was educated at St David's Mission School, Bonda, St Augustine's School, Penhalonga and then at Adam's College, <a href="http://wapedia.mobi/en/KwaZulu-Natal_Province">Natal</a>, <a href="http://wapedia.mobi/en/South_Africa">South Africa</a>, where he qualified as a teacher in 1945.</div><h3 class="head1" id="2.">2. Career</h3><div class="root">After teaching for a year, he resumed his studies to graduate with a BA degree from <a href="http://wapedia.mobi/en/Fort_Hare_University">Fort Hare University</a> College in 1949. He qualified as a Barrister-at-Law, and called to the bar by <a href="http://wapedia.mobi/en/Gray%27s_Inn">Gray's Inn</a>, alumni included <a href="http://wapedia.mobi/en/Winston_Churchill">Winston Churchill</a>. Further still whilst in London as a research assistant at the <a href="http://wapedia.mobi/en/School_of_Oriental_and_African_Studies">School of Oriental and African Studies</a>. He was the first African in Southern Rhodesia to qualify as a Barrister. In 1954 Chitepo became Rhodesia's first black lawyer (a special law was required to allow him to occupy chambers with white colleagues). <sup><small>[3]</small></sup> On returning to Rhodesia in 1954, he practised as a Lawyer and defended many African nationalists such as <a href="http://wapedia.mobi/en/Ndabaningi_Sithole">Ndabaningi Sithole</a> in court. In 1961, he served as legal adviser to <a href="http://wapedia.mobi/en/Joshua_Nkomo">Joshua Nkomo</a>, founder of the <a href="http://wapedia.mobi/en/ZAPU">Zimbabwe African Peoples Union</a> (ZAPU), at the Southern Rhodesia Constitutional Conference in London. In the same year (1961)he was also appointed to the Board of Governors of Bernard Mizeki College. <a href="http://wapedia.mobi/en/Ian_Smith">Ian Smith</a>'s government did not detain him as he did not come out in the open as an official of the nationalist movement and the regime also feared that being the first lawyer, Chitepo was too internationally well-known to be locked up.</div><h3 class="head1" id="3.">3. ZANU</h3><div class="root">In May 1962 <a href="http://wapedia.mobi/en/ZAPU">ZAPU</a> was banned because of <a href="http://wapedia.mobi/en/Militarism">militarism</a> and Chitepo was persuaded to go into voluntary exile to escape possible detention. He became <a href="http://wapedia.mobi/en/Tanganyika">Tanganyika</a>'s first African Director of Public Prosecutions. The <a href="http://wapedia.mobi/en/Ndabaningi_Sithole">Ndabaningi Sithole</a> and <a href="http://wapedia.mobi/en/Joshua_Nkomo">Joshua Nkomo</a> factions of ZAPU split apart in July, 1963. Nkomo's supporters founded the PCC-ZAPU (later just called ZAPU again) and favoured a more militaristic approach. As the more moderate faction, Chitepo sided with Sithole and was elected Chairman of ZANU ( having defeated Nathan Shamuyarira ) from its foundation. He held this post until 7 December 1974, when the <a href="http://wapedia.mobi/en/Lusaka_Accord">Lusaka Accord</a> was signed.</div><div class="root">Both parties vied for domination but in 1964 both were banned and the leaders were all arrested. Both parties chose to leave the country and reorganize and form armies from outside Rhodesian borders, although they chose different countries to make their base. ZAPU based itself in the West and <a href="http://wapedia.mobi/en/Zambia">Zambia</a> where it organized ZIPRA (the <a href="http://wapedia.mobi/en/Zimbabwe_People%27s_Revolutionary_Army">Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army</a>.) They allied with the <a href="http://wapedia.mobi/en/Soviet_Union">Soviet Union</a> and organised a vanguard of highly trained soldiers. ZANU, however, moved into <a href="http://wapedia.mobi/en/Tanzania">Tanzania</a> and then to <a href="http://wapedia.mobi/en/Mozambique">Mozambique</a> and set up ZANLA (<a href="http://wapedia.mobi/en/Zimbabwe_African_National_Liberation_Army">Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army</a>) which concentrated more on mobilizing the masses in the countryside in a method pioneered by the Chinese.</div><div class="root">In January 1966 Chitepo resigned as Director of Public Prosecutions and moved to <a href="http://wapedia.mobi/en/Zambia">Zambia</a> in order to concentrate on the armed struggle. He toured world capitals canvassing support for <a href="http://wapedia.mobi/en/ZANU">ZANU</a> and for the enforcement of total economic sanctions against Rhodesia. With his friendly disposition, he was very effective and earned for ZANU international recognition and respect.</div><div class="root">Sithole and others prepared a comprehensive document giving powers to Chitepo to lead ZANU while Rev. Sithole was in detention and specifically authorising him to carry out the armed struggle. Accordingly, Herbert Chitepo with the military supremo <a href="http://wapedia.mobi/en/Josiah_Tongogara">Josiah Tongogara</a> from the Karanga ethnic community,organised and planned successful military guerilla attacks and underground activities in Rhodesia from 1966 onwards. In 1972, he co-ordinated war operations with FRELIMO and opened up the North Eastern region of Zimbabwe as a new and effective war front.</div><h3 class="head1" id="4.">4. Assassination</h3><div class="root">Chitepo died at 8:05am on March 18, 1975 in <a href="http://wapedia.mobi/en/Lusaka">Lusaka</a>, <a href="http://wapedia.mobi/en/Zambia">Zambia</a> when a car bomb, placed in his Volkswagen Beetle the night before, exploded. He and Silas Shamiso, one of his bodyguards, were killed instantly. Sadat Kufamadzuba, his other bodyguard, was injured. The explosion sent part of the car onto the roof of his house and uprooted a tree next door. Hours later one of his neighbors died of injuries he sustained in the explosion. <sup><small>[4]</small></sup> <a href="http://wapedia.mobi/en/ZANU">ZANU</a> at the time blamed Rhodesian security forces.</div><div class="root">Zambian president <a href="http://wapedia.mobi/en/Kenneth_Kaunda">Kenneth Kaunda</a> commissioned an inquiry into Chitepo's death. Documents released in October, 2001, placed the blame on ZANU infighting. However, in his biographical account, <em>The Legend of The Selous Scouts</em>, Lt Col Ron Reid-Daly, Officer Commanding, Selous Scouts Regiment, Rhodesian Security Forces, clearly states that the Rhodesian <a href="http://wapedia.mobi/en/Central_Intelligence_Organization">Central Intelligence Organization</a> (CIO) under the leadership of Director General <a href="http://wapedia.mobi/en/Ken_Flower">Ken Flower</a>, masterminded the assassination of Herbert Chitepo, subsequently planting documentary evidence blaming ZANU members.</div><div class="root">"The decision by Ken Flower...to assassinate Herbert Chitepo, head of the ZANU War Council, now showed how badly Flower has misread the ZANU/ZANLA situation. The death of Chitepo purged ZANU of its many dissenting factions and a new and highly successful leader emerged. Robert Mugabe gave ZANLA the means to consolidate its efforts by providing ZANLA with an indispensable factor - unity." [pg. 173 <em>The Legend of The Selous Scouts</em>]</div><h3 class="head1" id="5.">5. References</h3><ol class="references"><li id="cite_note-death-0"><a class="external text" href="http://www.iwpr.net/?p=acr&s=f&o=239381&apc_state=heniacr2005">Mugabe still fears Chitepo's legacy</a> Institute for War and Peace Reporting</li>
<li id="cite_note-firstlawyer-1">Preston, Matthew. <em>Ending Civil War: Rhodesia and Lebanon in Perspective</em>, 2004. Page 98.</li>
<li id="cite_note-2">Time Magazine ,Monday, Mar. 31, 1975</li>
<li id="cite_note-details-3">White, Luise. <em>The Assassination of Herbert Chitepo: Texts and Politics in Zimbabwe.</em> Page 1.</li>
</ol><h3 class="head1" id="6.">6. External links</h3><ul><li><a class="external text" href="http://www.zimbabwesituation.com/oct15_2001.html">Zimbabwesituation.com</a></li>
<li><a class="external text" href="http://csf.colorado.edu/ipe/zimbabwe_seminar/background.html">Zimbabwe seminar</a></li>
<li><a class="external text" href="http://www.indiana.edu/%7Eiupress/books/0-253-34257-0.pdf">The Assassination of Herbert Chitepo</a></li>
</ul><div class="category"><strong>Categories:</strong> <a href="http://wapedia.mobi/en/Category:1923_births" title="Category:1923 births">1923 births</a>, <a href="http://wapedia.mobi/en/Category:1975_deaths" title="Category:1975 deaths">1975 deaths</a>, <a href="http://wapedia.mobi/en/Category:People_from_Manicaland" title="Category:People from Manicaland">People from Manicaland</a>, <a href="http://wapedia.mobi/en/Category:Alumni_of_the_School_of_Oriental_and_African_Studies" title="Category:Alumni of the School of Oriental and African Studies">Alumni of the School of Oriental and African Studies</a>, <a href="http://wapedia.mobi/en/Category:University_of_Fort_Hare_alumni" title="Category:University of Fort Hare alumni">University of Fort Hare alumni</a>, <a href="http://wapedia.mobi/en/Category:Zimbabwean_revolutionaries" title="Category:Zimbabwean revolutionaries">Zimbabwean revolutionaries</a>, <a href="http://wapedia.mobi/en/Category:Assassinated_Zimbabwean_politicians" title="Category:Assassinated Zimbabwean politicians">Assassinated Zimbabwean politicians</a>, <a href="http://wapedia.mobi/en/Category:Zimbabwean_people_murdered_abroad" title="Category:Zimbabwean people murdered abroad">Zimbabwean people murdered abroad</a>, <a href="http://wapedia.mobi/en/Category:People_murdered_in_Zambia" title="Category:People murdered in Zambia">People murdered in Zambia</a></div><div class="blogger-post-footer"><!-- Start Bravenet.com Service Code -->
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<!-- End Bravenet.com Service Code --></div>Beaver Shawhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15092980697221951142noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6501586017974986851.post-56263236322174884032010-11-11T23:19:00.000-08:002010-11-11T23:19:36.380-08:00DEATH OF TONGOGARA<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgqyTloeWpIK2X1NSeminnAR0Zb0ufeUhcfdlkYaZaZRHHZuTWsU7IwGIcRd4ufG229jyNEYbovt-gYIS-_hOnFvsMoCdRYN9QmbEvrwbVLRkEkBp7o6SFLwpAGyrLhDr1NcaL0h0UcaG2v/s1600/Josiah_Tongogara.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgqyTloeWpIK2X1NSeminnAR0Zb0ufeUhcfdlkYaZaZRHHZuTWsU7IwGIcRd4ufG229jyNEYbovt-gYIS-_hOnFvsMoCdRYN9QmbEvrwbVLRkEkBp7o6SFLwpAGyrLhDr1NcaL0h0UcaG2v/s1600/Josiah_Tongogara.jpg" /></a></div><div class="root"><br />
</div><div class="root"><strong>Josiah Magama Tongogara</strong> (<a href="http://wapedia.mobi/en/1938">1938</a> - December 26, 1979) was a commander of the <a href="http://wapedia.mobi/en/ZANLA">ZANLA</a> guerrilla army in <a href="http://wapedia.mobi/en/Rhodesia">Rhodesia</a>. He attended the <a href="http://wapedia.mobi/en/Lancaster_House_Agreement">Lancaster House conference</a> that led to Zimbabwe's independence and the end of white minority rule. Many expected him to be the first president of Zimbabwe, with <a href="http://wapedia.mobi/en/Robert_Mugabe">Robert Mugabe</a>, head of Zanla's political wing, <a href="http://wapedia.mobi/en/ZANU">ZANU</a>, as prime minister. </div><div class="root">Six days after the Lancaster House Agreement was signed <a href="http://wapedia.mobi/en/Robert_Mugabe">Robert Mugabe</a>, on the Voice of Zimbabwe radio station, conveyed "an extremely sad message" to "all the fighting people of Zimbabwe": the forty one year old Tongogara was dead, killed in a car accident in Mozambique on December 26, 1979.</div><div class="root"><a href="http://wapedia.mobi/en/Josiah_Tungamirai">Josiah Tungamirai</a>, the <a href="http://wapedia.mobi/en/ZANLA">ZANLA</a> High Command's political commissar relates that on the night of the fatality, he and Tongogara had been travelling with others in two vehicles from <a href="http://wapedia.mobi/en/Maputo">Maputo</a> to <a href="http://wapedia.mobi/en/Chimoio">Chimoio</a>. Tungamirai said he was in the front vehicle. It was dark and the roads were bad. Tungamirai's car passed a military vehicle that had been carelessly abandoned, with no warning signs at the side of the road. After that, he could no longer see the headlights of the following car in his rear view mirror. Eventually he turned back, and, as he had feared, they found Tongogara's car had struck the abandoned vehicle. Tongogara was sitting in the front passenger seat. Tungamirai told me that he had struggled to lift Tongogara out of the wrecked car. He said that as he was doing so, Tongogara heaved a huge sigh and died in his arms. <sup><small>[1]</small></sup></div><div class="root">Margaret Dongo was one of the last people to see him alive. "We were eighteen girls who were having a function and he came to say a few words to bless the occasion."</div><div class="root">ZANU released an undertaker's statement saying his injuries were consistent with a road accident, but no autopsy results or pictures have been released(the undertaker who gave the report was indeed Mr K.J Stokesand not Mr R Silke).</div><div class="root">TEKERE BOOK: Last updated: Thu, 12 Nov 2009 14:59:45 GMT AS I have mentioned before, Chimoio was a complex of camps, rather than a single entity, scattered around Chimoio Town to a radius of 40 km. So the Chimoio attack was not one, but a series of simultaneous attacks on all our camps. On the day of the Chimoio massacre, I was in Maputo, to attend a meeting with most of the senior commanders, including Tongogara. The attack began at dawn at dawn, on 23 November 1977, and Samora Machel came to inform us, telling us not to go there yet, as people were still being killed. It was only three days later that we were allowed to return. Later, it became clear that someone had informed the Rhodesians that all the people meeting in Maputo would actually be at Chimoio, and I was also told that a helicopter was hovering over my hut, calling on me to come out.</div><div class="root">During the attack, Frelimo moved in to support us, and gave us weapons from their armouries. This angered the Russians, who supported ZAPU/ZIPRA and did not want their weapons used by ZANLA. At one point, Frelimo even asked the Russians to collect their arms and leave Mozambique.</div><div class="root">After three days, we returned and began the grim task of picking up the dead and injured. At least 1200 people had been killed. Our people flooded Chimoio Hospital. Since our headquarters had been destroyed, we established another which we called MuGomba (in the pit), because it was literally down in a pit. We would have been extremely vulnerable if the Rhodesians had attacked again.</div><div class="root">Among those who died in the attack was Serbia, who had been my instructor, and my major source of inspiration. She had been a commander in Tete, where she headed and commando unit of some 99 men. She was the only woman there. The commandos did not fight regular battles, but were called upon to break through particularly difficult points. She was a priceless soldier.</div><div class="root">She had come to Chimoio to get supplies for her unit, and was killed in the maize field. It was sad that such a great fighter did not go down in battle, but we had no option but to bury her where she lay.</div><div class="root">Lazarus Mandeya was a transport operator and well known in business circles, but he had decided to join those who were leaving for Mozambique. When Mugabe and I arrived in Chimoio, he was already there with his wife and son, John. He was extremely valuable in our transport camp.</div><div class="root">As the attack approached, he went away and watched it from afar. As it drew nearer, he tried to go to his hut to rescue his wife and son, and, resisting the others who tried to hold him back, rushed back into the thick of the attack. Meanwhile, his son and wife were safe, hiding behind a reed bed. He was killed, and buried where he fell.</div><div class="root">Ruvimbo, my wife, survived by hiding in a pit latrine. The attack lasted for three days, and three nights, and afterwards it took some time before Tongogara’s team heard her cries and were able to pull her out.</div><div class="root">In order to continue, while so many terrible deaths surrounded us, we had to develop a certain frame of mind. Experiences could not be personalised, which meant that even the death of your own child could not be placed above the welfare of the whole group. And nobody wept, not a tear was shed. Even now, people who went through the war do not cry when a relative dies.</div><div class="root">After seeing the aftermath, I went to Maputo and commanded all our medical people to come to Chimoio. Didymus Mutasa at first refused to let his wife go, saying, “musukuru unoda kuti ndifire futi ndirimugota here? Handidi muzukuru” (My nephew, you want me to lose another wife? I’ve had enough! I don’t want!). Mutasa had been widowed once, and he was afraid to lose this, his second wife, but she eventually came. While in Maputo, I gave a report on the massacre to President Mugabe. Two thirds of our dead were women. He said to me, “You know what, I am beginning to wonder whether this is worthwhile, with all these people dying.” But I replied that we must go on to the end. His remark aroused in me a mixture of anger and disgust.</div><div class="root">After reporting to Mugabe, I had the difficult task of informing Simon Muzenda about the death of one of his daughters, Teresa. He did not take it badly. The matter of how we were going to report to the parents of all those who died was a real problem. We eventually agreed that within the first three months of gaining our independence we must summon all the chiefs and give them the full report, which they would carry to their villages.</div><div class="root">But when independence was finally won, we did not do as we had resolved. Instead of restoring the chiefs’ honour, lost during white rule, we began ill-treating them. This was wrong. As secretary general, it was my responsibility to organise this, and we decided to hold the gathering of chiefs at Chishawasha, at a ceremony that would take three days and three nights. I went and informed Mugabe when all preparations had been made, so that he could plan to be free at that time. He responded with, “I am the Minister of Defence, I am the commander of the armed forces, and I am busy with the integration of the army!”</div><div class="root">I told him that I had consulted with all the ZANLA and ZIPRA commanders from the war days, to which he retorted, “There is no such thing as a ZANLA or ZIPRA Commander, it’s not your responsibility to deal with them!” This made me so angry that I was ready to spit in his face, and I called him ugly names, finishing with, “If that’s the way you are going to be, you will need lots of luck!” At which I stormed out of his office, banging the day.</div><div class="root">Since independence, many people have asked why there was no cleansing ceremony after the war, and many of the ills which subsequently fell upon Zimbabwe have been attributed to this fact. Even the Mozambican people asked why we hadn’t held a ceremony at Chimoio. Well, this is how it happened. Mugabe decided that no cleansing was necessary in Zimbabwe.</div><div class="root">Following the massacre, I was summoned from Chimoio to Maputo by President Machel, in true military style. I felt as thought I was being put under house arrest. A squad of soldiers marched into where I was working, and ordered me, “Para Maputo!” I arrived by plane from Beira at about 8.00 in the evening, and we spent the whole night in discussion, reviewing the situation. Eventually, we agreed we agreed that we would meet again the following night, each accompanied by a military delegation. And Machel said to me, “I respect Mugabe, but he does not measure up to this scale of military operation and planning. He does not belong as a soldier.” In fact, the military Machel did not much like Robert Mugabe.”</div><div class="root">I immediately requested that Tongogara be brought form Tete. In fact I summoned him just as Machel had summoned me: “Para Maputo!” Having once been detained in Lusaka, he must have thought that it was all over again.</div><div class="root">The second night’s discussion was more detailed. We were planning a counter-response to the Chimoio massacre. After the meeting, I said to Tongogara,</div><div class="root">“Look here, you are going to see President Mugabe to make a courtesy call, but don’t give him a lot of details about this meeting.” Tongogara leaped to his feet.</div><div class="root">“Now you have heard it yourself! You are the one who brought a sell-out here. Look how many of the people have been killed!” He continued, “I told you not to bring him here - but you only believe what I said now because Machel has told you!” I did not react, but was shocked at the extent of Tongogara’s anger against Mugabe.</div><div class="root">Sometime later, I brought up the subject again with Tongogara. “Are you saying I brought a sell-out?” This time the two of us analysed the situation and realised that we were both equally apprehensive that Mugabe might let us down. After this, we began to isolate our dependable commanders, and tried to discover how many of us were still committed to the war. But this filled us with sadness.</div><div class="root">Tongogara and I worked very well together, and through this we also became close friends. Both of us felt the need for someone who could be depended upon entirely, and so came about what I call “The Covenant”, which was our vow of rededication to the war, just between the two of us. One evening, we went upstairs to my bedroom, which had only one chair to sit on apart from the bed. We set out a bottle of whisky, and sat down facing each other. “Tongogara,” I asked, “Are you still committed, are you really?” Tongogara in turn asked me the same question, and we both affirmed that we were totally committed. Now we were to make our vows of total commitment. I called to the guards outside to bring us our AK47s, cocked and loaded. The young men must have been very worried as to what we were about to do. Were we going to shoot each other?</div><div class="root">Guns in hand, we stood up, facing each other. “You swear, you are committed unto the end. If you show any hesitation, I’ll shoot you with my AK47. We each gave each other a military salute, gun at the ready, hand across the heart and took our oaths of total re-commitment. The young men were relieved when we called them to take away our guns.</div><div class="root">Tongogara continued the process of isolating the dependable commanders. Some of those excluded would be detained for the duration of the offensive in case they caused trouble. Josiah Tungamirai was one who feared battle. But there were a number of good soldiers, including Mark Dube, Rex Nhongo, Tonderai Nyika, Morgan Mhaka, Sarudzai Chinamaropa and Justin Chauke. It was sad that Serbia had died during the attack.</div><div class="root">We bided our time, waiting for the enemy to relax into thinking that they had destroyed us at Chimoio. When we eventually began the offensive it was very successful. While Tongogara was responsible for coordinating the attack, in the middle portion of my border, my responsibility was for the northern part, operating from Tete. Our forces pushed ahead fast, eventually reaching as far as Musana Communal Lands and Mazowe Valley, which was very close to Harare. This caused Ian Smith to say that his people could not win the war. When he was accused of weakness, he tried to retract the statement by saying he had not said they would lose - just would not win!</div><div class="root">A Lifetime of Struggle by Edgar Tekere is published by Sapes Books in Harare. The book was edited by Ibbo Mandaza. Also in the series is The Story of My Life by Joshua Nkomo, also published by Sapes.</div><h3 class="head2" id="3.1.">3. 1. Theories on death</h3><div class="root">A <a href="http://wapedia.mobi/en/CIA">CIA</a> intelligence briefing of 28 December 1979 said Tongogara was a potential political rival to Mugabe because of his <em>.. ambition, popularity and decisive style.</em> On the same day, the US embassy in Zambia reported: <em>Almost no one in Lusaka accepts Mugabe's assurance that Tongogara died accidentally. When the ambassador told the Soviet ambassador the news, the surprised Soviet immediately charged 'inside job'.</em> <sup><small>[2]</small></sup></div><div class="root"><a href="http://wapedia.mobi/en/Ian_Smith">Ian Smith</a> also insisted in his memoirs that Tongogara's "own people" killed him, and that he had disclosed at Lancaster House that Tongogara was under threat. "I made a point of discussing his death with our police commissioner and head of special branch, and both assured me that Tongogara had been assassinated," Smith wrote. <sup><small>[3]</small></sup></div><div class="root">A former Detective in the Law and Order Section of the now defunct BSA Police ( now Zimbabwe Republic Police ) saw photographs of Tongogara's body. There were three wounds, consistent with gun shot wounds, to his upper torso. The undertaker's statement (described above) was not a formal autopsy report and as such was dismissed by all but the senior politburo of ZANU.</div><div class="root">In spite of all these rumours, Mr. R. Silke, the pathologist for Mashfords Funeral Home in Zimbabwe, confirmed, in a television documentary in 1982 called "Tongo", that this theory of gunshot wounds on Tongogara's body was false as he personally inspected the body. He confirmed that the injuries he found were consistent with road accident trauma.</div><div class="root">Jungle Dweller who was also at Chimoio on the day of the attack said, he was shocked by the death of Josiah Tongogara. Most comrades were shocked and blamed Mugabe for the death of the great fighter. Most comrades thought Cde Tongo's death was a plot by Mugabe and his close allies. However, the fighters feared to say it out because he Mugabe was feared by most fighters even the leadership feared him too. Cde Tongo was loved by most fighters because of his style of leadership. " Tears flew down my cheeks when I heard of his death and I new the war was over because he used to address us informing us that many will be cheated to death few hours before our independence" said Comrade John mambewu (Jungle Dweller. Cde Jungle Dweller when asked to narrate his history could be seen sighing each time he mentioned names of deceased friends in arms. " Actually I was born in the district of Bikita from a poor family of eight boys and two girls. I attended my primary school at Chamburukira Lower Primary School up to grade 5. I worked as a cotton picker at farms 10, 8, and 9 in Chiredzi. I also worked for Peter WenningHam's Farm again as a cotton picker. This is where I experienced the worst cruelity I have ever seen in my life resulting in me joining the Chimurenga in 1976 Through Chikwekwete border post. I with Amos Mugwadi and Daniel Mukwena walked from our home area i.e. Musuzwa Kraal/Chamburukira Matuzu hill via Gudo,Mutsviri,Mabhiza School,Chibuwe,Maria/Cheche,Muumbe village, crossed Bhinya road into Mozambique Chikwete border post. We walked for two days before we crossed the border. I can't mentioned all the difficulties we faced on our way to Mozambique but really we had many problems. On our way we met Rhodesian soldiers several times and they questioned us and I remember we told them that we were looking for our lost cattle each time we met them. I also remember it started raining and lighting struck a tree in front of us while we were watching. My brother Daniel Mukwena started to have problems with his right eye. The eye swell, turned red and he started to cry but we said no going back lets move. I had never crossed a big river like Save(Sabi). When we arrived at the river, it was full and flowing hushly. We had no option but to swim across. we were helped by two men to cross over. I remember we lay down after we had seen a convoy of vehicles and horses patrolling along Bhinya road. I felt cold when two of the horses crossed two metres in front of me but I was never spotted. After the patrol convoy passed we crossed bhinya road and straight into Mozambique.</div>We were spotted by camaradas who took us to chikwekwete. At Chikwekwete we stayed for about a week before being taken to Sipunga Beira Via Mude Camp up to chigayo i.e. Chimoio. While we were at Chikwekwete we received news that our fellow cdes at Nyadzonya have been attacked and massacred. I also witnessed a capricon being axed behind the neck by the camaradas while tied beneath a mango tree. At chimoio we stayed for 3 weeks waiting for dodges to come and collect us to an unknown destination. We had count masters who would take our strength thrice a day. In the morning, afternoon and evening we would gather taken strength and then sing and dismissed to different position. I remember the situation was quiet tense because of the Nyadzonya attack which was still very fresh to every cde. All guerrilas were very vigilant to the extend that every recruit was escorted where ever he/she was going even to the toilet. When having lunch or supper you were forced to sit or kneel down while surrounded by armed trained guerrilas. <div class="root">Yes, you need a complete book to get into finer details. The dodges came we were loaded into them like sadines. Our strength had much increased. The vehicles were much full such that some were standing on top of others. The drivers drove through dust roads very speedy. I remember as we travelled to our destination one recruit had his eye blown off after it was hit by a tree branch. The recruit cried helplessily but the vehicle never stopped until we reached where we were introduced as Doroi Masengere/Caitono. Some called the area matanga enguruve. The trained personnel took the injured recruit to MOs of course I never saw him again. At doroi, this is where I experienced the worst in my life. I don't think I will ever experience such experiences. There was no food. We had no blankets, no warm clothes, no medication everything was just bad. The jiggerfleas,lice,hunger and diseases started to affect us. The clothes and shoes I had were taken away by other trainados and I was given tattered and torn clothes. I cried one night, I was already thinking home, thinking of my mother,father,brothers and sisters. The detantee had affected all the camps. No clothes were given to us. The area was a wet area. It could rain any time. We slept as the rain flows beneath us. Many cdes fell ill and died because of shortage of food,clothes etc. Daniel was also affected and died. I cried but there was no help. I thought Another theory is that he was killed by the Rhodesian SAS.</div><div class="blogger-post-footer"><!-- Start Bravenet.com Service Code -->
