CHOPPERTECH

BLOOD THE INK FOR MY AUTOPSY

2011-07-28T06:28:00.001-07:00

BLOOD, THE INK FOR MY AUTOPSY

By Kudakwashe KANHUTU

The plan had been hatched by a very far sighted person. As the struggle for liberation intensified there was an urgent need for able bodied men to join the fight. This led to acceptance of hardened criminals and those who habitually traversed the borders of sanity, into the fighting ranks of ZANLA. The exigencies of recruiting for a war already underway did not allow the set up of a Criminal Records Bureau, to painstakingly vet all cadres joining the struggle. However, one commander in the Dare reChimurenga (the War Council for ZANLA), had anticipated this problem with extra-ordinary foresight and countered it with equal cunning.

For the uninitiated I am taking you back to the colonial period in the Southern African country formerly called Rhodesia, specifically between 1972 and 1980. This is the time when the black nationalists’ demand for a release from the yoke of white minority oppression reached its apex. The main form of the demand was an armed struggle called Chimurenga II, which saw black people leave their country for training in neighbouring Mozambique and Zambia then return to talk to the white oppressor in terms which were unequivocal. The two main fighting groups were ZANLA, which was dominated by the Shona tribe, and ZIPRA which was smaller owing to it being composed of the minority Ndebele tribe. We were fighting a war of liberating the whole black population from the indignity of being disenfranchised in our own land by foreigners. The leader of the white minority was that rabid racist, Ian Smith.

I insist that the greatest compliment I ever received as a combatant in this war came from our sworn enemy, Ian Smith, in briefing his regular JOC meetings, he is said to have uttered that “Mabhunu’s fighting force shortens our projection for a thousand year rule”. I had adopted the nom de guerre Mabhunu Muchaendepi and the grudging respect of my enemy was not so much a source of pride, but confirmation that our methods were effective.

I must say I was initially averse to what I perceived as a waste of scarce resources when I was informed I would be part of a unit, charged with terminating comrades on the battlefield who were compromising the war by being cruel to the black population we were fighting to free. It was a terrible anti climax, hearing that my engagement with the white enemy would only be coincidental. I found it hard to believe I had shared caves with pythons, walked barefoot across game parks in the middle of the night to reach Mozambique, tottering, on legs swollen to twice their size, to fight, not the enemy; but my own fellow combatants.

It felt like a betrayal of the spirit of Liberation, a betrayal of the nation of Zimbabwe, but any qualms I had were laid to complete rest once we began our training. Basic training was administered to all who arrived at Chimoio, this involved political education, weapons and physical training. Our commanders then assigned us to different fields we would man, based on their assessment and judgement of our abilities, an essential division of labour for any effective fighting force.

It was in training I came into contact for the first time with the criminals who were to be my comrades in liberating Zimbabwe. I remember the vacant look in the eyes of some of these cadres, the inordinate eagerness to get weapons and return to the theatre of war. If I were to say today that I knew instinctively that these people were sadistic, any decent magistrate would throw me in jail owing to the paradigm shift since, but in a time of war, this instinct was indispensable and invaluable an attribute.

Vindication for that instinct would come of course from a reading of the brutal massacre of black civilians between Chipinge and Wedza which took place in such a short time after our pass out from Chimoio. It evoked despondency to watch on the news while we were at advanced training in Libya, the hacked off legs, burnt corpses, pregnant women stabbed by bayonets lying lifeless in row after row, murdered by their supposed liberators.

Ian Smith’s government of course to win the battle of hearts and minds allowed reporters from all over the world to have a field day when such massacres occurred. Extreme double standards because when the Rhodesian Army, frustrated by how cunning the genuine liberators were, massacred civilians in the hundreds, reporters would be banned from these areas. I would also venture that the reason Ian Smith began to doubt his government’s resolution for a thousand year white domination of the majority blacks was – has to be – the existence of a unit in ZANLA charged with protecting civilians from wayward liberators. Was this not a clear example of the advanced political acumen he was telling the world blacks inherently lack? Furthermore the atrocities visited on civilians by Smith’s army went unpunished even when it was so obvious and undeniable.

To be able to shed light on why my autopsy is being written in this sort of ink, let me posit that my death is imminent as I have chosen to let out the most closely guarded secret of Chimurenga II. The secret is that the black liberation fighters lost the war; we lost the war the day when Comrade Josiah Magama Tongogara died. The Kaguvi Sector, my unit in the armed struggle and a brain child of Comrade Tongogara, evolved to become an army within an army, fighting a war within a war. The Sector developed its own ethos which bordered on a preference to actually lose the war than gain leverage by terrorising civilians. Unfortunately this sentiment was not shared across the board, even in Dare reChimurenga Comrade Tongogara was an isolated figure as the other members were proponents of the scorched earth policy. It is a fact that some people in high positions of government today actually instructed the other guerrillas to be ruthless against the black population, summary executions were endorsed, cruel and unusual punishments shamelessly promoted, an all is fair in war doctrine.

Of the Kaguvi Sector numbering 85 at the end of the armed struggle, I am the only one left. 30 of my comrades were detained in Chimoio during the Lancaster House talks and were massacred on the same day that Comrade Tongogara died in a bizarre accident. 20 more comrades did not make it alive from Dzapasi Assembly Point. Over the years the other 34 remaining combatants of the Kaguvi Sector have met ignominious ends over the course of their lives in independent Zimbabwe, in very suspicious circumstances, so it is left to me to honour the memory of the foremost liberation unit by letting the truth be known instead of the myth that has been perpetuated that we won the war of liberation.

Do not waste your pity on me, better people have already died; Comrades Mandebvu, Elliot Hondo, Comrade Mabhunu Muchapera, Hokoyo, Zvaipa, Tafataona, Dragon, Tichafa…

HERBET CHITEPO ASASSINATION INFO

2011-07-28T06:26:00.000-07:00

author/source:Zimbabwe Standard
published:Sun 30-Sep-2001
posted on this site:Mon 1-Oct-2001

Article Type : News

Josiah Tongogara, Rugare Gumbo, Henry Hamadziripi, Kumbirai Kangai, Mukudzei Mudzi named in 1975 report into Chitepo's murder

Staff Writer

Top Zanu commanders from the Dare Rechimurenga and the Zanla High Command killed former Zanu chairman, Herbert Chitepo, in Zambia in 1975, a special report by a Zambian commission into the late leader's mysterious death reveals. This is the first time that the report has been made public since the lawyer-cum-politician's assasination 26 years ago. Chitepo died when a car bomb planted under the driver's seat in his VW Beetle detonated as he was trying to reverse the car from the garage at his Zambian house. The Standard this week reveals for the first time the contents of the report. The report puts paid to claims from within Mr Mugabe's party that Chitepo had been killed by agents of the Ian Smith regime. The late chairman's widow, Victoria Chitepo, is on record as saying it was common knowledge that the leader was killed by fellow party members.

The Report of the Special International Commission on the Assassination of Herbert Wiltshire Chitepo, which was commissioned by former Zambian president, Kenneth Kaunda, in Lusaka, 1976, cites the late Zanla commander, Josiah Tongogara; current deputy minister of home affairs, Rugare Gumbo, who was secretary for information and publicity; Henry Hamadziripi, secretary for finance; Kumbirai Kangai, secretary for public and social welfare; and Mukudzei Mudzi, secretary for administration as the people responsible for assassinating the Dare chairman, Chitepo.

The report said the late chairman was a victim of a tribal power struggle within the party. Said the report, in the possession of The Standard: "The members of Dare and the High Command decided on March 1975 to kill Chitepo for reasons already stated. On that day, Dauramanzi and Mpunzarima were sent to collect a bomb from Rex Nhongo. They returned on Monday 17 March when Chimurenga handed the bomb to Sadat Kufamazuba for safe keeping until midnight when Chimurenga, Rudo, Short and Sadat planted the bomb on the driver's seat of Chitepo's car. The four men were acting under the directions of Tongogara. On the same night, Tongogara sent Robson Manyika to Chitepo's house to go and check whether Chimurenga, Rudo and Short had carried out the mission. Manyika said he did all this and reported back to Tongogara. This account is consistent with the corroborative evidence of the members of Dare and the High Command before the Commission and with their demeanour when they appeared before us."

The report continues: "The members of Dare and the High Command could all therefore be indicated as principals to the murder of Chitepo because jointly and severally they actively desired to bring this about and did in fact bring it about. Although only one individual may have completed the final act to consummate the crime and though some may not have been present as in the case of Hamadziripi and Chigowe, who claim to have been in Malawi at the material time, they could all be charged for Chitepo's murder."

The report says members of the High Command who gave evidence admitted that on hearing rumours some of them were to be arrested, scattered and ran away from Zambia instead of being eager to assist Zambian Police. "So the whole evidence both circumstantial, as well as direct with regard to the Chitepo assassination, points inevitably and clearly to his colleagues in the Dare and the High Command, especially Tongogara, Chigowe, Mudzi, Gumbo, Kangai and Hamadziripi," says the report.

The commission was chaired by Reuben Chitandika Kamanga and Mathias Mainza Chona, both Zambians, representatives of African countries from Botswana, Congo, Ivory Coast, Libya, Malagasy, Morocco, Mozambique, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Tanzania and Zaire. Its terms of reference was to inquire into the events and circumstances leading to death of Chitepo on 18 March 1975. It was to investigate and establish "whether any racists or imperialists agents, or any racists or counter-revolutionaries or saboteurs were directly responsible for the said death." It was to investigate and establish the identity and the motive of the person or persons responsible for the said death. The commission was tasked to: "Make recommendations with regard to the measures or any additional measures that ought to be taken for the security of persons engaged in any political activities aimed at the attainment of freedom and independence of the people of Zimbabwe and any other country in Africa still under colonial or minority rule."

Said Kaunda on Zambian national radio on 31 March 1975: "We are shocked. We are still grieved and angered. We remain bitter against the murderous act, bitter against the murderers - the enemies of Zambia and Africa. Many Zambians are, to say the least, very dismayed and justifiably irritated by statements made by some Zimbabwe nationals, some, even nationalist leaders, have shown no concern whatsoever for the assassination of Mr Chitepo. To them, Mr Chitepo has been assassinated and that must be the end. Instead of calling upon the party and government to track down the killers of this gallant fighter, they are either completely silent, while others virtually demand that we stop the investigation altogether and thereby shelter the assassins."

Twenty-fours years later, Kaunda was still bitter as he told The Standard in 1999 when he came to visit the grave of the late vice president, Joshua Nkomo: "Chitepo was a committed leader. And some day we will talk about how he died. It is one blot in the history, a sad reflection of the whole liberation of this region. Some of the Zanla leadership left Zambia soon after the burial. I didn't expect them to leave immediately...this was their death. It was our death too, and it required all of us to work together on it," said Kaunda.

At the Review Conference of September 1973, the following were elected to the Dare: Herbert Chitepo - chairman (Manyika); Mukudzei Mudzi - administrative secretary (Karanga); Noel Mukono - secretary for external affairs (Manyika); Kumbirai Kangai - secretary for labour, social services and welfare (Karanga); Rugare Gumbo - secretary for information and publicity (Karanga); John Mataure -political commissar (Manyika); Henry Hamadziripi - secretary for finance (Karanga); Josiah Tongogara - chief of defence (Karanga). Apart from being an astute politician, Chitepo made history by becoming the first black advocate in southern Africa.

EXCLUSIVE - The Standard will, from next week, serialise the Report of the Special International Commission on the Assassination of Herbert Wiltshire Chitepo which was commissioned by former Zambian president, Kenneth Kaunda. The report is the most authoritative account into events surrounding the cold-blooded murder of the former nationalist leader. Standard editor, Mark Chavunduka, said yesterday that not a single sentence of the entire report will be edited out.

FIRST COPY OF CHOPPERTECH PRINTED

2011-04-09T02:06:00.000-07:00

Well there it is the first copy of Choppertech... get your orders in as it is a limited print

Wonder how many stones the book will upturn?

ANC ZIPRA BATTLE AGAINST RHODESIANS IN WANKIE AREA

2011-03-12T00:55:00.000-08:00

The Wankie and Sipolilo campaigns of 1967-8 had a significant impact internationally and within the country, demonstrating to the people of South Africa that the ANC's armed struggle was very much alive, writes Sandile Sijake, an ex-cadre of Umkhonto Wesizwe.

When the ANC and the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) agreed on close cooperation in relation to guerrilla operations, it was understood that the activity was taking the existing solidarity a step further. The relationship between the peoples of South Africa and those of Zimbabwe had from then onwards to be tempered in the fires of the common experiences in the struggle for social, economic, political and cultural emancipation.

In the ANC there had been a long period of unplanned attempts at infiltration of Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) members back to South Africa. These attempts were mainly focused on finding a route through Botswana. To facilitate the crossing we established a bone milling facility in one of the farms outside Livingstone. The facility worked very well for some time.
However the process of infiltration involved very small groups of one or two at a time. The rate of arrests and interception by the Botswana Paramilitary Police led some of us to suspect that there was a serious leak of information. The second concern was that whatever weapons the cadres carried along ended up in Botswana and there was no way that these could be recovered.
A number of frank discussions were held, mainly with then ANC President OR Tambo. In his absence these meetings would be chaired by Moses Kotane. Moses Mabhida and JB Marks were charged with finding routes other than Botswana. They set up a number of networks that became promising, and were operational.
There was an apparent tendency that some individual leaders placed more emphasise on commercial interests than the struggle for social, economic and political emancipation. These interests manifested themselves in the fact that these leaders set up factories and operated commercial farms mainly in Zambia. Bitter arguments also related to the fact that cadres sent to South Africa were given a mere five pounds to see them through operations, food, transportation and accommodation, to give but a few requirements of any political-military operation.
Members of MK appealed to the leadership that they be part of the planning of routes home. The joint operations with ZAPU's armed wing, the Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA), evolved out of this process. We agreed to have a combined venture with the specific understanding that we were to be on our way to South Africa. This took place after MK tried to have similar arrangements with FRELIMO in 1966. This could have been feasible given that at that stage FRELIMO was still operating up to Tete Province north of the Zambezi River.

The operations
Once the political strategic levels accepted the rationale of undertaking a form of combined operations, a number of corresponding structures had to be put in place to ensure implementation of the agreement.

Sijake has a high regard of Dabengwa as a great soldier. A Kenyan newspaper once described Dabengwa as the most trained soldier in the entire African continent.
A joint intelligence-cum-reconnaissance structure was established with Eric Manzi (MK) and Dumiso Dabengwa (ZIPRA) as respective leaders. There was also set up a Joint Headquarters (JHQ) consisting of the Overall Commanders, Commissars, Chiefs of Staff, Chiefs of Operations, Chiefs of Logistics and Supplies and a limited involvement of medical officers.
Each of these components of the JHQ had its particular teething problems, some of which it was possible to address, others were to be placed in abeyance, while some had to be wished away. In reconnaissance these challenges led to a form of ad hoc and autonomous activity. All the moves and steps taken were to be balanced to ensure all parties were happy with the process. When the structure of the detachment was assembled each level of authority had to be given serious consideration. It was finally agreed that John Dube of ZIPRA be the detachment commander and Chris Hani the detachment commissar.

In August 1967 a combined force of MK and ZIPRA freedom fighters were seen off across the Zambezi River by Tambo. The force numbered about 96 men with no maps, and limited dependence on ZIPRA cadres who, although Zimbabweans, had no better clue about that part of their country. The detachment had to rely on compasses for a general direction of march.

When this detachment was to cross into then Rhodesia there were two clear directives. The ZIPRA comrades were to establish themselves in their country as a guerrilla force. The ANC cadres were to head to South Africa and without any particular intention that they should engage the enemy inside Rhodesia except when necessary and as means of self-defence.
Inside Rhodesia the detachment was going to split into two main groups and a third part was going to be a group of two cadres using a train. One company was to head east towards the Matopo Hills, Paul Petersen and two other comrades were to go to the nearest railway station and take a train towards the midlands, and the main body was to move on the western part heading south.
The MK contingent intended to use Rhodesia as a passage home and not to conduct any operations in that country. No one among us knew that the first clashes with the enemy would take place in the vicinity of Wankie.
The members of this first detachment had to learn on their feet as they could not avoid blunders associated with undertaking such an operation without sufficient means and equipment. The situation was tense. On crossing the Zambezi river the detachment set up its own reconnaissance section. Some of the functions of reconnaissance were to move forward and backwards finding the routes to follow, water points, food, and information on the activities of the enemy.
The going was never smooth. On certain occasions arguments would be sparked by the issue of who must lead the detachment to the point identified by reconnaissance. Most times the ZIPRA cadres in reconnaissance would insist that they wanted to lead. Every time one of them had been given the opportunity to lead, the detachment would end up going astray and never linking up with that small contingent of reconnaissance left ahead to secure a new temporary base.
On the second day inside Rhodesia, the detachment ran out of food, bullets were in short supply and most, if not all, the MK members had about five pounds and not much water. There was no information about the quantities of rations each was going to get until they were on the banks of the Zambezi River and ready to cross.
The detachment reached the first village on the second day. The small community there gave valuable information to the guerrillas. They indicated that the previous day some soldiers came to their village and said they were looking for guerrillas. They could not remember the number of trucks or soldiers. The leader in that community was a ZAPU supporter and told the detachment that the soldiers did patrols during the day and at night; and their camp was on the other side of the next village. This man was willing to go to a shop owner at the next village and arrange for the purchase of food. The community gave some food to the reconnaissance group for the rest of the detachment.
The reconnaissance group discovered that the shop owner at the second village was also a ZAPU supporter. He gave valuable information about the enemy activities. He told them that all the passable routes converged near the soldiers' camp. After leaving his place the reconnaissance group established that there was a small enemy contingent at that camp. They were seated next to a fire and now and then one of them would go and look along the road intersection and return to the fire. The detachment decided to walk past the camp as they believed they would easily overwhelm the enemy. On seeing the detachment the soldiers ran away, abandoning the camp.
The detachment marched the whole night before deciding to have a long rest. After some rest we noticed that one member from Charlie Company was missing. We searched for him and after about two hours the search was called off and the detachment moved on.

On about day six, the detachment ran out of the food they had bought from the village shop. However, they arrived at a game reserve on the Shashi River valley where they shot a zebra for a meal and provisions. They had some water after having dug in the sand for about one and half metres.
Company B was now to move east in the general direction of Matopo Hills. Their immediate task was to see Paul Petersen to a train station at Dede. They parted with the rest of the detachment that now numbered about eighty guerrillas, heading in the general direction of Wankie.
Early the following day, radio news reports on some battles involving Company B started to filter through to the rest of the detachment. It was reported that one of the battles took more than six hours until the comrades ran out of ammunition. Some were arrested and many died there. Putting the pieces of information together, it appears that when Company B were at Dede station one of them was seen drinking water at a public tap. The enemy got an alert signal and the upshot was that the company was followed until the point of battle.
Similarly, Paul Petersen was followed as he travelled by train. He travelled over Tsholotsho area towards Plumtree. He apparently realised that he was being followed and got off the train, using a sub-machine gun he cleared the first road block he encountered. From that roadblock he took a motorbike and carried on southwards towards Plumtree. Riding on along the road, he found himself at an even bigger roadblock than the previous one. He opened fire, fighting his way and finally fell there.

On hearing the news of the fighting, the main body of the detachment decided to keep our radio sets on continuously, listening to the news. We moved more in the open with an aim of attracting the enemy, in the hope that they would not concentrate on Company B alone.
In the early morning of the ninth day while comrades Wilie, Modulo and Christopher Mampuru were conducting reconnaissance they spotted a large herd of animals. They followed the animals at a distance of about 200m. This led them to a big pond ahead. They were now cautious and had to consult with the rest of the detachment before shooting any of the animals. Wilie left Modulo and Christopher who decided to remain watching the animals while he went back to consult. They were not going to meet again.
Before Wilie could give any report to the detachment two spotter planes began circling the area of the pond. The detachment took up positions in battle formation as the enemy patrols in the air intensified and ground forces appeared in trucks from the direction we came. The enemy trucks passed the positions of the main body and headed for the direction of the pond. After a few moments gun fire sounded in that direction, apparently Christopher and Modulo engaged the enemy.
The following day, while the detachment was having a rest, it was hurled into action by the sound of an exploding hand grenade. The grenade exploded at the position occupied by members of a section consisting of comrades Berry, Baloi, Manchecker, Sparks and Mhlongo. Baloi and Berry died on the spot. Sparks got a bullet through the abdomen and Mhlongo was critically wounded. The enemy was busy shouting: "surrender there is nothing you are going to do".
The detachment engaged the enemy. Their remnants fled from the battlefield leaving behind their dead, maps, supplies and radios. There was one casualty on our side, Charles Sishuba. The members of the detachment got food supplies, fresh clothing, watches and water bottles and used the radios to mislead the enemy. From the maps members of the detachment were able to know about the plans of the enemy and routes they were using.
The disinformation attempts by the detachment proved to be effective, as the enemy acted on the information they received. They ended up one evening shooting at each other near a water pond. After that incident they changed their radio wave band.