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<!-- End Bravenet.com Service Code --></div>Beaver Shawhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15092980697221951142noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6501586017974986851.post-83704237266731632042010-11-11T23:11:00.001-08:002010-11-11T23:11:43.222-08:00Edison Sithole<h2 class="contentheading"> Edison Sithole’s remains found </h2><div class="article-toolswrap"> <div class="article-tools clearfix"> <div class="article-meta"> <span class="createdate"> Friday, 27 August 2010 11:31 </span> </div><div class="buttonheading"> <span> <a href="http://www.financialgazette.co.zw/component/mailto/?tmpl=component&link=aHR0cDovL3d3dy5maW5hbmNpYWxnYXpldHRlLmNvLnp3L3RvcC1zdG9yaWVzLzUzMzktZWRpc29uLXNpdGhvbGVzLXJlbWFpbnMtZm91bmQuaHRtbA%3D%3D" title="E-mail"><img alt="E-mail" src="http://www.financialgazette.co.zw/templates/ja_rutile/images/emailButton.png" /></a> </span> <span> <a href="http://www.financialgazette.co.zw/top-stories/5339-edison-sitholes-remains-found.html?tmpl=component&print=1&layout=default&page=" rel="nofollow" title="Print"><img alt="Print" src="http://www.financialgazette.co.zw/images/M_images/printButton.png" /></a> </span> <span> <a href="http://www.financialgazette.co.zw/top-stories/5339-edison-sitholes-remains-found.pdf" rel="nofollow" title="PDF"><img alt="PDF" src="http://www.financialgazette.co.zw/templates/ja_rutile/images/pdf_button.png" /></a> </span> </div></div></div><strong>Decades-long mystery resolved as . . .</strong><br />
<br />
<strong>Zivisai Chagaka, Staff Reporter</strong><br />
<br />
THE remains of national hero, Edison Sithole, who disappeared without trace following his abduction by suspected Rhodesian forces at the height of the country’s liberation struggle could soon be exhumed for reburial following revelations of the discovery of where his body was dumped, ending more than two decades of a historic search.<br />
Sithole was snatched, along with his young secretary, Miriam Mhlanga, outside a Harare hotel on October 15 1975 and later declared dead, but his body was never found.<br />
According to the Fallen Heroes Trust, a group composed of mainly war veterans that has been identifying, exhuming and reburying fallen liberation war fighters, the place where the veteran politician’s body was dumped by the colonial regime’s agents is now known, but finer details will only be released after his next of kin have been informed.<br />
Speaking during a media tour of a mass grave at Mukaradzi about 10km outside Mt Darwin, the Trust’s chief exhumer, Jimmy Motsi could only say Sithole’s body and that of his secretary were dumped in Harare province.<br />
In a separate interview with this paper, Eddison Sithole Jr, the late firebrand politician’s son who was Zimbabwe’s highest qualified legal expert at the time, said the Sithole family was “very receptive to any information that comes our way as far as this issue is concerned”.<br />
“But at the moment, our major focus is on recovering his remains or at least identify the way he might have been killed taking into account that there are other theories that are suggestive of the notion that he was dissolved in acid,” said Sithole Jr who was only three months old when his father disappeared.<br />
“This name that I carry is like a curse on me — it’s like an oxymoron. First, because it has certain privileges attached to it, but these privileges are outweighed by the curse effect it carries as long as the mystery remains unsolved.”<br />
A lawyer by profession, the late national hero obtained a BA in Law from University of London while in detention in 1962, becoming the second black person in Zimbabwe to be a lawyer after veteran nationalist and hero, Herbert Chitepo.<br />
In 1965 he obtained a Master of Law (LLM) and later an LLD, making him the first black person in the entire southern African region to attain that qualification.<br />
Writer and lecturer, David Martin, claimed in 1993 that Sithole and his secretary were kidnapped by Rhodesian secret services, the Rhodesian Special Branch, and disposed of by the notorious Selous Scouts using lethal injection.<br />
His car was reportedly found by police two days later in Mutare (then Umtali) near the railway station to give credence to suggestions that he had skipped the border to join the war.In an article which appeared in the British Sunday Express newspaper on January 18 1976 quoting the Edinburgh newspaper, The Scotsman, “one witness, an African (black) soldier, sought refuge in Malawi pending a Rhodesian High Court action, which Sithole’s family is bringing for habeas corpus”.<br />
A private investigator, hired by Sithole’s father, John Taylor, had managed to find two witnesses to the abduction and obtained two sworn affidavits indicating that two members of the Rhodesian Special Branch — DR Hart and DSO Mitchell — were involved in the abduction.<br />
The article — which carried the heading “We saw (Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian) Smith’s men grab Sithole — Police accused of abduction” — said that one of the private investigator’s witnesses was a Catholic priest, Brother Arthur, of the Justice and Peace Commission.<br />
Part of the article reads: [[Brother Arthur says he saw a group of men accost Dr Sithole outside Salisbury’s (now Harare) Ambassador Hotel on the evening of October 15.<br />
He claims he heard Dr Sithole say to one of them: ‘Special Branch . . .’ Then he adds: The man produced a wallet, which he opened for Dr Sithole to see. The man spoke again and I heard Sithole say: ‘Oh no, it’s not necessary; it’s alright . . .’<br />
Another affidavit is by an African member of the Rhodesian African Rifles who says he saw Dr Sithole getting out of a car at Nkomo Barracks (sic), the regiment’s headquarters near Salisbury. . . Mr Taylor flew this key witness out of Rhodesia on Boxing Day (1975) for safe refuge. <br />
It was the intention that he should go to Tanzania via Malawi, but Malawian airport officials became suspicious and placed the witness and one of Mr Taylor’s assistants in custody.<br />
On January 5, the secretary-general of (Bishop Abel) Muzorewa (faction of the) ANC (African National Council), Dr Gordon Chavunduka, flew to Blantyre (Malawi) to secure the witness’ release — and found himself in the same hotel as a senior member of the Rhodesian Special Branch, a Mr Guiness. This witness is still in Malawi awaiting the Rhodesian High Court case.<br />
But . . . the case is now being delayed because the ANC is having difficulty raising the reward money to pay Mr Taylor. . . . an emissary has left Rhodesia on a fundraising tour, carrying documents on the case.]]<br />
The ANC had offered a reward of R87 000 to anyone providing information disclosing Sithole’s whereabouts.<br />
Sithole entered into politics in the early 50s when he, James Chikerema and George Nyandoro formed the City Youth League political party in the then Salisbury, now Harare. At the time of his abduction, Sithole was publicist secretary for Muzorewa’s faction of the ANC.<br />
This reporter can also reveal that the mass grave at Mukaradzi, which is situated at a former training camp for guerrillas, Tigere Base, has been invaded by gold panners who are desecrating the place in search of the mineral. <br />
The remains of those who perished at the place during the Rhodesian regime’s brutal campaign against freedom fighters are wasting away on the surface of the scorched earth.<br />
Motsi said there are over a 100 people whose remains remain uncollected at the place.<br />
The Fallen Heroes Trust national chairperson and veteran politician, George Rutanhire, called on the government to seriously look into the issue of those freedom fighters whose remains lay unburied or are in mass graves. He said it is government’s business and not of children of fallen heroes to see to it that they help the relatives of the fallen fighters in reburying them.<div class="blogger-post-footer"><!-- Start Bravenet.com Service Code -->
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<!-- End Bravenet.com Service Code --></div>Beaver Shawhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15092980697221951142noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6501586017974986851.post-9814336969697412572010-11-11T23:02:00.001-08:002010-11-11T23:08:32.895-08:00BRITAIN TWISTS THE SWORD -JAVELINS IN NDOLA<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj5aBcM-KvuW4zhDo4WMZWQbRLFnBkyGAnjgTY6JjgA07FIH1yCX7ecwi_hB7biauF00NRK1xsE_fnXE8n94Jin87JYrATbkbOcQZutVtjDxDpHMcPXnScnAyAbvjXPO8NwbGNCOvxnOILn/s1600/800px-Javelin_in_Africa_01.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="192" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj5aBcM-KvuW4zhDo4WMZWQbRLFnBkyGAnjgTY6JjgA07FIH1yCX7ecwi_hB7biauF00NRK1xsE_fnXE8n94Jin87JYrATbkbOcQZutVtjDxDpHMcPXnScnAyAbvjXPO8NwbGNCOvxnOILn/s320/800px-Javelin_in_Africa_01.jpg" width="320" /></a></div>29 Squadron RAF (Gloster Javelin) deployed from RAF Akrotiri, Cyprus to Ndola to provide air defence following the announcement of Unilateral Declaration of Independence by the Rhodesian government. Air defence radars and ancillary equipment were flown into Zambia by No.114 and No.267 Squadrons (Armstrong Whitworth Argosy). No.29 Squadron returned to Akrotiri in August 1966. <br />
They flew south with a full load of six external tanks, raising a protest from the Egyptian government when they simply overflew Egyptian airspace to get there. Conditions were primitive, with one Javelin losing a Firestreak missile when a nest of termites crawled up the landing gear and ate the solid propellant out of the missile. <br />
Air defence radars and ancillary equipment were flown into Zambia by No.114 and No.267 Squadrons (Armstrong Whitworth Argosy). No.29 Squadron returned to RAF Akrotiri in August 1966. <br />
One of the aircraft from 29 Squadron, XH890, forced landed at Ndola and was damaged beyond economical repair, the aircraft was moved to a children’s playground in Ndola. Photos can be seen below. <br />
Of interest, Salisbury Radar controlled all airspace in the region, after take-off the Royal Air Force flight leader would contact the ‘rebels’ in Salisbury Radar, Salisbury Airport for clearance to fly a border patrol along the Zambia/Rhodesia border. <br />
I was at Ndola airport at least four or five times a week during the squadrons stay in Zambia and I don't know anything about the squadron’s activities in Lusaka. I did some research on the internet and the RAF History does not make mention of Lusaka. I did find a photo, though, taken from someone straddling the cockpit of a Javelin with the old Lusaka terminal in the background. The words LUSAKA are clearly visible on the roof of the terminal. The planes were definitely based in Ndola for the duration, however may have visited Lusaka on a regular basis. After all it took a Javelin approx. 30 minutes to fly there from Ndola to Lusaka. <br />
Excerpt from Time magazine: <br />
"Harold Wilson offered to send a token force—a squadron of R.A.F. fighters and a battalion of the Royal Scots—to the copper belt, some 250 miles north of the dam. Kaunda accepted the air protection (Zambia has only ten military aircraft of its own), but rejected the offer of troops unless they were sent directly to the dam. Into the copper-belt centre of Ndola at week's end swooped ten British Gloster Javelin jet fighters, accompanied by big-bellied Argosy and Beverley transports carrying the squadron's maintenance supplies. A brace of Bristol Britannia turboprop transports arrived at Lusaka itself. To the south, Smith was sardonically amused. "It is in our interest to have law and order maintained in Zambia," he deadpanned in a television interview." <br />
To Quote Air Chief Marshall Sir Jock Kennedy GCB AFC of the Royal Air Force: <br />
“They made telephonic contact with our jets to offer our men best wishes and suggested that it would be fun to meet in the air. Our pilots needed no second invitation. On a few occasions Hunter’s or Canberra’s met the Javelins to fly along the Zambezi River in formation with crews waving and taking photographs of each other”. The odd pilot happened to stop over in Salisbury, allegedly taking leave to visit South Africa. Their passports were never stamped and a number of them met with our Prime Minster, Ian Smith. When, in August 1966, the British Government announced the withdrawal of the Javelin squadron, Rhodesians gave the RAF lads a grand farewell party at Victoria Falls." <br />
Courtesy of <a class="external text" href="http://www.greatnorthroad.org/names/read.php?id=67" rel="nofollow" title="http://www.greatnorthroad.org/names/read.php?id=67">Mervyn Blumberg</a>.<div class="blogger-post-footer"><!-- Start Bravenet.com Service Code -->
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<!-- End Bravenet.com Service Code --></div>Beaver Shawhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15092980697221951142noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6501586017974986851.post-55995129182776611482010-11-11T22:58:00.000-08:002010-11-11T22:58:50.421-08:00HMS TIGER INFOHMS <i>Tiger was a conventional cruiser of the <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Royal_Navy">Royal Navy</a><span class="hp" id="m71060"><div class="hpHeader">Royal Navy</div><div class="hpContent">The Royal Navy of the United Kingdom is the oldest of HM Armed Forces . From the beginning of the 19th century until well into the 20th century it was the most powerful navy in the world, playing a key part in establishing the British Empire as the dominant world power from 1815 until the early 1940s...</div></span>, one of a three ship class known as the </i><a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Tiger_class_cruiser">Tiger<i> class</i></a><span class="hp" id="m20432"><div class="hpHeader"><i>Tiger class cruiser</i></div><div class="hpContent"><i>The Tiger-class helicopter cruisers were the first of such a type in the Royal Navy, and the last cruisers built for the Royal Navy. They were originally designed to be Minotaur-class light cruisers...</i></div><i><br />
</i></span><i>.<br />
</i><br />
<h2><i>Construction, redesign and commissioning</i></h2><i><br />
</i>Tiger<i> started out as </i>Bellerophon<i> laid down in 1941 at the John Brown Shipyard as part of the </i><a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Minotaur_class_cruiser_%281943%29">Minotaur<i> class</i></a><span class="hp" id="m68547" style="display: none; top: 581px;"><div class="hpHeader"><i>Minotaur class cruiser (1943)</i></div><div class="hpContent"><div class="hpImage" id="i68547"><img src="http://image.absoluteastronomy.com/images/topicthumbs/m/mi/minotaur_class_cruiser_%281943%29.gif" /></div><i>The Minotaur class of light cruisers of the Royal Navy, also known as the Swiftsure class, was designed as a modified version of the Crown Colony class incorporating war modifications and authorised in 1941, but, in spite of the heavy toll of cruisers in that year and the following one, the...</i></div><i><br />
</i></span><i> of <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Light_cruiser">light cruiser</a><span class="hp" id="m67290" style="display: none; top: 581px;"><div class="hpHeader">Light cruiser</div><div class="hpContent"><div class="hpImage" id="i67290"><img src="http://image.absoluteastronomy.com/images/topicthumbs/l/li/light_cruiser.gif" /></div>A light cruiser is a type of small-medium-sized warship. The term is a shortening of the phrase "light armoured cruiser", describing a small ship that carried armour in the same way as an armoured cruiser: a protective belt and deck...</div></span>s. They had a low construction priority due to more pressing requirements for other ship types during <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/World_War_II">World War II</a><span class="hp" id="m16662"><div class="hpHeader">World War II</div><div class="hpContent">World War II, or the Second World War , was a global military conflict lasting from 1939 to 1945 which involved most of the world's nations, including all of the great powers, organised into two opposing military alliances: the Allies and the Axis...</div></span>, particularly anti-submarine craft. </i>Bellerophon<i> was renamed </i>Tiger<i> in 1945, and was launched, partially constructed, on 25 October 1945. She was christened by Lady Stansgate, the wife of <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/William_Wedgwood_Benn,_1st_Viscount_Stansgate">William Benn</a><span class="hp" id="m88834"><div class="hpHeader">William Wedgwood Benn, 1st Viscount Stansgate</div><div class="hpContent">Air Commodore William Wedgwood Benn, 1st Viscount Stansgate PC, DSO, DFC was a British Liberal politician who later joined the Labour Party. He was Secretary of State for India between 1929 and 1931 and Secretary of State for Air between 1945 and 1946...</div></span>, the <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Secretary_of_State_for_Air">Secretary of State for Air</a><span class="hp" id="m12892"><div class="hpHeader">Secretary of State for Air</div><div class="hpContent">The Secretary of State for Air was a cabinet level British position. The person holding this position was in charge of the Air Ministry. It was created on 10 January 1919 to manage the Royal Air Force...</div></span>, and mother of MP Anthony Wedgewood Benn. However, work on </i>Tiger<i> was suspended in 1946, and she was laid up at <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Dalmuir">Dalmuir</a><span class="hp" id="m58493"><div class="hpHeader">Dalmuir</div><div class="hpContent">Dalmuir is an area on the western side of Clydebank, in West Dunbartonshire, Scotland.-Location:It is neighboured by the village of Old Kilpatrick, the Mountblow and Parkhall areas of Clydebank, as well as the town centre...</div></span>.<br />
<br />
Construction of </i>Tiger<i> resumed, but to a new design, with </i>Tiger becoming the name ship of the class. The new design was approved in 1951, but construction did not resume until 1954. She would have semi-automatic guns in twin high-angle mounts with each gun capable of shooting 20 rounds per minute, and a secondary battery of fully-automatic guns which delivered 90 rounds per minute per gun. She would have no lighter anti-aircraft armament or <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Torpedo_tube">torpedo tube</a><span class="hp" id="m75010"><div class="hpHeader">Torpedo tube</div><div class="hpContent">A torpedo tube is a device for launching torpedoes in a horizontal direction.There are two main types of torpedo tube:*Those designed to operate below water level, as fitted to submarines and some surface ships...</div></span>s. <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Air_conditioning">Air conditioning</a><span class="hp" id="m99067"><div class="hpHeader">Air conditioning</div><div class="hpContent">An air conditioner is a home appliance, system, or mechanism designed to dehumidify and extract heat from an area. The cooling is done using a simple refrigeration cycle. In construction, a complete system of heating, ventilation, and air conditioning is referred to as "HVAC"...</div></span> was fitted throughout the ship, and a 200-line automatic <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Telephone">telephone</a><span class="hp" id="m23125"><div class="hpHeader">Telephone</div><div class="hpContent">The telephone , commonly referred to as a phone, is a telecommunications device that transmits and receives sound, most commonly the human voice. Telephones are a point-to-point communication system whose most basic function is to allow two people separated by large distances to talk to one another...</div></span> exchange was installed. Each 6 inch and 3 inch mounting had its own director, linked to a dedicated radar on the director. Tiger<i> was finally commissioned on Clydebank in March 1959.<br />
<h2>Career</h2><br />
The early part of </i>Tigers first commission was spent, under Captain RE Wasbourn, on trials trying to make her new armament actually work. After workup under Captain R Hutchins <i>Tiger</i> went on a round of autumn flag-showing visits to Gdynia, Stockholm, Kiel and Antwerp. At the end of 1959 she deployed to the Mediterranean for a year as Fleet Flagship, under <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Admiral">Admiral</a><span class="hp" id="m47182"><div class="hpHeader">Admiral</div><div class="hpContent">Admiral is the rank, or part of the name of the ranks, of the highest naval officers. It is usually considered a full admiral and above Vice Admiral and below Admiral of the Fleet/Fleet Admiral. It is usually abbreviated to "Adm." or "ADM". Where relevant, Admiral is a 4 star rank...</div></span> <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Michael_Pollock">Michael Pollock</a><span class="hp" id="m18098"><div class="hpHeader">Michael Pollock</div><div class="hpContent">Admiral of the Fleet Sir Michael Patrick Pollock, GCB, LVO, DSC was a British officer in the Royal Navy who rose to become First Sea Lord from 1971 to 1974...</div></span>.<br />
<br />
She took part in operations in the <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Far_East">Far East</a><span class="hp" id="m87756" style="display: none; top: 918px;"><div class="hpHeader">Far East</div><div class="hpContent"><div class="hpImage" id="i87756"><img src="http://image.absoluteastronomy.com/images/topicthumbs/f/fa/far_east.gif" /></div>The Far East is a term used in English mostly equivalent to East Asia and Southeast Asia, sometimes to the inclusion of South Asia for economic and cultural reasons."Far East" came into use in European geopolitical discourse in...</div></span> during the Indonesian Confrontation in the early 1960s. In 1966, she hosted talks between Prime Ministers <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Harold_Wilson">Harold Wilson</a><span class="hp" id="m59929"><div class="hpHeader">Harold Wilson</div><div class="hpContent">James Harold Wilson, Baron Wilson of Rievaulx, KG, OBE, FRS, PC was a British Labour politician. One of the most prominent British politicians of the latter half of the 20th century, he served two terms as Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, firstly from 1964 to 1970, and again from 1974 to 1976...</div></span> (UK) and <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Ian_Smith">Ian Smith</a><span class="hp" id="m53645"><div class="hpHeader">Ian Smith</div><div class="hpContent">----Ian Douglas Smith GCLM ID served as the Prime Minister of the British self-governing colony of Southern Rhodesia from 13 April 1964 to 11 November 1965...</div></span> of <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Rhodesia">Rhodesia</a><span class="hp" id="m27074"><div class="hpHeader">Rhodesia</div><div class="hpContent">Rhodesia , officially the Republic of Rhodesia from 1970, was an unrecognised state located in Southern Africa that existed between 1965 and 1979 following its Unilateral Declaration of Independence from the United Kingdom on 11 November 1965...</div></span>. The latter had unilaterally declared independence from <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/United_Kingdom">Britain</a><span class="hp" id="m25818"><div class="hpHeader">United Kingdom</div><div class="hpContent">The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern IrelandIn the United Kingdom and Dependencies, other languages have been officially recognised as legitimate autochthonous languages under the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages...</div></span> due to Britain's insistence on the removal of white minority rule. <i>Tiger</i> was placed in reserve in 1966 before undergoing conversion to a "helicopter and commando cruiser" from 1968-72 in <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/HMNB_Devonport">HMNB Devonport</a><span class="hp" id="m49875"><div class="hpHeader">HMNB Devonport</div><div class="hpContent">Her Majesty's Naval Base Devonport , is one of three operating bases in the United Kingdom for the Royal Navy . HMNB Devonport is located in Devonport, in the west of the city of Plymouth in Devon, England...</div></span>.<br />
<h2>Conversion, obsolescence and decommissioning</h2><br />
This reconstruction included replacing the after 6 inch mount and 3 inch mounts with a flight deck and hangar to operate 4 Wessex (and then later Sea King) helicopters. She also had new <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Radar">radar</a><span class="hp" id="m24561"><div class="hpHeader">Radar</div><div class="hpContent">Radar is an object detection system that uses electromagnetic waves to identify the range, altitude, direction, or speed of both moving and fixed objects such as aircraft, ships, motor vehicles, weather formations, and terrain. The term RADAR was coined in 1940 by the U.S. Navy as an acronym for...</div></span>s, Sea Cat anti-aircraft missiles, and taller funnels. She had excellent command, control, and communications facilities installed, and found use as a <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Flagship">flagship</a><span class="hp" id="m23304"><div class="hpHeader">Flagship</div><div class="hpContent">A flagship is the lead ship in a fleet of vessels, a designation given on account of being either the largest, fastest, newest, most heavily armed or, for publicity purposes, the best known. In military terms, it is a ship used by the commanding officer of a group of naval ships...</div></span> to task groups. The refit was very expensive; some say the many millions to convert <i>Tiger</i>, as well as her sister ship <i>Blake</i> to helicopter cruisers drained much needed resources better used elsewhere. She was recommissioned in 1972. Her large crew made her an expensive ship to operate and maintain. When the economic difficulties of the early seventies came around this led to a defense manpower drawdown that resulted in manpower shortages, although <i>Tiger</i> remained in service long enough to take part in the 1977 <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Silver_Jubilee_of_Elizabeth_II">Silver Jubilee</a><span class="hp" id="m97989"><div class="hpHeader">Silver Jubilee of Elizabeth II</div><div class="hpContent">The Silver Jubilee of Elizabeth II marked the twenty-fifth anniversary of Queen Elizabeth II's accession to the throne of the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and other Commonwealth realms...</div></span> Fleet Review in celebration of <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Elizabeth_II_of_the_United_Kingdom">Queen Elizabeth II</a><span class="hp" id="m71418" style="display: none; top: 1150px;"><div class="hpHeader">Elizabeth II of the United Kingdom</div><div class="hpContent"><div class="hpImage" id="i71418"><img src="http://image.absoluteastronomy.com/images/topicthumbs/e/el/elizabeth_ii_of_the_united_kingdom.gif" /></div>Elizabeth II is queen regnant of 16 independent sovereign states known as the Commonwealth realms: the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Jamaica, Barbados, the Bahamas, Grenada, Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, Tuvalu, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Belize,...</div></span>. In 1978 <i>Tiger</i> was placed in reserve, subsequently being placed on the disposal list in 1979. Both Tiger and sister-ship <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/HMS_Blake_%28C99%29">HMS <i>Blake</i></a><span class="hp" id="m46105"><div class="hpHeader">HMS Blake (C99)</div><div class="hpContent">HMS Blake was a guided missile cruiser of the Tiger class of the Royal Navy, the last of the Royal Navy cruisers. She was named after Admiral Robert Blake, a 17th century admiral who was the "Father of the Royal Navy". She was ordered in 1942 as one of the Minotaur class of light cruisers...</div></span> were listed as part of the Standby squadron, and stored at HMNB Chatham. When the <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Falklands_War">Falklands War</a><span class="hp" id="m70162"><div class="hpHeader">Falklands War</div><div class="hpContent">The Falklands War , also called the Falklands Conflict/Crisis, was fought in 1982 between Argentina and the United Kingdom over the disputed Falkland Islands and South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands...</div></span> broke out in late March 1982, both ships were rapidly surveyed and it was determined both were in good enough material shape that both were drydocked (Tiger in Portsmouth and Blake at Chatham) and recommissioning work was begun, as it was deemed that their 6" guns would be useful for shore bombardment. By late-May it was realized that neither could be made ready in time for deployment and work was stopped. Though Chile showed a faint interest in acquiring Tiger (and sister-ship <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Blake">Blake</a><span class="hp" id="m44848"><div class="hpHeader">Blake</div><div class="hpContent">Blake is a surname or a given name which originated from Old English. Its derivation is uncertain; it could come from "blac", a nickname for someone who had dark hair or skin, or from "blaac", a nickname for someone with pale hair or skin. Another theory is that it is a corruption of "Ap Lake",...</div></span>), this did not get past the discussion stage, and Tiger lingered on tied to a mooring buoy in Portsmouth Harbour. Tiger existed in a slowly deteriorating condition until mid-1986, when she was sold for scrap. She was towed to Spain and scrapping started in October 1986. <div style="color: #8a867a; padding-top: 20px;"> The source of this article is <a class="greylink1" href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HMS_Tiger_%28C20%29">wikipedia</a>, the free encyclopedia. The text of this article is licensed under the <a class="greylink1" href="http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/gfdl.aspx">GFDL</a>.</div><div class="blogger-post-footer"><!-- Start Bravenet.com Service Code -->
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<!-- End Bravenet.com Service Code --></div>Beaver Shawhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15092980697221951142noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6501586017974986851.post-67888538287383681422010-11-11T22:49:00.000-08:002010-11-11T22:49:46.870-08:00HMS TIGER<h2> ON BOARD THE TIGER</h2><img align="RIGHT" border="1" height="245" hspace="15" src="http://www.rhodesia.nl/waving.jpg" vspace="15" width="358" /> THE Rhodesian issue dominated two conferences of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers during 1966. The first, at Lagos in January, produced the remarkable prediction in its communique: <blockquote>The Prime Ministers noted the statement by the British Prime Minister that, on the expert advice available to him, the cumulative effects of the economic and financial sanctions against Rhodesia might well bring the rebellion to an end in a matter of weeks rather than months.</blockquote>Some of the delegates found this difficult to swallow, for the passage went on: <blockquote>While some Prime Ministers had misgivings in this regard, all expressed the hope that these measures would result in the overthrow of the illegal regime in Rhodesia within the period mentioned by the British Prime Minister.</blockquote>The Lagos conference also produced a sixth principle to be added to the other five as a basis for an Independence Constitution: <blockquote>The need to ensure that, regardless of race, there is no oppression of majority by minority or of minority by majority.</blockquote>Rhodesia had little quarrel with this sentiment, provided it could work both ways. Experience in other African states had shown that while the whites bent over backwards to treat the Africans fairly, the opposite did not hold true once the Africans took over the reins of government. The second conference, at Marlborough House, London, in the following September saw the African Prime Ministers at their intemperate worst. They concentrated entirely on the Rhodesian issue, to the disgust of the more responsible Commonwealth statesmen who were anxious to discuss other matters of general concern. The agenda was disrupted as the Africans demanded direct action in Rhodesia, particularly the use of force. After nine days of bitter debate a communique was issued which showed that the 22 participating countries had failed to agree on a common policy and had split on racial lines - the Africans demanding an end to negotiation and the British Prime Minister and his supporters rejecting the use of force and insisting on another attempt to negotiate. <br />
Immediate steps were taken to hold further talks, and a stream of British Ministers and top officials visited Salisbury to discuss points of difference with the Rhodesian Prime Minister. But they got nowhere. The British terms were unacceptable with their insistence on smooth transition to majority rule, and the Rhodesian insistence on a braking mechanism was equally unacceptable to the visitors. No progress seemed possible. <br />
Then, on December 1, Rhodesians were electrified by the news that at 5.30 that morning Ian Smith and his Minister of Information, Mr. Jack Howman, together with Sir Humphrey Gibbs and Sir Hugh Beadle, had boarded an R.A.F. Comet to fly to the Mediterranean to meet the British Prime Minister and his Commonwealth Secretary. Their destination turned out to be Gibraltar, where they were to board the cruiser, H.M.S. Tiger, for talks that would be conducted in the strictest secrecy. <br />
While H.M.S. Tiger cruised through the choppy waters of the Mediterranean, the atmosphere on board her soon assumed the character of the weather. Mr. Wilson opened the first meeting quietly enough. His difficulty, he explained, was the time factor. Britain could not wait any longer before proceeding to carry out the commitments she had made to the Commonwealth regarding further action on Rhodesia. The African states were arguing that the British had not hesitated to use force to put down previous rebellions when the rebels were black, but when it came to Rhodesia, which was white-dominated, they hesitated. <br />
Ian Smith replied that he appreciated Britain's position, but her trouble was that she was working to a time schedule dictated by others. The other Commonwealth countries should not be allowed to interfere when there was a possiblity of a settlement, even if it took two more months. <br />
There was no question of waiting another two months, Wilson retorted. Negotiations had gone on long enough, and Britain's relations with other countries were being poisoned by her failure to deal successfully with the Rhodesian problem. An immediate settlement was imperative. <br />
Ian Smith's eye had a glint in it as he objected to the proposal that Rhodesia would have to give up her independence before any new constitution was agreed upon, without any guarantee at this stage that it would be granted. He could not make a final decision on a vital point like this on his own - he would have to consult his Cabinet colleagues. <br />
Harold Wilson blew up. The terms of the invitation to join him aboard the Tiger, he said, were that Smith should have a completely free hand to confirm or reject a settlement. <br />
lan Smith replied that he could not accept this version of the invitation. He had had a very limited time in which to consult his Cabinet before leaving Salisbury, and he was certainly not in a position to finalize the terms of a settlement without further reference to his colleagues. New factors had been introduced and his Cabinet would have to be put in the picture. <br />
When the two Prime Ministers met at 11.45 p.m. for their third meeting on December 2, Wilson pressed Smith to give an unqualified "yes" or "no" to the proposals. lt was essential that he should give a definite answer to the British Cabinet on his return to London. In an effort to assist he had ordered the Tiger to head back to Gibraltar so that Smith could return to Salisbury to discuss the proposals with his Cabinet. <br />
Alternatively, he suggested that Mr. Howman should return to Salisbury and take the proposals with him to put before the Rhodesian Cabinet. But lan Smith refused to agree to this. <br />
Harold Wilson turned on the heat. lf Rhodesia did not agree to a settlement, Britain would go to the United Nations for selective mandatory sanctions, and his undertaking to the Commonwealth Conference would be enforced - that if agreement were not reached by the end of the year any previous undertaking that independence would be granted before majority rule would fall away and Rhodesia would never get her independence on any other basis than immediate majority rule. <br />
Ian Smith replied stiffly that threats were of no consequence to him - he was concerned only with principles. <br />
All right, said Mr. Wilson, in that case they should meet again the following morning. In the meantime Mr. Smith should telegraph his Cabinet to stand by to consider the working document as soon as it had been transmitted to Salisbury. The Rhodesian Ministers must give an unqualified "yes" or "no" before midnight on Sunday, December 4. <br />
The next morning Ian Smith said that the proposals regarding a return to constitutionality were the main stumbling block, but that agreement on the constitutional arrangement was in sight. <br />
Mr. Wilson said his main worry was that during the interim period the Rhodesians might embark on a second UDI, in which case Britain would feel free to take what military action she thought necessary. It was also possible that after independence was granted a white-dominated Government might overthrow the Constitution, and therefore Britain wanted certain external guarantees. He suggested a treaty and also a defence agreement and he wanted to give the Governor greater power over the police and military. <br />
<blockquote>The British Government would have to be satisfied on the use that would be made of the Rhodesian forces and the police during the interim period and a British representative on a Defence and Security Council under the control of the Governor would be able to keep us informed.</blockquote>Mr. Smith objected on the ground that this meant keeping Rhodesia under supervision, and when Wilson confirmed this he said the whole proposal represented an alarming change in the British attitude. When the full conference resumed on the Saturday afternoon, a Working Document incorporating the British proposals was presented, and the meeting adjourned while the Rhodesians considered it. When they met again that evening Mr. Wilson urged Mr. Smith to sign an undertaking that he would "commend it to his colleagues in its entirety." This Ian Smith refused to do because it was not acceptable to him. <br />
The undertaking was then altered to read: <br />
<blockquote>Mr. Smith undertakes to inform his colleagues that it is acceptable to Her Majesty's Government as a settlement of the Rhodesian problem.</blockquote>This Mr. Smith accepted. While the new undertaking was being typed, Mr. Wilson was called away because "something of importance had occurred". <br />
When they met again at nine o'clock that evening Mr. Wilson's whole demeanour had changed. Jack Howman described the scene to the Rhodesian Parliament after their return: <br />
<blockquote>We came into the Admiral's day cabin to find Mr. Wilson in an absolute fury. I have never seen a man exhibit such malevolence as he did at that moment.</blockquote>He stormed at lan Smith. The British Government was no longer prepared to wait for a Rhodesian answer. lf Smith did not give it now he would withdraw the whole document. He was at liberty to leave the ship immediately. He (Wilson) had been in touch with his colleagues in London that afternoon and some of them were very disturbed. "The British Government refuses to be pushed around any longer", he declared. lan Smith told him with equal vehemence that he was not prepared to sign. He would take the document back to Salisbury and give it further study, but if Wilson insisted on an answer now it would have to be "No." <br />
Then Wilson really lashed out. The situation was an intolerable humiliation for him. Here was Rhodesia, which represented only one-tenth of one per cent of the Commonwealth, creating a situation which might result in a split of the Commonwealth itself. He had all along understood that Smith would attend the Tiger meeting with plenipotentiary powers to make decisions. But if he insisted on consulting his colleagues he must conclude that Smith never intended to reach a settlement. <br />
After further exchanges and a consultation which Mr. Wilson held with Sir Humphrey Gibbs and Sir Hugh Beadle, the British Prime Minister agreed that they shoud both take the document back to their respective Cabinets for discussion and decision. The answer would have to be a straight "Yes" or "No''. He would also postpone the deadline for a decision by 12 hours, so he would therefore expect Mr. Smith's answer by 12 noon Salisbury time on Monday, December 5. <br />
The Rhodesian party returned to Salisbury and Mr. Smith immediately went into session with his Cabinet. Mr. Wilson had returned to London and held a meeting with his Cabinet, which accepted the terms. At the end of the meeting, it was reported, the Ministers emerged "grim faced", indicating that Britain had made some unpalatable concessions. <br />
The Rhodesian Cabinet, however, sat right through Monday. The noon deadline came and went. Then, at 8.30 p.m., lan Smith emerged from the Cabinet room and told the waiting crowd that the proposals had been rejected. <br />
He said that while Rhodesia was prepared to accept proposals fulfilling Mr. Wilson's six principles as the basis of a constitution for an independent Rhodesia, they could not accept the abandonment of the 1965 Constitution before a new constitution had been finally secured and put to the test of public opinion. They also rejected the British proposals for a "return to legality", which involved major departures from the principles of parliamentary government which Rhodesia had enjoyed for 43 years. <br />
<blockquote>The Rhodesian Government is, of course, anxious to remove the differences that have existed over the past year between Rhodesia and Britain. Nevertheless, the Rhodesian Government cannot be expected to yield such fundamental principles and in a manner which amounts to surrender and the submission of power.</blockquote>lan Smith concluded his statement: <blockquote>The fight goes on.</blockquote>The Tiger negotiations might well have succeeded had Mr. Wilson not made the mistake of leaving no room for manoeuvre on the details of the return to legality - they had to be accepted in their entirety, without argument, with no possibility of amendment. Faced with such an ultimatum the Rhodesians, determined to follow the course they had set, reacted in the only predictable way. Their decision caused shock and dismay among their many countrymen who had been hoping for a settlement, an end to sanctions, a return to the community of nations, so that they could get on with the vital job of developing the country. But after mature reflection many of them concluded that the rejection had been justified. And that the man responsible for the failure had not been Ian Smith but Harold Wilson. <br />
Immediately after Rhodesia's rejection Britain took the independence issue to the United Nations despite Mr. Wilson's earlier contention that it was a matter entirely for Britain and Rhodesia to settle between them. Since her independence had not been internationally recognized and she had no seat in the United Nations. Rhodesia's application to state her case was refused. <br />
It was ironic that just as the Rhodesian issue came up for discussion in the Security Council. the General Assembly adopted a resolution calling for <br />
<blockquote>the immediate cessation of intervention in any form whatsoever in the domestic affairs of states and peoples.</blockquote>In his anger at Rhodesia's rejection of the Tiger proposals, Harold Wilson declared: "No Independence Before African Majority Rule". If anything was calculated to stiffen the Rhodesian backbone it was NIBMAR. It united the white Rhodesians, and a great many of the black Rhodesians as well, solidly behind the Government's determination not to give in. The British Prime Minister was a poor psychologist. It was nearly two years before the British and Rhodesian Prime Ministers met again. There had been little contact during the interval and it seemed that all prospect of further negotiations had been abandoned. Then, suddenly, on October 9, 1968, it was announced that the Rhodesian Prime Minister and a strong team had departed the previous evening in an R.A.F. Britannia to meet Mr. Wilson and a British team on board H.M.S. Fearless at Gibraltar. <br />
It was a different Mr. Wilson who met the Rhodesians this time. He was courteous and considerate and evidently prepared to be reasonable. But he made it clear in a television interview before the meeting that the biggest issue at the talks would be the creation of a "blocking quarter" of elected Africans able to veto any retrogressive amendment to a negotiated constitution, and also that agreement would have to be within the limits of the six principles laid down by Britain. <br />
Both sides were genuinely anxious to reach a settlement, but once again the differences between them were too great What particularly stuck in the Rhodesian gizzard was a British requirement regarding possible amendments to the entrenched clauses of the Constitution - that if such an amendment were found by the Constitutional Council to be unjustly discriminatory between the races, the Council could refer it to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, which would have the final say. <br />
The Rhodesians argued that this provision opened the door to outside interference in the country's affairs, that the Privy Council would be called upon to make political rather than judicial decisions, and that the Appellate Division of the Rhodesian High Court was the proper body to hear appeals of this kind. <br />
The negotiations failed. To their mutual regret, Britain and Rhodesia continued to be at loggerheads.<div class="blogger-post-footer"><!-- Start Bravenet.com Service Code -->
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<!-- End Bravenet.com Service Code --></div>Beaver Shawhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15092980697221951142noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6501586017974986851.post-78026319123262809682010-11-11T22:46:00.000-08:002010-11-11T22:46:05.230-08:00UDI RHODESANS RALLY<h2>THE RHODESIANS RALLY</h2>During the ten days preceding the Declaration, signs were not lacking that something momentous was in the wind. The Government declared a state of emergency, on the ground that saboteurs from outside the country's borders were becoming active and the national security was threatened. All public meetings were banned, no large gatherings were permitted, swift action could be taken against any hint of subversion. At about the same time import controls were introduced to safeguard Rhodesia's foreign exchange and economic well-being. Immediately after Ian Smith made his declaration, the Government issued its UDI Proclamation. <br />
Public reaction on the whole was restrained. There was some celebration, but the business men of Salisbury and Bulawayo, Gwelo and Umtali, did not celebrate. They took the threat of sanctions seriously and feared for their future. They could not understand why this step should have been taken just as they were climbing out of the trough following the break-up of the Federation. Now they would have to tighten their belts against the prospects of shrinking markets. The markets they were worried about were those immediately to the north - Zambia and Malawi, which since the dissolution of the Federation had imposed tariffs on goods manufactured in Rhodesia. It was only to be expected that they would seize on Rhodesia's illegal act to raise those barriers still further. <br />
The initial reaction of dismay on the part of many Rhodesians was swiftly followed by another. The step had been taken. The die had been cast. Every patriotic Rhodesian agreed that the country was entitled to her independence, far more so than the black states to the north who had had it thrust upon them with such indecent haste. They might not agree with the way it had been achieved, but now that we had it we would have to see that we retained it. Because the alternative was too awful to contemplate. If Rhodesia collapsed, if she had to beg for clemency from an outraged British Government, there could be no doubt what sort of government world be imposed. It would be black majority government almost right away. <br />
Therefore, there could be no question of actively opposing the Government's decision, of organizing a political opposition. Rhodesia and her future came first. Ian Smith could be assured of their loyalty and support in facing the challenge, in meeting the dangers ahead. <br />
The African population took the declaration calmly. A planned outbreak of violence was expected, but there were only a few instances of attempted rioting and intimidation, mostly in Bulawayo, and these were promptly stamped out by the police. An attempt to organize a general strike, again mostly at Bulawayo, produced little or no response. As long as the tenor of their daily lives was undisturbed, the mass of the Africans was unconcerned. <br />
The Governor, Sir Humphrey Gibbs, was in an agonizing position. As a highly respected Rhodesian of long standing, and the first Rhodesian to hold the office of Governor, he must have agreed that Rhodesia was entitled to her independence. But he could not possibly agree with the manner in which it had been obtained. At the same time as Ian Smith issued his Proclamation of Independence, Sir Humphrey issued his own proclamation declaring the Government illegal and removing Mr. Smith and his Ministers from office. <br />
But censorship had been introduced that morning, and the Governor's proclamation was neither published nor broadcast within Rhodesia. But, since the censorship did not apply to outgoing messages, it was published in the Press in South Africa and Britain and it was broadcast by the BBC, so that a number of Rhodesians knew about it. Ian Smith was quick to take action. <br />
He issued a statement on November l 5 describing his meeting with Sir Humphrey on the morning of November 11 when he had told him of his intention to broadcast his Declaration of Independence at lunch-time. Sir Humphrey, he said, had been expecting this. <br />
<blockquote>He said he believed my decision was wrong in that if we were not able to negotiate with the British Government we should maintain the status quo. He acknowledged that it was not possible to convince me of his way of thinking, and added that although he was opposed to my decision, once UDI was a fait accompli all good Rhodesians should stand together in the interests of Rhodesia. He assured me that he was a good Rhodesian.</blockquote>Following Sir Humphrey's proclamation, he had paid him another visit. <blockquote>l found that he had changed his stand and had obviously received instructions from London. I pointed out to him that his constitutional position was quite untenable, and I suggested that he should ask Her Majesty to relieve him of his position. This he was not prepared to do.</blockquote>The Prime Minister went on to explain that the message purporting to have come from the Queen dismissing him and his Ministers had, in fact, emanated from the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations. It was clear that Sir Humphrey was not representing the Queen so much as the British Prime Minister. When Sir Humphrey refused either to resign or to leave Government House, the Government withdrew the trappings of office, such as the Police Guard, and refused to pay the salaries of members of the staff who remained with him. Sir Humphrey was permitted to go on living at Government House, but as a private citizen at a rental of £250 a month. <br />