The detachment reached the area of Manzamnyama, and they had a brief encounter with some members of the Rhodesian Rifles, who were predominantly black soldiers. After Manzamnyama the detachment was supposed to veer away from the Wankie Game Reserve. The terrain in the intended direction was sparse and any movement would be easily detected. The enemy was still pursuing the detachment.

During the day, while the detachment rested, the silence was broken by the sound of Halifax bombers pounding the bush area about a kilometre away from the isolated trees where the detachment rested. The bombings started a yellowish fire, characteristic of napalm bombs. After the bombers, the ground forces arrived in their trucks and started to conduct a mop-up operation.
Late the following evening the detachment fought its last major battle with a combined force of South African and Rhodesian soldiers. The enemy was routed and the detachment's casualties include comrades Donda and Jackson Simelane.
The detachment proceeded in the general direction of Plumtree. As they moved they did not realise they had strayed into Botswana. They were arrested by Botswana paramilitary police in small groups as they came across them.
The arrest of the last group more or less ended the Wankie part of the campaign and triggered the Sipolilo phase.
Sipolilo
The JHQ undertook a general review of the Wankie battles and as the news reached Lusaka through Rhodesian citizens working in Zambia and other numerous sources, the main talk in both the ANC and ZAPU circles was that of sending reinforcements. This remained in the heads of the members of the JHQ after the fighting had died out and all survivors had been arrested. The second phase was to follow a different belief and thinking.
The plan for the second phase was based on the assumption that it was important to have a sustainable base inside Rhodesia before starting operations in South Africa.
The second detachment crossed to Sipolilo between October 1967 and January 1968. At the end of December 1967 there were over 150 guerrillas in the bushes of the eastern part of Rhodesia. The number fluctuated as more people joined and a few returned to Zambia.
The second detachment was instructed to establish guerrilla bases inside Rhodesia. They were to identify a place to set up an internal headquarters with all the necessary components, as well as alternative bases in case of need. Timeous communications with Morogoro and Lusaka (linking to ANC HQ) was going to be maintained by means of a long range multi-functional radio acquired from Germany. The radio was to be powered by means of a generator. The fuel for the generator was to be acquired from Zambia and stores were to be established by the detachment itself.
The detachment was expected to establish a number of arms caches, assisted by a supply group assembled for the purpose. The weapons, rations and uniform replenishment were supplied from Lusaka. Some of the reasons behind supplying the detachment with food and clothing was to ensure that they did not get involved in extensive hunting as that would attract the enemy.
The JHQ in Lusaka left all the main decisions to the command structure of the detachment. Teams visited the front from Lusaka and Tanzania, taking photographs to show that we had a presence behind the enemy lines. At the same time enemy activities started to grow in the general vicinity of the game reserve.
Early one morning in April 1968 the main bases that had been established in the area were the target of intensive bombing. The enemy ground forces followed the bombing. The enemy had learnt from the previous operations the importance of combining air and ground firepower. This attack triggered the clashes that were to last for more than a week, as pockets of the detachment fought in different directions, with the main force fighting towards Salisbury.
A number of comrades died in the battles that ensued, some were arrested and a few ended up in South Africa. There were then two routes to South Africa; some comrades found their way home and finally got arrested, while others were brought home through an agreement between Rhodesian and South African officials.
April 1968 was the climax of what has come to be known as the Wankie campaigns. The significance of these campaigns internationally is that they led to countries like the USA reshaping their policies on Southern Africa. Internally, the South African regime formulated the notorious Terrorism Act. The masses of our people became aware that the ANC was very much alive and still the main political vehicle for social, economic, political and cultural emancipation. Pan African Newswire

SANDILE SIJAKE was a member of the Luthuli Detachment of Umkhonto we Sizwe.

DOCUMENTARY CHOPPERTECH AND POLL?

2011-03-10T22:32:00.000-08:00

I NEED SOME COMMENTS ON THIS PLEASE-Would Choppertech make a good movie documentary say for History or Discovery Channel?
ALSO WHY ARE YOU INTERESTED IN THIS SUBJECT ?
Email me at shawzie@hotmail.com

CHOPPERTECH LIFE LESSONS

2011-03-10T22:19:00.000-08:00

Everything I Ever Needed To Know About Life, I Learned As a Helicopter Tech on Seven Squadron.

Reliving my pre-loss of innocence youth. I found this a long time back, and added a bunch of penciled notes. Cleaned it up a while ago, and just found it again while clearing files. Sending to a few who might understand.

A lot of this is inside stuff.

1. Helicopters are cool!
2. A wallet in your trouser pocket can be a real pain in the arse.
3. Decisions made by someone over your head will seldom be in your best interest.
4. Once you are in the fight, it is way too late to wonder if this is a good idea.
5. There is no such thing as a small contact.
6. A frozen area has nothing to do with economics.
7. Happiness is a belt-fed weapon especially if it is 20mm.
8. NEVER get into a fight without more ammunition than the other guy.
9. When you shoot your gun, clean it the first chance you get.
10.White phos can make a dull day fun.
11. The terms "Protective Armor" and "Helicopter" are mutually exclusive.
12. "Chicken Plates" are not something you order in a restaurant.
13. If you are wearing a flak jacket, the incoming will probably miss that part.
14. Dying can hurt a lot. So can Living.
15. It hurts less to die with a uniform on than to die in a hospital bed.
16. A sucking chest wound may be God's way of telling you it's time to go home.
17. Prayer may not help . . . but it can't hurt.
18. Flying is better than walking. Walking is better than running.
Running is better than crawling. All of these however, are better than extraction by a Cas-Evac, even if this is technically a form of flying.
19. It is a fact that helicopter tail rotors are instinctively drawn toward trees, stumps, rocks, etc. While it may be possible to ward off this natural event some of the time, it cannot, despite the best efforts of the crew, always be prevented. It's just what they do.
20. The engine RPM, and the rotor RPM, must BOTH be kept in the GREEN. Failure to heed this commandment can affect the morale of the crew.
21. If everything is as clear as a bell, and everything is going exactly as planned, you're about to be surprised.
22. Loud sudden noises in a helicopter WILL get your undivided attention.
23. The BSR (Bang Stare Read) Theory states that the louder the sudden bang in the helicopter, the quicker your eyes will be drawn to the gauges.
24. The longer you stare at the gauges, the less time it takes them to move from green to red.
25. If something hasn't broken on your helicopter, it's about to.
26. The farther you fly into the mountains, the louder the strange noises become.
27. Running out of pedal, fore or aft cyclic, or collective are all bad ideas. Any combination of these can be deadly.
28. It is a bad thing to run out of airspeed, altitude, and ideas all at the same time.
29. Gravity: It may not be fair, but it is the law.
30.Landing in Buffalo Beans is not a good idea.
31. Eat when you can. Sleep when you can. Visit the loo when you can.
The next opportunity may not come around for a long time. If ever.
32. Combat pay is a flawed concept.
33. Medals are OK, but having your body in one piece at the end of the day is better.
34. Thousands of Rhodesians earned medals for bravery every day. A few were even awarded.
35. Hot FAF food is better than hot rat packs, which, in turn is better than cold rat packs, which is better than no food at all. All of these, however, are preferable to cold Sadza (given to you by the RAR) even if they do have the little pieces of fish in them.
36. Always make sure someone has a 9 mm Star.
37. Girlfriends are fair game. Wives are not.
38. Everybody's a hero on the ground in the pub after the fourth drink.
39. Do not fear the enemy, for your enemy can only take your life. It is far better that you fear the media, for they will steal your HONOUR.
40 Pilots always ask you to keep your eyes open?

ZIPRA CAMPS REVISITED

2011-03-09T03:59:00.000-08:00

Extracted from new zim situation.com

In Bulawayo A group of ZIPRA liberation war veterans has toured Mkushi war-time guerilla Camp in Zambia, to pay homage to more than 420 of their colleagues killed by a Rhodesian bombardment on the Camp on October 19, 1978. On arrival following a two-day Zambian expedition, the Mkhushi camp survivors broke into war-time ZIPRA revolutionary songs. They toyi-toyed, they chanted ZAPU slogans, there were also prayers and choruses – in all languages – reverberated through the dense forests, and should have awaken the spirits of the dead cadres sleeping in the mass graves and defence pits. The atmosphere was really somber. Even the crocodiles in Mkushi River should have noticed that this was a different day. Two buses full of ex-fighters who survived the bombing endured a two-day journey from Zimbabwe to Mkushi. The trip was the veterans’ own initiative and was funded from their own pockets, with assistance from some well-wishers. Mafela Trust, an organization that researches and documents the political and military activities of ZIPRA during the liberation war, sent some of their officers on the trip to assist with records and other information. "Mafela" was the liberation war name of the last ZIPRA commander Lookout Masuku (late). The Trust was registered in 1992 and hasMade remarkable progress in researching and recording the role of ZIPRA during the war of liberation. Mkushi camp was exclusively for female ZIPRA cadres. Female guerillas administered and commanded the camp. Mafela Trust national coordinator, Nkomo ... Latest News and Pictures">Zephaniah Nkomo said the trip was successful from the point of view that it enabled the ex-guerillas to fulfill their long-standing desire of going back to the camp to pay homage to their departed colleagues. He said while the ex-fighters appreciated efforts by the Department Of Museums And National Monuments in looking after the place, they felt more could be done to improve the shrine. Mafela Trust urges the department to also erect sites at ZIPRA camps in Tanzania, Botswana ... Latest News and Pictures">Angola And Botswana where hundreds of other freedom fighters were killed in bombings by the Rhodesian Regime during the struggle. "We appreciate the efforts of the department of museums to construct shrines in Zambia and Mozambique, Mafela Trust feels the exercise must move to erect similar shrines at camps in Tanzania and Angola," Nkomo said. He added that there was also need to recognize Botswana’s role in facilitating the struggle through their invaluable support with transit camps, Food and other utilities. Mkushi camp was raided by the Rhodesian forces on the 19th October 1978, killing hundreds of trainees and trained cadres, leaving hundreds others injured. The raid was supported by helicopter gun ships, paratroopers and ground laid ambush enemy forces. The camp, located 130 km from Kabwe Mining Town North East in the savanna grassland along Mkushi river banks became a potential target in the height of the liberation war targeting ZIPRA Camps in Zambia. Those who survived the raid continue to Live with memories of the traumatic experience, 31 years after the incident. It is this sad memory that Made the survivors to undertake the historic memorial visit to Mkushi. Survivors of the Mkushi raid, Mrs. Gift A.Basutu and Mrs. Sebenzile A. Mazinyane among others, initiated the trip and mobilized others for the tour. Mafela Trust, an organization that documents Zapu and Zipra history, was brought in at the final stages of the trip, and assisted with some logistics. The National Museums and Monuments of Zimbabwe, the custodian of all shrines, and the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation were taken on board. Report compiled by Zephaniah Nkomo Despite challenges with resources, transport, fuel and immigration issues, the trip succeeded. Two buses left Bulawayo and picked up other cadres in Gweru and Harare. The traveling party arrived on the 17th and put up for the night at the Zimbabwean Embassy in Lusaka, before proceeding to Kabwe. Zambian authorities provided police escort and security to the entourage to Mkushi Camp. We arrived at Mkushi Camp at 7 pm on the 18th of October 2009. On arrival, survivors marched to the fenced shrine gate in solemn files. War cries, songs, and traditional salutes were performed as a way of announcing arrival at the shrine. More war songs, church songs, toyi-toyi, slogans, prayers and choruses – in all languages – reverberated through the dense forests, and should have awaken the spirits of the dead cadres sleeping in the mass graves and defence pits. The atmosphere was really somber. Even the crocodiles in Mkushi River should have noticed that this was a different day. As it was getting dark, candles were lit amid ritual dances, heroes’ praises, poetry and sobs by some of us as we remembered our colleagues who Lost their lives at Mkushi. It was time for the survivors of the last Mkushi ZIPRA last detachment to give their personal experiences of the attack. Their tales were harrowing. Joshua Tsharu, a local Mkushi community resident told the touring party how he and fellow residents participated in the collection of skeletons and scattered bones of the bombing victims after Zimbabwe museums authorities promised that they would be paid for their efforts. Tsharu said that a Zimbabwean delegation that visited the camp 2002 identified him and other community leaders to search and collect human skulls in the Mkushi surroundings. For every skull they found, they would be paid 50 thousand kwacha, they were made to believe. He said he collected five skulls from Camp B. His wife collected three skulls and another four along Mkushi river. Three 50kgs bag full of loose bones were collected. The Mkushi residents called off the search after no payment came from the Zimbabwean authorities. An emotional Mr Tsharu said he was bitter over the issue, and complained that no cleansing ceremony had been done, in line with tradition. In addition, the Mkushi community was further promised that a clinic and a school would be built as a thank you gesture for their support and suffering during Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle. This also has not been fulfilled. On the following day (19 October) a prayer and singing of the national anthem opened the day. The tour proceeded to inspect the grave sites, identification of memorial features at the Mkushi river banks, the old clinic site, kitchen, and defense pits. The tour revealed that bones and skeletons were still scattered in the defense pits and had not been removed for a decent burial. Mr Tsharu indicated more than 30 defense pits and shelters that have been covered by soil, where bones could be buried. These defense pits and shelters stretch on an area of more than 300 meters. The travelers were later addressed by ZRP Commissioner Nonkosi Ncube, a survivor of the bombings. She expressed profound gratitude to all stakeholders involved on the pilgrimage, in particular Mafela Trust and the Government for efforts to project the role of ZIPRA in the liberation struggle. Observations on Mkushi camp site The tour observed that the shrine has been mash-wire fenced enclosing 10 mass graves of bricks and cement. One mass graver has an inscription which says "411" lay there. A large quantity of expended cartridges litters the parade square zone. Another grave within the fenced area has not been properly marked and constructed. The biggest mass grave is outside the fenced area and has apparently not been properly identified and marked because thePeople who constructed the shrine did not know about it, a museums official admitted. There is need to address this urgently. The official noted that efforts were in progress towards raising the shrine to accepted standards. He also admitted the anomaly on the mass grave left outside the fence and agreed to take up the matter with Head Office. He also concurred with the delegation that there was need to redo the boundaries of the shrine regarding findings in Respect of identified defence pits and shelters and the mass grave left outside the fenced area. The delegation also called for the inscription of the Mkushi Role of Honour with the assistance of Mafela Trust, which has the personnel and records. Mafela Trust has on numerous occasions discussed with the Director Of Museums And Monuments Of Zimbabwe on the partnership projects as relating to the liberation war time archival material and information with a view to adopt user-friendly means and ways to strengthen partnership and hope the long awaited M.O.U. between the two parties will be signed and implemented soon. "Mafela" was the last ZPRA commander Lookout Masuku’s (late) liberation war name. The trust was registered in 1992 to research and document the History of Zapu and ZPRA.

303 BSAP BY MIMI CAWOOD

2011-03-09T01:02:00.000-08:00

So far, there has been no book that has been written by someone who was involved with one of the most important and vital key roles during the Rhodesian Bush War and that is the world of signals. Radio communications is an essential service especially in the army, airforce, and police and also where there are large areas without telephones, particularly the remote farming areas. The author served in the BSAP and was based in Beitbridge, on the south east border with South Africa. Mocambique is only 150km away and the region was a hotbed of terror and anti-terror activity. There, she liaised mainly with the quick reaction Fire Force based in the area comprising of RAF 7 Squadron (Alouettes) and the army's 1 Indep Company. Her call-sign was '303' and many in the area knew her as the 'Voice' or '303'. She took advantage of the fact she was female and would constantly be cheeky with the menfolk whilst being really strict and that kept everyone on their toes. There are many stories that will bring back memories - stories that will make you laugh, smile and bring tears to the eye. She was once overwelmed when a survivor who lost both his legs from a RPG7 incident was driven to Beitbridge to thank her for saving his life, a very emotional experience - she had intercepted a Mayday call several months earlier just by chance (her normal channel to Bulawayo was not working and so switched over to the Fort Victoria channel), an act which saved the victims' life.
Mimi is keen to hear from anyone who recalls call-sign '303' and have stories to contribute.

FOREWARD OF CHOPPERTECH BY DON PRICE BCR OC 3 Cdo RLI

2011-02-23T03:49:00.000-08:00

Someone asked me the other day, "Hey Don, did you know this guy Gordon Shaw? I think they called him Beaver. He was a blue job, a chopper tech. Did you know him? Did he see any action?" I do know Beaver Shaw and I did have the pleasure to operate with him!

My mind wanders off and I remember........Fireforce, a call-out, the wind in my face, the speed we were moving over the ground towards the target area.....and.......
“One minute out," came the words from the pilot. We pulled up and the command, "Smoke! Now!" filled my headset. I lobbed the smoke canister out the open door and we banked sharp left, the blades chopping the air in a clatter of noise; there was that brief second, when time seemed to stand still as we waited for something to happen. Then it came............

The chopper tech barked into his mouthpiece, "Roger, Gooks 10 o'clock......left, bank left, bank left now! K Car is firing!" Dum-dida-dum, the sound of the 20 mm cannon firing, dum-dida-dum and the action was on! You talk about an adrenalin rush, something to shove you to the edge of your seat, exciting stuff, all of this and more, much more! A time to pray, a time to laugh, sometimes to cry. All of these emotions come to you at different times in an airborne Fire- force assault. The experience is something once never forgotten. It is exhilarating, exciting, fast, often frightening but always, always..... magic!

In the contact described above I have recollections of glancing to my left as we circled the contact area. The tech, K Car gunner, was crouched kneeling and firing the 20 mm gun with deadly effect. His crooked smile, calm demeanor and self confidence steadied and calmed my nerves as the battle unfolded! There are flashes of green and orange on the ground followed by the roar of incoming enemy ground fire. The Perspex shatters just to the left of my head and I am stung by the plastic and shrapnel which suddenly fills the cock-pit slams into my shoulder! It feels like a hefty punch and when I touch my shoulder it’s wet, sticky and hot. Apart from that I am fine and there is no time to worry about this now as things are happening and fast! The floor between my legs bursts upwards like thin silver paper being torn as rounds crash through the aircraft floor and green hornets whizz around I duck and feel vulnerable and stupid all at the same time as there is nowhere to take cover! Nowhere to hide or dodge the bullets! I look to my left once more.....the tech is still smiling, still firing and once more I relax. Beaver you biscuit sort them out, bud! You go Boy!!

So the battle continues. The para Dak runs in over the target and deploys just off to the west. The paras seem to be ejected from the aircraft but then they steady to float and swing down towards the ground and the enemy below. All the time the K Car circles and the team watches; flashes all over the place and men running. Suddenly a billowing mushroom of white smoke makes us zero in on a contact taking place below. The radio crackles to life, "Contact, contact! Stop one we have a contact!" Beaver adjusts his position and shuffles left or right on his knees behind his gun, taking in the situation He looks, aims and a split second before firing he advises both the K Car team and the troops below, "K Car firing!" and the 20 mm once more spits out its deadly load.
There are yellow-white flashes and then a plumb of smoke as he makes a direct hit on a gook scrambling for cover behind a baobab tree. In an instance the gook disappears, vaporized. Everything is in slow motion now and the 20 mm spits again......Duda-doom....dud -dum!

Back in camp and safe on the ground I swing out of the chopper and onto terra-ferma. The chopper tech walks around and claps me on the shoulder, "Great stuff, Ishe! Wasn't that outstanding?" The pilot, Chas, unclasps his mouth-piece, "Good work, Beav! Spot on shooting, mate well done!" Chas and I saunter back to the Ops room for a debrief and some hot tea. For us the show is over for a while anyway. But for Sgt Beaver Shaw and the other chopper techs like him it has only just begun. He must now get to work and work quickly as there is no time to waste. The next call-out could come at any moment and he must re-arm, clean his gun to avoid stoppages, check everything on the aircraft, refuel, re-grease, check all oil levels and seals, all joints and blade tips as everything must be 100 % before the next siren blast signals another call-out!

Later that evening in the troop’s canteen the lads relive the battle. Stories are told and retold.The drinks flow but eventually, rather quickly actually, the lads are finished, expired, too much adrenaline has been pumping; one by one they peel off but before they go each and everyone says , Hey Beav...thanks bro you were magic up there, man. You made that 20 mil sing boet.....thank you Beav, thank you!" There are high fives all around. Eventually only a few of us are left and we reflect one last time on the day’s action and punch-up! The swirl of the last swallow and one last look at the dying fire. "Good night you all.....good job Chas and great shooting Beav. Cheers everybody. See you tomorrow." So ends a normal Fire Force day; what will the morrow bring?