Simultaneously with the Independence Proclamation, a new Constitution was given the country to supersede that of 1961. One of its provisions was the appointment of a Governor- General by the Queen on the advice of "her Rhodesian Ministers". Since this was not possible, it was necessary to appoint an Officer Administering the Government to carry out his functions, and the Deputy Prime Minister, Mr. Clifford Dupont, was appointed to the office. <br />
Mr. Dupont was M.P. for the Salisbury constituency of Arundel, and when he resigned his seat to take up his new post there was speculation about a possible by-election. There was none. So solid was public opinion behind the Government on the independence issue that a contest would have been a waste of time, and the Rhodesian Front candidate was returned unopposed. <br />
Any discussion about the new Constitution in the Press was effectively stifled by the censorship regulations. The Rhodesian Front had all along made no secret of its detestation of the Rhodesian Printing and Publishing Company's newspapers, particularly the two dailies, which were opposed to the Government's policies, and the regulations were severely applied. <br />
The editors retaliated by leaving blank spaces where reports and leaders had been censored, and most issues carried large white spaces on the main pages. A censorship aimed at preventing the leakage of information on Rhodesian moves to counter sanctions was understandable, but critical opinion and information on other aspects of Rhodesian affairs also came under the censor's pencil, and the system aroused widespread resentment. When the regulations were withdrawn in April, 1968, both Press and public were relieved. <br />
In an attempt to counter the censorship, the British Government erected a radio transmitting station at Francistown, close to the Rhodesian border in Botswana. Its object was to put over a "peace aims" offensive which the British hoped would topple the "Smith regime". Its presence was resented in Francistown and British troops were posted to guard it. It was a costly undertaking - and it was completely ineffective. Its broadcasts were jammed, it created no stir of interest in Rhodesia and the few messages that did get through were largely ignored. It was an expensive failure, and when it was closed down in March, 1968, there were no regrets. <br />
The only real trouble in Rhodesia occurred in the only place where the emergency regulations could not be promptly applied - the campus of the University College in Salisbury. In the beginning discontent over UDI was confined to the campus itself, but on March 17, 1966, it erupted into noisy demonstrations by a large group of African students who treated the Principal, Dr. Walter Adams, and other faculty members with gross disrespect. Not all the African students took part, and some of those who did alleged that they had been intimidated into doing so. <br />
As the trouble mounted on the third day the police intervened to prevent further demonstrations and meetings were banned. This led to 25 lecturers going on strike and walking out of a combined faculty meeting addressed by Dr. Adams because "we feel our freedom has been infringed upon and the university's charter violated by the imposition of police control." <br />
The trouble died down temporarily on March 23, when the executive committee of the college council recommended that Dr. R. Birley, a visiting professor at the Witwatersrand University, Johannesburg, should investigate the causes of the disturbances and also the machinery for liaison between the administration, the staff and the students. The lecturers returned to their duties, the striking students went back to their classes and the police were withdrawn. <br />
But the trouble flared up again, this time due to an act by Dr. Adams himself. An African student who had been restricted for his subversive activities arrived on the campus and frankly admitted that he had walked out of the restriction area at Gonakudzingwa. Dr. Adams decided not to inform the police or to allow them to arrest him as long as he remained on the campus. <br />
This caused such public indignation that the Principal offered to resign, and later, when he was appointed Director of the London School of Economics, he did so. Other members of the staff also resigned, most of them from the faculties of Arts and Social Studies. <br />
The climax came at the graduation ceremony on Saturday, July 16. A crowd of about 50 African students deliberately insulted the guest of honour, Dr. J. P. Duminy, Principal of Cape Town University, calling him a "Boer" and urging him to "go back to Verwoerd". The venerable Rhodesian statesman, Lord Malvern, was jostled in spite of his 83 years, and two Cabinet Ministers were jeered at. The main speeches were delivered against a constant uproar and the ceremony was carried out only with the greatest difficulty. Some of the white students linked arms to keep the demonstrators away from the platform, and the police were called in. <br />
The left-wingers had overstepped the mark. At dawn on July 28 the police arrested nine Arts and Social Studies lecturers and an Asian student under detention orders. The lecturers were five British, one Canadian, an Italian, a Norwegian and a Rhodesian. Nine students were placed in restriction - five Africans, three Europeans and one Asian. A couple of days later it was announced that the eight non-Rhodesian lecturers were to be deported. <br />
Parliament was told that they had been actively engaged in subversion. Some of them had been open about their Communist affiliations. Their plan had been to create conditions <br />
<blockquote>which would lead to the closure of the university and result in a state of affairs which might, in their minds, justify intervention by Britain.</blockquote>Justification for these allegations came when one of the lecturers was charged with contravening the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act. He was found guilty of possessing Russian hand grenades and other "offensive materials" for use against the European community, and of having kept in contact with terrorists who had infiltrated into the country. He was sent to prison for 20 years after pleading guilty to six counts of conspiring to commit terrorist acts. With the removal of the trouble-makers, U.C.R. settled down to its job of educating Rhodesia's youth of all races. Dr. Adams was succeeded as Principal by Professor T. G. Miller, of Reading University, who took up his duties in November, 1967. His liberal views, however, soon brought him into conflict with the authorities and less than two years later he resigned and left the country. <br />
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiky0aDkaRTTP6zk3KQa4QBpl170CSUkj6VIHQZTnpBeFy8Gb0b3hKRdGUWuNSgdDEte7uF2dWO1vQxLYgT_dJWxIO9NGx8BBrXCN2qFR_gdzpJMVtRY9ZWYSEyMjrUr4cYA9gvYLFRPE2H/s1600/020iansmithDM_468x519.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="320" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiky0aDkaRTTP6zk3KQa4QBpl170CSUkj6VIHQZTnpBeFy8Gb0b3hKRdGUWuNSgdDEte7uF2dWO1vQxLYgT_dJWxIO9NGx8BBrXCN2qFR_gdzpJMVtRY9ZWYSEyMjrUr4cYA9gvYLFRPE2H/s320/020iansmithDM_468x519.jpg" width="288" /></a></div>He was succeeded by Professor Robert Craig, Professor of Theology at U.C.R., who has had many years' experience of Rhodesian conditions and is well qualified to guide the university's future development.<div class="blogger-post-footer"><!-- Start Bravenet.com Service Code -->
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<!-- End Bravenet.com Service Code --></div>Beaver Shawhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15092980697221951142noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6501586017974986851.post-9179667376846966842010-11-11T22:39:00.001-08:002010-11-11T22:39:25.062-08:00RHODESIAN FARMER ROLL OF HONOUR<center><h1><a href="" name="_Toc34366929">Roll of Honour</a></h1></center> <center><h4>In memory of members of the Rhodesia National Farmers' Union, their wives, sons and daughters, killed in the terrorist war.</h4></center> <center><h4><i>At the going down of the sun and in the morning we will remember them.<br />
(Laurence Binyon)</i></h4></center> <ul><li>Major E. C. Addams, Odzi, 14/8/74.</li>
<li>Mr L. Ashby, Mzingwane, 7/7/76.</li>
<li>Mr J. Ashworth, Umtali, 18/1/78.</li>
<li>Mr R. Abbot, Odzi, 10/4/78.</li>
<li>Mrs K. Backe-Hansen, Matetsi, 9/9/76.</li>
<li>Mr D. Bashford, Karoi, 24/12/76.</li>
<li>Mr A. Bathhurst, Karoi, 24/12/76.</li>
<li>Mr R. A. Barton, Melsetter, 6/4/77.</li>
<li>Mr J. Blignaut, Ayrshire, 17/6/77.</li>
<li>Mr A. P. Burger, Matetsi, 12/6/77.</li>
<li>Mr A. Barclay, Gwanda/West Nicholson, 12/8/77.</li>
<li>Mr D. Barclay, Ayrshire, 7/12/77.</li>
<li>Mr B. Brakenridge, Gadzema, 6/1/78.</li>
<li>Mr B. Brakenridge [Son], Gadzema, 6/1/78.</li>
<li>Mrs S. Brakenridge [Sen.], Gadzema, 6/1/78.</li>
<li>Mr P. Bezuidenhout, Nuanetsi, 14/2/78.</li>
<li>Mr D. C. Bagnall. Headlands, 14/3/78.</li>
<li>Mr K. H. Bicknell, Selous, 10/4/78.</li>
<li>Mr H. Blignaut, Doma, 20/4/78.</li>
<li>Mr I. D. Black, Odzi, 17/5/78.</li>
<li>Mr D. Burton, Lonely District, 25/5/78.</li>
<li>Mrs E. Botha, Gazaland, 6/6/78.</li>
<li>Mr P. Bouwer, Tengwe, 13/7/78.</li>
<li>Mr O. Bordini, Shamva, 31/7/78.</li>
<li>Mr C. Brent, Marula, 20/10/78.</li>
<li>Mr A. Beamish, Horseshoe, 2/11 /78.</li>
<li>Mr S. H. Barnard, Cashel, 6/12/78.</li>
<li>Mr W. Bezuidenhout, Gazaland, 20/12/78.</li>
<li>Mr J. A. Bennett, Shamva, 23/12/78.</li>
<li>Mrs M. Bennett, Shamva, 23/12/78.</li>
<li>Bennett [Minor], Shamva, 23/12/78.</li>
<li>Bennett [Minor], Shamva, 23/12/78.</li>
<li>Mr L. L. Brooks, Darwin, 19/3/79.</li>
<li>Mr I. R. Brown, Sipolilo, 28/3/79.</li>
<li>Mr M. Brooke-Mee, Gwelo, 30/3/79.</li>
<li>Mr B. Couve, Shamva, 6/6/73.</li>
<li>Mr N. Campbell, Marandellas, 23/5/76.</li>
<li>Mr D. Carshalton, Gazaland, 27/8/76.</li>
<li>Mr C. M. Cloete, Filabusi, 31/10/76.</li>
<li>Mrs M. Cloete, Filabusi, 31/10/76.</li>
<li>Mr A. Cumming, Matetsi, 5/11/76.</li>
<li>Mr P. Crouch, Ayrshire, 17/12/76.</li>
<li>Mr W. P. Cremer, Bindura, 26/1/77.</li>
<li>Mr D. Cookson, Centenary, Feb. 1977.</li>
<li>Mr C. A. Capell, Shamva, 9/3/77.</li>
<li>Mr C. Chapman, Melsetter, 22/5/77.</li>
<li>Miss C. Chessworth, Figtree, 14/8/77.</li>
<li>Mr E. Claasen, Odzi, 29/9/77.</li>
<li>Mr J. F. Coomans, Cashel, 6/12/77.</li>
<li>Mrs S. A. Cumming, Norton, 7/1/78.</li>
<li>Miss S. C. Cumming, Norton, 7/1/78.</li>
<li>Mr D. L. Courtney, Mrewa, 6/4/78.</li>
<li>Mr D. I. Crombie, Macheke, 8/8/78.</li>
<li>Mr P. J. Cloete, Centenary, 8/8/78.</li>
<li>Mr K. Cremer, Gazaland, 18/8/78.</li>
<li>Mr V. Conlon, Mazoe, 11/1/79.</li>
<li>Mr G. Crane, Goromonzi, 19/3/79.</li>
<li>Mr M. D. Cleave, Juliasdale, 1/5/79.</li>
<li>Mr M. J. Chance, Bindura, 15/5/79.</li>
<li>Mr J. S. Donald, Umtali, 26/4/76.</li>
<li>Mr S. L. J. Davies, Gwaai Valley, 26/7/76.</li>
<li>Mr D. Dodd, Ayrshire, 6/4/77.</li>
<li>Mr D. W. S. Dunn, Shamva, 13/9/77.</li>
<li>Mr C. A. Delaney, Melsetter, 3D/9/77.</li>
<li>Mr B. J. Dean, Melsetter, 30/9/77.</li>
<li>Mr D. de Coupelay, Macheke/Virginia, 4/6/78.</li>
<li>Mr S. Donnelly, Karoi, 21/6/78.</li>
<li>Mrs F. M. du Toit, Gutu, 23/7/78.</li>
<li>Mr C. J. J. Davies, Umtali, 20/8/78.</li>
<li>Miss J. Douglass, Melsetter, 22/8/78.</li>
<li>Mr A. de Nadai, Mayo, 21/8/78.</li>
<li>Mr H. du Plessis, Gazaland, 28/1/79.</li>
<li>Mr T. H. Elton, Cashel, 19/5/78.</li>
<li>Mr I. J. Eksteen, Inyazura, 11/1/79.</li>
<li>Mrs J. M. Eksteen, Inyazura, 11/1/79.</li>
<li>Mr T. V. Forbes, Mount Darwin, 23/4/73.</li>
<li>Mr E. Fletcher, Centenary, 17/2/74.</li>
<li>Mrs B. Fletcher, Centenary, 17/2/74.</li>
<li>Mr G. Farge, Gazaland 24/10/76.</li>
<li>Mr H. Fenzel, Melsetter, 16/4/78.</li>
<li>Mr F. Falzoi, Karoi, 12/6/78.</li>
<li>Mr H. Franken, Selukwe, 17/7/78.</li>
<li>Mr F. N. J. Fourie, Tengwe, 14/8/78.</li>
<li>Mr P. H. Fairbanks, Gazaland, 2/9/78.</li>
<li>Mr B. T. Furber, Gwanda, 16/4/79.</li>
<li>Mr T. Greyvenstein, Mayo, 16/9/76.</li>
<li>Mr D. R. C. Greef, Plumtree, 15/5/77.</li>
<li>Mrs M. A. Greef, Plumtree, 15/5/77.</li>
<li>Miss N. Glenny (Baby), Melsetter, 29/9/77.</li>
<li>Mr F. A. Grobler, Matopos South, 17/6/78.</li>
<li>Mrs A. E. Grobler, Matopos South, 17/6/78.</li>
<li>Mr K. Gifford, Gazaland, 6/7/78.</li>
<li>Mr P. J. Gunn, Middle Sabi, 5/10/78.</li>
<li>Mr D. A. Galloway, Melsetter, 24/10/78.</li>
<li>Mr A. V. Howe, Umvukwes, 24/6/75.</li>
<li>Miss M. Habig, Gazaland, 6/6/76.</li>
<li>Miss L. Habig, Gazaland, 6/6/76.</li>
<li>Miss Y. Habig, Gazaland, 6/6/76.</li>
<li>Mr J. E. Hudson-Beck, Melsetter, 12/8/76.</li>
<li>Mr H. T. J. Hastings, Shamva, 11/3/77.</li>
<li>Mrs M. H. Hastings, Shamva, 11/3/77.</li>
<li>Mr A. Hill, Wedza, 26/6/77.</li>
<li>Mrs A. C. Horton, Nyamandhlovu, 29/8/77.</li>
<li>Mr P. L. Hanson, Melsetter, 20/10/77.</li>
<li>Mr H. Holstenberg, Melsetter, 20/10/77.</li>
<li>Mr R. C. Hunt, Melsetter, 20/10/77.</li>
<li>Mr H. J. Hurley, Centenary, 21/12/77.</li>
<li>Mr J. Henry, Gazaland, 31/12/77.</li>
<li>Mr E. J. Hards, Shamva, 10/4/78.</li>
<li>Mr A. A. Hess, Karoi, 25/5/78.</li>
<li>Mr J. R. Hill, Tokwe, 11/12/78.</li>
<li>Mr D. B. Hutchinson, Lalapanzi, 29/12/78.</li>
<li>Mrs D. I. Hutchinson, Lalapanzi, 29/12/78.</li>
<li>Master B. Hutchinson (6 yrs), Lalapanzi, 29/12/78.</li>
<li>Master V. Hutchinson (3 yrs), Lalapanzi, 29/12/78.</li>
<li>Mrs R. Hacking, Odzi, 8/1/79.</li>
<li>Mr P. Hovell, Mazoe, 13/1/79.</li>
<li>Mr T. Hulley, Tengwe, 23/2/79.</li>
<li>Mr W. Houston, Inyanga, 14/3/79.</li>
<li>Mr L. M. Jellicoe, Centenary, 4/2/73.</li>
<li>Mr A. Joubert, Wedza, 30/3/73.</li>
<li>Mr D. C. James, Gwelo, 27/4/76.</li>
<li>Master I. Johnson, Umvukwes, 26/12/77.</li>
<li>Mr L. M. Jellicoe, Centenary, 9/7/78.</li>
<li>Mr G. D. Joubert, Ayrshire, 22/12/78.</li>
<li>Mrs I. Kleynhans, Centenary, 24/1/73.</li>
<li>Mr P. J. O. Knight, Doma, 17/5/75.</li>
<li>Mr T. F. Koen, Centenary, 2/2/78.</li>
<li>Mr P. Kenchington, Mid-Sabi, 3/2/79.</li>
<li>Mr B. J. S. Kearns, Bindura, 15/4/79.</li>
<li>Mr M. Langeman. Melsetter, 22/1/77.</li>
<li>Mr W. P. Lilford, Karoi, 9/11/77.</li>
<li>Mr S. Le Vieux, Chiredzi, 7/2/78.</li>
<li>Mr R. J. Liebermann, Marandellas, 4/6/78.</li>
<li>Mr J. H. C. Liddle, Bindura, 1/10/78.</li>
<li>Mr P. Lentner, Shamva, 18/2/79.</li>
<li>Mrs M. E. G. Liebenberg, Shangani, 11/4/79.</li>
<li>Mrs L. M. McFedden, Plumtree, 7/9/76.</li>
<li>Mr D. H. MacKay, Melsetter, 1/1/77</li>
<li>Mr D. G. MacKenzie, Shamva, 1/2/77.</li>
<li>Mr G. J. Myburgh, Mayo, 26/1/77.</li>
<li>Miss S. G. McRoberts, Shamva, 11/3/77.</li>
<li>Mr G. I. Murdoch, Selous, 18/6/77.</li>
<li>Mr K. Mrowic, Que Que, 25/5/78.</li>
<li>Mr H. M. Meyer, Plumtree, 29/9/78.</li>
<li>Mrs E. L. Meyer, Plumtree, 29/9/78.</li>
<li>Mr F. J. Mee, Inyanga, 26/10/78.</li>
<li>Mrs M. A. Mee, Inyanga, 26/10/78.</li>
<li>Mr T. Margarson, Gwelo, 15/11/78</li>
<li>Mr D. Moorcroft, Bindura, 15/12/78.</li>
<li>Mr G. J. Muller, Centenary, 25/12/78.</li>
<li>Mr D. S. Muir, Mount Darwin, 13/5/78.</li>
<li>Mr S. P. Naude, Somabula, 17/10/76.</li>
<li>Mr A. C. Newman, Melsetter, 15/10/76.</li>
<li>Mr P. S. Naude, Centenary, 21/10/76.</li>
<li>Mr M. Nielsen, Karoi, 17/12/76.</li>
<li>Mr F. J. Nel, Tengwe, 23/11/77.</li>
<li>Mr C. D. Northcroft, Shamva, 20/12/77.</li>
<li>Mrs Y. Nicol, Gazaland, 17/3/78.</li>
<li>Mr J. D. Nicholson, Nyamandhlovu, 25/5/78.</li>
<li>Mr P. A. J. Oberholtzer, Melsetter, 4/7/64.</li>
<li>Mr C. Ogilvy, Shamva, 13/9/77.</li>
<li>Mr C. H. Olivey, Melsetter, 15/5/78.</li>
<li>Mr F. J. Oosthuizen, Gwelo, 26/9/78.</li>
<li>Mr F. Pitcher, Bindura, 14/6/76.</li>
<li>Mrs W. Palmer, Mrewa/Mtoko, 19/10/76.</li>
<li>Mr N. G. Payne, Bindura, 26/1/77.</li>
<li>Mr K. Prinsloo, Chiredzi, 16/4/77.</li>
<li>Miss L. A. Philips, Insiza, 12/7/77.</li>
<li>Mr N. H. E. Prince, Tengwe, 23/3/78.</li>
<li>Mr F. Pretorius, Nuanetsi, 18/4/78.</li>
<li>Mr P. Potgieter, Doma, 9/7/78.</li>
<li>Mr T. M. S. Peech, Macheke/Virginia, 13/7/78.</li>
<li>Mr J. F. B. Payn, Matopos South, 21/9/78.</li>
<li>Mr R. W. G. Puckrin, Insiza, 30/10/78.</li>
<li>Mrs F. I. Pearson, Selukwe, 28/12/78.</li>
<li>Mr P. Purcell-Gilpin, Headlands, 4/3/79.</li>
<li>Mr A. Purcell-Gilpin, Headlands, 4/3/79.</li>
<li>Mr P. Rouse, Centenary, 18/2/74.</li>
<li>Mr E. A. Richardson, Belingwe, 24/3/77.</li>
<li>Mr A. J. Ritson, Selukwe, 6/8/77.</li>
<li>Mr A. Robertson, Gwelo East, 21/8/77.</li>
<li>Mrs E. M. Rushmore, Myamandhlovu, 6/9/77.</li>
<li>Mr W. E. Read, Gatooma, 15/1/78.</li>
<li>Mr N. J. Royston, Karoi, 18/2/78.</li>
<li>Mr J. Reyneke, Gazaland, 8/3/78.</li>
<li>Mr I. Rosenfels, Marula, 29/3/78.</li>
<li>Mr J. Roberts, Penhalonga, 22/4/78.</li>
<li>Mr P. J. Richards, Gwanda, 27/11/78.</li>
<li>Mr D. C. Rosenfels, Marula, 8/2/79.</li>
<li>Mr C. Rosenfels, Kezi, 24/4/79.</li>
<li>Mr D. M. Stacey, Karoi, 9/3/73.</li>
<li>Mr V. Stockil-Gill, Marandellas, 27/10/74.</li>
<li>Mr P. Snyders, Vumba, 9/10/75.</li>
<li>Mr R. M. Smith, Insiza/Shangani, 28/7/76.</li>
<li>Mr L. R. Shakespeare, Karoi, 23/8/77.</li>
<li>Mr J. Stopforth, Gwelo East, 23/9/77.</li>
<li>Mr A. Stander, Nuanetsi, 22/2/78.</li>
<li>Mr J. N. Strydom, Headlands, 9/3/78.</li>
<li>Mr C. A. Steyn, Cashel, 4/4/78.</li>
<li>Mr J. U. Stanley, Tengwe, 5/4/78.</li>
<li>Mr G. Swartz, Gazaland, 12/4/78.</li>
<li>Mr R. Swemmer, Macheke/Virginia, 3/6/78.</li>
<li>Mr H. Stander, Nuanetsi, 5/8/78.</li>
<li>Mr A. Stander, Beit Bridge, 15/8/78.</li>
<li>Mr E. Swanepoel, Melsetter, 22/8/78.</li>
<li>Mr J. K. G. Syme, Melsetter, 13/9/78.</li>
<li>Mrs H. A. Syme, Melsetter, 13/9/78.</li>
<li>Mr R. S. Smallman, Melsetter, 11/9/78.</li>
<li>Mr F. C. Steyn, Cashel, 18/12/78.</li>
<li>Mr J. Souter, Nuanetsi, 23/1/79.</li>
<li>Mr J. Smit, Beatrice, 30/1/79.</li>
<li>Mrs C. Smit, Beatrice, 30/1/79.</li>
<li>Mr J. Strydom, Inyanga, 2/2/79.</li>
<li>Mrs M. O. A. Scott, Gwelo, 7/2/79.</li>
<li>Mr P. Steyn, Odzi, 13/2/79.</li>
<li>Infant Son G. P. Starling, Mtepatepa, 30/3/79.</li>
<li>Master C. C. Tilley, Mashonaland South, 11/1/78.</li>
<li>Mr C. C. Tompson, Nuanetsi, 14/2/78.</li>
<li>Miss C. C. Tilley, Mashonaland South, 3/9/78.</li>
<li>Mrs V. E. Trinder, Nyamandhlovu, 3/9/79.</li>
<li>Mrs H. Turner, Gazaland, 9/1/79.</li>
<li>Miss S. Turner, Gazaland, 9/1/79.</li>
<li>Mr J. H. Viljoen, Gadzema, 16/5/66.</li>
<li>Mrs Viljoen, Gadzema, 16/5/66.</li>
<li>Mr D. J. Vincent, Centenary, 3/4/73.</li>
<li>Mr J. J. F. Van Vuuren, Matopos South, 22/5/76.</li>
<li>Mr M. J. Van Vuuren, Matopos South, 22/5/76.</li>
<li>Mr O. P. Valentine, Melsetter, 12/8/76.</li>
<li>Mr K. D. Viljoen, Melsetter, 1/10/77.</li>
<li>Mrs E. A. Viljoen, Melsetter, 1/10/77.</li>
<li>Mr J. J. F. Van Maarseveen, Cashel, 4/12/77.</li>
<li>Mr B. Vermeulen, Headlands, 11/1/78.</li>
<li>Mr J. l_. S. Vorster, Melsetter, 23/1/78.</li>
<li>Mr M. A. Van Aard, Macheke/Virginia, 30/1/78.</li>
<li>Mr S. P. Van Blerk, Headlands, 26/5/78.</li>
<li>Mrs G. Van Blerk, Headlands, 26/5/78.</li>
<li>Miss L. Van Blerk, Headlands, 26/5/78.</li>
<li>Miss M. A. Van Reenen, Macheke/Virginia, 15/9/78.</li>
<li>Mr S. Van der Merwe, Nuanetsi, 15/2/79.</li>
<li>Mr R. C. Vassard, Chipinga, 12/5/79.</li>
<li>Mr G. West, Gazaland, 12/11/76.</li>
<li>Mr J. Wright, Odzi, 10/9/77.</li>
<li>Mr N. Willis, Shamva, 14/2/74.</li>
<li>Mr R. S. Williams, Inyanga, 17/1/78.</li>
<li>Mr J. F. Wolfaard, Nuanetsi, 9/2/78.</li>
<li>Mrs C. J. Willers, Gazaland, 10/6/78.</li>
<li>Mr D. Ward, Mazoe, 23/6/78.</li>
<li>Mr B. H. Williams, Inyati, 3/8/78.</li>
<li>Master M. Wilger, Nyamandhlovu, 3/9/78.</li>
<li>Miss L. Wilger, Nyamandhlovu, 3/9/78.</li>
<li>Mrs S. Watkins, Nuanetsi, 29/12/79.</li>
<li>Mr C. A. S. Young, Melsetter, 29/4/75.</li>
<li>Mr S. Ziegler, Marandellas, 16/1/78.</li>
</ul><h4>Most recent deaths</h4><ul><li>Mr R. D. Kennedy, Mzingwani, 7/5/79</li>
<li>Mr K. F. Hogg, Fort Victoria, 19/6/79</li>
<li>Mr S. J. Stander, Beitbridge, 19/6/79</li>
<li>Mr P. J. D. Breytenbach, Headlands, 25/6/79</li>
<li>Mr C. P. Beale, Nyamandhlovu, 27/6/79</li>
<li>Mrs M. Hofmeyr, Fort Victoria, 6/7/79</li>
<li>Mr J. M. Jeffreys, Marandellas, 7/7/79</li>
<li>Mr T. Hartley, Headlands, 8/7/79</li>
<li>Mrs S. Bother, Somabula, 18/7/79</li>
<li>Master A. Smit, aged 2 years, Somabula, 18/7/79</li>
<li>Mr I. D. N. McGiles, Penhalonga, 21/7/79</li>
<li>Mr R. Beamish, Sipolilo,</li>
<li>Mr T. Speight, Umvukwes,</li>
<li>Mr E. Volker, Arcturus, 5/8/79</li>
<li>Mr W. A. Reinsford, Nyamandhlovu, 10/8/79</li>
<li>Mr B. L. T. Eastwick, Centenary, 17/8/79</li>
<li>Mr D. A. Baker, Macheke, 18/8/79</li>
<li>Mr B. S. Bassett, Rusape, 19/8/79</li>
<li>Mr J. E. Oostindien, Macheke, 15/8/79</li>
<li>Mr S. Edridge, Wedza, 11 /9/79</li>
<li>Mr F. Forward, Sinoia, 16/9/79</li>
<li>Mr J. D. Jordaan, Odzi, 17/9/79</li>
</ul><center><i><h4>The Roll of Honour does not include the names of the sons of farmers killed on active duty with the Security Forces.</h4></i></center><div class="blogger-post-footer"><!-- Start Bravenet.com Service Code -->
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<!-- End Bravenet.com Service Code --></div>Beaver Shawhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15092980697221951142noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6501586017974986851.post-36837539129949500872010-11-11T22:36:00.000-08:002010-11-11T22:36:43.495-08:00RHODESIAN FARMER DEFENCE OF FARMS<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgeHXz9JEJCpsHd4KxJL3cTDFX9ym_FbGs5f-d9k5HKq6sH9TDqYIV-hqZu8ik6e1nLcgOPvOmsQjvEVjOiBQjsXZ9kqGCj_UCShlbP_eu-yKc8RlAgmc4n5IduyP_pT-H0KmC9jGwxhpur/s1600/landy.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="310" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgeHXz9JEJCpsHd4KxJL3cTDFX9ym_FbGs5f-d9k5HKq6sH9TDqYIV-hqZu8ik6e1nLcgOPvOmsQjvEVjOiBQjsXZ9kqGCj_UCShlbP_eu-yKc8RlAgmc4n5IduyP_pT-H0KmC9jGwxhpur/s320/landy.jpg" width="320" /></a></div>Rhodesian Farmers Defensive Arrangements<br />
<br />
I knew many Rhodesian farmers and have visited many farmsteads over the years. At every farm, defensive arrangements were made up to suit their particular situation and infrastructure. The following would be a general overview:<br />
<br />
1) Most farmers fitted hand-grenade grills to the outside of all windows. Doors leading outside were likewise security grilled.<br />
<br />
2) Many farmers built thick walls about a meter in front of bedroom windows to stop bullets, but particularly to deal with RPG 7`s. Beds were never placed against the outside walls of a farmhouse.<br />
<br />
3) It was usual to have a designated safe room within the farmhouse that could be defended until support arrived. Sometimes this was a central corridor that allowed the farmer to move into other rooms to attack those outside through the windows. In the loft or ceiling over the safe room, some farmers laid sand bags to deal with possible mortar attack.<br />
<br />
4) Every farmhouse in a given area was linked by a radio system called “Agric Alert”. This allowed radio contact with other farmers who formed their own defence units, usually under the umbrella of PATU (Police Anti-Terrorist Unit), which would react to a call from one of their neighbours for assistance. Another means of alarm raising was the use of a signal rocket - The Agric-Alert system was not done away with after the war, such was the lack of trust in Mugabe`s promises. It performed admirably as well when dealing with criminal activity such as stock theft. The alert system arranged for all farmers to check in with each other at a given time in the morning and evening as a means of monitoring their status.<br />
<br />
5) Around all farmhouse gardens were erected security fences with barbed wire (or razor wire) and which often had simple alarm systems built into them. Some I believe were electrified, if not before the end of the war, certainly afterwards. Within the fence boundary, every farmer usually had a couple of large dogs. The dogs were fed their largest meal in the morning instead of the evening, in order to help keep them awake at night. Other farmers had geese or ducks, which made excellent guard “dogs.” Gardens were kept deliberately trim so as to keep clear fields of view and fire etc. The farm houses also had outside flood lighting erected in such a way as to blind those outside the fence, but not to interfere with the vision of those within the farmhouse. <br />
<br />
6) All farmers and their wives were armed with an assortment of weapons, and most farmers were trained military men. They had at least one assault rifle, usually an FAL 7.62, assorted shot guns, .303 hunting rifles and so forth. It was also not unusual for wives to carry Uzi`s around with them, or other equivalents such as the Rhodesian Cobra. All members of the family were trained on the various weaponry available to them, including the kids. In one famous incident a child successfully fought off the attacking terrorists after both of his parents were wounded. The main defensive weapons were at all times within immediate reach of the adult farmhouse occupants, and were placed next to the bed at night.<br />
<br />
7) Some farmers used mine protected vehicles, as a favourite of terrorists was to landmine the driveway outside the fence. A great deal of time was spent looking at the dirt roads for freshly dug earth points and so forth when driving around the farm.<br />
<br />
8) Some farm gardens and particular points external to the fence were wired with home-made claymore like devices strategically placed in areas where attackers were likely to take cover. In a few instances farmers deliberately erected “cover positions” for the terrorists to use outside the fence, which were then blown up upon attack. A particular favourite was a section of plastic piping filled with nails, nuts, bolts, screws and so forth. I witnessed tests with these and the tubes cleared large areas of their intended aiming point of all bush cover and leaves from trees etc for about 30 meters into the bush. By placing a number of figure 8`s in front of these tests, it was apparent from the strike patterns that not one of them would have walked again had they been terrorists.<br />
<br />
9) Some farmers also hired soldiers on leave to guard their premises at night. Usually these were men looking for extra “beer” money. They were called Bright Lights, and often ended up in fire fights with the terrorists, where they came as a nasty surprise to the terrs when the latter were expecting a nice soft hit and run. Like all farmers in an area, Bright Lights would participate in the support of other farmers when the situation required. <br />
<br />
10) Good relationships with farm labour, particularly the house staff, very often warned of problems before they occurred. All of us who grew up in the country have fond memories of those employees who took care of us as kids, and who often placed themselves at great risk for doing so. <br />
<br />
I.R.<div class="blogger-post-footer"><!-- Start Bravenet.com Service Code -->
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<!-- End Bravenet.com Service Code --></div>Beaver Shawhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15092980697221951142noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6501586017974986851.post-79276483057563730392010-09-16T03:47:00.001-07:002010-09-16T03:47:59.235-07:00Selous Scouts 1977 article from Armed Forces<h2>RHODESIA'S SELOUS SCOUTS</h2>by Chris Vermaak <br />
(written in 1977) <b>This in depth report by Chris Vermaak on the Selous Scouts attempts to set the record straight before the event. Chris Vermaak is one of the most experienced and respected correspondents in Africa and has a long and deep knowledge of the turmoils that have beset the continent over the last 20 years. The report on the Scouts we feel will surely prove to be of great interest to anyone interested in Terrorist activities.</b> <br />
Rhodesia's crack Selous Scouts, a tough and highly selected band of men, White and Black, who are said to be possibly the best and toughest bush fighters in the world, have been branded as a bunch of demented killers by terrorists and their Marxist henchmen who have never hesitated to twist the truth to suit their own sinister ends. <br />
In any case of atrocity, there are those whose interest is served by publishing the facts, those who seek to prevent publicity being attracted to those facts, and those who seek to manipulate selected facts to shift the blame away from the guilty parties. Thus we find that a number of recent acts of ruthless violence in Rhodesia which were indeed committed by terrorists belonging either to the Nkomo or Mugabe wing of the so-called Patriotic Front have been consistently attributed to the Selous Scouts. The lie has been spread abroad by both Nkomo and Mugabe, perpetuated by a number of misguided church leaders, gullible journalists guided only by financial preferences and foreign deserters from the Rhodesian forces who should never have been allowed into the country in the first place. <br />
The underlying motive for these deliberate lies, completely divorced from proven facts, must seem obvious to those acquainted with terrorist and Marxist strategy - namely, the creation of an ever-increasing rift between the population and members of the armed forces, to neutralise the vital battle for the hearts and minds of people enmeshed by the war. To attempt division and dissension within the army itself. Predictably the Selous Scouts, Rhodesia's answer to terrorist infiltration, its most battle-hardened unit, has been selected for this dubious purpose. This superb band of men is being crucified almost daily as murderers and butchers of innocent people, baby-bashers, blood-crazed maniacs. <br />
As contemporary military correspondents we remember very well a not too distant parallel - the vilificiation of the crack Portuguese commando's who bore the brunt of the fighting in Mozambique and Angola. They fought well and died well. They were the victims of consistent Frelimo abuse, aimed at alienating them from the population and stigmatising them as a band of ruthless killers, intent on systematic genocide. Frelimo's sustained campaign of hate and suspicion, fanned by the emergent Armed Forces Movement (AFM) ideology from Lisbon eventually paid off, to such an extent that the commando's were despised and ostracised by the thousands of dismal toy soldiers who never ventured near the front. <br />
Communist strategy seldom differs and another case in point concerns the German Battalion in former French Indochina. Consisting of men who escaped possible war crimes trials in Europe after World War II, they joined the French Foreign Legion and shot, bombed, tortured and bayonetted their way into the Viet Minh. Theirs was a war of reprisals and vicious counter-reprisals, of criminal violence on both sides, of outrages against humanity, of war at its rawest, cruellest and most gruesome. Stumped by veterans who gave even more than they received, the treacherous Viet Minh embarked on a systematic campaign of denigration, using the Communist press and some Western media. <br />
The French were rebuked for using their erstwhile enemies to further their "imperialistic designs" and henceforth the German Battalion ceased to exist. The "Battalion of the Damned" as they preferred to call themselves had lived exactly 1,243 days. during which it destroyed 7,466 guerillas by body count, 221 Viet Minh bases, supply dumps, and camps; it liberated 311 military and civilian prisoners from terrorist captivity and covered roughly 11,000 kilometres on foot. They lost 515 men - to them a very heavy loss indeed. The Viet Minh had scored a resounding victory, to be followed 700 days later by the tragedy of Dien Bien Phu, the ultimate French humiliation. <br />
I thought of all these things when I interviewed huge Joshua Nkomo in the unkept garden of Zimbabwe House, ZAPU's headquarters in Conakry Road, Lusaka. He said killings in Rhodesia by the security forces were becoming as regular as detailed weather reports. He continued: <br />
<blockquote>When met by the ruthless Selous Scouts our people - men, women and children - are asked a few questions and shot.'' He claimed he could produce a witness - there was no sign of him - who could testify to a "particularly degenerate'' security force atrocity near the southern Botswana border. His story: ''Six women - three with babies on their backs - had identified themselves to members of the Selous Scouts before crossing the Shashi River. They had conspicuous front and back identity tags. When they walked down towards the river the three mothers were gunned down. They died, but not the babies on their backs. One of the Scouts asked: "What must we do with the babies?'' Others answered by slitting their throats with bayonets. They were buried in a common grave. A son who inquired after his mother was also shot.</blockquote>Almost humbly, with incredible hypocrisy, he told the world press: <blockquote>Freedom fighters are told not to molest civilians, to concentrate only on military targets. Our people are being killed in their hundreds by the Selous Scouts to make the people hate the freedom movement. The freedom fighters are under strict instruction not to touch civilians no matter what their colour. These Scouts are beginning to kindle a bitterness in Zimbabwe towards the White people. The cutting of young children's throats and the shooting of women returning from their fields are beginning to have a cumulative effect on the minds of the people against the White people. If these atrocities do not cease, the Whites will be regarded as part and parcel of Smith. Sustained genocide by the Scouts will lead to a very serious rift between Whites and Blacks and it will reach a stage when my people won't distinguish between the guilty and the innocent.</blockquote>Only the totally uninformed, the very dumb or the feebly sentimental will be taken in by Mr. Nkomo's exaggerated claims which follow a distinct line, traceable to the Lupane murders on December 5, 1976, when a member of Nkomo's terrorist group, Albert Sumne Ncube, killed Bishop Adolph Schmitt, Father Possenti Weggarten and Sister Maria Francis, on a road near Lupane. According to Sister Ermenfried, the only survivor, the terrorist denounced the missionaries as "enemies of the people" before opening fire. Ncube, who was later captured by the police, admitted these and other murders as well as undergoing terrorist training in ZAPU camps in Tanzania. He subsequently escaped from custody, however, and may have returned to Zambia. On Sunday, December 19, 1976, a group of Mugabe terrorists from Mozambique slaughtered 27 defenceless African workers on a tea estate in the Honde Valley in front of their wives and children. They then withdrew to Mozambique. <br />
On Sunday February 6, 1977 a group of 12 Mugabe terrorists murdered Father Martin Thomas, SJ, Father Christopher Shepherd-Smith, SJ, Brother John Conway, SJ, Sister Epiphany Bertha Schneider, OP, Sister Joseph Paulina Wilkinson, OP, Sister Magdala Christa Lewandoski, OP, and sister Ceslaus Anna Steiger, OP, at St. Paul's Mission, Musami. <br />
According to Father Dunstan Myerscough, SJ, who survived, together with Sister Anna Victoria Reggel, OP, the murders were "obviously the result of Russian indoctrination. In my opinion, if you want proof the Communists are behind this, come to the mission. The terrorists must have been got at to have that brutality in them." He said he had no doubt of the terrorists' culpability. <br />
Apart from the fact that all these brutal slayings took place on Sundays, thereby indicating that they were planned operations rather than irresponsible acts of folly, as has been claimed by embarrassed terrorist supporters, it is important to note that in all cases the survivors or witnesses were under no doubt whatsoever that the culprits were terrorists belonging to either the Nkomo or Mugabe factions. <br />
The terrorists' culpability was proved beyond any doubt when security forces found an incriminating diary in the possession of a slain terrorist. He described in full how his group had slain the missionaries and how a number of other civilians had been murdered farther afield, concluding: "We were very lucky". <br />
These facts have not, however, deterred the terrorist leaders from attempting to blame the Rhodesian security forces and especially the Selous Scouts, or from attributing these acts of violence to the "inevitable" consequences of Rhodesian government policies. Thus Mr. Nkomo and Mr. Mugabe both denied that the Lupane murders could have been the work of their "Patriotic Front". To quote Mr. Nkomo: <br />
<blockquote>It is a tragedy to be looked at against the background of the whole situation and the people of the Smith regime who are causing the continuation of the war. Selous Scouts do this sort of thing to make the guerrilla movement unpopular.</blockquote>He did, however, call for an international inquiry into the Honde massacre for which his uneasy partner, Mr. Mugabe's followers were responsible. Terrorist comments on the Honde massacre and the Musami murders have combined this type of accusation with sentimental protestations of innocence. Thus, according to Mr. Mugabe's interview with the BBC on February 8, 1977: <br />
<blockquote>We are not capable of such inhumanity (as the Musami murders). After all, we are fighting a progressive war which is aimed at mobilising all the democratic forces capable of lending support to the Revolution and all along we have been working very harmoniously with all the church organisations.</blockquote>A Similar line has been adopted by Radio Maputo, the Zambian "Daily Mail" and other channels expressing the views of the "frontline" Presidents. Coupled with these accusations against the Selous Scouts were "authoritiative" reports by leftist journalist David Martin and a deserter from the Rhodesian forces who peddled his story in London. Quoting nationalist sources, Martin, based in Lusaka (undesirable in Rhodesia), reported in The Guardian that "there can be no doubt that the Selous Scouts had been involved in the recent atrocities''. <br />
The deserter claimed that he had in fact overheard members of the Scouts planning and discussing the atrocities. Adding to the barrage, Botswana claimed at the beginning of May that Rhodesia had been linked to the killing of two people and the wounding of 80 others when a Russian-made hand grenade was tossed on to a crowded dance floor in Francistown. Stating that a Rhodesian coloured had been arrested in connection with the incident at the Mophane Club and condemning the bombing as an "act of sabotage and barbarism," the office of the Botswana President said seven Black Rhodesians had been arrested. The statement said the Rhodesians, in refugee camps in Francistown and Selebi-Pikwe, had admitted being members of the Selous Scouts sent to spy on refugees. They had entered the country as refugees but when they were questioned by the police they admitted that they had been sent by the Rhodesian Government to spy on the situation of the refugee camps for possible attacks. Later reports said the seven Selous Scouts had asked for political asylum and that they had been allowed to travel to Zambia. <br />
Without positive proof, Mr. Philip Steenkamp, Permanent Secretary in the Office of the President, said he believed the explosion was connected with Rhodesia's crack anti-guerrilla Selous Scouts unit. The seven "defectors" will no doubt be paraded in front of the world press to add further evidence to mounting Selous Scouts dossiers. Fact or fiction, the lie is gaining impetus and the impact is bound to be the same. Reading into Marxist intentions, the Selous Scouts will be hounded ruthlessly to single them out as the best ''horror cast" in the business. The eventual aim of course, is to discredit them in the eyes of both White and Black Rhodesians with the ultimate hope of sapping them psychologically and creating a public outcry against their "murderous'' ventures. For it is common knowledge that the Rhodesian security forces cannot pursue the war successfully without the unique qualities of the hand-picked Selous Scouts. <br />
In purely military terms the terrorists cannot improve their position and the Selous Scouts have proved to be their enemies in more ways than one. <br />
Understandably bitter about the terror accusation against its crack unit and lest it should be accused of attempting to conceal the ''awful truth", the Rhodesian Government recently reacted by lifting, for the first time, the cloak of secrecy which has surrounded the Scouts since its inception as a tracking combat unit in October 1974. A small group of international newsmen were allowed access to their training base where, for the Scouts, it all begins. Here journalists understood the terrorists' dilemma when they were told that by March 1977 conservative estimates were that the Selous Scouts had accounted for 1,205 terrorist kills, losing a mere ten of their own men. By any means a remarkable record. <br />
<center> <img height="276" src="http://www.rhodesia.nl/scouts2.jpg" width="450" /></center> The advanced training base is about an hour's drive from Kariba, or a 30-minute boat trip on the edge of the famous man-made lake. It consists of a collection of grass roofed huts which, at first glance resemble a prisoner-of war camp like those used by the Japanese in World War 11. The camp, known as the Wafa Wafa, takes its name from the Shona words Wafa Wasara which loosely translated means <b>Those who die, die - those who stay behind, stay behind.</b> <br />
It is an approptirate motto - because the gruelling selection course here "kills off" more recruits than those who survive to finish successfully. That any of the recruits survive the training period at all seems a minor miracle, but they do and subsequently become the Rhodesian answer to terrorist infiltration. Principally they are taught to kill and survive and, in training, are pushed to their physical limits. Rations are cut to one sixth of that given to a man on normal active service. <br />
It is therefore appropriate to describe the grassy encampment as the selection and tracker-training headquarters of one of the most specialised and toughest fighting forces ever seen. <br />
Among the many tests they undergo is one where they are dropped in the bush with a gun, 20 rounds of ammunition, a match and material to strike it, and an egg. Lions, buffalo and elephant abound and the object is to have the egg hard-boiled and ready for inspection the following morning. <br />
The Scouts' operational record was sketched briefly by a Rhodesian Journalist: <br />
<blockquote>Shrouded in secrecy with a mystique that spawns a thousand stories, many true and most mere rumour, the Scouts have in only two years become the most-decorated outfit in the Rhodesian security forces collecting along the way amongst many other awards - six Silver Crosses (the highest award for gallantry yet presented); 11 Bronze Crosses; six orders for Members of the Legion of Merit for acts of bravery, sel- dom reported, but which have all played a major part in fighting the country's terror war.</blockquote>The Selous Scouts is fully-integrated, with an undisclosed number of soldiers - but the ratio is eight Blacks to two White troops. The initial selection procedures last for about 18 days and are probably the most rigorous in the world. Every man who goes to the camp is a volunteer - and many are highly experienced, battle-hardened soldiers who find that after a few days they simply cannot stand the strain. Small wonder that following the most recent selection course, only 14 out of 126 volunteers made the grade. <br />
The officer commanding the Selous Scouts, and the driving force behind it, is Major Ron Reid-Daly, a 47 year old regular soldier who was once regimental sergent- major of the Rhodesian Light Infantry, known as "The Incredibles." He learned his job with the British Special Air Service in Malaya after leaving his native Salisbury in 1950 to go to England, and he served with the SAS during the Communist terror war there in the early 1950's. <br />
The prison camp analogy does not elude Reid-Daly. <br />
<blockquote>I reckon in most armies today I simply wouldn't be allowed to put these poor bastards through the kind of selection course we give them. They'd think I was trying to kill the men who volunteer to join us. I agree, there is something of the prison camp attitude towards our men under selection and training. We take them to the very threshold of tolerance mentally - and it's here that most of them crack. You can take almost any fit man and train him to a high standard of physical ability. But you can't give a man what he hasn't already got inside him.</blockquote>Under selection each man is reduced to below a threshold which the average human being could not endure. He is virtually "dehumanised", forced to live off rats, snakes, baboon meat and eyes, to survive in hostile surroundings which prove that nature, too, can be as deadly as any human enemy. And they are taught to live off nature, to drink from the water in the carcass of a dead animal - a yellowish liquid - and to eat maggot-ridden green meat which can be cooked only once before becoming deadly poisonous. Students are not given rations except for water. They are expected to survive off the land, making their own fires without matches, and making and using bark string - "gusi tambo" - to help catch food for themselves. They are soon hungry enough to capture any small creatures they can find - grasshoppers, lizards and squirrels - to stave off the hunger. "And you do get hungry." said one student who had recently been on the survival course. "We caught and killed a small leguaan, and before we even had time to skin it, one of the men was ready to take a bite out of it". <br />
The Selous Scouts have for the first time admitted that thev have been used on hot pursuit raids into Mozambique including the highly spectacular and tactically successful raid on the Nyadzonya terrorist training camp last August in which over 300, and possibly more than 500, terrorists were killed. <br />
For those who come through the selection course there follows a posting to one of the small sections on operations, after a short tracking course, initially as a flank tracker. They work in remote parts of Rhodesia hunting down terrorist spoor and leading the infantry in for the kill if the invading group is too big for the small two or three man teams to handle on their own. Each member of the Selous Scouts, down to the lowest ranking White soldier, speaks at least one African language - necessary for communication with their Black comrades-in-arms with whom they work in the closest possible context as equals. <br />
Tracking survival and close-combat tactics are high on the list of the Scouts' training priorities. From what newsmen saw at Wafa Wafa camp it takes a very special kind of man to qualify for service in what has become Rhodesia's elite and much-envied military unit. Yet Major Reid-Daly detests the word elite: <br />
<blockquote>We do not consider ourselves an elite group of men, nor do we think we are of the highest calibre. It could cause the men to imagine themselves better than they really are and this could in turn lead to recklessness. We are simply just trackers out to do a job.</blockquote>About training procedures, Major Reid-Daly, as tough as they come, explained: <blockquote>We take a chap right down when he first comes here, right to the bottom. And then we build him up again into what we need in the Selous Scouts. Some people might say it's a dehumanising process, and maybe it is. But as far as I'm concerned, that's the way it has to be if we have to keep this unit up to standard. I have heard of all sorts of so-called crack outfits becoming nothing more than shadows of what they were because of a lowering of standards to increase the numbers of men going through into combat. And I'm determined not to let that happen here.</blockquote>You see these men sometimes in town, with their chocolate-brown berets and green belts with an osprey badge. The osprey is a bird of prey, a fish eater, not common, but found in small numbers in many parts of the world where there are large stretches of water. The badge - previously the unofficial badge of Rhodesia's tracking men - was drawn up in commemoration of Andre Rabie, the first regular instructor of tracking. He was killed on active service in 1973. Most of the men who are involved in this anti-terror outfit regard Andre Rabie as having being the inspiration behind the Selous Scouts. <br />
The Selous Scouts have one of the best stocked aviaries in Rhodesia. They have also added a snake park. Not as frivolous as it sounds. The emphasis is on bush survival and in order to survive for many days at a time if necessary, the men must be able to recognise and make use of whatever vegatation, birds, animals and insects the bush has to offer. They must also learn to understand and turn to advantage what they see. An instructor said: <br />
<blockquote>Everything is of some use to you in the veld. The more you get familiar with it, the better your chance of survival. The ignorant person bumbles into trouble wherever he goes. Certain birds give your presence away. Butterflies, which some people see as nothing but pretty little insects, are a potent indication of water in the winter months. We aim to make our students at home in the environment in which they work. Vegetation not only provides them with food in times of need. It plays one of the basic roles in tracking. And certain trees are used medically. The marula gives the best anti-histamine you can find.</blockquote>Many of the men are trained parachutists to enable them to reach an area quickly when their tracking skills are required. Their stories of survival in the bush are manifold - like the youngster from Salisbury who spent 18 days in the bush trying to evade a terrorist gang who were hot after his trail. As the Scout put it, "a spot of bother when something didn't work out quite right". <br />
He had no rations, no water and a limited supply of ammunition. But his fieldcraft and survival training at Wafa Wafa helped him win through. <br />
These are the men the terrorists want out of the way, men who are justifiably proud of their official motto - <b>Pamwe Chete, Together Only.</b> <br />
Editor: The breakdown and build-up training technique used for the training of the Selous Scouts appears to be very similar to that used by the Portuguese for the training of their Comandos. <br />
From: ARMED FORCES, MAY 1977<div class="blogger-post-footer"><!-- Start Bravenet.com Service Code -->
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<!-- End Bravenet.com Service Code --></div>Beaver Shawhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15092980697221951142noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6501586017974986851.post-51795320476213230002010-09-15T03:45:00.001-07:002010-09-15T03:45:57.591-07:00EARLY INCURSION ..THE LONG MARCH ANC<b> THE LONG MARCH</b> <br />