Sgt Beaver (Gordon) Shaw was one of those dedicated chopper techs, a true professional who loved every minute of his work and calling. As a gunner both in the G Car and K Car he was unparalleled; apart from being a deadly shot with an uncanny knack of knowing the gooks next move before it happened he was also a great guy and a superb airborne soldier who always remained extremely modest.

I met Beaver in 1978 when he was posted as part of Fire Force Delta to Beitbridge where I was OC 1 (Independent) Coy RAR. The area was tough, dry and very hot in both meanings of the word - temperature wise and gook action. Beaver worked with me as tech/gunner in the K Car on many a call-out and I can honestly say I was always impressed by this quiet often shy young man in olive green overalls. For me he was and will always be one of the Blue Job's (Air force’s) unsung heroes as during his time with 7 & 8 Squadron his accurate shooting accounted for hundreds of gooks killed. He spent day after day doing what I described in just one action, never bitching, whinging or finding fault in anyone....just quietly doing his job!

Beaver went on to be actively involved in almost every operation where choppers were deployed as well as airborne assaults into Mozambique like the raid on Chimoio in Operation Dingo. In fact the list of his deployments is staggering.

Beaver also accompanied pilots into neighboring hostile (enemy) countries on “hot extraction” missions playing an important role in rescuing soldiers from life threatening situations and bringing them back to safety. Tasks the normal soldier never spoke or heard about but which were very real. Again, chopper techs like Beaver were never praised for their part in these highly dangerous airborne mercy missions; to this day they remain unsung heroes!
.
Beaver’s memoires, “Chopper Tech” is a must read for both military historians and civilians alike. It is a wonderful record from a totally different perspective of the Rhodesian war and our fight against terrorism.

I am honored to have been asked to write a foreword for this quiet totally unassuming and modest professional ….. Sgt Gordon (Beaver) Shaw.

Major Don Price BCR
OC 3Cdo
1 RLI

AN INTERESTING LINK ON FIREFORCE

2011-02-11T01:00:00.000-08:00

http://www.combatreform.org/RLIfireforce.htm

The Chimurenga war in a nutshell

2010-11-12T03:28:00.001-08:00

Rhodesian Bush War

Encyclopedia

The Rhodesian Bush War—also known as the Zimbabwe War of Liberation or the Second Chimurenga
Chimurenga
Chimurenga is a Shona word for 'revolutionary struggle'. The word's modern interpretation has been extended to describe a struggle for human rights, political dignity and social justice, specifically used for the African insurrections against British colonial rule 1896–1897 and the guerrilla war...
—was a civil war in the former country of Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) fought from July 1964 to 1979. The Rhodesian government under Ian Smith and Zimbabwe-Rhodesian government under Abel Muzorewa

Abel Muzorewa

Bishop Abel Tendekayi Muzorewa served as Prime Minister of Zimbabwe Rhodesia from the Internal Settlement to the Lancaster House Agreement in 1979...

fought against Robert Mugabe

Robert Mugabe

Robert Gabriel Mugabe is the second and current President of Zimbabwe. One of the leaders of the liberation movement against white-minority rule, he was elected into power as the head of government since 1980, as Prime Minister from 1980 to 1987, and as the first executive head of state since...

's Zimbabwe African National Union and Joshua Nkomo's Zimbabwe African People's Union

Zimbabwe African People's Union

The Zimbabwe African People's Union is a once militant organization and political party that fought for the national liberation of Zimbabwe from its founding in 1961 until it merged with the Zimbabwe African National Union in December 1987....

. The war and its subsequent settlement ultimately led to the implementation of universal suffrage, the end of the white minority ruled Rhodesia and the short-lived government of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, and resulted in the creation of the Republic of Zimbabwe under the leadership of Prime Minister

Prime Minister of Zimbabwe

The Prime Minister of Zimbabwe is the head of government in Zimbabwe. From 1980 to 1987, Robert Mugabe was the first person to hold the position following independence from the United Kingdom. He took office when Rhodesia became the Republic of Zimbabwe on April 18, 1980...

Robert Mugabe

Background

The origins of the war in Rhodesia can be traced to the colonization of the region by white settlers in the late 19th century, and the dissent of black African nationalist leaders who opposed white minority rule. Rhodesia was settled by British and South African pioneers beginning in the 1890s and while it was never accorded full dominion status, Rhodesia effectively governed itself after 1923. In his famous "Wind of Change" speech addressed to the parliament of South Africa in 1960, British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan stated Britain's intention to grant independence to British territories in Africa. As a consequence many Rhodesians were concerned at the possibility that decolonization and native rule would bring chaos, as had resulted when the Congo became independent . Britain's unwillingness to compromise on the policy of "No independence before majority rule" led to Rhodesia unilaterally declaring independence

Unilateral Declaration of Independence (Rhodesia)

The Unilateral Declaration of Independence of Rhodesia from the United Kingdom was signed on November 11, 1965, by the administration of Ian Smith, whose Rhodesian Front party opposed black majority rule in the then British colony. Although it declared independence from the United Kingdom it...

on 11 November 1965. Though Rhodesia had the support of neighbouring South Africa and Portuguese-ruled Mozambique, it never gained formal recognition from any other country. A common misconception is that blacks were subjected to extreme racism and this was the factor that led to the war; however, while some social services were segregated, voting was colourblind (with qualifications), and the white-run government provided health, education and housing services to blacks. The nationalists went to war over white rule and land dispossession.

By contrast, most white Rhodesians viewed the war as one of survival with atrocities committed in the former Belgian Congo, the Mau Mau Uprising campaign in Kenya and elsewhere in Africa fresh in their minds. Many whites (and a sizable minority of black Rhodesians) viewed their lifestyle as being under attack, which both had considered safer and with a higher standard of living than many other African countries.

Although the vote in Rhodesia was open to all, regardless of race, property ownership requirements effectively denied the franchise to most of Rhodesia's blacks. and the 1969 constitution provided for "Non-Europeans" (principally blacks) to elect representatives for 8 of the seats in the 66 seat parliament. A further 8 of these seats were reserved for tribal chiefs.

Amidst this backdrop, black nationalists advocated armed struggle to bring about independence in Rhodesia. Resistance also stemmed from the wide disparities in wealth possession between blacks and whites. In Rhodesia, Europeans owned most of the fertile land whilst Africans were crowded on barren land, following forced evictions or clearances by the colonial authorities.

Two rival nationalist organizations soon emerged: the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) and the Zimbabwe African National Union

Zimbabwe African National Union

The Zimbabwe African National Union was a militant organization that fought against white minority rule in Rhodesia, formed as a split from the Zimbabwe African People's Union...

(ZANU), following a split in the former in August 1963, following disagreements over tactics as well as tribalism and personality clashes.. ZANU and its military wing ZANLA were headed initially by the Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole, and later Robert Mugabe, consisted mainly of the Shona

Shona

Shona may refer to:*Shona people, a Southern African people*Shona language, a Bantu language spoken in Zimbabwe and parts of Mozambique. It has several dialects which include Zezuru spoken by the people in the northern part of Zimbabwe, Manyika in Manicaland, and Karanga in southern part of...

speaking tribes. ZAPU and its military wing ZIPRA consisted mainly of Ndebele ethnic groups under Joshua Nkomo.

Cold War

Cold War

The Cold War was the continuing state of political conflict, military tension, proxy wars, and economic competition existing after World War II , primarily between the Soviet Union and its satellite states, and the powers of the Western world, particularly the United States...

politics played into the conflict also, with the Soviet Union supporting ZIPRA and Communist China providing support to ZANLA. Each group subsequently fought a separate war against the Rhodesian security forces, and the two groups sometimes fought against each other as well. In June 1979, the governments of Cuba

Cuba

The Republic of Cuba is an island country in the Caribbean. It consists of the island of Cuba, the Isla de la Juventud, and several archipelagos. Havana is the largest city in Cuba and the country's capital. Santiago de Cuba is the second largest city....

and Mozambique

Mozambique

Mozambique, officially the Republic of Mozambique , is a country in southeastern Africa bordered by the Indian Ocean to the east, Tanzania to the north, Malawi and Zambia to the northwest, Zimbabwe to the west and Swaziland and South Africa to the southwest.The area was explored by Vasco da Gama in...

offered direct military assistance to the Patriotic Front, but Mugabe and Nkomo declined. Other foreign nations also contributed to the conflict, for instance North Korea

North Korea

North Korea, officially the Democratic People's Republic of Korea , is a country in East Asia, occupying the northern half of the Korean Peninsula. Its capital and largest city is Pyongyang. The Korean Demilitarized Zone serves as the buffer zone between North Korea and South Korea...

n military officials taught Zimbabwean militants how to use explosives and arms in a camp near Pyongyang

Pyongyang

Pyongyang is the capital of North Korea, located on the Taedong River. According to preliminary results from the 2008 population census, it has a population of 3,255,388....

. By April 1979 12,000 ZANLA troops were training in Tanzania

Tanzania

The United Republic of Tanzania is a nation in central East Africa bordered by Kenya and Uganda to the north, Rwanda, Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo to the west, and Zambia, Malawi and Mozambique to the south. The country's eastern borders lie on the Indian Ocean.The United...

, Ethiopia

Ethiopia

Ethiopia is a landlocked country located in the Horn of Africa. Officially known as the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, it is the second-most populous nation in Africa with over 79.2 million people and the tenth-largest by area with its 1,100,000 km². The capital is Addis...

, and Libya

Libya

Libya , officially the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya , is a country located in North Africa...

. On the other side of the conflict South Africa clandestinely provided both material and military support to the Rhodesian government.

Inevitably the Bush War occurred within the context of regional Cold War in Africa, and became embroiled with a number of conflicts in several neighbouring countries as well. Such conflicts included the Angolan War of Independence

Angolan War of Independence

The Angolan War of Independence began as an uprising against forced cotton harvesting, and became a multi-faction struggle for control of Portugal's Overseas Province of Angola with 11 separatist movements...

(1961–1975) and Angolan Civil War

Angolan Civil War

The Angolan Civil War began in Angola after the end of the war for independence from Portugal in 1975. The war featured conflict between two primary Angolan factions, the communist MPLA and the anti-communist UNITA. A third movement, the FLEC, an association of separatist militant groups, fought...

(1975–2002), the Mozambican War of Independence

Mozambican War of Independence

The Mozambican War of Independence was an armed conflict between the guerrilla forces of the Mozambique Liberation Front or FRELIMO , and Portugal...

(1964–1974) and Mozambican Civil War

Mozambican Civil War

The Mozambican Civil War began in 1977, two years after the end of the war of independence. The ruling party, Front for Liberation of Mozambique , was violently opposed from 1977 by the Rhodesian- and South African-funded Mozambique Resistance Movement...

(1977–1992), and the Shaba I

Shaba I

Shaba I was a conflict between the neighbouring states of Zaire and Angola in 1977, and was arguably a consequence of Zaire's support for the FNLA and UNITA factions in the Angolan Civil War....

(1977) and Shaba II

Shaba II

Shaba II was an invasion of the Shaba separatist movement FNLC into the Zairian province of Shaba on 11 May 1978. The FNLC had its bases in eastern Angola and probably had the support of the Angolan government...

(1978) conflicts.

Perceptions

The conflict was seen by the nationalist groups and the British government of the time as a war of national and racial liberation. The Rhodesian government saw the conflict as a fight between one part of the country's population (the whites) on behalf of the whole population (including the black majority) against several externally financed parties made up of predominantly black radicals

Radicalization

Radicalization is the process in which an individual changes from passiveness or activism to become more revolutionary, militant or extremist. Radicalization is often associated with youth, adversity, alienation, social exclusion, poverty, or the perception of injustice to self or...

and communists. The Nationalists saw their country as having been occupied and dominated by a foreign power, namely, Britain, since 1890. The British government, in the person of the Governor General, directly ruled the country from 1923, when it took over from the British South Africa Company

British South Africa Company

The British South Africa Company was established by Cecil Rhodes through the amalgamation of the Central Search Association and the Exploring Company Ltd., receiving a royal charter in 1889...

. In 1965, Ian Smith's Rhodesian Front

Rhodesian Front

The Rhodesian Front was a political party in Southern Rhodesia when the country was under white minority rule. Led first by Winston Field, and, from 1964, by Ian Smith, the Rhodesian Front was the successor to the Dominion Party, which was the main opposition party in Southern Rhodesia during the...

party took over the government when it unilaterally declared independence. The minority Rhodesian government believed they were defending Western values, Christianity

Christianity

Christianity is a monotheistic religion based on the life and teachings of Jesus of Nazareth as presented in the New Testament....

, the rule of law

Rule of law

The rule of law is a legal maxim according to which no one is immune to the law.While the rule of law has been described as "an exceedingly elusive notion" giving rise to a "rampant divergence of understandings", a dichotomy can be identified between two principal conceptions of the rule of law: a...

and democracy

Democracy

Democracy is a political form of government carried out either directly by the people or by means of elected representatives of the people...

by fighting Communists. They were unwilling to compromise on most political, economic and social inequalities. The Smith administration said the traditional chiefs were the legitimate voice of the black Shona and Ndebele population and that the nationalists were dangerous usurpers.

In 1978-1979 the Smith administration attempted to blunt the power of the nationalist cause by acceding to an "Internal Settlement" which ended minority rule, changed the name of the country to Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, and installed the country's first black head of government, Abel Muzorewa

Abel Muzorewa

Bishop Abel Tendekayi Muzorewa served as Prime Minister of Zimbabwe Rhodesia from the Internal Settlement to the Lancaster House Agreement in 1979...

. However, unsatisfied with this and spurred on by Britain's refusal to recognise the new order, the nationalist forces persisted. Ultimately the war ended when the white-dominated government of Rhodesia returned power to the British government with the 1979 Lancaster House Agreement

Lancaster House Agreement

The negotiations which led to the Lancaster House Agreement brought independence to Rhodesia following Ian Smith’s Unilateral Declaration of Independence in 1965. The Agreement covered the Independence Constitution, pre-independence arrangements, and a ceasefire...

. The Rhodesian government did so at the behest of both South Africa (its major backer) and the United States. Britain recognised this new government, headed by Robert Mugabe, and the newly independent and internationally recognised country was renamed Zimbabwe

Zimbabwe

Zimbabwe is a landlocked country located in the southern part of the continent of Africa, between the Zambezi and Limpopo rivers...

Rhodesian Security Forces

Despite the impact of economic and diplomatic sanctions, Rhodesia was able to develop and maintain a potent and professional military capability.

The regular army was always a relatively small force, but by 1978-79 it consisted of some 10,800 regulars nominally supported by about 40,000 reservists - though by the last year of the war, perhaps as few as 15,000 were available for active service. While the regular army consisted of a professional core drawn from the white population (and some units, such as the Rhodesian SAS and the Rhodesian Light Infantry

Rhodesian Light Infantry

The 1st Battalion, The Rhodesian Light Infantry was a regular airborne commando regiment in the Rhodesian army. The RLI was originally formed as a light infantry regiment in 1961, reformed as a commando battalion in 1965, became a parachute Battalion in 1977 and was disbanded at the end of the...

, were all-white), by 1978-79 the majority of its complement was actually composed of black soldiers. The army reserves, in contrast, were largely white and, toward the end of the war, were increasingly being called up to deal with the growing insurgency. The regular army was supported by the para-military British South Africa Police

British South Africa Police

The British South Africa Police was the police force of the British South Africa Company of Cecil Rhodes which became the national police force of Southern Rhodesia and its successor after 1965, Rhodesia...

with a strength of about 8,000 to 11,000 men (the majority of whom were black) and supported by between 19,000 to 35,000 police reservists (which, like their army counterparts, were largely white). The police reserves acted as type of home guard.

The war saw the extensive operation of Rhodesian regulars as well as elite units such as the Selous Scouts

Selous Scouts

The Selous Scouts was the name given to a special forces regiment of the Rhodesian Army, which operated from 1973 until the introduction of majority rule in 1980. It was named after British explorer Frederick Courteney Selous , and their motto was pamwe chete, which, in the Shona, roughly means...

and the Rhodesian SAS. The Rhodesian Army fought bitterly against the black nationalist guerrillas. The Rhodesian Army also comprised mostly black regiments such as the Rhodesian African Rifles

Rhodesian African Rifles

The Rhodesian African Rifles, or RAR, was the oldest regiment in the Rhodesian Army, dating from the formation of the 1st Rhodesian Native Regiment in 1916 during the First World War. This was followed by the creation of the Matabeleland Native Regiment, and the 2nd Rhodesian Native Regiment,...

. As the war went on, the frequent callup of reservists was increasingly utilized to supplement the professional soldiers and the many volunteers from overseas. By 1978 all white males up to the age of 60 were subject to periodic call-up into the army; younger men up to 35 might expect to spend alternating blocks of six weeks in the army and at home. Many of the overseas volunteers came from Britain

United Kingdom

The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern IrelandIn the United Kingdom and Dependencies, other languages have been officially recognised as legitimate autochthonous languages under the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages...

, Ireland

Ireland

Ireland is the third largest island in Europe and the twentieth largest island in the world. It lies to the northwest of continental Europe and is surrounded by hundreds of islands and islets. To the east of Ireland is Great Britain, separated from it by the Irish Sea. The Republic of Ireland...

, South Africa, Portugal, Hong Kong, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the United States of America with the latter three being held in high regard for their recent Vietnam War

Vietnam War

The Vietnam War was a Cold War military conflict that occurred in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia from November 1, 1955 , to April 30, 1975 when Saigon fell...

experience.

The Rhodesian Army was, considering the arms embargo, well-equipped. The standard infantry weapon was the Belgian FN FAL

FN FAL

The Fusil Automatique Léger or FAL is a self-loading, selective fire battle rifle produced by the Belgian armaments manufacturer Fabrique Nationale de Herstal . During the Cold War it was adopted by many North Atlantic Treaty Organization countries, with the notable exception of the United States...

Rifle as produced in South Africa under license as the R1 Rifle and supplemented by the H&K G3 rifle that came from Portuguese forces. However other weapons such as the British L1A1 variant of the FAL and the older British Lee-Enfield

Lee-Enfield

The Lee-Enfield bolt-action, magazine-fed, repeating rifle was the main firearm used by the military forces of the British Empire and Commonwealth during the first half of the 20th century...

bolt action rifle were used by reservists and the British South Africa Police

British South Africa Police

. Other weapons included the Bren

Bren

The Bren, usually called the Bren Gun, was a series of light machine guns adopted by Britain in the 1930s and used in various roles until 1991...

LMG, Sten

Sten

The Sten was a family of British 9 mm submachine guns used extensively by British and Commonwealth forces throughout World War II and the Korean War. They were notable for having a simple design and very low production cost....

SMG, Uzi, Browning Hi-Power

Browning Hi-Power

The Browning Hi-Power is a single-action, 9mm semi-automatic handgun. It is based on a design by American firearms inventor John Browning, and later improved by Dieudonné Saive at Fabrique Nationale of Herstal, Belgium. Browning died in 1926, several years before the design was finalized...

pistol, Colt M16 rifle

M16 rifle

The M16 is the United States military designation for the AR-15 rifle. Colt purchased the rights to the AR-15 from ArmaLite and currently uses that designation only for semi-automatic versions of the rifle...

(very late in the war), FN MAG

FN MAG

The FN MAG is a Belgian 7.62 mm general purpose machine gun, designed in the early 1950s at Fabrique Nationale by Ernest Vervier. It has been used by more than 80 countries, and it has been made under licence in countries such as Argentina, Egypt, India, Singapore, the United Kingdom and the...

general-purpose machine-gun, 81 mm mortar

L16 81mm Mortar

The United Kingdom's L16 81 mm mortar is the standard mortar used by the British armed forces. It originated as a joint design by UK and Canada. The version produced and used by Australia is named the F2 81mm Mortar, whilst the version used by the U.S...

, and Claymore

M18A1 Claymore Antipersonnel Mine

The M18A1 Claymore is a directional anti-personnel mine used by the U.S. military. It was named after the large Scottish sword by its inventor, Norman A. MacLeod. The Claymore fires shrapnel, in the form of steel balls, out to about 100 meters within a 60° arc in front of the device. It is used...

mines. After UDI

Unilateral Declaration of Independence (Rhodesia)

Rhodesia was heavily reliant on South African and domestically-produced weapons and equipment, as well as international smuggling operations.