<div align="justify" class="style8"><span class="style1">A night before the crossing, Norman Duka and 32 other people in his group were transported to the Rhodesian border in a lorry. They stopped for the night close to Katambora. The guerrillas checked that their guns and supplies were in order. They went over their plans once more and took care not to leave any trace of their presence and everything had to buried or taken with them.</span> <a href="http://home.intekom.com/southafricanhistoryonline/pages/sources/vandriel-thesis/chapter-three.htm#1"><span class="style4">1</span></a> </div><div align="justify" class="style9">Prior to the crossing an ANC-ZAPU reconnaissance team had preceded the detachment to select the best route possible to Rhodesia. On the morning of </div><div align="justify" class="style9">31 July 1967, Oliver Tambo, together with Thomas Nkobi, the secretary-general of the ANC, Joe Modise, Commander in Chief of MK and Ndlovo of ZAPU stood on the cliff like banks of the Zambesi River to witness the crossing of the main ANC-ZAPU force. </div><div align="justify" class="style9">Norman Duka says John Dube <a href="http://home.intekom.com/southafricanhistoryonline/pages/sources/vandriel-thesis/chapter-three.htm#2"><span class="style2">2</span></a> the overall commanding officer of the joint unit of 80 men <a href="http://home.intekom.com/southafricanhistoryonline/pages/sources/vandriel-thesis/chapter-three.htm#3"><span class="style2">3</span></a> addressed the combatants just before they crossed the Zambezi River: </div><div align="justify" class="style9">Today we are beginning the long journey home, home to those we left behind with a promise to return. We must each be determined to see our task through to the end. The enemy is strong, we must not underestimate his strength; but we too are strong. We are now trained and will meet their bullets with our own. <a href="http://home.intekom.com/southafricanhistoryonline/pages/sources/vandriel-thesis/chapter-three.htm#4"><span class="style2">4</span></a> </div><div align="justify" class="style9">The Rhodesians had a routine aerial reconnaissance operation at the banks of the Zambezi River and the plan was to cross where the Rhodesians would least expect it. <a href="http://home.intekom.com/southafricanhistoryonline/pages/sources/vandriel-thesis/chapter-three.htm#5"><span class="style2">5</span></a> The crossing point was hazardous. It was west of Victoria Falls and close to Kazangula where the Kariba Dam begins. Thomas Nkobi later wrote: </div><div align="justify" class="style9">When we reached the river and were shown the places selected for crossing, we could not believe our eyes. The commander explained that those were the best points because they were hazardous and difficult and therefore the last places the enemy could suspect. <a href="http://home.intekom.com/southafricanhistoryonline/pages/sources/vandriel-thesis/chapter-three.htm#6"><span class="style2">6</span></a> </div><div align="justify" class="style9">Two cadres moved to and fro across a strong Zambezi current from morning until late afternoon, conveying the party of 80 guerrillas to the other side. Crossing the river was no easy task. The combatants contended with a swift current, a deep gorge and sheer cliffs. As they crossed the Zambezi River, James April, <a href="http://home.intekom.com/southafricanhistoryonline/pages/sources/vandriel-thesis/chapter-three.htm#7"><span class="style2">7</span></a> recalls how his close friend and comrade, Basil February <a href="http://home.intekom.com/southafricanhistoryonline/pages/sources/vandriel-thesis/chapter-three.htm#8"><span class="style2">8</span></a> turned to him and said,' We are crossing the Rubicon. The die is cast'. <a href="http://home.intekom.com/southafricanhistoryonline/pages/sources/vandriel-thesis/chapter-three.htm#9"><span class="style2">9</span></a> </div><div align="justify" class="style9">The crossing lasted throughout the night. Once the guerrillas had crossed the gorge into Rhodesia it was the early hours of the morning of 1 August 1967. The crossing itself was a closely guarded secret. This most probably led to the incorrect date being used by various authors; for example Morris quotes 8 August and so does Lodge. This confusion is compounded by the fact that the guerrillas themselves during interrogation deliberately gave the incorrect date of the crossing to the Security Police. <a href="http://home.intekom.com/southafricanhistoryonline/pages/sources/vandriel-thesis/chapter-three.htm#10"><span class="style2">10</span></a> The Rhodesians did, however, claim to know through intelligence reports that the ANC-ZAPU planned a big crossing into Rhodesia. Still, the presence of the ANC-ZAPU guerrillas caught them completely by surprise. </div><div align="justify" class="style9">Chris Hani, recalls the high spirits of the cadres, and that the cohesion between the MK and ZPRA guerrillas was ‘magnificent'. He adds, ‘After crossing the river, there was a spirit of elation and joy, due to the fact that we had already crossed the first obstacle, namely the river…' <a href="http://home.intekom.com/southafricanhistoryonline/pages/sources/vandriel-thesis/chapter-three.htm#11"><span class="style2">11</span></a> </div><div align="justify" class="style8"><span class="style1"><b>The guerrillas enter Rhodesian soil <a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6501586017974986851" id="soil" name="soil"></a></b></span></div><div align="justify" class="style9">Once the unit managed to cross the Zambezi River, they rested for their first night in Rhodesia, and the next morning they started marching. A group of approximately nine guerrillas were sent to reconnoitre the area. They got lost and were never able to locate the main group. However, they later managed to reach Botswana. <a href="http://home.intekom.com/southafricanhistoryonline/pages/sources/vandriel-thesis/chapter-three.htm#12"><span class="style2">12</span></a> </div><div align="justify" class="style9">As a precautionary measure the guerrillas favoured taking cover during the day and moved mostly at night. Norman Duka says that Commander Moloto decided it was best to rest during the day, because of the heat and to march during the night. The Rhodesian security forces described the <i>modus operandi </i>of the guerrillas. The group's intention was to move mainly at night and very little during the day. Their pattern was planned as follows: </div><div align="justify" class="style9">Walk from dusk until midnight. </div><div align="justify" class="style9">Rest from midnight to approximately 04h00 hours </div><div align="justify" class="style9">Walk from approximately 04h00hrs until dawn. </div><div align="justify" class="style9">Set up base camp and rest throughout the day. <a href="http://home.intekom.com/southafricanhistoryonline/pages/sources/vandriel-thesis/chapter-three.htm#13"><span class="style2">13</span></a> </div><div align="justify" class="style9">The planners of the march estimated that it would take the South African-bound group 10 or 12 days to reach the South African border, if they were to head in the direction of how the crow flies. <a href="http://home.intekom.com/southafricanhistoryonline/pages/sources/vandriel-thesis/chapter-three.htm#14"><span class="style2">14</span></a> </div><div align="justify" class="style9"><b>The first week of the march <a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6501586017974986851" id="march" name="march"></a></b></div><div align="justify" class="style9">During the first days of the march the guerrillas made camp during the day and built small fires in the ground over which they warmed their tin food. Once the group set up camp, all positions were assigned in case of an attack. The posting of guards was done on a rotational basis. <a href="http://home.intekom.com/southafricanhistoryonline/pages/sources/vandriel-thesis/chapter-three.htm#15"><span class="style2">15</span></a> </div><div align="justify" class="style9">Late in the afternoon the guerrillas would clean their camp and bury the fires and food tins. The group commanders would check that no presence of the guerrillas remained. At sunset the group would set off on their journey. During this period they saw not a soul, black or white. However, their pace was slower than anticipated and their rations were decreasing. <a href="http://home.intekom.com/southafricanhistoryonline/pages/sources/vandriel-thesis/chapter-three.htm#16"><span class="style2">16</span></a> </div><div align="justify" class="style9">One evening the guerrillas neared a village. They saw cattle and people in the distance and decided to circle the village not wishing to make unnecessary contact with the local population. By the seventh day the group had run completely out of food and water was scarce. Everyone was hungry, thirsty and weak and their clothes were sweaty and dirty. <a href="http://home.intekom.com/southafricanhistoryonline/pages/sources/vandriel-thesis/chapter-three.htm#17"><span class="style2">17</span></a> </div><div align="justify" class="style9">From the very beginning, the major problems that faced the guerrillas throughout their march, were a lack of water and a shortage of food. They were not familiar with the terrain and had expected ‘…to come across streams and rivulets with water'. <a href="http://home.intekom.com/southafricanhistoryonline/pages/sources/vandriel-thesis/chapter-three.htm#18"><span class="style2">18</span></a> Instead, the further the guerrillas moved away from the Zambezi River, the drier the land and the scarcer water became. At that time, most people living away from the Zambezi River got their water from boreholes. Unfortunately, the commencement of the march coincided with the dry season in Rhodesia. The guerrillas marched for days without food. This lack of food and water necessitated earlier contact with people than expected. </div><div align="justify" class="style9">The big ANC-ZAPU group marched for a week before they reached the Wankie Game Reserve. They had marched for about 300 miles through the bush when they reached the town of Wankie. <a href="http://home.intekom.com/southafricanhistoryonline/pages/sources/vandriel-thesis/chapter-three.htm#19"><span class="style2">19</span></a> The unit sent someone to buy food supplies as the guerrillas had no pre-arranged contacts amongst the local population. <a href="http://home.intekom.com/southafricanhistoryonline/pages/sources/vandriel-thesis/chapter-three.htm#20"><span class="style2">20</span></a> The chief who assisted the guerrillas had this to say: </div><blockquote class="style8"><div align="justify" class="style1">Yes, it's very good that you people are here. And I am here not satisfied. The Smith regime they sent me without my consent and my people here to the stones. We can't plough. And after they put me here, they say I must watch for guerrillas not to pass through here, ja, ja. So I'm also fighting the boers, I'm going to help you all. <a href="http://home.intekom.com/southafricanhistoryonline/pages/sources/vandriel-thesis/chapter-three.htm#21"><span class="style2">21</span></a> </div></blockquote><div align="justify" class="style9">So the guerrillas were received with enthusiasm and given supplies. Be that as it may, Barrell argues that this contact was a grave risk, which the group had been compelled to make prematurely. <a href="http://home.intekom.com/southafricanhistoryonline/pages/sources/vandriel-thesis/chapter-three.htm#22"><span class="style2">22</span></a> </div><div align="justify" class="style9"><b>The detachment splits into two <a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6501586017974986851" id="two" name="two"></a></b></div><div align="justify" class="style9">In the northern part of the Wankie Game Reserve the detachment split into two, with each group going their separate ways. Leonard Nkosi claims the group split into three. <a href="http://home.intekom.com/southafricanhistoryonline/pages/sources/vandriel-thesis/chapter-three.htm#23"><span class="style2">23</span></a> All other indications are that the ANC-ZAPU detachment split into two and not three: the bigger group was bound for South Africa and the smaller group for Lupane in eastern Rhodesia. As time went on smaller groups broke away from the two big groups. As the guerrillas progressed further into the game reserve there was only bush and animals. Poor maps and compasses did not help either. </div><div align="justify" class="style9">Lennox Lagu <a href="http://home.intekom.com/southafricanhistoryonline/pages/sources/vandriel-thesis/chapter-three.htm#24"><span class="style2">24</span></a> was the commander of the MK group consisting of about 56 soldiers heading south towards South Africa and included Chris Hani, Peter Mfene, Douglas Wana, Mbijana, Victor Dlamini, Castro, Mashigo, Paul Sithole, Desmond, Wilson Msweli, Shooter Makasi, Eric Nduna, Basil February and James April. <a href="http://home.intekom.com/southafricanhistoryonline/pages/sources/vandriel-thesis/chapter-three.htm#25"><span class="style2">25</span></a> </div><div align="justify" class="style9">Whilst the second group consisting of 23 men headed east towards Lupane, with the intention of setting up a ZAPU base. The commander of this group was Madzimba Matho of ZAPU who was deputised by Andries Motsepe of the ANC. <a href="http://home.intekom.com/southafricanhistoryonline/pages/sources/vandriel-thesis/chapter-three.htm#26"><span class="style2">26</span></a> Their mission was to go and blow up a bridge. <a href="http://home.intekom.com/southafricanhistoryonline/pages/sources/vandriel-thesis/chapter-three.htm#27"><span class="style2">27</span></a> </div><div align="justify" class="style9"><b>Who were the Rhodesian security forces that the ANC-ZAPU guerrillas would soon come into contact with?<a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6501586017974986851" id="rhod" name="rhod"></a> </b></div><div align="justify" class="style9">The Rhodesian security forces consisted of the Army, the Air Force and the British South Africa Police (BSAP). There were close links between the police and the army and the two worked together to thwart insurgency actions along the Zambezi valley. In 1966 the Rhodesians set up a joint counter-insurgency organisation. However, the air force and the air arm of the police remained White only. <a href="http://home.intekom.com/southafricanhistoryonline/pages/sources/vandriel-thesis/chapter-three.htm#28"><span class="style2">28</span></a> The Rhodesian airforce at the time of UDI comprised 99 aircraft. This was not adequate for battle, so South African assistance during the 1967 insurgency included the dispatch of South African aircraft for use by Rhodesians. <a href="http://home.intekom.com/southafricanhistoryonline/pages/sources/vandriel-thesis/chapter-three.htm#29"><span class="style2">29</span></a> </div><div align="justify" class="style9">The Rhodesian army had three components namely the paratrooper Special Air Squadron (SAS) (White), the Rhodesian Light infantry (RLI) (White) and the Rhodesian African Rifles (RAR), (African but with White officers). At UDI the army consisted of 3 400 men. There were also 4 000 White reservists in four active and four reserve territorial force battalions of the Rhodesian regiment. <a href="http://home.intekom.com/southafricanhistoryonline/pages/sources/vandriel-thesis/chapter-three.htm#30"><span class="style2">30</span></a> </div><div align="justify" class="style9">Within the Rhodesian army, Africans played an important role, as their tracking skills were invaluable to its White members. The Rhodesian regime claimed that the existence of the RAR was testimony to the support enjoyed by African Rhodesians. The majority of RAR troops were drawn from Rhodesia's East Victorian region; they were family connected and were from the Vakaranga tribe, i.e. part of the Mashona. A <i>Guardian </i>journalist asked an African RAR sergeant major why he fought for the Rhodesian security forces, his answer was: </div><blockquote class="style8"><div align="justify" class="style1">I am fighting for Rhodesia. It is my home…They [the guerrillas] come with Chinese grenades and guns and the people are frightened of them. I am sorry for some of them, but this communist thing is no good for Rhodesia. <a href="http://home.intekom.com/southafricanhistoryonline/pages/sources/vandriel-thesis/chapter-three.htm#31"><span class="style2">31</span></a> </div></blockquote><div align="justify" class="style9">The army offered Africans the opportunity of earning a good salary at a time when unemployment was high. Maxey cites cases of dissatisfaction among African RAR members saying: </div><blockquote class="style8"><div align="left" class="style1">…the nationalists have claimed that some African members of the army have refused to fight in the Zambezi, and as a result, 113 soldiers were imprisoned in a camp near Salisbury, in February 1968.<a href="http://home.intekom.com/southafricanhistoryonline/pages/sources/vandriel-thesis/chapter-three.htm#32"><span class="style2"> 32</span></a> </div></blockquote><div align="justify" class="style9"><b>When was the first guerrilla caught? <a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6501586017974986851" id="guerrella" name="guerrella"></a></b></div><div align="justify" class="style9">Celliers implies that the guerrillas miscalculated the attitude of the local black population who informed the security forces of their presence. <a href="http://home.intekom.com/southafricanhistoryonline/pages/sources/vandriel-thesis/chapter-three.htm#33"><span class="style2">33</span></a> The Rhodesian Situation Report reveals that the first guerrilla was caught on 7 August: </div><div align="justify" class="style9">One guerrilla was captured south of Wankie. Interrogation revealed that he was one of a gang of 6 consisting of 3 ANC and 3 ZAPU men. The ANC was heading for Johannesburg. <a href="http://home.intekom.com/southafricanhistoryonline/pages/sources/vandriel-thesis/chapter-three.htm#34"><span class="style2">34</span></a> </div><div align="justify" class="style9">This is contrary to Shay and Vermaak's claim that on Tuesday 10 August, <a href="http://home.intekom.com/southafricanhistoryonline/pages/sources/vandriel-thesis/chapter-three.htm#35"><span class="style2">35</span></a> the first guerrilla was arrested at a mission station near Wankie. Maxey says the Rhodesian authorities were unaware of the presence of the guerrillas until nine days after the initial crossing when a guerrilla was captured, about 70 miles from the point of crossing. <a href="http://home.intekom.com/southafricanhistoryonline/pages/sources/vandriel-thesis/chapter-three.htm#36"><span class="style2">36</span></a> </div><div align="justify" class="style9">On Saturday, 12 August another guerrilla was arrested near Dett, approximately </div><div align="justify" class="style9">30 miles from where the first guerrilla was arrested and a third man who was with him escaped in a stolen car and died in a shoot out with police near Figtree. <a href="http://home.intekom.com/southafricanhistoryonline/pages/sources/vandriel-thesis/chapter-three.htm#37"><span class="style2">37</span></a> By now the Rhodesian security forces had gleaned information about the insurgent guerrillas. At first their information was insufficient and they did not realise the number of guerrillas involved and the full extent of the crossing. T he interrogation of the first two guerrillas caught gave the Rhodesians some idea that there were others in Rhodesia. It seems that the detained guerrillas used delaying tactics and did not reveal everything. <a href="http://home.intekom.com/southafricanhistoryonline/pages/sources/vandriel-thesis/chapter-three.htm#38"><span class="style2">38</span></a> So the Rhodesian authorities only learnt about the full extent of the crossing a bit later. <a href="http://home.intekom.com/southafricanhistoryonline/pages/sources/vandriel-thesis/chapter-three.htm#39"><span class="style2">39</span></a> </div><div align="justify" class="style9"><b>The Battle of Nyatuwe </b><a href="http://home.intekom.com/southafricanhistoryonline/pages/sources/vandriel-thesis/chapter-three.htm#40"><span class="style2">40</span></a> <a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6501586017974986851" id="nyatuwe" name="nyatuwe"></a></div><div align="justify" class="style9">About a week after the detachment split into two the Lupane-bound group was the first to encounter the Rhodesian security forces. The Rhodesians realising the presence of the guerrillas, swiftly sent a RAR unit called Command 1 Brigade to the Wankie Valley area where the first clash between the brigade and the guerrillas occurred on Sunday 13 August, and lasted for about ten hours. </div><div align="justify" class="style9">Comrade Rodgers, a Wankie veteran gives a vivid and dramatic account of the battle that took place between Wankie and Dett on the banks of the Nyatuwe River, which was dry at the time. <a href="http://home.intekom.com/southafricanhistoryonline/pages/sources/vandriel-thesis/chapter-three.htm#41"><span class="style2">41</span></a> The Lupane-bound group reached the banks of the river early in the morning. After posting guards the guerrillas camped on the side of the river, which was meant to give, good cover against ‘airplanes, helicopters and distant people'. <a href="http://home.intekom.com/southafricanhistoryonline/pages/sources/vandriel-thesis/chapter-three.htm#42"><span class="style2">42</span></a> </div><div align="justify" class="style9">After eating and making camp for the day the guerrillas noticed spotter planes circling their position overhead at about 07h00, which they ignored. This proved to be a fatal error. At about 08h30 the guerrillas heard a deafening salvo of automatic rifle fire and a “boer” voice bellowed: “SURRENDER”. <a href="http://home.intekom.com/southafricanhistoryonline/pages/sources/vandriel-thesis/chapter-three.htm#43"><span class="style2">43</span></a> The spotter aircraft must have reported the position of the guerrillas to the Rhodesian ground troops. This sudden attack caused momentary confusion amongst some of the guerrillas although some managed to take position and return fire. Masimini was shouting at the top of his voice saying he will shoot any son-of a-bitch who ran away, ordering them to fire back. Others had merely taken cover and were not firing at the enemy…On the way I met Zami (Bothwell Tamane) who was alone manning another position, firing at the enemy. <a href="http://home.intekom.com/southafricanhistoryonline/pages/sources/vandriel-thesis/chapter-three.htm#44"><span class="style2">44</span></a> </div><div align="justify" class="style9">An important moment in the battle was when the guerrillas tried to reach the hillock close to the river. The Rhodesians tried to prevent this from happening and bombed the guerrillas' position. At one point a White officer shouted: “Surrender, you're surrounded.” This was communicated through an interpreter in Shona and Ndebele. Rodgers asked Ronnie Dube of ZAPU to translate: “We will never surrender”. <a href="http://home.intekom.com/southafricanhistoryonline/pages/sources/vandriel-thesis/chapter-three.htm#45"><span class="style2">45</span></a> </div><div align="justify" class="style9">The battle continued well into the afternoon. The Rhodesians had encircled the guerrillas and used two helicopters with 12.7mm machine guns to bombard them. <a href="http://home.intekom.com/southafricanhistoryonline/pages/sources/vandriel-thesis/chapter-three.htm#46"><span class="style2">46</span></a> </div><div align="justify" class="style9">By late afternoon, when the firing from both sides had quietened down Donda was found with a fatal wound to the back. Masimini was badly injured and had lost lots of blood. The guerrillas tried carrying him with a makeshift stretcher. This did not help. Masimini told them to leave him behind and proceed, “the corridor must be opened at all cost”, he said. <a href="http://home.intekom.com/southafricanhistoryonline/pages/sources/vandriel-thesis/chapter-three.htm#47"><span class="style2">47</span></a> </div><div align="justify" class="style9">After the Battle of Nyatuwe , the guerrillas left during the night leaving four dead cadres and a fifth seriously injured. The fifth guerrilla James Masimini insisted on giving cover to the retreating ANC-ZAPU guerrillas. He died in the morning in a shoot out with the Rhodesian security forces. In this skirmish two members of the RAR were killed and three wounded. <span class="style2"><a href="http://home.intekom.com/southafricanhistoryonline/pages/sources/vandriel-thesis/chapter-three.htm#48">48</a></span> </div><h1 align="justify" class="style9">The Rhodesians drop leaflets – ‘Surrender or die' <a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6501586017974986851" id="surrender" name="surrender"></a></h1><div align="justify" class="style9">During the Battle of Nyatuwe and the subsequent ones that followed, the Rhodesians tried to frighten the guerrillas by showering them with leaflets in English and Shona and called on the insurgents to “surrender or die”. The leaflets offered amnesty to the guerrillas if they buried their arms and then walked to the security forces shouting: ‘We do not want to die – save us – we are here'. The leaflets had little effect on the guerrillas. <a href="http://home.intekom.com/southafricanhistoryonline/pages/sources/vandriel-thesis/chapter-three.htm#49"><span class="style2">49</span></a> See Appendix 7 for a copy of the leaflet. Appendix 8 is an example of the leaflets given to the local Rhodesian population by the authorities. </div><h1 align="justify" class="style9">The South African Security Police become involved <a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6501586017974986851" id="police" name="police"></a></h1><div align="justify" class="style9">By 17 August 1967, the South African Security Police were assisting the Rhodesian authorities with the interrogation of captured guerrillas and the following information was gleaned: <a href="http://home.intekom.com/southafricanhistoryonline/pages/sources/vandriel-thesis/chapter-three.htm#50"><span class="style2">50</span></a> Two ANC guerrillas were arrested. A further four guerrillas were shot dead during a skirmish, of which two were ANC members namely, James Masimani and David Sibojeni. Another guerrilla was shot dead close to Wankie and another one that was arrested escaped. <a href="http://home.intekom.com/southafricanhistoryonline/pages/sources/vandriel-thesis/chapter-three.htm#51"><span class="style2">51</span></a> In Botswana three guerrillas were arrested and are thought to be members of the ANC and PAC. One's name is George Muuyane. </div><div align="justify" class="style9">During interrogation it was revealed that a group of 30 guerrillas of which between 16 and 20 are ANC members were told on Thursday 3 August to prepare for a journey to the Republic of South Africa. On Friday 4 August, a Landrover and other vehicles took them from Linanda near Lusaka, to a farm close to Livingstone. Here they were fitted out with backpacks and resources. They were taken straight from the farm to the Zambezi River. Between 08h00 and 04h00 the next morning they crossed the river in a motorboat that could take three passengers, at a time. </div><div align="justify" class="style9"><b>A Coloured man took them across the river<a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6501586017974986851" id="river" name="river"></a></b></div><div align="justify" class="style9">The guerrillas hid in the bushes and moved at night until they reached a place called Masue close to a railway line where the group of 30 split into two. One group followed the railway line in a southern direction and the other group moved off in an easterly direction. A ZAPU guerrilla led one of the groups. The group's instructions was to reach Bulawayo and go to the Old Location where they would meet an unknown ZAPU leader who would give them further instructions as well as explosives. </div><div align="justify" class="style9">One of the arrested guerrillas told the Rhodesian Police that the group of 30 guerrillas consisted of 29 ANC members and one ZAPU member. Their instructions were to move south to South Africa by passing residential areas. They were also instructed to avoid Botswana because of a water shortage and the fact that the residents of Botswana were not sympathetic enough. Lieutenant Pretorius was certain that the farm mentioned is Drummond Park farm, the ANC camp, which is, situated 4,5miles north west of Livingstone and four miles north of the Zambezi River. <a href="http://home.intekom.com/southafricanhistoryonline/pages/sources/vandriel-thesis/chapter-three.htm#52"><span class="style2">52</span></a> </div><div align="justify" class="style9"><b>What happened to the Lupane-bound group after the battle of Nyatuwe? <a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6501586017974986851" id="lupane" name="lupane"></a></b></div><div align="justify" class="style9">The next engagement took place on 18 August <a href="http://home.intekom.com/southafricanhistoryonline/pages/sources/vandriel-thesis/chapter-three.htm#53"><span class="style2">53</span></a> with the Lupane-bound guerrillas who were continuing with their march. The Rhodesians claim the incident involved 15 guerrillas at MJ950880. <a href="http://home.intekom.com/southafricanhistoryonline/pages/sources/vandriel-thesis/chapter-three.htm#54"><span class="style2">54</span></a> Comrade Rodgers described what happened like this: </div><div align="justify" class="style9">We continued fighting but were ultimately overpowered by the enemy. By then only seven of us were remaining, five ZAPU comrades, myself and Bothwell. <a href="http://home.intekom.com/southafricanhistoryonline/pages/sources/vandriel-thesis/chapter-three.htm#55"><span class="style2">55</span></a> </div><div align="justify" class="style9">Eight guerrillas were killed, six were captured and one escaped. Large quantities of ammunition and arms were captured. <a href="http://home.intekom.com/southafricanhistoryonline/pages/sources/vandriel-thesis/chapter-three.htm#56"><span class="style2">56</span></a> </div><h1 align="justify" class="style9">ANC-ZAPU issues a joint communiqué <a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6501586017974986851" id="commu" name="commu"></a></h1><div align="justify" class="style9">On 19 August 1967, ANC Oliver Tambo and the Vice-President of ZAPU James Chikerema issued a joint communiqué outlining the military alliance between the ANC and ZAPU and the reason for the joint campaign. <a href="http://home.intekom.com/southafricanhistoryonline/pages/sources/vandriel-thesis/chapter-three.htm#57"><span class="style2">57</span></a> Furious fighting has been and is taking place in various parts of Southern Rhodesia. From the thirteenth of