The Rhodesian Air Force (RhAF) operated a variety of equipment and carried out numerous roles, with air power providing the Rhodesians with a significant advantage over their enemy. When the arms embargo was introduced, the RhAF was suddenly lacking spare parts from external suppliers and was forced to find alternative means of keeping their aircraft flying. The RhAF was also relatively well equipped and used a large proportion of equipment which was obsolete, such as the World War II

World War II

World War II, or the Second World War , was a global military conflict lasting from 1939 to 1945 which involved most of the world's nations, including all of the great powers, organised into two opposing military alliances: the Allies and the Axis...

vintage Douglas Dakota

C-47 Skytrain

The Douglas C-47 Skytrain or Dakota is a military transport aircraft that was developed from the Douglas DC-3 airliner. It was used extensively by the Allies during World War II and remained in front line operations through the 1950s with a few remaining in operation to this day.-Design and...

transport aircraft and the early British jet-fighter the de Havilland Vampire

De Havilland Vampire

The de Havilland DH.100 Vampire was a British jet-engine fighter. It was commissioned by the Royal Air Force during the Second World War, and was the second jet fighter to enter service with the RAF, after the pioneering Gloster Meteor...

. It also used more modern types of aircraft like the Hawker Hunter

Hawker Hunter

The Hawker Hunter was a British jet fighter aircraft of the 1950s and 1960s. The Hunter served for many years with the Royal Air Force and was widely exported, serving with 19 air forces. A total of 1,972 Hunters were produced by Hawker Siddeley and under licence.-Development:The origins of the...

and Canberra

English Electric Canberra

The English Electric Canberra is a first-generation jet-powered light bomber manufactured in large numbers through the 1950s. It proved to be highly adaptable, serving in such varied roles for tactical bombing, photographic, electronic, and meteorological reconnaissance...

bombers, the Cessna Skymaster

Cessna Skymaster

The Cessna Skymaster is a United States twin-engine civil utility aircraft built in a push-pull configuration. Its engines are mounted in the nose and rear of its pod-style fuselage. Twin booms extend aft of the wings to the vertical stabilizers, with the rear engine between them. The horizontal...

as well as Aérospatiale Alouette III

Aérospatiale Alouette III

The Aérospatiale Alouette III is a single-engine, light utility helicopter developed by Sud Aviation and later manufactured by Aérospatiale of France. The Alouette III is the successor to the Alouette II, being larger and having more seating...

helicopters until they were supplemented by the Augusta Bell 205. Very late in the war, the Rhodesian forces were able to obtain and use a very few smuggled in Bell UH-1 Iroquois

UH-1 Iroquois

The UH-1 Iroquois is a military helicopter powered by a single, turboshaft engine, with a two-bladed main rotor and tail rotor. The helicopter was developed by Bell Helicopter to meet the United States Army's requirement for a medical evacuation and utility helicopter in 1952, and first flew on 20...

helicopters.

At the beginning of the war much of Rhodesia's military hardware was of British and Commonwealth origin but during the course of the conflict new equipment such as armoured cars were procured from the South Africans. Several captured Soviet Bloc T-55

T-55

The T-54 and T-55 tanks were a series of main battle tanks designed in the Soviet Union. The first T-54 prototype appeared in March 1945, just before the end of the Second World War. The T-54 entered full production in 1947 and became the main tank for armored units of the Soviet Army, armies of...

tanks were provided to Rhodesia by the South Africans, though only in the last year of the war. The Rhodesians also produced some of their own armoured vehicles, including unlicensed copies of the Mercedes-Benz

Mercedes-Benz

Mercedes-Benz is a German manufacturer of luxury automobiles, buses, coaches, and trucks. It is currently a division of the parent company, Daimler AG , after previously being owned by Daimler-Benz...

UR-416. The means with which the Rhodesian's procured weaponry meant that the arms embargoes had little effect on the Rhodesian war effort. During the course of the war most white citizens carried personal weapons, and it was not unusual to see white housewives carrying submachine gun

Submachine gun

A submachine gun is an automatic carbine, designed to fire pistol cartridges. It combines the automatic fire of a machine gun with the cartridge of a pistol...

s. A siege mentality

Siege mentality

Siege mentality is a shared feeling of victimization and defensiveness. It is a state of mind whereby one believes that one is being constantly attacked, oppressed, or isolated and make one frightened of surrounding people. This can cause a state of being overly fearful leading to a defensive...

set in and all civilian transport had to be escorted in convoys for safety against ambushes. Farms and villages in rural areas were frequently attacked.

The Rhodesian government divided the nation into eight geographical operational areas: North West Border (Operation Ranger), Eastern Border (Operation Thrasher), North East Border (Operation Hurricane), South East Border (Operation Repulse), Midlands (Operation Grapple), Kariba (Operation Splinter), Matabeleland (Operation Tangent), Salisbury

Harare

Harare is the capital of Zimbabwe. It has an estimated population of 1,600,000, with 2,800,000 in its metropolitan area . Administratively, Harare is an independent city equivalent to a province. It is Zimbabwe's largest city and its administrative, commercial, and communications centre...

and District ("SALOPS").

Rebel/Guerilla Forces

The two major armed groups campaigning against Ian Smith

Ian Smith

----Ian Douglas Smith GCLM ID served as the Prime Minister of the British self-governing colony of Southern Rhodesia from 13 April 1964 to 11 November 1965...

's government were:

ZANLA (Zimbabwe National Liberation Army), the armed wing of ZANU (Zimbabwe African National Union
Zimbabwe African National Union
The Zimbabwe African National Union was a militant organization that fought against white minority rule in Rhodesia, formed as a split from the Zimbabwe African People's Union...
).
ZIPRA
ZIPRA
Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army was the armed wing of the Zimbabwe African People's Union, a political party in Rhodesia. It participated in the Second Chimurenga against white minority rule in the former Rhodesia....
(Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army), the armed wing of ZAPU (Zimbabwe African People's Union
Zimbabwe African People's Union
The Zimbabwe African People's Union is a once militant organization and political party that fought for the national liberation of Zimbabwe from its founding in 1961 until it merged with the Zimbabwe African National Union in December 1987....
).

The fighting was largely rural, with both movements attempting to secure peasant support and to recruit fighters while harassing the administration and the white civilians. Unlike the town-dwellers, rural whites faced danger and many were killed but in 1979 there were still 6,000 white farmers. They were vulnerable every time they left the homestead.

ZANLA

ZANLA was the armed wing of ZANU. The organization also had strong links with Mozambique

Mozambique

's independence movement, FRELIMO. ZANLA, in the end, was present on a more or less permanent basis in over half the country, as evidenced by the location of the demobilisation bases at the end of the war, which were in every province except Matabeleland North

Matabeleland North

Matabeleland North is a province in western Zimbabwe. It borders the provinces of Midlands and Mashonaland West to the east and northeast respectively, and the province of Matabeleland South and the city of Bulawayo to the south. Its northern border is defined by the Zambezi river, while its...

. In addition, they were fighting a civil war against ZIPRA, despite the formation of a joint front by their political parties after 1978. It was ZANLA's intention to occupy the ground, supplant the administration in rural areas, and then mount the final conventional campaign. ZANLA concentrated on the politicisation of the rural areas using force, persuasion, ties of kinship and collaboration with spirit mediums.

ZANLA tried to paralyze the Rhodesian effort and economy by planting Soviet anti-tank land mine

Land mine

A land mine is usually a victim-triggered explosive device which is intended to damage its target via blast and/or fragments....

s on the roads. From 1972 to 1980 there were 2,504 vehicle detonations of land mines (mainly Soviet TM46s), killing 632 people and injuring 4,410. The mining of roads increased as the war intensified; indeed the increase from 1978 (894 mines or 2.44 mines were detonated or recovered a day) to 1979 (2,089 mines or 5.72 mines a day) was 233.7%. In response, the Rhodesians co-operated with the South Africans to develop a range of mine protected vehicles. They began by replacing air in tyres with water which absorbed some of the blast and reduced the heat of the explosion. Initially, they protected the bodies with steel deflector plates, sandbags and mine conveyor belting. Later, purpose built vehicles with V shaped blast hulls dispersed the blast and deaths in such vehicles became unusual events.

ZIPRA

ZIPRA was the anti-government force based around the Ndebele ethnicity, led by Joshua Nkomo

Joshua Nkomo

Joshua Mqabuko Nyongolo Nkomo was the leader and founder of the Zimbabwe African People's Union and a member of the Kalanga tribe. He was affectionately known in Zimbabwe as Father Zimbabwe, Umdala Wethu, Umafukufuku or Chibwechitedza...

, and the ZAPU political organization. In contrast to ZANLA's Mozambique links, Nkomo's ZIPRA was more oriented towards Zambia

Zambia

The Republic of Zambia is a landlocked country in Southern Africa. The neighbouring countries are the Democratic Republic of the Congo to the north, Tanzania to the north-east, Malawi to the east, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Botswana, and Namibia to the south, and Angola to the west. The capital city is...

for local bases. However, this was not always with full Zambian government support, and by 1979 ZIPRA's forces, combined with ANC

African National Congress

The African National Congress has been South Africa's governing left-wing party, supported by its tripartite alliance with the Congress of South African Trade Unions and the South African Communist Party , since the establishment of non-racial democracy in April 1994. It defines itself as a...

and SWAPO forces in Zambia, was a major threat to Zambia's internal security. Because ZAPU's political strategy relied more heavily on negotiations than armed force, ZIPRA did not grow as quickly or elaborately as ZANLA, but by 1979 it had an estimated 20,000 combatants, almost all based in camps around Lusaka, Zambia.

ZIPRA

ZIPRA

Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army was the armed wing of the Zimbabwe African People's Union, a political party in Rhodesia. It participated in the Second Chimurenga against white minority rule in the former Rhodesia....

was responsible for two attacks on civilian Air Rhodesia Viscount airplanes

Air Rhodesia Flight RH825

Air Rhodesia Flight 825 was a scheduled flight from Kariba to Salisbury that was shot down on September 3, 1978 by ZIPRA guerillas using a SA-7 surface-to-air missile-Incident:...

, using a SAM-7

Strela 2

The 9K32 “Strela-2” is a man-portable, shoulder-fired, low-altitude surface-to-air missile system with a high explosive warhead and passive infrared homing guidance...

surface-to-air missile

Surface-to-air missile

A Surface to Air Missile or ground-to-air missile is a missile designed to be launched from the ground to destroy aircraft. Development of surface-to-air missiles began in Nazi Germany during late World War II with missiles like the Wasserfall. It is one part of the anti-aircraft system...

s. Ten out of the eighteen civilians on board who survived the first crash were subsequently killed by the ZIPRA militants. Nkomo later spoke to the BBC

BBC

The British Broadcasting Corporation is the largest broadcasting organisation in the world. The BBC is an autonomous public service broadcaster that operates under a Royal Charter...

of the attack in a way some considered gloating. In his memoirs, Story of My Life (1985), Nkomo expressed regret for the shooting down of both planes, claiming ZIPRA intelligence believed the plane was carrying General Walls and his aides.

ZIPRA took advice from its Soviet instructors in formulating its version of popular revolution and its strategy for taking over the country. There were about 1.400 Soviets, 700 East German and 500 Cuban instructors deployed to the area. On the advice of the Soviets, ZIPRA built up its conventional forces, and motorised with Soviet armored vehicles and a number of small airplanes, in Zambia. ZIPRA's (i.e. ZAPU's) intention was to allow ZANLA to bring the Rhodesian forces to the point of defeat, and then to take the victory from the much lighter forces of ZANLA and the essentially defeated Rhodesians. ZIPRA kept a light presence within Rhodesia, reconnoitering, keeping contact with the peasants and sometimes skirmishing with ZANLA. ZIPRA's conventional threat actually distracted the Rhodesians from fighting ZANLA to an extent. By the late 1970s, ZIPRA had developed a strategy known as Storming the Heavens to launch a conventional invasion from Zambia, supported by a limited number of armoured vehicles and light aircraft. An operation by the Rhodesian armed forces to destroy a ZIPRA base near Livingstone in Zambia was never launched.

The ZAPU/ZIPRA strategy for taking over Zimbabwe proved unsuccessful. In any event, the transfer of power to black nationalists took place not by the military take-over expected by ZAPU/ZIPRA, but by a peaceful and internationally supervised election. Rhodesia reverted briefly to real British rule, and a general election took place in early 1980. This election was supervised both by the UK and international forces. Robert Mugabe (of ZANLA/ZANU) won this election, being the only major competitor for the vote of the majority ethnicity, the Shona. Once in power, Mugabe was internationally recognised as Zimbabwe's leader and was installed as head of government, as well as having the backing of the overwhelming majority ethnic group. He was therefore able to quickly and irreversibly consolidate his power in Zimbabwe, forcing ZAPU, and therefore ZIPRA which was ZAPU's army, to give up hope of taking over the country in the place of ZANU/ZANLA.

Civil disobedience (1957–1964)

In September 1956, bus fares in Salisbury

Harare

were raised to the point at which workers were spending between 18% and 30% of their earnings on transportation. The City Youth League responded by boycotting the United Transport Company's buses and succeeded in preventing the price change. On 12 September 1957 members of the Youth League and the defunct ANC formed the Southern Rhodesia African National Congress, led by Joshua Nkomo. The Whitehead administration

Edgar Whitehead

Sir Edgar Cuthbert Fremantle Whitehead, OBE, was a Rhodesian politician. He was a longstanding member of the Southern Rhodesia Legislative Assembly, although his career was interrupted by other posts and by illness. In particular he had poor eyesight, and wore very thick glasses, and later...

banned the SRANC in 1959 and arrested 307 leaders, excluding Nkomo who was out of the country, on 29 February in Operation Sunrise

Operation Sunrise

Operation Sunrise may refer to:*Operation Sunrise , a 1962 test of the Strategic Hamlet Program*Operation Crossword or Operation Sunrise, a series of secret negotiations conducted in March 1945 in Switzerland...

.

Nkomo, Mugabe, Herbert Chitepo

Herbert Chitepo

Herbert Wiltshire Chitepo led the Zimbabwe African National Union until the Central Intelligence Organization of Rhodesia assassinated him in March 1975....

, and Ndabaningi Sithole established the National Democratic Party in January 1960. Nkomo became its leader in October. An NDP delegation headed by Nkomo attended the constitutional conference in January 1961. While Nkomo initially supported the constitution, he reversed his position after other NDP leaders disagreed. The government banned the NDP in December 1961 and arrested NDP leaders, excluding Nkomo who, again, was out of the country. Nkomo formed the Zimbabwe African People's Union which the Whitehead administration banned in September 1962.

The United Federal Party

United Federal Party

The United Federal Party, previously known as the United Party and the United Rhodesia Party, was one of Southern Rhodesia's most successful political parties, and governed the country for over 30 years...

, campaigning on majority rule, lost overwhelmingly in the 1962 general election to the more conservative Rhodesian Front

Rhodesian Front

. Nkomo, legally barred from forming a new political party, moved ZAPU's headquarters to Dar es Salaam

Dar es Salaam

Dar es Salaam , formerly Mzizima, is the largest city in Tanzania. It is also the country's richest city and a regionally important economic centre...

, Tanzania

Tanzania

.

In July 1963 Nkomo suspended Ndabaningi Sithole, Robert Mugabe

Robert Mugabe

, Leopold Takawira

Leopold Takawira

Leopold Takawira served as the Vice President of the Zimbabwe African National Union after supporting the National Democratic Party and later the Zimbabwe African People's Union.Leopold Takawira was also known by his Mhazi to totem as 'Shumba yeChirumanzi'Takawira was born at Chirumanzi, Victoria...

, and Washington Malianga

Washington Malianga

Washington Malianga is one of several leaders of the Zimbabwe African People's Union who left ZAPU in 1963 and founded the Zimbabwe African National Union. ZAPU leader Joshua Nkomo suspended their membership due to their opposition to his continued leadership. The other leaders were Ndabaningi...

for their opposition to his continued leadership of ZAPU. On 8 August they announced the establishment of the Zimbabwe African National Union

Zimbabwe African National Union

The Zimbabwe African National Union was a militant organization that fought against white minority rule in Rhodesia, formed as a split from the Zimbabwe African People's Union...

. ZANU members formed a militant wing, the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army

Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army

Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army was the military wing of the Zimbabwe African National Union, a militant African nationalist organization, and participated in the Rhodesian Bush War against white minority rule in Rhodesia....

, and sent ZANLA members to the People's Republic of China for training.

In July 1964 ZANLA forces assassinated a Rhodesian Front official and the war began.

First phase (1964–1972)

In July 1964 ZANLA ambushed and killed a white civilian, Petrus Oberholtzer, in the first act of war to occur in Rhodesia since the 1890s. The killing had a lasting effect on the small, close-knit white community, even though it was an isolated incident. The Smith administration subsequently moved to detain the ZANU and ZAPU political leadership in August 1964. The major political leaders imprisoned were Ndabaningi Sithole, Leopold Takawira

Leopold Takawira

, Edgar Tekere

Edgar Tekere

Edgar Zivanai Tekere is a Zimbabwean politician. He was a president of the Zimbabwe African National Union who organised the party during the Lancaster House talks and served in government before his popularity as a potential rival to Robert Mugabe caused their estrangement...

, Enos Nkala

Enos Nkala

Enos Nkala is one of the founders of the Zimbabwe African National Union. During the war, he served on the ZANU high command, or Dare reChimurenga. He was detained by the Rhodesian government at Gonakudzingwa....

, Maurice Nyagumbo

Maurice Nyagumbo

Tapfumaneyi Maurice Nyagumbo was a Zimbabwean politician.Working in South Africa in the 1940s, he joined the South African Communist Party. He spent most of the years 1957 to 1979 in detention in Southern Rhodesia. During this time he wrote an autobiography, With the People...

. The remaining military leaders of ZANLA, consisted of Dare ReChimurenga, the barrister Herbert Chitepo

Herbert Chitepo

Herbert Wiltshire Chitepo led the Zimbabwe African National Union until the Central Intelligence Organization of Rhodesia assassinated him in March 1975....

, and Josiah Tongogara

Josiah Tongogara

Josiah Magama Tongogara was a commander of the ZANLA guerrilla army in Rhodesia. He attended the Lancaster House conference that led to Zimbabwe's independence and the end of white minority rule...

. Operating from bases in Zambia and later from Mozambique

Mozambique

, militants subsequently began launching attacks against Rhodesia.

The conflict intensified after the Unilateral Declaration of Independence from Britain

United Kingdom

on 11 November 1965. Sanctions

International sanctions

International sanctions are actions taken by countries against others for political reasons, either unilaterally or multilaterally.There are several types of sanctions....

were implemented by the British government after UDI, and member states of the United Nations

United Nations

The United Nations Organization or simply United Nations is an international organization whose stated aims are facilitating cooperation in international law, international security, economic development, social progress, human rights, and the achieving of world peace...

endorsed the British embargo

Embargo

An embargo is the partial or complete prohibition of the movement of merchant ships into or out of a country's ports, in order to isolate it. Embargoes are considered strong diplomatic measures imposed in an effort, by the embargo-imposing-country, to elicit a given national-interest result from...

. The embargo meant the Rhodesians were hampered by a lack of modern equipment but used other means to receive vital war supplies such as receiving oil

Petroleum

Petroleum or crude oil is a naturally occurring, toxic, flammable liquid consisting of a complex mixture of hydrocarbons of various molecular weights, and other organic compounds, that are found in geologic formations beneath the Earth's surface.The term petroleum was first used in the treatise De...

, munitions, and arms via the government of apartheid-era South Africa. War material was also obtained through elaborate international smuggling schemes, domestic production, and equipment captured from infiltrating enemy combatants.

Five months later on 28 April 1966, the Rhodesian Security Forces engaged militants in Sinoia

Chinhoyi

Chinhoyi is a large provincial town and is the capital of Mashonaland West province in Zimbabwe. Sinoia was established in 1906 as a group settlement scheme by a wealthy Italian called Lieutenant Margherito Guidotti who encouraged 10 Italian families to settle there.- Overview :Chinhoyi is located...

, during the first major engagement of the war. Seven ZANLA men were killed during the fighting and in retaliation the survivors killed two civilians at their farm near Hartley three weeks later.

Prior to the collapse of Portuguese rule in Mozambique in 1974-75, the Rhodesians were able to defend their frontier with Zambia with relative ease and prevent many guerrilla incursions. The Rhodesians were able to set up a strong defensive line along the Zambezi River running from Lake Kariba to the Mozambique border. Here 30-man camps were etablished at 8 kilometer intervals supported by mobile rapid reaction units. Between 1966 and 1970 these defences accounted for 175 insurgents killed for the loss of 14 defenders.

In the latter months of 1971, the black nationalist factions united and formed a coalition which became known as the 'Joint Guerrilla Alliance to Overthrow the Government.' Regardless, the conflict continued at a low level until 21 December 1972 when ZANLA attacked Altena Farm in north-east Rhodesia. In response the Rhodesians moved to hit their enemy in their foreign camps and staging areas before they could infiltrate into Rhodesia.