this month, the area of Wankie has been the scene of the most daring battles ever fought between freedom fighters and the white oppressor's army in Rhodesia. </div><div align="justify" class="style9">…We wish to declare here that that the fighting that is presently going on in the Wankie area is indeed being carried out by a combined force of ZAPU and ANC which marched into the country as comrades-in-arms on a common route, each bound to its destination. It is the determination of these Combined Forces to fight the common settler enemy to the finish, at any point of encounter as they make their way to their respective zones. <a href="http://home.intekom.com/southafricanhistoryonline/pages/sources/vandriel-thesis/chapter-three.htm#58"><span class="style2">58</span></a> </div><h1 align="justify" class="style9">The South African-bound group continues marching south <a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6501586017974986851" id="sa" name="sa"></a></h1><div align="justify" class="style9">The South African-bound group continued on its southward journey. The guerrillas were now hunting game and one managed to shoot a buck, which provided food for two days. </div><div align="justify" class="style9">They became aware of the Lupane-bound group's skirmishes with the Rhodesian security forces as they had a radio with them. <a href="http://home.intekom.com/southafricanhistoryonline/pages/sources/vandriel-thesis/chapter-three.htm#59"><span class="style2">59</span></a> On the twelfth day after crossing the Zambezi River, the guerrillas came to the Wankie valley. There they saw spotter planes flying very high. At a small river they filled their canteens and washed their socks and uniforms. Two groups scouted the area, the one looking for game and the other checking what was happening on the road ahead. No game was found and commander Moloto divided the remainder of the meat amongst the men. <a href="http://home.intekom.com/southafricanhistoryonline/pages/sources/vandriel-thesis/chapter-three.htm#60"><span class="style2">60</span></a> </div><div align="justify" class="style9">Early in the morning of the 13 th day three of the guerrillas went hunting and spotted some zebras. They managed to wound one. Everyone was very happy and excited about the capture of the zebra that was too heavy to move. Instead the guerrillas moved to where the zebra was and made camp. Fires were built, the zebra was skinned and large chunks of meat were roasted. Duka remembers, ‘Everyone ate as much as they could. The men stacked their knapsacks with roast meat. The remainder of the meat was left behind.' At dusk, after this feast the guerrillas covered their fires, picked up their rucksacks and continued marching. <a href="http://home.intekom.com/southafricanhistoryonline/pages/sources/vandriel-thesis/chapter-three.htm#61"><span class="style2">61</span></a> </div><div align="justify" class="style9">The guerrillas experienced another food shortage but continued marching. There was also no water. The next time they found water, they did not stop to use purifying tablets, and they hastily quenched their thirst. <a href="http://home.intekom.com/southafricanhistoryonline/pages/sources/vandriel-thesis/chapter-three.htm#62"><span class="style2">62</span></a> </div><div align="justify" class="style9">The guerrillas marched for several more nights and had no contact with villagers. Their main priority was to reach South Africa without engaging the Rhodesian security forces. They saw lots of elephants and lions. The group stayed for about 10 days without food – and were forced to eat leaves from the trees. At one point they managed to shoot a dove and make some soup from it. <a href="http://home.intekom.com/southafricanhistoryonline/pages/sources/vandriel-thesis/chapter-three.htm#63"><span class="style2">63</span></a> </div><div align="justify" class="style9"><b>The South African-bound group clash with the Rhodesian security forces <a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6501586017974986851" id="clash" name="clash"></a></b></div><div align="justify" class="style9">About a week after the Lupane-bound group first clashed with the Rhodesian security forces the hungry South Africa-bound group noticed enemy aerial reconnaissance. </div><div align="justify" class="style9">The guerrillas now more than ever moved only at night and dug themselves in during the day. Just before dawn they reached a large village. The guerrillas were very hungry. Whilst the group set up camp four comrades were sent to the village to see if they could buy a goat. Two unarmed guerrillas went to ask for food while the other two covered them at a distance with rifles. The men had orders neither to disclose their number nor to say what they were doing. Prior to the detachments' departure from Zambia, ZAPU had made a radio broadcast to the Zimbabwean people saying that if anyone approached their village for help it should be given, ‘These are our sons, fighting for a free Zimbabwe'. <a href="http://home.intekom.com/southafricanhistoryonline/pages/sources/vandriel-thesis/chapter-three.htm#64"><span class="style2">64</span></a> </div><div align="justify" class="style9">When they got to the post they found an old man, who said they were expecting the guerrillas and that he had been told to give them food. The men were away from their cattle post as it was Sunday, and would only return the following day with food. Instead the old man gave them four gallons of sour milk and a bit of porridge. <a href="http://home.intekom.com/southafricanhistoryonline/pages/sources/vandriel-thesis/chapter-three.htm#65"><span class="style2">65</span></a> Just as the guerrillas completed their drink they heard gunfire. They then heard shouting: ‘Surrender! Commandos! Surrender! Surrender! <i>Apanzan shaida' </i>– in Shona this means that you can't do nothing'. <a href="http://home.intekom.com/southafricanhistoryonline/pages/sources/vandriel-thesis/chapter-three.htm#66"><span class="style2">66</span></a> The guerrillas returned fire and the Rhodesian security forces ran away leaving behind their kitbags with clothing and food. </div><div align="justify" class="style9">Leonard Nkosi describes the same event. His group met the Rhodesian security forces as they left the Wankie Game Reserve, at the end of August. It was 22 August to be exact. We were marching early in the morning – very early. We heard a cockcrow and then we realised that there must be somebody living nearby. At that stage we were very weak and tired, and hungry. <a href="http://home.intekom.com/southafricanhistoryonline/pages/sources/vandriel-thesis/chapter-three.htm#67"><span class="style2">67</span></a> </div><div align="justify" class="style9">Early that afternoon they noticed enemy vehicles in the distance and prepared for battle. The RAR patrol ran into the South African bound group, while it followed a specially laid false trail. <a href="http://home.intekom.com/southafricanhistoryonline/pages/sources/vandriel-thesis/chapter-three.htm#68"><span class="style2">68</span></a> The cadres held back and did not fire. They wished to avoid unnecessary contact and to safeguard precious ammunition. What happened next is best described in Hani's words: </div><div align="justify" class="style9">…the enemy got impatient. They stood up and began to ask: ‘Where are the terrorists?' This was when there was a fusillade of furious fire from us…They simply ran for their dear lives leaving behind food, ammunition and communication equipment…This was the first time that we had what I can call a civilised meal – cheese, biltong, meat and other usual rations carried by the regular army…For us that day was a day of celebrations because with our own eyes we had seen the enemy run…A feeling of faith in one another and recognition of the courage of the unit developed…There was no going back. <a href="http://home.intekom.com/southafricanhistoryonline/pages/sources/vandriel-thesis/chapter-three.htm#69"><span class="style2">69</span></a> </div><div align="justify" class="style9">The RAR patrol led by Patrol Officer Hopkins describes the battle I this way: </div><div align="justify" class="style9">We did not see them until they opened fire. The whole action was confined to about 300 yards but because of the difficult country, and our limited force, we could not surround them. There was firing all afternoon and it kept movement to a minimum. It was a tricky situation. <a href="http://home.intekom.com/southafricanhistoryonline/pages/sources/vandriel-thesis/chapter-three.htm#70"><span class="style2">70</span></a> </div><div align="justify" class="style9">Hani estimates that MK lost three members namely Charles Seshoba, Sparks Moloi and Baloi and one was wounded. <a href="http://home.intekom.com/southafricanhistoryonline/pages/sources/vandriel-thesis/chapter-three.htm#71"><span class="style2">71</span></a> ‘We must have killed between 12 and 15, including a lieutenant, a sergeant major, a warrant officer and a number of other soldiers'. <a href="http://home.intekom.com/southafricanhistoryonline/pages/sources/vandriel-thesis/chapter-three.htm#72"><span class="style2">72</span></a> Morodi also says, ‘We have killed about fifteen of them, they killed three of us from the first section. So they run away, and we captured this food'. <a href="http://home.intekom.com/southafricanhistoryonline/pages/sources/vandriel-thesis/chapter-three.htm#73"><span class="style2">73</span></a> </div><div align="justify" class="style9">Nkosi claims four people died in his group during this encounter. In the Rhodesian group he saw one European dead and one non-European dead. <a href="http://home.intekom.com/southafricanhistoryonline/pages/sources/vandriel-thesis/chapter-three.htm#74"><span class="style2">74</span></a> Lieutenant Smith and an African sergeant major died in this battle. <a href="http://home.intekom.com/southafricanhistoryonline/pages/sources/vandriel-thesis/chapter-three.htm#75"><span class="style2">75</span></a> </div><div align="justify" class="style9">As the Rhodesian soldiers retreated, the MK soldiers captured their supplies of arms, radios, food, and clothing including the camouflage uniform of the Rhodesians. </div><div align="justify" class="style9">Hani says this about that first important battle: </div><div align="justify" class="style9">It was a memorable victory and to every soldier victory is very important… [that] this was a virgin victory for us since we had never fought with modern weapons against the enemy. For us that day was a day of celebrations because with our own eyes we had seen the enemy run. We had seen the enemy frozen with fear…We had also seen and observed each other reacting to the enemy's attacks. A feeling of faith in one another and recognition of the courage of the unit developed. <a href="http://home.intekom.com/southafricanhistoryonline/pages/sources/vandriel-thesis/chapter-three.htm#76"><span class="style2">76</span></a> </div><div align="justify" class="style9">Although the guerrillas were tired and weak from not having eaten, they were able to cause the Rhodesians to flee leaving behind their food and firearms. Immediately after the battle the guerrillas rushed to the belongings of the fleeing Rhodesian soldiers. </div><div align="justify" class="style9">The first thing we hurried to, because we were very hungry – we went to the bags, which contained the food and we also, collected their firearms. <span class="style2"><a href="http://home.intekom.com/southafricanhistoryonline/pages/sources/vandriel-thesis/chapter-three.htm#77">77</a></span> </div><div align="justify" class="style9">The food and clothing of the fleeing Rhodesian security forces came in handy, as the guerrillas were very hungry. Morodi recalls this anecdote: </div><div align="justify" class="style9">…I saw something like toothpaste. I open it. It was condensed milk, I drink, then Lennox he says to me, 'No no no. You know it's the law of the guerrilla anything that you pick up you must report to the commander – otherwise they are going to shoot you. But I drink. Then he took another one and he also drinks. I said, ‘Now they are going to shoot both of us! [Laughs] Then we get together, we report whatever we have captured there. <a href="http://home.intekom.com/southafricanhistoryonline/pages/sources/vandriel-thesis/chapter-three.htm#78"><span class="style2">78</span></a> </div><div align="justify" class="style9">Some of the guerrillas put on the Rhodesian uniforms, but took off the badges. Helicopters and spotter planes were flying low all the time. The guerrillas also captured a radio and could listen to the helicopter signals. </div><div align="justify" class="style9">Hopkins' patrol followed this group, which seemed to be heading for the Botswana border. <a href="http://home.intekom.com/southafricanhistoryonline/pages/sources/vandriel-thesis/chapter-three.htm#79"><span class="style2">79</span></a> On 23 August, a day after the first battle with the South African-bound group a second platoon under the command of Lieutenant William Rodney Winnall, was sent in to pursue the guerrillas in conjunction with Hopkin's patrol. However, the Rhodesians first planned and carried out a furious bombardment against the group. Lieutenant Winnall says of the aerial strike: </div><div align="justify" class="style9">At approximately 4 o'clock I was given the order to halt my advance as [an] air strike was going in. The strike went, in fact, approximately five to six miles ahead of where we were actually based. That was the only strike that went in. <a href="http://home.intekom.com/southafricanhistoryonline/pages/sources/vandriel-thesis/chapter-three.htm#80"><span class="style2">80</span></a> </div><div align="justify" class="style9">The South African buccaneer jets and helicopters missed the guerrillas by about two kilometres. This bombing by the airforce had little effect on the guerrillas. <a href="http://home.intekom.com/southafricanhistoryonline/pages/sources/vandriel-thesis/chapter-three.htm#81"><span class="style2">81</span></a> So the Rhodesian Royal Air Force had tried to bombard Hani's group but missed them. The security forces pursuing the guerrillas consisting of two platoons and fifty men continued following the trail of the nationalists. </div><div align="justify" class="style9">The second battle took place that same day of the aerial bombardment against the guerrillas at about 4:30 p.m. The scene of the second skirmish was approximately five miles east of the first battle the previous day. <a href="http://home.intekom.com/southafricanhistoryonline/pages/sources/vandriel-thesis/chapter-three.htm#82"><span class="style2">82</span></a> </div><div align="justify" class="style9">The MK guerrillas surmised that the Rhodesian security forces were planning a mop-up operation for the day 23 August. Nkosi says the guerillas decided to outwit the pursuing Rhodesians by doubling back and lying in wait for their enemy and launched a surprise attack. Nkosi explains the tactics of the ANC-ZAPU group and what happened next: </div><div align="justify" class="style9">On that day we heard that there were some people nearby us. Our commander then moved out to find out who these persons were. He was then wearing one of the Rhodesian security uniforms – one of those we had picked up…he came back running to us and told us that the Rhodesian forces have come down near us, and he gave us an order to move forward in a line towards them. We were sitting, waiting in that position. Our light machine guns were on the flanks and in the centre was another light machine gun, and in between those were the sub machine guns and the carbine. <a href="http://home.intekom.com/southafricanhistoryonline/pages/sources/vandriel-thesis/chapter-three.htm#83"><span class="style2">83</span></a> </div><div align="justify" class="style9">Hani explains that he was accompanied by James April, <a href="http://home.intekom.com/southafricanhistoryonline/pages/sources/vandriel-thesis/chapter-three.htm#84"><span class="style2">84</span></a> Douglas Wana, Jack Simelane, Victor Dlamini and others and recalls the event in this way. </div><div align="justify" class="style9">We crawled towards the enemy's position and first attacked their tents with grenades and then followed with our AKs and LMGs. The enemy fought back furiously and after fifteen minutes we called for reinforcements from the rear, and within ten minutes we overran the enemy's position…The enemy fled leaving behind supplies, weapons, grenades, uniforms and communication radios. <a href="http://home.intekom.com/southafricanhistoryonline/pages/sources/vandriel-thesis/chapter-three.htm#85"><span class="style2">85</span></a> </div><div align="justify" class="style9">Lieutenant Winnall commander of the RAR platoon stationed near Bulawayo remembers this same event. His platoon consisted of between 22 and 24 men, two police dog handlers patrol officers Thomas and Horn and two trackers [the latter presumably civilians] assisted the platoon. </div><div align="justify" class="style9">Winnall explained that at 5p.m they were forming a base camp when he heard sporadic firing to his right. A sergeant major came to report to him that he had seen two guerrillas. Immediately after that the guerrillas opened heavy fire on the camp. </div><div align="justify" class="style9">According to Lieutenant Winnall, the platoon commander, ‘…there was chaos… </div><div align="justify" class="style9">I thought we were not in a good position to defend ourselves. Hand-grenades were being thrown into the camp. I thought we had lost the initiative and I ordered withdrawal.' <a href="http://home.intekom.com/southafricanhistoryonline/pages/sources/vandriel-thesis/chapter-three.htm#86"><span class="style2">86</span></a> </div><div align="justify" class="style9">Mr Rees: (the prosecutor) And what type of attacking formation did the attackers appear to adopt? </div><div align="justify" class="style9">Winnall : After a while I got the impression that they were beginning to encircle us, and outflank us. At the same time with this automatic fire they were also throwing grenades into the camp, one of which exploded approximately ten paces away from me and I got a bit of shrapnel in my shoulder and my hip, and a little bit in my face. </div><div align="justify" class="style9">Mr Rees : What appeared to be the morale of the attacking force? --- The morale appeared to be very high, and they were certainly very aggressive. A short way away there was someone shouting “Attack, attack, attack” and it was in the initial stages, in fact, of this attack that patrol officer Thomas was killed. In trying to get his dog under control he was shot. </div><div align="justify" class="style9">What casualty was suffered by your side? --- Thomas was killed. I was not aware that anybody had been, but in fact the lance corporal in my platoon was also killed – shot in the face – and there were a number of people injured; it amounted to approximately seven. <a href="http://home.intekom.com/southafricanhistoryonline/pages/sources/vandriel-thesis/chapter-three.htm#87"><span class="style2">87</span></a> </div><div align="justify" class="style9">Winnall was so badly injured that he was airlifted to a hospital. James April referred to him as ‘the man with a thousand wounds', convinced that Winnall exaggerated his wounds in order to receive the sympathy of the court and I quote from the trial record: </div><div align="justify" class="style9">Mr Rees: (the prosecutor) What injuries did you suffer? Could you tell the court? --- [Winnall] Shrapnel wounds, bullet wounds in the calf, the left calf; a bullet wound through the left upper arm; a bullet wound across the top left thumb, and one across the top of my head. </div><div align="justify" class="style9">KENNEDY, J : (judge) You were a very lucky man to have escaped death, I must say? --- [Winnall] I think so, Sir. <a href="http://home.intekom.com/southafricanhistoryonline/pages/sources/vandriel-thesis/chapter-three.htm#88"><span class="style2">88</span></a> </div><div align="justify" class="style9">Winnall went on to say, ‘I was evacuated to hospital and did not return to the area'. <a href="http://home.intekom.com/southafricanhistoryonline/pages/sources/vandriel-thesis/chapter-three.htm#89"><span class="style2">89</span></a> Two RAR members were killed and eight wounded. Another member was killed as a result of an ‘accident'. Two guerrillas were killed. With both incidents the guerrillas operated from well-built hideouts and captured some of the RAR guns and most importantly two wireless sets, which were used to monitor the movements of the security forces. <a href="http://home.intekom.com/southafricanhistoryonline/pages/sources/vandriel-thesis/chapter-three.htm#90"><span class="style2">90</span></a> </div><div align="justify" class="style9">The guerrillas decide to return the four-gallon tin in which they carried the sour milk, so as not to incriminate the old man. The latter told them not to go near the river as the Rhodesian security forces were planning an ambush. The guerrillas were very thirsty but dared not go near the river. Instead the old man showed them an alternate route. Morodi carried one of the wounded men quite a long distance. <a href="http://home.intekom.com/southafricanhistoryonline/pages/sources/vandriel-thesis/chapter-three.htm#91"><span class="style2">91</span></a> </div><h1 align="justify" class="style9">The guerrillas shoot at four black Rhodesian soldiers <a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6501586017974986851" id="shoot" name="shoot"></a></h1><div align="justify" class="style9">What followed was one of the curious happenings during the Wankie campaign and is best told in the exact words of Morodi: </div><div align="justify" class="style9">Just as we walk – it was a full moon – we saw four black soldiers coming. And when they saw us they say, ‘No! Don't kill us because we are also black.' We opened fire! We didn't waste time. We were afraid if we capture them then they are going to see our number and they are going to see how we are armed, and they may escape and give a proper report that side…Within two, three minutes, we hear firing at the river. <span class="style2"><a href="http://home.intekom.com/southafricanhistoryonline/pages/sources/vandriel-thesis/chapter-three.htm#92">92</a> </span></div><div align="justify" class="style9">The guerrillas meeting of, and shooting at the four black soldiers set off another chain of events. In the meanwhile the Rhodesian security forces had set a trap for the fleeing guerrillas at the river. They put two groups of soldiers on either side. It was planned that once the guerrillas got to the river the one group of Rhodesian soldiers would open fire, the guerrillas would retreat and the other group of Rhodesian soldiers would advance and shoot the guerrillas from the rear. When the Rhodesian soldiers heard shots, which was the sound of the guerrillas shooting at the four black Rhodesian soldiers they thought the trap had worked. So the rear guard advanced. And the two Rhodesian groups started shooting at each other. Morodi says the shooting went on for about fifteen minutes. The guerrillas continued on their way. The next morning they listened to the radio. A report was given to Salisbury saying that an ambush had been laid and that the guerrillas had killed the commander and fifteen others. This was not true they had shot at themselves. </div><div align="justify" class="style9">The next morning enemy reconnaissance was sent to the area. The guerrillas decided to evade the helicopters by resting in nearby tall trees. The guerrillas ate and cleaned their guns. In the meanwhile they sent two scouts on reconnaissance. One scout spotted the Rhodesian Security Forces and crawled towards them. He heard them discussing the battle. The Rhodesians said: ‘If we can meet those people and they fight like they did yesterday…I'll run, you see'. <a href="http://home.intekom.com/southafricanhistoryonline/pages/sources/vandriel-thesis/chapter-three.htm#93"><span class="style2">93</span></a> </div><div class="style9">The Rhodesian soldiers spotted one of the MK guerrillas and a pitched battle followed lasting an hour and a half. The guerrillas lost two men. According to Morodi, they killed a number of Rhodesians as they were close to them. The dead apparently included a brigadier from South Africa, an expert in anti-guerrilla warfare. The brigadier had been sent straight from South Africa to Salisbury and then to the front. He died within a short while of arriving in Rhodesia. Morodi thought the guerrillas lucky as they were able to kill the commander and the radio people – seven all in all, whilst the guerrillas lost only two men. </div><div align="justify" class="style9">The group walked along a donga, crossed at a certain point and were given shelter for a few days at Sithole's shop at Kabayu. Southeast of the shop the group later concealed firearms and equipment. <a href="http://home.intekom.com/southafricanhistoryonline/pages/sources/vandriel-thesis/chapter-three.htm#94"><span class="style2">94</span></a> Hartley explained at April's trial what happened to this group which included Nkosi: </div><div align="justify" class="style9">The point of engagement (point A), a clearing in the bush. After which the guerrillas worked for about 11/2 miles along a donga, marked B. At a spot in the Donga Marked C, some of the guerrillas hid firearms and equipment which they had seized from Security Force members. </div><div align="justify" class="style9">A mile later they crossed the donga at point D. From point A to E is approximately 17 miles at point E they reached Sithole's shop at Gulakibile, where the group was given shelter for a few days. At point F, south east of Sithole's shop the guerrillas buried their firearms and equipment. At point G, a spot west of Sithole's store the guerrillas buried there automatic pistols and hand grenades. <a href="http://home.intekom.com/southafricanhistoryonline/pages/sources/vandriel-thesis/chapter-three.htm#95"><span class="style2">95</span></a> </div><div align="justify" class="style9">Nkosi and two others ‘deserted', as they wanted to move back to South Africa. It is not clear whether Nkosi understood what ‘desert' means in military terms and whether he and two others wished to make their way back to South Africa which was there destination. </div><div align="justify" class="style9">After this battle the guerrilla supplies were once again running low. Lack of water forced the group to once again send out men in search of a supply. This smaller group of five men included James April and the ANC commander. </div><div align="justify" class="style9">A week later, a captured guerrilla led security forces to a base where a surprise attack killed four guerrillas. The RRAF strafed the base with great success. <a href="http://home.intekom.com/southafricanhistoryonline/pages/sources/vandriel-thesis/chapter-three.htm#96"><span class="style2">96 </span></a></div><div align="justify" class="style9">A third ANC-ZAPU group making its way south, had a major clash at Tjolotjo township, which is about sixty miles from Bulawayo. It seems that fierce fighting took place on 31 August, and the South African forces were involved in the clashes. <span class="style2"><a href="http://home.intekom.com/southafricanhistoryonline/pages/sources/vandriel-thesis/chapter-three.htm#97">97</a></span> </div><div align="justify" class="style9">The group looking for water were unable