Secret cross-border operations by the Special Air Service began in the mid-1960s, with Rhodesian Security Forces already engaging in hot-pursuits into Mozambique. However three weeks after the attack on Altena Farm, ZANLA killed two civilians and abducted another who was subsequently taken into Mozambique and then Tanzania. In response SAS troops were inserted into Mozambique with the approval of the Portuguese administration, in the first officially sanctioned external operation. The Rhodesian government began authorizing an increasing number of external operations.

In the first phase of the conflict (up until the end of 1972), Rhodesia's political and military position appeared to be a strong one. Nationalist guerrillas had been unable to make serious military inroads against Rhodesia and Britain's efforts to isolate Rhodesia economically had not forced major compromises from the Smith Government. Indeed, late in 1971 the British and Rhodesian Governments had negotiated a compromise political settlement which would have bowed to the Smith Government's agenda of postponing majority rule into the indefinite future. Nevertheless, when it was found that such a delayed approach to majority rule was completely unacceptable to most of Rhodesia's African population, the deal fell apart. It would take the collapse of Portuguese rule in Mozambique to create new military and political pressures on the Rhodesian Government to accept the principle of immediate majority rule.

Second phase (1972–1979)

For Rhodesian Army counter-insurgency "Fireforce" tactics see:

The black nationalists continued to operate from secluded bases in neighbouring Zambia

Zambia

and from FRELIMO-controlled areas in the Portuguese colony of Mozambique

Mozambique

, making periodic raids into Rhodesia

Rhodesia

Rhodesia , officially the Republic of Rhodesia from 1970, was an unrecognised state located in Southern Africa that existed between 1965 and 1979 following its Unilateral Declaration of Independence from the United Kingdom on 11 November 1965...

. In April 1974, a left wing coup in Portugal heralded the coming end of colonial rule in Mozambique. FRELIMO formed a transitional government within months, and officially took over the country in June 1975. Such events proved beneficial to ZANLA but disastrous for the Rhodesians, adding an additional 800 miles of hostile border. Indeed with the demise of the Portuguese empire Ian Smith realised Rhodesia was surrounded on three sides by hostile nations and declared a formal state of emergency. Soon Mozambique closed its border, however Rhodesian forces continued to cross the border in "hot pursuit" raids, attacking the nationalists and their training camps.

By 1976 it was clear that an indefinite postponment of majority rule, which had been the cornerstone of the Smith Government's strategy since UDI, was no longer viable. Late in 1976, Ian Smith accepted the basic elements of the compromise proposals made by US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger

Henry Kissinger

Henry Alfred Kissinger is a German-born American political scientist, diplomat, and recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize. He served as National Security Advisor and later concurrently as Secretary of State in the administrations of Presidents Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford...

to introduce majority rule within two years. The Smith Government then sought to negotiate an acceptable settlement with moderate black leaders, while retaining strong white influence in key areas. The Rhodesian military, in turn, had the job of eroding the rising military strength of the ZANLA and ZIPRA to the greatest extent possible in order "buy time" for an acceptable political settlement to be reached.

The Rhodesian Security Forces called up part-time soldiers in preparation for a major counter-offensive on 2 May 1976. In August 1976, Rhodesian Selous Scouts

Selous Scouts

destroyed a camp at Nyadzonya in Mozambique containing many hundreds of trainees, which they claimed was a military target. The Rhodesians reported more than 1,000 insurgents killed when they were caught by surprise on the parade ground , while the nationalists claimed the site was a refugee camp. The Rhodesians also operated into Zambia

Zambia

after Nkomo's nationalists shot down two unarmed Vickers Viscount

Vickers Viscount

The Viscount was a British medium-range turboprop airliner first flown in 1948 by Vickers-Armstrongs, making it the first such aircraft to enter service in the world...

civilian airliners with Soviet supplied SAM-7 heat-seeking missiles. In the first incident, Air Rhodesia Flight RH825

Air Rhodesia Flight RH825

Air Rhodesia Flight 825 was a scheduled flight from Kariba to Salisbury that was shot down on September 3, 1978 by ZIPRA guerillas using a SA-7 surface-to-air missile-Incident:...

, ten passengers who survived the crash landing were shot and killed at the crash scene. Militants bombed a railroad bridge over Matetsi River on 7 October 1976 when a train carrying ore passed over.
As the conflict intensified, the United States and Britain

United Kingdom

attempted to negotiate a peaceful settlement. However this was rejected by the Rhodesian government insofar at it involved any potential surrender of power to the ZANLA or ZIPRA.

By 1977 the war had spread throughout Rhodesia. ZANLA continued to operate from Mozambique, remained dominant among the Mashona peoples in eastern and central Rhodesia. Meanwhile ZIPRA remained active in the north and west, using bases in Zambia and Botswana, and were mainly supported by the Ndebele tribes. With this escalation came increasing sophistication and organisation. No longer were the guerrillas the disorganised force they had been in the 1960s. Indeed now they were well-equipped with modern weapons, and although many were still untrained, an increasing number had received training in Communist bloc and other sympathetic countries. Weapons fielded included AK47 and SKS

SKS

The SKS is a Soviet semi-automatic carbine chambered for the 7.62x39mm round, designed in 1945 by Sergei Gavrilovich Simonov. SKS is an acronym for Samozaryadniy Karabin sistemi Simonova , 1945 , or SKS 45...

assault rifles, RPD

RPD

The RPD is a 7.62mm light machine gun developed in the Soviet Union by Vasily Degtyaryov for the intermediate 7.62x39mm M43 cartridge. It was created as a replacement for the DP machine gun chambered for the 7.62x54mmR Mosin rifle round. It is a precursor of most SAW's -History:Work on the weapon...

and RPK

RPK

The RPK is a 7.62x39mm light machine gun of Soviet design, developed by Mikhail Kalashnikov in the late 1950s, parallel with the AKM assault rifle...

light machine guns, as well as RPG-2

RPG-2

The RPG-2 was the first rocket-propelled grenade launcher designed in the Soviet Union.-Development:The RPG-2 , was a man-portable, shoulder-launched rocket propelled grenade anti-armor weapon...

and RPG-7

RPG-7

The RPG-7 is a widely-produced, portable, shoulder-launched, anti-tank rocket propelled grenade weapon. Originally the RPG-7 and its predecessor, the RPG-2, were designed by the Soviet Union, and now manufactured by the Bazalt company...

rocket propelled grenade launchers. Just how well equipped the nationalists had become only became evident from Rhodesian raids on guerrilla base areas which even revealed mortars as well as 12.7mm and 14.5mm heavy machine guns, and even heavier calibre weapons such as 122mm multiple rocket launchers towards the end of the war.

On 3 April 1977, General Peter Walls

Peter Walls

Lieutenant General George Peter Walls served as the Commander of the Combined Operations Headquarters of the Military of Rhodesia, and later Zimbabwe, from 1977 until his retirement on 29 July 1980 during the Rhodesian Bush War. He lives in exile in Eastern Cape, South Africa.-Military...

announced the government would launch a campaign to win the "hearts and minds" of Rhodesia's black citizens. In May Walls received reports of ZANLA forces massing in the city of Mapai

Mapai, Mozambique

- History :In June 1976 a Selous Scouts attack from Rhodesia named Operation Long John was launched on the ZANLA transit camp in Mapai and Chicualacuala...

in Gaza Province

Gaza Province

Gaza is a province of Mozambique. It has an area of 75,709 km² and a population of 1,333,106 .Xai-Xai is the capital of the province. Located to the east is the Inhambane Province, to the north is Manica Province, and to the south is Maputo Province....

, Mozambique

Mozambique

. Prime Minister Smith gave Walls permission to destroy the base. Walls told the media the Rhodesian forces were changing tactics from contain and hold to search and destroy

Search and destroy

Search and Destroy, Seek and Destroy, or even simply S&D, refers to a military strategy that became a notorious component of the Vietnam War. The idea was to insert ground forces into hostile territory, search out the enemy, destroy them, and withdraw immediately afterwards...

, "adopting hot pursuit when necessary."

On 30 May 1977, 500 troops passed the border and travelled 60 miles to Mapai, engaging the ZANLA forces with air cover from the Rhodesian Air Force and paratroopers in C-47 Dakotas. The Rhodesian government said the military killed 32 ZANLA fighters and lost one Rhodesian pilot. The Mozambican government disputed the number of casualties, saying it shot down three Rhodesian planes and a helicopter and took several troops prisoner, all of which Minister of Combined Operations Roger Hawkins denied. The United Nations Security Council subsequently denounced the incursion of the "illegal racist minority regime in Southern Rhodesia" into Mozambique in Resolution 411, on 30 June 1977. Walls announced a day later that the Rhodesian military would occupy Mapai until they had eliminated ZANLA's presence. Kurt Waldheim

Kurt Waldheim

Kurt Josef Waldheim was an Austrian diplomat and politician. Waldheim was the fourth Secretary-General of the United Nations from 1972 to 1981, and the ninth President of Austria, from 1986 to 1992...

, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, condemned the incident on 1 June, and Rhodesian forces withdrew. The American, British, and Soviet governments also condemned the raid.

Militants bombed Woolworth's department store in Salisbury

Harare

on 11 August, killing 11 and injuring 70. They killed sixteen black civilians in eastern Rhodesia on 21 August, burning their homes on a white-owned farm. In November, 1977, in response to the buildup of ZANLA guerrillas in Mozambique, Rhodesian forces launched Operation Dingo

Operation Dingo

Operation Dingo, also known as the Chimoio massacre was a major raid conducted by the Rhodesian Security Forces against the ZANLA headquarters of Robert Mugabe at Chimoio and a smaller camp at Tembue in Mozambique from November 23-25, 1977...

, a pre-emptive combined arms surprise attack on guerrilla camps at Chimoio and Tembue in Mozambique. The attack was carried out over three days, from November 23 to 25, 1977. While these operations reportedly inflicted thousands of casualties on Robert Mugabe's ZANLA cadres, probably blunting guerrilla incursions in the months that followed, a steady intensification of the insurgency neverthless continued through 1978.

In order to disrupt FRELIMO's hold on Mozambique, the Rhodesian Central Intelligence Organization

Central Intelligence Organization

The Central Intelligence Organisation is the national intelligence agency or "secret police" of Zimbabwe.-History:The CIO was formed in Rhodesia on the instructions of Prime Minister Winston Field in 1963 at the dissolution of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, and took over from the...

helped to create and support its own insurgency movement within Mozambique. This guerrilla group, known as RENAMO battled with FRELIMO even as Rhodesian forces fought the ZANLA within Mozambique.
In May 1978, 50 civilians were killed in crossfire exchanged between Marxist militants and the Rhodesian military, the highest number of civilians to be killed in an engagement up to that point. In July Patriotic Front members killed 39 black civilians and the Rhodesian government killed 106 militants. On 4 November 1978 Walls said 2,000 Patriotic Front militants had been persuaded to defect and fight for the Rhodesian Security Forces. In reality only 50 militants defected.
In 1978 450 ZANLA militants crossed the Mozambique border and attacked the town of Umtali

Mutare

Mutare is the fourth largest city in Zimbabwe, with a population of approximately 170,106. It is the capital of Manicaland province.-History:...

. At the time ZANU said the militants were women, an unusual characteristic, but in 1996 Joyce Mujuru

Joyce Mujuru

Joice Mujuru is a Zimbabwean politician, currently serving as Vice President of Zimbabwe. She has held this post since December 2004, and is also Vice President of ZANU-PF...

said the vast majority involved were men and ZANU concocted the story to make Western organizations believe women were involved in the fighting. In retaliation for these acts the Rhodesian Air Force bombed guerrilla camps 125 miles inside Mozambique, using 'fatigued' Canberra B2

English Electric Canberra

aircraft and Hawker Hunter

Hawker Hunter

s — actively, but clandestinely, supported by several of the more capable Canberra B(I)12 aircraft of the South African Air Force

South African Air Force

The South African Air Force is the air force of South Africa, with headquarters in Pretoria. It is the world's second oldest independent air force, and its motto is Per Aspera Ad Astra...

. A number of joint-force bomber raids on guerrilla encampments and assembly areas in Mozambique and Zambia were mounted in 1978, and extensive air reconnaissance and surveillance of guerrilla encampments and logistical build-up was carried out by the South African Air Force on behalf of the RhAF. In October, 1978 Rhodesian Air Force Canberra bombers, Hunter fighter-bombers and helicopter gunships attacked the ZIPRA guerrilla base at Westlands farm near Lusaka, Zambia while Zambian forces were warned by radio not to interfere.

The increased effectiveness of the bombing and follow-up 'air mobile' strikes using Dakota

C-47 Skytrain

-dropped parachutists and helicopter 'air cav' techniques had a significant effect on the development of the conflict. As late as September 1979, despite the increased sophistication of guerrilla forces in Mozambique, a raid by Selous Scouts, with artillery and air support, on "New Chimoio" still reportedly resulted in heavy ZANLA casualties.
However, a successful raid on the Rhodesian strategic fuel reserves in Salisbury

Harare

also underscored the importance of concluding a negotiated settlement and achieving international recognition before the war expanded further.

The larger problem was that by 1979, combined ZIRPA and ZANLA strength inside Rhodesia totalled at least 12,500 guerrillas and it was evident that insurgents were entering the country at a rate greater than the Rhodesian forces could kill or capture. In addition, 22,000 ZIPRA and 16,000 ZANLA fighters remained uncommitted outside the country. Joshua Nkomo's ZIPRA forces were preparing their forces in Zambia with the intent of confronting the Rhodesians through a conventional invasion. Whether such an invasion could have been successful in the short term against the well trained Rhodesian army and air force is questionable. However, what was clear was that the insurgency was growing in strength daily and the ability of the security forces to continue to control the entire country was coming under serious challenge.

By putting the civilian population at risk, ZIPRA and the ZANLA had been particularly effective in creating conditions that accelerated white emigration. This not only seriously undermined the morale of the white population, it was also gradually reducing the availability of trained reserves for the army and the police. For a discussion see: The economy was also suffering badly as a result of the war with the Rhodesian GDP in consistent decline in the late 1970s.

Politically, the Rhodesians were therefore pinning all their hopes on the "internal" political settlement that had been negotiated with moderate black nationalist leaders in 1978 and its ability to achieve external recognition and support. This internal settlement led to the creation of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia under a new constitution in 1979.

Resolution

Under the agreement of March 1978, the country was to be known as Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, and in the general election of 24 April 1979, Bishop Abel Muzorewa

Abel Muzorewa

Bishop Abel Tendekayi Muzorewa served as Prime Minister of Zimbabwe Rhodesia from the Internal Settlement to the Lancaster House Agreement in 1979...

became the country's first black prime minister. The factions led by Nkomo and Mugabe denounced the new government as a puppet of white Rhodesians and fighting continued. The hoped for recognition of the internal settlement, and of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, by the newly elected Conservative

Conservative Party (UK)

The Conservative and Unionist Party, more commonly known as the Conservative Party, is a political party in the United Kingdom that adheres to a right wing ideology of conservatism and British unionism...

government of Margaret Thatcher

Margaret Thatcher

Margaret Hilda Thatcher, Baroness Thatcher, LG, OM, PC, FRS served as Prime Minister of the United Kingdom from 1979 to 1990 and Leader of the Conservative Party from 1975 to 1990...

did not materialize after the latter's election in May, 1979. Likewise, despite the fact that the US Senate voted to lift sanctions against Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, the Carter administration also refused to recognize the internal settlement.

While Prime Minister Thatcher clearly sympathized with the internal settlement and thought of the ZANLA and ZIPRA leaders as "terrorists", she was prepared to support a push for further compromise if it could end the fighting. Britain was also reluctant to recognize the internal settlement for fear of fracturing the unity of the Commonwealth

Commonwealth

Commonwealth is a traditional English term for a political community founded for the common good. Historically, it has sometimes been synonymous with "republic".More recently it has been used for fraternal associations of some sovereign nations....

. Thus later in 1979, the Thatcher government called a peace conference in London to which all nationalist leaders were invited. The outcome of this conference would become known as the Lancaster House Agreement. During the conference, the Zimbabwe-Rhodesian Government accepted a watering down of the 1978 internal settlement while Mugabe and Nkomo agreed to end the war in exchange for new elections in which they could participate. The economic sanctions imposed on the country were lifted in late 1979, and British rule resumed under a transitional arrangement leading to full independence. On 21 December 1979 a cease-fire was subsequently announced.

The elections of 1980 resulted in a victory for Robert Mugabe, who assumed the post of prime minister after ZANU-PF

Zimbabwe African National Union - Patriotic Front

The Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front is a Zimbabwean political party that was the ruling government in Zimbabwe since independence in 1980, led by Robert Mugabe, first as Prime Minister with the party simply known as ZANU, and then as President from 1988 after taking over ZAPU and...

received 63% of the vote. Accusations of voter intimidation by Mugabe's guerrilla cadres, sections of which were accused of not having assembled in the designated guerrilla assembly points as required under the Lancaster House Agreement, may have led the Rhodesian military to give serious consideration to a coup d'etat in March 1980. This alleged coup was to have included the assassination of Mugabe and coordinated assaults on ZANLA guerrilla assembly points within the country. However, even in the context of alleged voter intimidation by ZANLA elements, widespread support for Mugabe from large sections of the black population (in particular from his own Shona

Shona

tribal group which made up the overwhelming majority of the country's population) could not be seriously disputed. Moreover, the clear absence of any external support for such a coup, and the inevitable conflagration that would have engulfed the country thereafter, scuttled the plan.

The result was that on 18 April 1980 the country gained independence and international recognition. Two years later the government changed the name of the country's capital from Salisbury to Harare

Harare

Aftermath

Following independence, Robert Mugabe acted incrementally to consolidate his power.

Fighting between ZANLA and ZIPRA units broke out in 1981 and led to what has become known as Gukurahundi (Shona: "the early rain which washes away the chaff before the spring rains")) or the Matabeleland Massacres, which ran from 1982 until 1985. Mugabe used his North Korean trained Fifth Brigade to crush any resistance in Matabeleland. It has been estimated that 20,000 Matabele were murdered in these first years after the war.

Beyond Zimbabwe's borders, as a result of Rhodesian aid and support for RENAMO, the Bush War also led to the outbreak of the Mozambique Civil War, which lasted from 1977 until 1992. That conflict claimed about 30 times the number of lives lost in the Rhodesian War and also led to some 5 million people being made homeless.

External links

Rhodesian Bush War historical research / discussion forum
FireForce Operations: Helicopter Warfare in Rhodesia: 1962–80
The Selous Scouts Home Page a site with a lot of information on the war in general and in the Selous Scouts in particular
Rhodesian and South African Military History: An extensive collection of histories and analysis of Rhodesian and South African military operations, to the early 1980s
Rhodesian Special Forces roll of honour, awards and images.
The bush war Leopard: Leopard, Rhodesian Bush War landmine resisting vehicle.
The Black Devils: the Rhodesian Armoured Car Regiment
Nyadzonya Raid: Selous Scouts raid on the Nyadzonya Camp in Mozambique.

Externals- SLATED BY TIME

2010-11-12T03:23:00.000-08:00

Monday, Jun. 13, 1977

RHODESIA: Smith Takes a Dangerous New Gamble

Even as Britain and the U.S. continue to press Prime Minister Ian Smith's regime in Rhodesia toward accepting black majority rule, "Smithy" lashed out at nationalist guerrillas operating from across the border in Mozambique. The incident could further diminish the chances of a settlement and inflame the situation in southern Africa.
For weeks, Rhodesia's Supreme Military Commander, Lieut. General Peter Walls, had been receiving intelligence reports of a guerrilla force building up in southwestern Mozambique. Faced with a security problem that would further extend his hard-pressed troops, Walls asked Smith for permission to make a punitive raid on Mozambique's Gaza province, a key infiltration and supply route. Smith readily gave him the go-ahead. Last week the first columns of Rhodesian army trucks, carrying some 500 troops, rolled across the Mozambican border shortly after daybreak and headed toward the village of Mapai, 60 miles away. Overhead, Rhodesian air force planes provided cover, while low-flying C-47 Dakotas disgorged teams of paratroopers.
This raid was significantly different from other search-and-destroy missions the Rhodesian military has mounted in its four-year war with the guerrillas. No sooner had the troops crossed the border than the Salisbury government announced the attack—and declared that they would stay in Mozambique as long as necessary to complete the job.
News of the mission was received by many Rhodesian whites with satisfaction; successful or not, the raid was a way of venting their frustrations at living for so long with uncertainty and terror. The international response was anger and outrage. Washington publicly denounced both Smith's government and the raid into Mozambique as illegal. To emphasize the point, South Africa's ambassador to Washington, Donald Sole (who represents Rhodesia's interests), was informed of the Administration's displeasure by National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski. Britain also sent Smith a stern message, and the two countries began drawing up a resolution of condemnation to put before the United Nations Security Council.
Mission Accomplished. Whether or not the warnings had their intended effect, the Rhodesians reported their mission accomplished after five days at Mapai, and packed up to return home. The joint operations command in Salisbury announced that 32 guerrillas had been killed and only one Rhodesian—a pilot who was shot down after taking off from the airstrip at Mapai. For its part, Mozambique reported that it shot down three Rhodesian planes and a helicopter, and engaged the Rhodesian forces in "heavy fighting." Minister of Combined Operations Roger Hawkins denied such claims, as well as Mozambique's announcement that a number of Rhodesian troops had been taken prisoner.
Considering the size and scope of the operation, there was little evidence of any major gains. Even the cache of weapons displayed from the operation turned out to be unconvincing. TIME Correspondent William McWhirter, who landed at the dusty airstrip at Chiredzi in southeastern Rhodesia, reports: "Spread out on two canvas aprons on the brown grass were two small heaps that looked like the remains from a weapons picnic or the last leftovers from some outdoor arms fair. There were a couple of rocket launchers, several assault rifles and ancient carbines, some mortars with rounds. The sad little arrangements were all there was to show from the drama and bravado of the week.
"The Communist-supplied weapons, mainly Soviet, were still wrapped in their wooden packing crates—a reminder of the fresh arsenals flowing into the frontline states. Among the prize exhibits was a deadly 14.5-mm. antiaircraft gun with glistening gold-and red-tipped bullets. There was also a Czech-made land mine of Bakelite, undetectable with any of the usual metal devices used by the army. Like the other arms on display, the weapons were newer than the Rhodesians' equipment."
In an interview with McWhirter, Minister Hawkins insisted that the raid was purely a military operation stemming "from our inherent right of self-defense." But did Smith have political motives in authorizing the mission? Western diplomats noted that the raid began the same morning an Anglo-American negotiating team, headed by British Diplomat John Graham and U.S. Ambassador to Zambia Stephen Low, left Salisbury for the Mozambican capital of Maputo. Their mission: to discuss a possible settlement with Black Nationalist Leader Robert Mugabe, head of the Zimbabwe African National Union and co-chairman with Joshua Nkomo of the Patriotic Front, the joint guerrilla force that is recognized by the frontline states as the sole legitimate liberation movement. Smith opposes U.S.British demands that any settlement include the guerrilla leaders. He wants the negotiators to come around to his own "internal solution"—meaning turning power over to black moderate Bishop Abel Muzorewa, who leads the nonmilitary United African National Council. The timing of the raid, a top Whitehall source told TIME, was "a very strange coincidence. Our assumption [of Smith's sincerity] has been badly shaken."
There was little doubt that Smith hoped the raid and its attendant publicity would boost flagging morale. More than 1,000 whites are leaving Rhodesia each month, fearful both of the expanding civil war and their doubtful future under majority rule. Others who want to stay are convinced that a quick and equitable settlement is necessary. Still, when word trickled out that "the boys" were returning from the supposedly successful raid, many whites were cheered.
Lost Time. Rhodesian blacks were more apprehensive. They recall a similar search-and-destroy operation last August on a U.N.-sponsored refugee camp in Mozambique that reportedly killed some 700 civilians (the Rhodesians claimed to have killed 320 guerrillas). "We fear this place could become like Angola," said a black insurance salesman in Salisbury. "Why can't they all talk? We're frightened of what might happen next." Added a leading black lawyer: "It's an open invitation to [Mozambican President Samora] Machel to get someone to help him. The danger is getting the Russians and the Cubans in. I don't believe the Africans really want them. But Smith has exacerbated the problem, and every minute lost arriving at a settlement is a minute gained for Communism."
Although the mission was humiliating evidence that Rhodesian forces can cross Mozambique's borders any time they choose, Machel's government downplayed the raid as "just another aggression." Mozambique officials believe that Smith was merely trying to up the ante by raising the stakes of Mozambique's support for the guerrillas—and perhaps forcing Maputo to seek outside help. That in turn, they theorized, would justify Smith's seeking help from South Africa. If Smith did have such a Machiavellian motive, he was apparently mistaken. A top aide said that South African Prime Minister John Vorster was "dismayed" by the raid, adding that "the last thing the Prime Minister wants is to see a full-scale Cuban or Nigerian or Somalian involvement to protect Mozambique." Already under fire from the U.S. and other Western powers for his government's apartheid policies, Vorster has enough trouble of his own.

ZAF raids into mozambique

2010-11-12T03:13:00.001-08:00

RAIDS ON GORONGOSSA
Zimbabwe's Military Involvement in Mozambique1982 - 1992

by NORMAN MLAMBO

Norman Mlambo is a Zimbabwean PhD student in the Department of History at the University of Cape Town.
1: Introduction

2: The Political Economy of Zimbabwe's Trade Routes

3: The Three Corridors: Beira, Limpopo and Tete

3.1 The Beira Corridor

3.2 The Limpopo Corridor

3.3 The Tete Corridor

4: Raids on Gorongossa

4.1 The First Raid on Gorongossa

4.2 The Second Raid on Gorongossa

5: Other Operations 1986--1990

6: The Air Element

6.1 Routine Operations

6.2 Aircraft Accidents

7: ZDF Expenditure in Mozambique

7.1 The Zimbabwe Defence Budget

7.2 Army Expenditure

7.3 Air Force Expenditure

8: Casualties

9: Withdrawal of Zimbabwean Troops from Mozambique

10: Conclusion

Bibliography and Footnotes

1: Introduction

For ten years, the Zimbabwe Defence Forces (ZDF) were deployed in Mozambique helping that country's government in their fight against the Mozambique National Resistance Movement (Renamo). Although Zimbabwe's military involvement was formally requested by the Mozambican Government in 1985, Zimbabwean troops were already deployed along the Mutare - Beira route and along the Nyamapanda - Zobue route long before 1985. The Mozambican request therefore only served to regularise an already existing situation, and to legitimise the ZDF presence in Mozambique since 1982. Although Zimbabwe's military involvement in Mozambique between 1982 and 1992 was mainly to protect Zimbabwe's trade routes through Mozambique, that involvement ended up having far-reaching political and military implications. The political and ideological twist that the war took has been explained in terms of the Cold War in which certain governments (e.g. USA, South Africa) supported Renamo while other governments (e.g. Soviet Union, China) supported the then Marxist regimes of Mozambique and Zimbabwe. This paper will concentrate on the military operations carried out by the ZDF in Mozambique because the political and economic aspects of the war have already been covered in another paper¹.
This paper will argue that from a military and operational perspective, the Mozambican operations overstretched the ZDF to the limit. While the Zimbabwean forces won a number of important military battles in Mozambique, they did not succeed in eliminating Renamo's threat along Zimbabwe's three main trade routes through Mozambique. The most important ZDF military successes were undermined by the inability of the Mozambican Armed Forces (FAM) to hold any of the bases captured from Renamo. Furthermore, the operations were also very expensive to the ZDF in terms of manpower, equipment and money, and there were a lot of incidents, which led to an unnecessary loss of life and equipment. The ZDF did not use proper accounting methods to evaluate the costs of the war effort, and no accurate financial records were kept detailing the amount of resources which were used. Thus, it is almost impossible to quantify the economic impact of Zimbabwe's military involvement in Mozambique during the period 1982 - 1992.

2: The Political Economy Of Zimbabwe's Trade Routes

Zimbabwe is a landlocked country, and her imports and exports therefore depend on trade routes through neighbouring countries, particularly South Africa and Mozambique. This situation has made the quest for easy access to the sea a dominant factor in determining Zimbabwe's geo - politics for over a century. Efforts to secure the port of Beira as Rhodesia's outlet to the sea were started by Cecil John Rhodes in 1890². Mozambique was then under Portuguese rule and an Anglo - Portuguese Convention of 1881 did not allow an independent Rhodesian route through Beira. However, after a lot of lobbying Rhodesia was granted "freedom of transit" through Portuguese territory, and in 1892 Cecil John Rhodes started the construction of a railway line from Beira to Salisbury (now Harare)³.
Rhodes also started the extension of the Cape railway line, which reached Bulawayo in November 1897 and Salisbury in 1902. These transport routes were further developed through the years not only to give Rhodesia easy access to the sea, but to serve the exploitative interests of the colonial power, Britain. The main aim was to make it easier for the colony to export raw materials to Britain, especially minerals and agricultural products.
In 1965, Ian Smith unilaterally declared Southern Rhodesia's independence from Britain (UDI), and the United Nations responded by imposing economic and other sanctions against the Smith regime. However, Mozambique, which was still under Portuguese rule, and apartheid South Africa, did not enforce these sanctions. Rhodesia preferred to use the Mozambican routes which were both shorter and much cheaper than the South African routes, and the Portuguese allowed the Rhodesians to maintain customs offices at both Beira and Lourenco Marques (now Maputo).
When it became obvious that Mozambique would soon gain its independence, there was a fear that the new Mozambican government would impose the United Nations sanctions against Rhodesia and close the country's two trading routes. This would leave only the South African routes open to Rhodesia. To reinforce the South African routes, in 1974 another railway line to Durban via Beit Bridge was constructed in only 93 days⁴. By the end of 1974 Rhodesia had a network of transport corridors to the sea as shown in table 1.

Table 1: Rhodesia�s Transport Corridors, 1974

*Route*	*Length*	*Year Opened*
Harare - Beira	602km	1898
Harare - Maputo via Chicualacuala	1 269km	1955
Harare - Durban via Beit Bridge	2 066km	1974
Harare - East London via Botswana	2 370km	1897
Harare - Cape Town via Kimberley	2 657km	1902

Source: Zimbabwe National Transport Study (Swedish International Development Authority, Stockholm, 1985), p.13. In 1975 Mozambique became independent from Portugal, and as predicted, in 1976 closed its border with Rhodesia, and all Rhodesia's trade had to go through South Africa. The South African government never imposed sanctions against the Smith regime, and in fact South Africa became Rhodesia's "intermediary" in international trade. Rhodesia was already heavily dependent on South Africa as a trading partner, as a major investor, and as an ally in sanctions busting. The rerouting of all her trade via South Africa enforced Rhodesia's dependency on South Africa and made her economy more fully integrated into the South African economy.
When Rhodesia became independent as Zimbabwe in 1980, it was only logical that the country would move back to using the shorter and cheaper Mozambican routes. The new government decided to "disengage" from the South African trade routes by reintroducing the Beira - Mutare "corridor" for both economic and political reasons. The economic rationale for this decision becomes obvious when one compares the distances and prices of transporting various items to Zimbabwe from Beira and South African ports (see table 2)

Table 2. Comparison of Transport Costs: Durban/Beira to Zimbabwe

	Durban Z$	Beira Z$	Saving Z$	% Saving
Exports
Tobacco unit trains	2 732	1 701	1 031	38
Tobacco non-unit trains	2 853	1 618	1 235	43
Other cargo unit trains
Harare	3 036	1 787	1 249	41
Bulawayo	3 007	N/A	N/A	N/A
Mutare	3 155	N/A	N/A	N/A
Other cargo non-unit trains
Harare	3 209	1 629	1 580	49
Bulawayo	3 180	1 864	1 316	41
Mutare	3 328	1 325	2 003	60
Imports
Harare	3 745	2 034	1 711	46
Bulawayo	3 613	2 343	1 270	35
Mutare	3 825	1 526	2 299	60

Source: BCG Bulletin No.19 (August 1990) The decision to "disengage" from the South African routes was also in line with the objectives of the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC), of which Zimbabwe was a member⁵. SADCC was formed on the 1st of April 1980 when the nine founder members (Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe) signed the document entitled "Southern Africa: Towards Economic Liberation" in Lusaka, Zambia.
One of the objectives of SADCC was "the reduction of economic dependence, particularly, but not only on South Africa". The transport and communications sector was identified as a key area in the Lusaka Declaration and therefore, a Southern African Transport and Communications Commission (SATCC) was also established to co-ordinate regional transport projects⁶. This regional transport co-ordination was necessary in view of the fact that six of the member states of SADCC are landlocked and were relying heavily on South African transport routes thus making them vulnerable to South Africa's acts of destabilisation.
Another crucial factor that influenced Zimbabwe's decision to "disengage" from South African transport routes was the apartheid regime's concerted efforts to use its economic power to try and bludgeon Zimbabwe into political and diplomatic concessions⁷. As a result of the outspoken position against apartheid and the socialist rhetoric from the Zimbabwean government, by November 1980, more than 50 000 tonnes of Zimbabwean goods were being deliberately held at South African ports. In 1981 there was a fertiliser shortage in Zimbabwe while 300 000 tonnes of the country's freight was being held in South Africa, including three shipments of fertiliser. In April the same year, the South African Railways (SAR) announced the end of its trade agreement with the National Railways of Zimbabwe (NRZ), and demanded the return of 24 diesel locomotives leased to the NRZ. A transport crisis ensued and by the end of the year, more than Z$100 million worth of exports was being held up inside Zimbabwe for lack of transport to the ports⁸.
The "maize train" was the first major freight to be re-routed via the Beira Corridor, but the line came under immediate attack from Renamo. Renamo was created by the Rhodesian Security Forces in the 1970s to destabilise the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA), the military wing of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), which was fighting against the Smith regime from Mozambique. After the independence of Zimbabwe, control of Renamo was taken over by the South African Defence Force (SADF) who used it to destabilise neighbouring countries⁹. Since 1976, Renamo had managed to cripple Mozambique through acts of sabotage. In the 1980s, apartheid South Africa found another task for Renamo, that of sabotaging Zimbabwe's transport routes through Mozambique.
On 29 October 1981, the railway and road bridges over the Pungwe River were blown up together with Zimbabwe's oil pipeline, which runs under the road bridge¹⁰. In December 1982, the oil storage depot at Maforga was also blown up. The resulting fuel shortage in Zimbabwe was so critical that road traffic was brought to a virtual stand still. Queues of vehicles at filling stations stretched several kilometres and at one point there was only one day's supply of petrol and two days' supply of diesel for the whole country¹¹. A national disaster was only averted by the clandestine movement of fuel by rail from Maputo via Komatipoort in South Africa to Beit Bridge. This line had been used as a sanctions-busting route for Rhodesia during the UDI era. When apartheid South Africa cut off that connection as well, the National Railways of Zimbabwe also blocked South African cargo to and from Zambia and Zaire. It was only then that Zimbabwean freight was released from South African ports and allowed to reach Zimbabwe.
In March 1981 South Africa gave one year's notice that it would abrogate the special bilateral trade agreement whereby Rhodesia had been allowed access at reduced duties to South Africa's protected market. The chronic state of uncertainty, which was created by that announcement, drove many South African buyers away from the Zimbabwean market even before the date of the end of the agreement¹².
The government of Zimbabwe therefore faced real economic and political pressures for the reopening of trade routes through Mozambique. Part of the economic rationale was that, even in a post - apartheid Southern Africa, there would still be a need to move away from South Africa both to reduce transportation costs and to try and balance economic benefits within the region in accordance with the aims of SADCC.

3: The Three Corridors - Beira, Limpopo And Tete

3.1 The Beira Corridor

This corridor contains four transport systems linking the Mozambican port of Beira on the Indian Ocean to the city of Mutare on the eastern border of Zimbabwe. The four systems are the railway line, the road, the oil pipeline and an electric powerline. The railway line was built by Cecil John Rhodes in 1898 and runs for 314 kilometres between Mutare and Beira. The oil pipeline from Beira to Feruka near Mutare was built by LONRHO in 1965. The pipeline runs parallel to the tarmac road that stretches from Machipanda on the Zimbabwean border to Beira. The electric powerline is a Mozambican line, which runs alongside the road from Chicamba Real Dam near Manica all the way to Beira. The rehabilitation of the Beira Corridor was SADCC's highest priority programme, with SATCC publishing a ten-year development plan in May 1985. Control of the project was vested with the Beira Corridor Authority (BCA), a Mozambican parastatal body formed in 1985. The BCA worked hand in hand with the Beira Corridor Group (BCG), a user lobby and limited liability private company based in Zimbabwe. Technical assistance was obtained mostly from the Nordic countries and donor and soft loan funding was secured for capital and manpower by March 1986. The Beira Corridor was designated a protected area by the SADCC and security was to be maintained by Mozambican and Zimbabwean security forces.

3.2 The Limpopo Corridor

This corridor comprises a rail link from Chicualacuala on the Zimbabwe - Mozambique border to the port of Maputo. The railway line was opened in 1955 and is 534 kilometres long. A road runs alongside the railway line, but by 1990 the road was only tarred between Barragem (where it crosses the Limpopo River), and Maputo, a very short distance. By 1974, this railway line carried 34 percent of Rhodesia's total exports. At its operational peak in 1974, Maputo was the largest port in Southern Africa after Durban. At Zimbabwe's independence in 1980, there was an increase in trade, but the line was effectively closed in 1984 due to increased Renamo attacks. The rehabilitation of the Limpopo Corridor started in 1987 when the National Railways of Zimbabwe (NRZ) was contracted under a SADCC programme to replace the worn out wooden railway sleepers with concrete sleepers. The NRZ also had to replace the light 30-kilo-per-metre railway line for a 40-kilo-per-metre continuously welded line. The British Government provided the funding and a British company, Plessey, won the contract for the reinstallation of the radio and teleprinter links.
Security from Renamo attacks was to be provided by Mozambican and Zimbabwean armed forces. To this end, the British Government financed the training of five companies of Mozambican troops at Nyanga in Zimbabwe under the British Military Advisory and Training Team (BMATT) scheme. The British also provided funding to the ZDF and to the FAM, for "non - lethal" equipment for the units guarding the Limpopo Corridor.

3.3 The Tete Corridor

This corridor is a tarred 263-kilometre road running from Nyamapanda on the Zimbabwean border through the Mozambican city of Tete to Zobue on the Malawi border. After UDI in 1965, this route carried Rhodesian goods to and from Malawi, which had not applied United Nations sanctions against the Smith regime. After the independence of Mozambique in 1974, the bulk of Malawi's trade with South Africa went through Rhodesia by road via Tete. It was only in 1984 that trade via this route declined because of Renamo attacks. It was in the wake of these developments that in June 1984 the governments of Malawi, Mozambique and Zimbabwe formed a joint security committee¹³. The aim of the committee was to monitor operations on a day - to - day basis and to attempt to remove all security threats along the Tete Corridor. Zimbabwe's First Mechanised Battalion was ordered to move into Mozambique and they established their headquarters in Tete thereby securing the strategic bridge crossing the Zambezi River. In 1985, President Samora Machel of Mozambique formally requested the governments of Tanzania and Zimbabwe to contribute troops for "the restoration of law and order" in Mozambique. Following this request, Tanzanian troops were deployed into Mozambique in the provinces north of the Zambezi River while Zimbabwe undertook to help restore law and order in the provinces south of the Zambezi River.
The decision to send Zimbabwean troops to help restore law and order in Mozambique was partly influenced by Zimbabwe's close relationship with the Mozambican government which dates back to Frelimo's assistance during Zimbabwe's war of liberation. There was also the underlying fact that Frelimo and ZANU shared a common Marxist ideology of scientific socialism. The South Africa-backed Renamo professed to be an anti - communist movement, just like Jonas Savimbi's Unita movement, which was fighting against the Marxist MPLA government of Angola. There was thus an ideological alliance of the Maputo - Harare - Luanda axis, with support for these governments from the Soviet Union. The fact that the United States of America was providing covert and overt support to opposition movements such as Unita in Angola and Renamo in Mozambique reflected the extension of the Cold War to Southern Africa. It was Zimbabwe's involvement in this complicated situation that deteriorated into what some critics have called "Zimbabwe's Vietnam"¹⁴.

4: Raids On Gorongossa

The first comprehensive intelligence on the importance of Renamo bases along the Gorongossa Mountains in Mozambique came from some Renamo elements that had been captured near Katiyo in north - eastern Zimbabwe. Some Renamo elements had crossed from Mozambique into Zimbabwe several times, had robbed some shops along the border and had burned down a timber factory. After several meetings with Mozambican officials it was agreed that the ZDF could pursue into Mozambique any Renamo elements that might have committed atrocities in Zimbabwe. This was the basis on which the ZDF started planning follow up operations which took them deep into Mozambique and all the way to Gorongossa.