to find any, and neither could they find their way back to the detachment that had been forced to move. This group of five decided to cross the border into Botswana where they buried their weapons. However, once inside Botswana the guerrillas saw the Botswana government paramilitary troops in the distance. The MK guerrillas after much discussion decided not to resist, nor to militarily engage the Botswana troops. They particularly noted that Botswana had recently gained its independence and was a member of the OAU. The MK guerrillas reasoned that the Botswana government was not the enemy of the people of South Africa. Hani explains that the Botswana paramilitary police initially pretended to be friendly but later manacled, arrested and ill-treated the guerrillas. The latter discovered that the Botswana and South African authorities were working hand in hand. <a href="http://home.intekom.com/southafricanhistoryonline/pages/sources/vandriel-thesis/chapter-three.htm#98"><span class="style2">98</span></a> </div><div align="justify" class="style9">The group denied having any arms. However, the police retraced their footsteps and found the buried cache. They were arrested and given food, after which they were transferred to Francistown. They were charged with bringing weapons of war into Botswana and with entering the country without a permit. </div><div align="justify" class="style9">Further fighting was reported a few days later some 25 miles to the west of Bulawayo. Maxey says that a subsequent trial, which took place in South Africa in 1969, gives much more detail of the both engagements. <span class="style2"><a href="http://home.intekom.com/southafricanhistoryonline/pages/sources/vandriel-thesis/chapter-three.htm#99">99</a> </span></div><div align="justify" class="style9">On 4 September 1967, another clash occurred and three guerrillas were killed, one security force member was killed and one injured. It is believed that nine ANC guerrillas involved in the fighting mentioned were arrested in Botswana. One died in Botswana of wounds received in Rhodesia. </div><div align="justify" class="style9">Enemy reinforcements were increasing in the area and the South African bound group now consisting of 34 men decided to retreat west, into Botswana. The guerrillas' purpose in retreating into Botswana was to refresh themselves, heal the injured, acquire food supplies and then proceed to South Africa. There was no intention of battling with the Botswana authorities. The Botswana police later arrested them and demanded that they hand over their weapons. </div><div align="justify" class="style9">The guerrillas were charged and sentenced for ‘bringing weapons of war into Botswana' and for ‘illegal entry'. The sentences received differed. Some of the guerrillas received two years, some three years and some others even six years. After appeals the sentences were reduced. <a href="http://home.intekom.com/southafricanhistoryonline/pages/sources/vandriel-thesis/chapter-three.htm#100"><span class="style2">100 </span></a></div><h1 class="style9">The OAU intervenes <a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6501586017974986851" id="oau" name="oau"></a></h1><div align="justify" class="style9">After serving approximately two years in the Botswana prison , the OAU intervened and the sentences were commuted. The guerrillas were released in December 1968 and they were flown to Lusaka, Zambia. In Lusaka a ‘journalist', who later turned out to be a senior CIA member interviewed Morodi about the Wankie campaign. Morodi told him it was not ANC-ZAPU policy to kill civilians. In fact during the course of their march the guerrillas had met a White man and a White woman in the bush, who should not have seen them. They did not harm them, as they were civilians. <a href="http://home.intekom.com/southafricanhistoryonline/pages/sources/vandriel-thesis/chapter-three.htm#101"><span class="style2">101</span></a> </div><hr noshade="noshade" /><div class="style9"><a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6501586017974986851" id="1" name="1"></a>B.C. Richmond, From Shantytown to forest, the story of Norman Duka (London, LSM Information Centre, 1974) p.71 </div><div class="style9"><a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6501586017974986851" id="2" name="2"></a>He was also known as Jackson Moloto </div><div align="justify" class="style9"><a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6501586017974986851" id="3" name="3"></a> Interview with James April (Cape town, September 1990). Varying figures have been given for the number of men in the joint ANC-ZAPU force. For example, D. Martin and P. Johnson, The struggle for Zimbabwe: The Chimurenga War (Johannesburg, Ravan Press, 1981) p.10 gives 70 as the number and M. Horrell, Survey of Race Relations (Johannesburg, SAIRR, 1967) p. 66 gives the number as 80 men. The latter is more accurate. </div><div class="style9"><a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6501586017974986851" id="4" name="4"></a>B.C. Richmond, From Shantytown to forest, the story of Norman Duka (London, LSM Information Centre, 1974) p.71 </div><div class="style9"><a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6501586017974986851" id="5" name="5"></a> Interview with James April (Cape Town, September 1990) </div><div class="style9"><a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6501586017974986851" id="6" name="6"></a> T. Nkobi, “Crossing the Zambezi”, <i>Dawn </i>, (Lusaka, ANC, Souvenir issue, 1986) </div><div class="style9"><a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6501586017974986851" id="7" name="7"></a> He was also known as George Driver. </div><div class="style9"><a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6501586017974986851" id="8" name="8"></a> He was also known as Paul Petersen. </div><div class="style9"><a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6501586017974986851" id="9" name="9"></a> N. Van Driel, <i>The journey to Wankie: The story of a ‘Coloured' MK soldier, </i>Unpublished History Honours essay, UWC, Bellville, 1991 </div><div class="style9"><a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6501586017974986851" id="10" name="10"></a> Even under interrogation some of the guerrillas did not disclose the correct date of the crossing. See Sitrep s.n.15. </div><div class="style9"><a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6501586017974986851" id="11" name="11"></a> See C. Hani, “The Wankie Campaign”, @ <a href="http://home.intekom.com/southafricanhistoryonline/pages/sources/vandriel-thesis/www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/mk/wankie/html" target="_blank">www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/mk/wankie/html</a>, p.1 </div><div class="style9"><a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6501586017974986851" id="12" name="12"></a> Wilson Zola was in this group. </div><div class="style9"><a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6501586017974986851" id="13" name="13"></a> See <i>Rhodesia Debriefs BGG 210/3/11/2 Vol.1. </i>p.7 Appendix 2 </div><div class="style9"><a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6501586017974986851" id="14" name="14"></a>B.C. Richmond, From Shantytown to forest, the story of Norman Duka (London, LSM Information Centre, 1974) p.71 </div><div class="style9"><a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6501586017974986851" id="15" name="15"></a> See page 80 more details. </div><div class="style9"><a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6501586017974986851" id="16" name="16"></a> B.C. Richmond, From Shantytown to forest, the story of Norman Duka (London, LSM Information Centre, 1974) p.71 </div><div class="style9"><a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6501586017974986851" id="17" name="17"></a> Ibid. </div><div class="style9"><a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6501586017974986851" id="18" name="18"></a> See C. Hani, “The Wankie Campaign”, @ <a href="http://home.intekom.com/southafricanhistoryonline/pages/sources/vandriel-thesis/www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/mk/wankie/html" target="_blank">www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/mk/wankie/html</a>, p.1 </div><div class="style9"><a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6501586017974986851" id="19" name="19"></a> H. Bernstein, The Rift: The exile experience of South Africans (London, Jonathan Cape, 1994) p.163 </div><div class="style9"><a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6501586017974986851" id="20" name="20"></a> H Barrell, MK: the ANC's armed struggle (London, Penguin books, 1990) p.21 </div><div class="style9"><a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6501586017974986851" id="21" name="21"></a> H. Bernstein, The Rift: The exile experience of South Africans (London, Jonathan Cape, 1994) p.163 p. 164 </div><div class="style9"><a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6501586017974986851" id="22" name="22"></a> H Barrell, MK: the ANC's armed struggle (London, Penguin books, 1990) p.20 </div><div class="style9"><a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6501586017974986851" id="23" name="23"></a>According to the evidence given by Leonard Nkosi at the trial of James April, the ANC/ZAPU group split into three and not two. There is no evidence to support his claim. The detachment split into two. See <i>The State vs James Edward April </i>, Supreme Court of South Africa, Natal Provincial Division Case No. 84/71 10 –15 May 1971 p.75 </div><div class="style9"><a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6501586017974986851" id="24" name="24"></a> Also known as Charlie Mjojo </div><div class="style9"><a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6501586017974986851" id="25" name="25"></a> See C. Hani, “The Wankie Campaign”, @ www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/mk/wankie/html, p.1 Basil February was actually not part of this group. He joined the Lupane-bound group. Interview James April (Cape Town, September 1990) </div><div class="style9"><a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6501586017974986851" id="26" name="26"></a> Motsepe later died in battle. See Comrade Rodgers, “Heroes of our revolution', in <i>Dawn </i>, (Lusaka, ANC, Souvenir issue, 1986) p.20 </div><div class="style9"><a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6501586017974986851" id="27" name="27"></a>H. Bernstein, The Rift: The exile experience of South Africans (London, Jonathan Cape, 1994) p.164 </div><div class="style9"><a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6501586017974986851" id="28" name="28"></a> K. Maxey, The fight for Zimbabwe (London, Rex Collings, 1975) p.30 He lists the specific number of aircraft, which was held by the Rhodesian Airforce. </div><div class="style9"><a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6501586017974986851" id="29" name="29"></a> Ibid. </div><div class="style9"><a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6501586017974986851" id="30" name="30"></a> Ibid. </div><div class="style9"><a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6501586017974986851" id="31" name="31"></a> Ibid. </div><div class="style9"><a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6501586017974986851" id="32" name="32"></a> Ibid.p.34 </div><div class="style9"><a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6501586017974986851" id="33" name="33"></a> J.K. Celliers, Counter-insurgency in Rhodesia , (London, Biddles Ltd, 1985) p.7 </div><div class="style9"><a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6501586017974986851" id="34" name="34"></a> Sitrep s.n. 6 </div><div class="style9"><a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6501586017974986851" id="35" name="35"></a> R. Shay, & C. Vermaak, The silent war (Rhodesia, Galaxie Press, 1971) p.50 According to the calendar of 1967, 10 August was a Thursday. </div><div class="style9"><a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6501586017974986851" id="36" name="36"></a> K. Maxey, The fight for Zimbabwe (London, Rex Collings, 1975) p. 64 </div><div class="style9"><a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6501586017974986851" id="37" name="37"></a> Ibid. The guerrilla who died at Figtree was Basil February. Maxey says the guerrilla was killed near Bulawayo. </div><div class="style9"><a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6501586017974986851" id="38" name="38"></a> See p.35 </div><div class="style9"><a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6501586017974986851" id="39" name="39"></a> See SITREP s.n. 40 </div><div class="style9"><a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6501586017974986851" id="40" name="40"></a> Comrade Rodgers, “The Battle of Nyatuwe”, <i>Dawn </i>, Souvenir issue (Lusaka, ANC, 1986) p.47. The Rhodesians called the place Inyatue. See <i>Rhodesia Debriefs BGG210/3/11/2 Vol.1 </i></div><div class="style9"><a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6501586017974986851" id="41" name="41"></a> Ibid.pp.47-48 </div><div align="justify" class="style8"><a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6501586017974986851" id="42" name="42"></a> <span class="style1">Ibid. p.47 </span></div><div align="justify" class="style9"><a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6501586017974986851" id="43" name="43"></a> Ibid. </div><div align="justify" class="style9"><a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6501586017974986851" id="44" name="44"></a> Ibid. </div><div align="justify" class="style9"><a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6501586017974986851" id="45" name="45"></a> Ibid. </div><div align="justify" class="style9"><a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6501586017974986851" id="46" name="46"></a> Ibid. p.48 </div><div align="justify" class="style9"><a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6501586017974986851" id="47" name="47"></a> Ibid. </div><div align="justify" class="style9"><a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6501586017974986851" id="48" name="48"></a> Ibid. See K. Maxey, The fight for Zimbabwe (London, Rex Collings, 1975) p.65 </div><div align="justify" class="style9"><a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6501586017974986851" id="49" name="49"></a> Ibid. </div><div align="justify" class="style9"><a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6501586017974986851" id="50" name="50"></a>The following was revealed when Lieutenant Pretorius, of the SA Army interviewed Lieutenant Scholtz of the South African Security Police. See Taakmag 4 GPI File INT/c/21/1 SWA (Feitlike Inligting) pp.14-16 </div><div align="justify" class="style9"><a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6501586017974986851" id="51" name="51"></a> These names are not spelt correctly but are reflected as such in the archival document listed immediately below. </div><div align="justify" class="style9"><a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6501586017974986851" id="52" name="52"></a> From <i>Taakmag 4 GPI File INT/c/21/1, SWA (Feitlike Inligting) </i></div><div align="justify" class="style9"><a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6501586017974986851" id="53" name="53"></a> Comrade Rodgers, “The Battle of Nyatuwe”, <i>Dawn </i>, Souvenir issue (Lusaka, ANC, 1986) p.48. He estimates the time of the next engagement to be seven or ten days after the Battle of Nyatuwe. Instead it was five days. During the march the guerrillas tended to lose track of time and sometimes became confused with the days of the week. </div><div align="justify" class="style9"><a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6501586017974986851" id="54" name="54"></a> Sitrep s.n.12 </div><div align="justify" class="style9"><a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6501586017974986851" id="55" name="55"></a> Comrade Rodgers, “The Battle of Nyatuwe”, <i>Dawn </i>, Souvenir issue (Lusaka, ANC, 1986) p.48 </div><div align="justify" class="style9"><a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6501586017974986851" id="56" name="56"></a> Sitrep s.n.12 </div><div align="justify" class="style9"><a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6501586017974986851" id="57" name="57"></a>From <i>Sechaba</i>, October 1967 @ www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/or/or67-6html </div><div align="justify" class="style9"><a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6501586017974986851" id="58" name="58"></a> Ibid. </div><div align="justify" class="style9"><a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6501586017974986851" id="59" name="59"></a> Interview with James April (Cape Town, September 1990) </div><div align="justify" class="style9"><a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6501586017974986851" id="60" name="60"></a> H. Bernstein, The Rift: The exile experience of South Africans (London, Jonathan Cape, 1994) p.163 </div><div align="justify" class="style9"><a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6501586017974986851" id="61" name="61"></a>B. C. Richmond, From Shantytown to forest, the story of Norman Duka (London, LSM Information Centre, 1974) p.71 </div><div align="justify" class="style9"><a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6501586017974986851" id="62" name="62"></a> H. Bernstein, The Rift: The exile experience of South Africans (London, Jonathan Cape, 1994) p.164 </div><div align="justify" class="style9"><a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6501586017974986851" id="63" name="63"></a>Ibid. pp.164-165 </div><div align="justify" class="style9"><a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6501586017974986851" id="64" name="64"></a>B.C. Richmond, From Shantytown to forest, the story of Norman Duka (London, LSM Information Centre, 1974) p.78 </div><div align="justify" class="style9"><a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6501586017974986851" id="65" name="65"></a> H. Bernstein, The Rift: The exile experience of South Africans (London, Jonathan Cape, 1994) pp.164-165. During the march the guerrillas tended to lose track of time and sometimes became confused with the days of the week. Although Morodi says these events occurred on a Sunday, it was a Tuesday. </div><div align="justify" class="style9"><a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6501586017974986851" id="66" name="66"></a> Ibid. </div><div align="justify" class="style9"><a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6501586017974986851" id="67" name="67"></a><i>The State vs James Edward April</i>, Supreme Court of South Africa, Natal Provincial Division Case No. 84/71 10 –15 May 1971, p.76 </div><div align="justify" class="style9"><a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6501586017974986851" id="68" name="68"></a> K. Maxey, The fight for Zimbabwe (London, Rex Collings, 1975) p. 65 </div><div align="justify" class="style9"><a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6501586017974986851" id="69" name="69"></a> See C. Hani, “The Wankie Campaign”, @ <a href="http://home.intekom.com/southafricanhistoryonline/pages/sources/vandriel-thesis/www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/mk/wankie/html" target="_blank">www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/mk/wankie/html</a>, pp.2-3 </div><div align="justify" class="style9"><a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6501586017974986851" id="70" name="70"></a> K. Maxey, The fight for Zimbabwe (London, Rex Collings, 1975) p.65 </div><div align="justify" class="style9"><a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6501586017974986851" id="71" name="71"></a> Ibid. See list of ANC members who died in exile at <a href="http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/deathlst.html">http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/deathlst.html </a></div><div align="justify" class="style9"><a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6501586017974986851" id="72" name="72"></a> H. Bernstein, The Rift: The exile experience of South Africans (London, Jonathan Cape, 1994) p.165 </div><div align="justify" class="style9"><a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6501586017974986851" id="73" name="73"></a> Ibid. </div><div align="justify" class="style9"><a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6501586017974986851" id="74" name="74"></a><i>The State vs James Edward April </i>, Supreme Court of South Africa, Natal Provincial Division Case No. 84/71 10 –15 May 1971 , p. 76 </div><div align="justify" class="style9"><a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6501586017974986851" id="75" name="75"></a> Ibid. p.100 </div><div align="justify" class="style9"><a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6501586017974986851" id="76" name="76"></a> C. Hani, “The Wankie Campaign”, @ <a href="http://home.intekom.com/southafricanhistoryonline/pages/sources/vandriel-thesis/www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/mk/wankie/html" target="_blank">www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/mk/wankie/html</a>, p.3 </div><div align="justify" class="style9"><a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6501586017974986851" id="77" name="77"></a><i>The State vs James Edward April </i>, Supreme Court of South Africa, Natal Provincial Division Case No. 84/71 10 –15 May 1971 , p. 76 </div><div align="justify" class="style9"><a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6501586017974986851" id="78" name="78"></a> H. Bernstein, The Rift: The exile experience of South Africans (London, Jonathan Cape, 1994) p.165 </div><div align="justify" class="style9"><a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6501586017974986851" id="79" name="79"></a> K. Maxey, The fight for Zimbabwe (London, Rex Collings, 1975) p.65 </div><div align="justify" class="style9"><a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6501586017974986851" id="80" name="80"></a><i>The State vs James Edward April</i>, Supreme Court of South Africa, Natal Provincial Division Case No. 84/71 10 –15 May 1971, p.94 </div><div align="justify" class="style9"><a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6501586017974986851" id="81" name="81"></a> K. Maxey, The fight for Zimbabwe (London, Rex Collings, 1975) p. 66 </div><div align="justify" class="style9"><a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6501586017974986851" id="82" name="82"></a><i>The State vs James Edward April</i>, Supreme Court of South Africa, Natal Provincial Division Case No. 84/71 10 –15 May 1971 , p77. Detective Section Officer N.S.F. Hartley of the BSAP gave details of location of two battles. pp. 94-101 </div><div align="justify" class="style9"><a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6501586017974986851" id="83" name="83"></a><i>The State vs James Edward April</i>, Supreme Court of South Africa, Natal Provincial Division Case No. 84/71 10 –15 May 1971 , p. 78. See Appendix 7 </div><div align="justify" class="style9"><a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6501586017974986851" id="84" name="84"></a> Ibid. Nkosi said the accused James April was also dressed in the Rhodesian camouflage uniform during the battle. </div><div align="justify" class="style9"><a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6501586017974986851" id="85" name="85"></a> C. Hani, “The Wankie Campaign”, @ <a href="http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/mk/wankie/html">www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/mk/wankie/html </a>, p.3 </div><div align="justify" class="style9"><a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6501586017974986851" id="86" name="86"></a><i>The State vs James Edward April </i>, Supreme Court of South Africa, Natal Provincial Division Case No. 84/71 10 –15 May 1971 , p.66 </div><div align="justify" class="style9"><a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6501586017974986851" id="87" name="87"></a> Ibid. p.92 </div><div align="justify" class="style9"><a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6501586017974986851" id="88" name="88"></a> Ibid. p.93 </div><div align="justify" class="style9"><a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6501586017974986851" id="89" name="89"></a> Ibid. </div><div align="justify" class="style9"><a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6501586017974986851" id="90" name="90"></a>Ibid. p.78 According to Nkosi, two guerrillas were killed in this skirmish and he saw two [dead] Non-Europeans on the side of the enemy. </div><div align="justify" class="style9"><a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6501586017974986851" id="91" name="91"></a> H. Bernstein, The Rift: The exile experience of South Africans (London, Jonathan Cape, 1994) p.165 </div><div align="justify" class="style9"><a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6501586017974986851" id="92" name="92"></a> Ibid. </div><div align="justify" class="style9"><a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6501586017974986851" id="93" name="93"></a> Ibid. p .166 </div><div align="justify" class="style9"><a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6501586017974986851" id="94" name="94"></a><i>The State vs James Edward April</i>, Supreme Court of South Africa, Natal Provincial Division Case No. 84/71 10 –15 May 1971, p.97 </div><div align="justify" class="style9"><a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6501586017974986851" id="95" name="95"></a> See Appendices 8 & 9 </div><div align="justify" class="style9"><a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6501586017974986851" id="96" name="96"></a> K. Maxey, The fight for Zimbabwe (London, Rex Collings, 1975) p.66 </div><div align="justify" class="style9"><a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6501586017974986851" id="97" name="97"></a> Sitrep s.n. 33 </div><div align="justify" class="style9"><a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6501586017974986851" id="98" name="98"></a> C. Hani, “The Wankie Campaign”, @ <a href="http://home.intekom.com/southafricanhistoryonline/pages/sources/vandriel-thesis/www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/mk/wankie/html" target="_blank">www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/mk/wankie/html</a>, p.4 </div><div align="justify" class="style9"><a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6501586017974986851" id="99" name="99"></a> Ibid. Maxey is referring to the trial of Daluxola Luthuli and 10 other accused, quoted Prisoners of Apartheid: a biographical list of political prisoners and banned persons in South Africa (London, IDAF with UN Centre against Apartheid, 1978) p.33 </div><div align="justify" class="style9"><a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6501586017974986851" id="100" name="100"></a> H. Bernstein, The Rift: The exile experience of South Africans (London, Jonathan Cape, 1994) p. 167 </div><div align="justify" class="style9"><a href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=6501586017974986851" id="101" name="101"></a> Ibid. </div><div align="right" class="style1"><span class="style2"><a class="style7" href="http://home.intekom.com/southafricanhistoryonline/pages/sources/vandriel-thesis/menu-index.htm"><<< Menu >>></a></span></div><div align="left"><br />
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