4.1 The First Raid on Gorongossa.

Operation Lemon. The first of these ZDF follow up operations was launched from Katiyo and Aberdeen and it was code named Operation Lemon. The operation lasted from the 5-9 December 1984. It comprised elements of 3 Brigade, the Para - Group, Special Air Service (SAS), and was supported by the Air Force of Zimbabwe (AFZ). Bad weather conditions and the difficult mountainous terrain reduced the use of aircraft, and all the trooping had to be done by helicopters. The movement of troops on the ground was also difficult. Four contacts were made and two Renamo bases were destroyed. However, most Renamo elements in the bases managed to escape and only eight were captured. The ZDF considered this operation as a major failure and the code word Lemon was corrupted to mean any failure in all subsequent operations. From the captured Renamo elements it was learned that one of the destroyed bases held approximately 100 Renamo elements. It was further established that there were no other permanent bases in the area, only some advance posts and temporary bases used by Renamo as launching pads for food raids into Zimbabwe. It was also revealed for the first time that the main Renamo bases were at Messinse, Chito, Nyazonia, Buetoni, Gorongossa, Central Base and Cassa Banana. The captured Renamo elements also pinpointed the grid reference of Cassa Banana. They said that it was the headquarters of Renamo and that their commander, Afonso Dhlakama, stayed at that base with more than 400 Renamo elements. It was also revealed that some Zimbabweans were being trained at Cassa Banana and that this fact was a closely guarded secret. The report on Operation Lemon concluded that the only way of getting to the bottom of these claims was to attack the Renamo headquarters in the Gorongossa Mountains.
Operation Grape Fruit. The report for Operation Lemon was taken seriously by the commanders of the ZDF, and in July 1985 preparations for major offensive operations were started. Rehearsals for a FireForce operation were carried out at Inkomo Barracks near Harare. Three infantry brigades were mobilised together with the Para Group, One Commando Battalion and the AFZ. Men and equipment were moved to Chimoio in Mozambique, with a Forward Replenishment Point (FRP) being established at Grand Reef near Mutare. The Ministry of Defence set aside Z$40 million for the offensive. It was code named Operation Grapefruit, and the mission was "to annihilate the Renamo bandits and restore law and order in Manica, Tete and Sofala provinces"¹⁵.
Intelligence sources had indicated that Renamo's main regional base in Manica province was at Muxamba and that Cassa Banana was the national stronghold of Renamo. Both bases had to be attacked and Muxamba was targeted first, being only 70 kilometres south of Chimoio. The most important consideration however, was the hope that activities around Muxamba might divert Renamo's attention from monitoring too closely the movement of the heavily armed three Zimbabwean infantry battalions marching from Chimoio towards the Gorongossa Mountains.
Muxamba was believed to hold at least 400 Renamo elements commanded by Major General Mabachi. The attack on Muxamba was launched on the 20th of August 1985 by elements of 3 Brigade, supported by the Para Group and the AFZ. The operation went on for four days with minor problems for the ZDF. One helicopter was riddled with small arms fire but managed to get back to Chimoio.
At the end of the operation, a head count of casualties revealed 40 Renamo and 30 civilian collaborators killed in the base. Captured documents revealed that Renamo had divided Mozambique into regions. In Manica and Sofala provinces these regions extended from the coast to the Zimbabwean border. Muxamba base was confirmed as having been the headquarters of Lion Region, which extended from Machipanda to Beira, and from Espungabeira to Nova Sofala. This Lion Region as a whole held a total strength of 2 000 Renamo elements who were organised into specialist units which included 40 paratroopers and 8 amphibious elements. Most of the weaponry captured at Muxamba was fairly old and mostly from the former Eastern Block countries.
Raid on Cassa Banana. Intelligence sources had indicated that Cassa Banana, Renamo's national headquarters had a strength of 400 elements. However, the organisation maintained a string of other smaller bases along the Gorongossa Mountains, which were considered as part of the main base. This raised the total estimated strength in the area to 1 000 elements. During the night of the 27th of August 1985, three Zimbabwe infantry battalions were established in their Form Up Points (FUP) with the help of the SAS and Commando elements. At Chimoio a FireForce was being given final briefing, and five AFZ planes were given orders for a first light take off for Gorongossa on the morning of the 28th of August.
Although the Renamo elements captured at Katiyo had given a grid reference for Cassa Banana, further intelligence had cast some doubt as to which of the several Renamo bases scattered on all sides of the Gorongossa Mountains was the actual headquarters of Renamo. It was because of this uncertainty that the FireForce was divided into three sections each with one helicopter gunship, two transport helicopters and two transport aircraft with paratroopers.
Each FireForce section was detailed to attack specific suspected Renamo positions around the Gorongossa Mountains. It was during this three pronged attack that one helicopter flew overhead Cassa Banana airstrip and the pilot noticed a green pickup truck disappearing into some bushes. It was then that the pilot recognised the place as that given at the briefing as Cassa Banana. The jets from ThornHill, which were already orbiting overhead a predetermined Initial Point (IP), were then talked on to the target, and the raid on Cassa Banana began.
The aircraft attacked the target, knocking out several Anti - Aircraft gun positions. Two helicopter gunships continued to hit suspected strategic positions and managed to flash out several pockets of resistance. A third helicopter was directing the dropping of the first wave of paratroopers. When the paratroopers had entered the base, the infantry battalions, which were close by, were ordered to move in and occupy strategic positions. The FireForce then moved on to deal with the several pockets of resistance from the smaller Renamo bases all along the Gorongossa Mountains. It took the whole day to silence all of these pockets of resistance.
There is no official Zimbabwean record of the number of casualties on the first raid on Cassa Banana. However, considering the amount of effort, the numbers of troops involved on both sides, and the time it took to capture the base, there must have been a lot of deaths and injuries on both sides. The leader of Renamo, Afonso Dhlakama, is said to have been deliberately allowed to escape by motorcycle in a northerly direction. He was believed to have been picked up the same day by an unidentified aircraft from an airstrip at Maringue north of Cassa Banana.
During the raid, a large quantity of weapons and documents were captured. The documents confirmed the fact that Renamo was receiving equipment and arms from South Africa, from the United States of America, and from Portugal. It was also revealed that Renamo was training some Zimbabweans who called themselves the Zimbabwe Resistance Army. Of the arms captured at Cassa Banana, most were of Eastern Block origin. The heavy field guns had all been captured from the FAM. It appears as if the South African forces on whom Renamo relied for weapons, were simply passing on to Renamo the arms they were capturing from Angola.

4.1.1. The Impact of the First Raid on Gorongossa

From August to December 1985, the ZDF continued to consolidate its position around the Gorongossa Mountains. The AFZ maintained three helicopters in the area with one transport aircraft for resupply and casualty evacuation. During early November 1985, another clearing operation was carried out around Samacueza. This was a follow up to make sure that Renamo did not regroup after their flight from Cassa Banana, and also to show a military presence before the planned withdrawal of the ZDF from the area. On the 5th of November 1985, a small base was sighted near Samacueza and the FireForce was ordered to engage it. However, the canon of the helicopter gunship jammed on initial firing and the Renamo elements disappeared in the five minutes that it took to clear the gun from a safe distance. The search and destroy missions that followed prolonged the operations around Samacueza with grave consequences for the ZDF. Six days later, two Allouette helicopters crashed during night operations. Three crewmembers died and both helicopters were completely written off¹⁶.
The two attacks on Muxamba and Cassa Banana, although tactically successful, could not be regarded as a strategic victory for the ZDF for various reasons. First, while these attacks destroyed Renamo's cached logistics and temporarily disorganised their command and control system, the manpower establishments were hardly affected. Of the 1 600 Renamo elements estimated to have been in the two headquarters, 200 were reported killed. This left an estimated 1 400 still at large including the leadership. After a nine-day period of radio communication confusion, Renamo appeared to have reorganised themselves and radio signals were being sent with more clarity¹⁷.
All bases were instructed to cache their arms outside their resident bases to avoid a repetition of the losses incurred at Cassa Banana. Most Renamo bases in Manica and Sofala also changed their locations. However, intelligence sources in Zimbabwe were of the opinion that Renamo could not assume a truly mobile character because of the sparse nature of the rural population on which they depended.
While the idea was still that the FAM would occupy the areas attacked and neutralised by the ZDF, the ability of the Mozambicans to do so was doubtful. The raid on Cassa Banana released thousands of civilians who had been living in areas controlled by Renamo. These people desperately needed food, medical and other essential supplies. However, considering the fact that the Mozambican Government was finding it difficult to resupply their own troops with rations, medicine, clothing and ammunition, it was improbable that they could supply these civilians whom they considered to have been collaborating with the enemy. In the mean time however, the ZDF had to feed, cloth and treat these civilians to encourage them to stay within safe distances and not run away to rejoin Renamo in the bush. This was a very expensive exercise, one that the Zimbabweans could not maintain for any length of time.
Another factor, which undermined the Zimbabwean tactical successes, was that, while they had reduced Renamo's threat by a considerable degree in Manica and Sofala, Renamo operations had been going on unchecked in other provinces. The towns of Luabo, Chinde, Morrumbala, Mopeia and Caia were still under Renamo control, with Morrumbala, Caia and Mopeia having been captured by Renamo after the fall of Cassa Banana. A substantial quantity of arms and ammunition was also captured from the Mozambican forces that were stationed in these towns. The Renamo gains in ground and equipment from these latest moves could well have compensated for their losses in Sofala province. On the other hand, it can be said that the ZDF operations managed to neutralise Renamo operations in the two provinces of Manica and Sofala. Renamo movements across, in and out of areas adjacent to the Beira Corridor decreased dramatically. Movements after the raids indicated a northward flow into Zambezia and Tete provinces.
Also, Zimbabwe intelligence reports indicated that Renamo were abandoning their main base at Matenje in Tete province and were withdrawing to Malawi. Their flight from Matenje was believed to have been prompted by the advance of two FAM battalions with a Zimbabwean escort who were moving into Casula. However, this Renamo move could have been a redeployment to Zambezia, Niassa and the northern provinces. In the final analysis, the first raids on Gorongossa did not neutralise Renamo, as the Zimbabweans had believed.

4.2. The Second Raid on Gorongossa

Operation Octopus. After the capture of Cassa Banana by the ZDF in August 1985, thousands of Renamo elements moved north towards the Zambezi River. Strategic towns along the Zambezi River such as Caia, Mutarara and Sena were captured by Renamo with very little resistance from the FAM. Generally, the area between Cassa Banana and Tete was not easily accessible and all roads and railway lines into the area had long been made unusable. The Zambezi River is navigable all the way from the Indian Ocean to Tete and the FAM were still strategically holding the town of Marromeu near the mouth of the Zambezi. The town of Marromeu boasted the largest sugar refinery in Southern Africa, and the sugar mills were still functioning. However, it was learned that Renamo was poised to attack the town and that the surrounding population was becoming sympathetic to the Renamo cause. Based on the success of the raid on Cassa Banana, the ZDF Special Task Force (STF) commander at Chimoio, Col.Magama, planned an elaborate operation into the Marromeu area. The operation was code named Octopus. The plan was encouraged by the fact that the Zimbabwean and Mozambican commanders had made an agreement in December 1985 that the Air Forces of the two countries should operate jointly in any future anti - Renamo operation. Octopus was tipped to be the first operation to test such co-operation.
Some Zimbabwean SAS elements were moved from Chimoio to the town of Marromeu with the hope of reinforcing the FAM elements in the town. When they got near Marromeu the Zimbabweans learned that Renamo had already captured the town on the 9th January 1986. The 260 FAM elements in the area had abandoned their bases with little resistance, leaving all their stores, equipment, arms and ammunition for Renamo to take over. Renamo also took control of the only tarmac runway in the area.
When the news of the capture of Marromeu by Renamo reached the STF headquarters at Chimoio, Col. Magama flew to Beira where he received orders from the FAM General Mabote to recapture Marromeu with a joint FAM - ZDF force. A plan was quickly put into place and D-Day was set for the 24th January 1986. However, there was no detailed reconnaissance to confirm the Renamo positions plotted by the SAS from their places of hiding. There was no detailed knowledge of the deployment terrain and the SAS could not ascertain how many Renamo elements were in the area. The logistical backup, such as fuel for the helicopters, the resupply of troops and means of communication was not worked out in detail. The biggest mistake however, was the assumption that aircraft would be made available from Zimbabwe for the operation. As it turned out, the AFZ did not have a single aircraft serviceable for operations at that point in time.
On the 24th January 1986, a Casa transport aircraft on a routine resupply and troop -changeover mission landed at Chimoio from Harare. The STF Headquarters took the opportunity to use the aircraft to drop some Paras and Commandos near Marromeu. Their immediate task was to recapture and secure the runway at Marromeu for the coming operation. Two Mozambican helicopters (1x Mi 25 and 1x Mi 8) were available and it was decided that these would be used to conduct a forced reconnaissance on the town to determine the exact position of the Renamo elements. Col. Magama flew in with the Mi 25 helicopter in order to direct the operation from the air. The helicopter was shot down by Renamo while in orbit overhead the runway and it crashed into the Zambezi River. Col. Magama died on the spot including two SAS members and three Mozambican crewmembers¹⁸.
The Mi 8 helicopter was also shot at but the pilot managed to fly it to Inhaminga. The Zimbabwean Casa transport aircraft only managed to drop troops but could not land to recover the victims of the Mi 25 crash because the runway had not been secured. The troops on the ground could not get near the crash site either, they could only watch from a distance as Renamo elements stripped the bodies of the victims of the crash of all clothing and equipment. They also looted everything that could be removed from the helicopter and the bodies of the victims were left to float on the Zambezi River.
For two days, frantic efforts were made to scramble aircraft for a rescue operation at Marromeu¹⁹. However, no AFZ helicopters could be made serviceable. In the end, ZDF Headquarters in Harare sent a message to Chimoio instructing them to use Mozambican aircraft for the recapture of Marromeu. On the 26th January 1986, a FireForce section was assembled at Inhaminga under the command of Col. Dyck. It included 3 x Mi 25 helicopters, 1 x Mi 8 helicopter, 2 x Antonov transport aircraft, 2 x Dakotas, 1 x Casa 212 and elements of the Zimbabwean Para Group. There were no Zimbabwean helicopters available. The FireForce intended to attack Marromeu after a jet strike planned in detail by Col. Dyck²⁰. However, the weather was so bad both in Zimbabwe and in Mozambique that the jets could not take off. By the end of the third day there was still no action and the situation on the ground at Marromeu was becoming desperate.
On the morning of the 27th January, Col.Dyck decided to use the transport aircraft at his disposal for a dawn attack on Marromeu. When the Mozambicans refused to use their aircraft at Inhaminga, he loaded paratroopers into the two Dakotas and used the Casa 212 as his command aircraft for directing troops on the ground. The Paras were dropped right overhead the runway, capturing and securing it within a matter of minutes. The Dakotas flew several waves bringing in more troops, arms and ammunition from Inhaminga and Chimoio.
With this kind of reinforcements, the troops on the ground were able to move onto the town and flash out Renamo positions. They managed at last to get to the helicopter crash site and recovered the bodies of the victims. By that afternoon the town of Marromeu had been recaptured and more aircraft could land on the runway with safety. A Casa 212 landed to pick up the victims of the Mi 25 crash.
Besides the Mi 25 victims, two more Zimbabwean soldiers died during the assault and eight were injured. They were all evacuated by air. Of the 1 300 Renamo estimated to have been in and around Marromeu, 150 were said to have been killed. The rest fled further north into Zambezia province. A large assortment of arms and ammunition were captured, among which were 2 Main Battle Tanks and 4 Anti Aircraft guns that had been captured from the FAM²¹. On the 28th January 1986, the ZDF was ordered to withdraw from both Marromeu and Inhaminga to Chimoio. The Zimbabweans were to hand over their positions to the Mozambicans. Other positions, which were also being held by the ZDF such as Fabrica, Cavalho, Canda and Cassa Banana, were also to be handed over to the FAM. The withdrawal was completed by the 31st January. By the beginning of February 1986, all Zimbabwean troops and aircraft were once again confined to the three corridors. Operation Octopus could not be sustained because of a lack of adequate air support.
Operation Zero. On the 10th February 1986, the STF Headquarters at Chimoio received an urgent signal from Villa Paiva De Andrada for air support at Cassa Banana. The message was originated by the FAM at Cassa Banana who reported that they were being attacked by a brigade size of Renamo troops. As there were no AFZ aircraft at Chimoio at the time, the message was further relayed to Beira. There was no reply from the FAM in Beira.
In the mean time, the Zimbabwean company at Villa Paiva De Andrada gathered that approximately 450 Renamo troops had recaptured Cassa Banana from the FAM, and were preparing to attack Canda and Villa Paiva De Andrada. A number of aircraft were also seen flying in and out of the area possibly resupplying Renamo. Some FAM soldiers who had fled from Cassa Banana arrived at Villa Paiva De Andrada and reported that at least ten of their number had been killed by Renamo, eight had been seriously injured and an unspecified number had been captured²². The FAM also confirmed that they had left behind a lot of equipment, which Renamo was obviously going to use.
At a meeting held on the 5th February 1986, the ZDF commanders resolved to recapture Cassa Banana from Renamo and to change the ZDF method of operation. It was proposed that a StrikeForce be created to operate in a mode similar to the Rhodesian lightning cross border raids of the 1970s. The first such StrikeForce operation was therefore proposed for the second recapture of Cassa Banana. It took the ZDF exactly two months to put together the StrikeForce with the capacity to recapture Cassa Banana, which for the purpose of planning was code named Delta Base. The whole operation for the recapture of Cassa Banana was code named Operation Zero.
The planned D-Day for Operation Zero was Friday the 11th April 1986. However, on that day again the weather was bad with rain and thick fog around Mutare and Chimoio and visibility down to less than one kilometre. The operation had to be postponed to the next day. On the morning of the next day, the Zimbabwean StrikeForce attacked Delta Base, quickly seizing the northern and southern parts of the base. There was a lot of fighting in the northern sector, with one Zimbabwean killed and three injured in the first few minutes of their landing. On the southern sector there was also a lot of resistance especially from Panda Hills and along the river south of the runway. These resistance points were however neutralised by aircraft bombs.
However, fighting continued in the outer areas of Cassa Banana and Panda Hills was occupied by the middle of the day. The preparation of defensive positions and the dropping of supplies and reinforcement troops continued throughout the rest of the day. At Chimoio, the two Mozambican generals were still discussing plans when Major General Gava informed them that the ZDF had recaptured Cassa Banana for the second time. The Mozambicans expressed disbelief, but at 14:00Hrs Major General Die passed on the message to Maputo that Cassa Banana had been recaptured from Renamo.
The consolidation of captured positions was also a difficult task. The ZDF Commanders had decided that the StrikeForce should pull out of Cassa Banana as soon as possible and that there position should be occupied by No 1 Artillery Regiment. It was also decided that 32 Infantry Battalion should recapture and occupy Cavalho. A jet strike hit Cavalho at 13:00Hrs on the 14th April to soften the target for 32 Infantry Battalion. However, on their long march from Villa Paiva De Andrada, the battalion exhausted their first line of ammunition on minor skirmishes with Renamo elements along the way. When a Renamo rocket knocked out one of their vehicles, the whole battalion was grounded and could not proceed. It was only the next day that two companies of 32 Infantry Battalion occupied Cavalho, and the other two companies were uplifted by helicopters for reinforcements at Cassa Banana. By 14th April, Operation Zero's mission had been successfully accomplished.
On 15th April 1986, a high powered Zimbabwean delegation led by Major General Gava was able to survey the recaptured areas by helicopter. They flew from Chimoio through Machesi, Cavalho, Fabrica, round Panda Hills and landed at Cassa Banana. The briefing that they received was that Operation Zero had gone well, with all the air and ground troops executing their tasks as ordered. It was reported that 3 Zimbabwean soldiers had died during the attack, and that 7 were injured, one of them seriously. The dead and injured had all been evacuated by air to Chimoio and to Harare. One helicopter had received a small bullet hole, but no aircrew had been injured.
Among the captured equipment were 1x Anti - Aircraft gun and ammunition (one AA gun was blown up during the raid), 1 x vehicle, 1 x anti - paratrooper grenade launcher (the latest Soviet type 1982 model), 1 x armoured car, 1 x fully functional grader, and numerous bags of mealie - meal. The number of Renamo elements killed or injured could not be ascertained. The battleground was a gruesome sight with bodies scattered all over as a result of the aircraft bombing. Two Renamo bodies were recovered and buried. But, even allowing for the fact that, as a matter of principle Renamo never left their dead behind, the kill rate of Operation Zero appeared to be small considering the effort.

5: Other Operations 1986 - 1990 ²³

Operation Zero and the recapture of Cassa Banana was the end of the ZDF's initial involvement in Mozambique. It was also the beginning of a series of lightning strikes by the ZDF StrikeForce units comprising mostly Air Force, Para and Commando elements. These units became involved in a number of seek and destroy operations against Renamo bases all the way from Matenje in the north to Chokwe in the south of Mozambique. These operations were a direct result of the success the ZDF had recorded with the StrikeForce concept during the recapture of Cassa Banana. The ZDF Commanders were convinced that the only way that the Beira Corridor could remain safe from Renamo attacks was by destroying Renamo bases. It was concluded that the only way these bases could be destroyed was by mounting relentless strike operations wherever a concentration of Renamo troops could be detected.
However, the StrikeForce was not expected to plan and execute their special operations as an entity by themselves. They were supposed to work in support of Zimbabwean infantry and mechanised battalions, which became semi - permanently based in Mozambique along the three trade corridors. Three blanket names were adopted for these semi - permanent "routine" operations being carried out by the Zimbabwean ground forces. These were Operation Grapefruit for the Beira Corridor, Operation Cobweb for the Tete Corridor, and Operation Open Way for the Limpopo Corridor.
In support of these semi - permanent "routine" operations, more than 40 StrikeForce operations were carried out covering the length and breadth of Mozambique. The tactics employed were the same as those used on the raids on Cassa Banana, but the scale of the air effort fluctuated a lot. All in all, more than 30 000 Zimbabwean troops were involved in these routine and special operations.
Operation Ndonga Chirenje, which was conducted around Mepunga and Djambe in June 1990 was a result of a follow up of Zimbabwean dissidents belonging to the Rev. Sithole who were said to be operating with Renamo assistance from bases around Mepunga and Djambe in Mozambique. Documents captured during the operation confirmed the suspicions and three Zimbabweans were captured²⁴. These were later used in the treason trials of Sithole.

6: The Air Element ²⁵

6.1. Routine Operations

While the Commandos and the Para groups were engaged in their numerous StrikeForce operations, the infantry battalions and the mechanised group in the three corridors also required air support from the AFZ. The AFZ had to resuscitate long abandoned Forward AirFields (FAF) and mobilise the entire Supporting Services branch for the effort. Grand Reef, Buffalo Range and Kotwa Forward AirFields were brought back to life, and Tactical Command Units (TCUs) were established at Chimoio and Cassa Banana. Some wooden Temporary Field Accommodation (TFA) was constructed at Grand Reef, Buffalo Range and Chimoio while tents were erected at Kotwa and Cassa Banana. On 24th March 1986, the AFZ detached 65 supporting staff from various sections to Chimoio. The men and equipment were to be under the command of the STF Commander at Chimoio. The reasons for this AFZ deployment included the following: first, Chimoio is 314 kilometres from Harare, which was two hours flying time by Allouette helicopter. The Allouette was the workhorse of the AFZ and it could be used for a variety of roles because of its versatility. AFZ reaction time to any foreseeable emergency in Mozambique would therefore be greatly improved if they operated from Chimoio.
Second, Zimbabwe's Eastern Highlands that border Mozambique are favourable for the formation of low, thick and rainy clouds that in many cases spread as far as Chimoio. It was difficult for aircraft to react to emergency calls in Mozambique even from border airfields like Kotwa, Grand Reef and Buffalo Range. The situation was compounded by the fact that the runway at Chimoio had no ground navigational beacons and that most AFZ aircraft had limited navigational instruments.
Third, the bureaucratic red tape involved in the requesting of aircraft to react to an emergency was such that in a number of cases the approval for the use of an aircraft would be given when it was already too late to attend to the emergency. In some cases soldiers who could have been saved died in the Mozambican jungle before an aircraft could be released, even though there were always some aircraft on standby in Harare. Because of all these reasons an AFZ detachment with three helicopters and a transport aircraft were semi - permanently stationed at Chimoio under the command of a Forward Field Unit (FFU) officer of the rank of Wing Commander.
The roles of these aircraft were various. The helicopters deployed troops, delivered supplies, evacuated casualties and gave close air support. They carried out search and rescue operations, visual reconnaissance, hot extraction, and also escorted trains from Beira to Mutare and back. The transport aircraft were used mainly for the dropping of troops and supplies, casualty evacuation to Harare, establishing communications with lost units, sky - shouting and the dropping of propaganda leaflets. Sometimes armed Agusta Bell 412 helicopters would escort the transport aircraft. The Agusta Bell was not used as a gunship but it fulfilled all the other roles played by the Allouette helicopter. In addition, the Bell was used to ferry Commanders and other VIPs on their routine inspections and tours of the operational areas to boost the morale of the troops.
The AFZ also experienced a lot of manpower problems in the 1980s. Most of the experienced former Rhodesian pilots had left the country after Zimbabwe's independence in 1980. The few who remained had their chances spoiled by one of their own. In 1987 Flight Lieutenant Garry Kane stole an AFZ Agusta Bell 412 helicopter and in co-operation with some South African Commandos, tried to free some South African 'spies' who were being held at Harare's Chikurubi Maximum Security Prison. The plot failed, but Garry Kane escaped to South Africa with his South African Commando friends. Afraid of being associated with Garry Kane, many former Rhodesian pilots who had remained behind also left the AFZ.
All AFZ squadrons were in the process of training pilots and technicians when the Mozambican campaign started. A lot of young pilots had received training in China, North Korea, Romania, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Greece, Libya and the former USSR. Their methods of operation and the types of aircraft they had been trained on were so different that they all needed to be retrained on local aircraft and on local Standard Operational Procedures (SOPs). The AFZ contracted flying and technical instructors from Pakistan but, although they did their job well, they were not familiar with local SOPs and some Zimbabwean aircraft were not available in Pakistan.
The squadron of C337 Lynx aircraft was grounded until 1985 because there were no pilots who could fly the Lynx. It was only in 1987 that one pilot qualified as a captain on the C337 and joined the operations in Mozambique. The fleet of Canberra aircraft remained grounded for the duration of the operation because there were no pilots, no technicians and no navigators for the Canberra. In 1986 some American flying instructors tried to retrain Zimbabwean pilots on the Bell 205 helicopter, but the aircraft was quickly withdrawn from the Mozambican operations because there were too many accidents involving the Bell 205. Also, there was only one technician who knew how to service the Bell 205 and he had since left the AFZ and was only being contracted from a civilian company, AIRWORK, on an hourly basis.
When the squadron of 12 Agusta Bell 412 helicopters became operational in 1987, there was such a shortage of pilots that some young newly arrived Libyan - trained pilots went into operations in Mozambique without doing any ground studies on the aircraft. Their Pakistani instructors just taught them how to start and fly the helicopter and how to perform the basic operational manoeuvres. They had no idea as to how any of the systems on the aircraft worked and how to handle technical emergency situations. Some of these pilots had to do some technical lessons at Grand Reef during the night after flying the aircraft in Mozambique for operations during the day.
As mentioned earlier, the Allouette 111 helicopters were so overused that by January 1986 they were all grounded for major services. The 12 Cassa 212 transport aircraft were also new in the system and most of the technicians were not sure of some of the aircraft's operational capabilities. At one time a number of Cassa 212 aircraft experienced oil filter problems which took the technicians weeks to figure out how to repair. Such time delays in making aircraft serviceable meant that the AFZ's operational demands could not be met.
With the Agusta Bell 412, pilots overestimated the maximum all up weight of the helicopter mostly because they did not know the technical limitations of the aircraft. In some instances they would load boxes of ammunition to the roof of the cabin and try to take off, of course without success. This caused a lot of stress on the airframes of the helicopters and this was reflected by increased vibrations, which sometimes caused the windshields of the aircraft to crack. By the end of 1988 at least 10 Agusta Bell 412 helicopters had to have their windshields changed at great expense to the AFZ. The fleet of DC-47 Dakotas was eventually retired from service because of age but one Dakota had killed 17 people, the biggest number of Zimbabweans to die in one accident in Mozambique.
There were no modern maps of Mozambique available for both the ground forces and for the AFZ. For the entire period of the war, the pilots had to use photostat copies of very old maps of Mozambique, some of which were printed in the 1960s. Getting lost was common among crews because almost all the pilots reported getting lost at some point or another. There were no ground navigational radio beacons to home onto and not a single AFZ aircraft had any Global Positioning System (GPS) which would have made navigation that much easier for the Zimbabwean pilots. Instead, the pilots had to rely on low level point-to-point navigation, which was very dangerous.
The AFZ also lacked senior representation in the field and this created a lot of problems. Ground force commanders were left to make important decisions concerning the use of aircraft, in most cases on the advice of an AFZ Flight Lieutenant and in rare cases a Squadron Leader. Most of these junior AFZ officers had no direct communications with Air Force Headquarters and had to request clearances for action via their squadrons which would request the Base Commander to get clearance from Air Force Headquarters in Harare. This caused a lot of unnecessary delays. Also, these junior officers never wrote any daily reports of occurrences so that a lot of what happened to the AFZ in Mozambique was never recorded.

6.2. Aircraft Accidents

There were seven fatal aircraft accidents involving the AFZ in Mozambique between 1983 and 1990. These involved 4 x Allouette 111 helicopters, 1 x DC-47 Dakota, 1 x Casa 212, and 1 x Agusta Bell 412 helicopter. In these accidents, 26 Zimbabwean soldiers died and 12 were injured. All the aircraft concerned were completely written off. These aircraft were not replaced, first because insurance companies would not pay for damage resulting from an act of war, and second because the Zimbabwean Government did not have the money to buy replacement aircraft. There were also 100 minor aircraft accidents/special occurrences (SOR) in which no one died but the aircraft were seriously damaged. The Allouette 111 helicopter experienced the largest number of accidents and SOR throughout the whole period. This was mainly due to the fact that the Allouette 111 was the most active aircraft in the war, and that the Allouette crew were almost always overworked and therefore more exposed to error inducing factors. Most of the accidents and SOR were classified by Boards of Inquiry as "Crew Error - Avoidable". However, other aircraft types and their crews experienced their share of accidents at one time or another. Out of the 100 SORs, 40 were classified as crew error, 34 were due to operational hazards that were unavoidable and 26 were a result of technical faults.

7: ZDF Expenditure In Mozambique

7.1. The Zimbabwe Defence Budget

Although the ZDF's operations in Mozambique were extremely costly, their effect on Zimbabwe's defence budget tended to be overshadowed by other equally important factors. In order to place this expenditure in its proper perspective, it is necessary first to examine Zimbabwe's total defence expenditure in relation to the country's Total Government Budget and Gross National Product (GNP), as shown in table 3.

Table 3. Zimbabwe�s Defence Expenditure and Armed Forces, 1981-1994

Year	Current US$m	Constant 1994 US$m	Armed Forces	Defence/ Total Govt (%)	Defence/ GNP (%)	Armed Forces Per 1000
1981	181	307	74	19.2	6.2	9.8
1982	202	319	50	15.6	6.5	6.4
1983	207	314	46	16.7	6.3	5.7
1984	186	257	46	15.0	6.7	5.5
1985	178	237	46	14.4	5.7	5.3
1986	204	266	45	15.6	6.4	5.0
1987	250	315	45	16.1	7.5	4.8
1988	236	287	45	15.0	6.3	4.7
1989	255	296	51	15.0	6.1	5.1
1990	235	262	45	13.0	5.3	4.4
1991	262	281	45	14.0	5.6	4.3
1992	250	260	48	11.9	5.5	4.5
1993	209	213	48	15.0	4.3	4.4
1994	188	188	43	N/A	3.7	3.9

The increase in defence expenditure in the early 1980s was due mainly to the increased number of personnel in the armed forces which jumped from the 38 000 Rhodesian Security Forces to 94 000 after the inclusion of the former ZANLA and ZIPRA forces. Defence expenditure further increased in 1983 mainly because of the "dissident" problem in Matebeleland and the increase in the number of military establishments as the army infantry brigades were increased from four in 1980 to six by 1990. However, part of the increase in defence expenditure after 1982 was due to the ZDF's operations in Mozambique.
In 1984 a decrease in defence expenditure was recorded when there was hope of peace due to decreased Renamo activity following the Nkomati Accord between Mozambique and South Africa. However, the Nkomati Accord was a failure and when the ZDF started raiding Renamo bases in Mozambique, Zimbabwe's defence expenditure went up again, reaching a peak in 1987 when ZDF activities in Mozambique were at their highest. In 1987 defence expenditure accounted for 7.5% of GNP, its highest level since 1981. From a peak in 1987 defence expenditure began to decline in real terms during the late 1980s and early 1990s, despite the fact that the ZDF became increasingly involved in United Nations peacekeeping operations in Rwanda, Somalia and Angola. The start of constitutional negotiations in 1990 between the African National Congress and the South African government aimed at ending apartheid, and the ending of South Africa's destabilisation tactics in the region also contributed to the declines in defence expenditure in the early 1990s.

7.2. Army Expenditure ²⁶

Between 1982 and 1984 the Zimbabwe National Army did not calculate expenditure in Mozambique. A senior officer in the Army Finance Branch explained that during those days the Army did not keep any financial statistics because they did not expect to be reimbursed by the Mozambican Government. However Army Operations Branch had their own explanation for the lack of statistics. A senior OPS officer explained that before 1985, most operational information was top secret. No one told anyone else the nature and extent of their contribution to operations. The were still many white former Rhodesian Security Forces in the ZDF and they could not be trusted with information because some of them were known to be involved in acts of sabotage against the Zimbabwean Government. The examples that the OPS officer gave included the incident on 16th August 1981 in which a series of massive explosions ripped through the armoury at Inkomo Barracks near Harare destroying Z$36 million worth of arms and ammunition. On 25th July 1982 a quarter of Zimbabwe's FGA jets, which were newly acquired from the United Kingdom, were burned to the ground in a hanger at Thorn Hill Air Base near Gweru. In both incidents, some white former Rhodesian Security Forces who were still serving in the ZDF were arrested for the crimes.
On the other hand, "integrated" former ZANLA and former ZIPRA guerrillas did not trust each other because of the "dissident" problem in Matebeleland in which some former ZIPRA guerrillas had taken to the bush in 1981 threatening to plunge the country into civil war. This situation necessitated the deployment of the Fifth Brigade into Matebeleland. The methods used by the Fifth Brigade to avert civil war received the highest level of criticism both nationally and internationally. As a result of mutual suspicions, said the OPS officer, commanders in the field whether internal or external did not make any reports whether on operational results or costs because they did not know who might get hold of such information and what they might use it for. From 1985 some internal costings were made of ZDF expenditure in Mozambique (see table 4).

Table 4. ZNA and AFZ Expenditure in Mozambique 1985 � 90

Year	ZNA Expenditure	AFZ Expenditure
1985	8 734 750	not calculated
1986	13 345 948	2 309 611
1987	24 645 575	5 361 478
1988	20 320 943	3 479 816
1989	22 223 472	2 564 590
1990	14 525 883	8 776 348

Sources: ZNA file, FIN/25/6/1, 1990, Annex A-D (Totalled);
AFZ file, HQ/C2/6/1/Air, Vols.1-3, 1985-1990 The figures in table 4 must be viewed in light of the following explanations sent to the Secretary for Defence by the then Army Commander Lieutenant General Mujuru.

Salaries are not included.

It must be emphasised that the figures presented are estimates only such that the actual costs have been much higher than is reflected in the Annexes.

Information on all damaged/destroyed equipment cannot be accurately ascertained because in most cases the units did not submit the figures when the costings had been done.

Depreciation of equipment has not been included because Logistics Branch and the respective corps have not come up with formula for calculating depreciation.

The cost of transportation of equipment and rations to the operational areas has not been calculated again because Logistics Branch has not advised the Finance Branch of the methods by which these costs could be measured.

The largest items on the Army expenditure list were rations followed by ammunition. The general rise in the prices of food items in the country due to inflation no doubt contributed a lot to the ever-increasing costs for rations. However, a sizeable amount of the rations found their way onto the black-market where they were sold in exchange for items that were scarce in Zimbabwe like whisky, rice and prawns. These and other items were often smuggled by soldiers into Zimbabwe. However, the majority of officials who investigated cases of smuggling by soldiers seem to think there were no serious cases of smuggling or blackmarketeering. This is despite the fact that a number of cases hit the headlines of many local newspapers showing some soldiers who were caught selling items that had been smuggled in from Mozambique.

7.3. Air Force Expenditure

The AFZ did not make any estimates of expenditure before the launching of the first raid on Gorongossa. After the raid, no calculations were made as to how many aircraft hours were flown and how much aviation fuel was used. To these omissions must be added the cost of bombs thrown on targets, the cost of aircraft spares used in the operation, the cost of parachutes used and the value of those parachutes not recovered, and the rations for all the supporting staff that were deployed for the operation. A senior Air Force officer estimated that the operation must have cost the Air Force at least Z$5 million in 1985 prices. Another senior Air Force officer suggested that perhaps the official thinking was that the war was going to be short, and that an evaluation of expenditure was going to be carried out once the operation was over. However, the war did not end that soon, and it was only in 1986 that some financial records of the Mozambican campaign were kept by the AFZ (see table 4).
Unfortunately, these figures do not tell the whole story, as there is a lot of information that was not included in official calculations. These include the cost of the seven aircraft that crashed in Mozambique and were written off. Also important is the cost of recovering the wreckage of all the aircraft that were involved in accidents in Mozambique. The Zimbabweans carried every scrap of metal from crash sites for the purposes of Boards of Inquiry, which could not be carried out in operational areas. There was also the unrecorded costs of repairing all those aircraft that recorded "special occurrences" in Mozambique.
The biggest error by Air Force Headquarters was the omission of data from Thorn Hill Air Base from all their calculations. The number of flying hours and the operational costs of jet and other fighter aircraft that operated from Thorn Hill does not appear on any report sent to the Ministry of Defence for the whole period. Yet, such expensive aircraft like Hunters, Hawks, C337 and SF-260 were used in almost every FireForce or StrikeForce operation, and a good number of them were damaged. The cost of the bombs and other ammunition that these aircraft used was not calculated, nor the amount and cost of aviation fuel that these aircraft used.
While there is no evidence that the ZDF deliberately contaminated their statistics in order to misinform the general public, there is no doubt that there was gross negligence in accounting for Zimbabwe's war effort in Mozambique. It is rather paradoxical that the Government was so keen to reduce national transport costs to the point of involving its armed forces in a neighbouring country's civil war and yet the forces involved in that economic war did not take the trouble of properly accounting for their expenses and losses.

8: Casualties

The official number of ZDF members who died and those who were injured in Mozambique as a result of direct participation in operations are presented in table 5.

Table 5: ZDF casualties in Mozambique, 1984-1990

	*Army*		*Airforce*
*Year*	*Killed*	*Injured*	*Killed*	*Injured*
1984	42	N/A	N/A	N/A
1985	61	N/A	2	2
1986	40	130	14	7
1987	33	144	4	NIL
1988	44	110	2	3
1989	31	98	2	NIL
1990	45	141	NIL	NIL
Total	296	623	24	12

Source: Army - ZAPARC Records; Airforce - PARO Records It is difficult to be accurate on the number of Zimbabwean casualties because operational casualty figures were never kept separate from other deaths and injuries records for both the Army and the Air Force. It appears as if this lack of concern for accurate records of casualties went as far as the Ministry of Defence itself. In a 1988 interview, the then Minister of Defence Mr Enos Nkala was quoted as saying,

"There is a war on and yes we have lost some people. But it is not really something that the nation should worry about, as the numbers are so insignificant" ²⁷

It is true that the ZDF's losses in Mozambique were relatively small, but to say that "the numbers are so insignificant" is an understatement, which shows a lack of respect for human life. Even the loss of one life should not be taken lightly. There are also some financial implications involved in the death of any soldier. First, the pensions and or compensation for those killed or injured become immediately due and payable by the Government and this amounted to millions of dollars. Second the dead and injured have to be replaced and the training of an individual for combat readiness requires a lot of resources in time, money and equipment.

9: Withdrawal Of Zimbabwean Troops From Mozambique

Peace in Mozambique was brought about not by victory from either side but by negotiation. The peace negotiations were organised by the Italian Catholic Community of Sant'Egidio, and they took place in Rome Italy between July 1990 and October 1992. By 1990 the Cold War had ended and with it ended the political standoff that had prevented the holding of talks between opposing forces in Southern Africa. The situation was well summed up by Cameron Hume:

"By the early 1990s, no external party was prepared to keep sustaining its chosen Mozambican ally; alliances were frayed (for example Zimbabwe wanted an exit from its intervention, and the Soviets and South Africans were disengaging), and donor fatigue had begun to appear; moreover, Mozambique had virtually no resources of its own to sustain the conflict. The impetus from Rome (both religious and official) found a receptive audience in Southern Africa - in part because U.S., British, and Portuguese attention was directed elsewhere" ²⁸

In November 1990, while the peace negotiations were still taking place, a partial cease-fire agreement was signed which paved the way for the withdrawal of Zimbabwean troops from Mozambique. The terms of the partial cease-fire required that Zimbabwean troops be concentrated into the Beira and Limpopo Corridors each twenty kilometres wide. Border operations were restricted to the Zimbabwe - Mozambique border and there were to be no AFZ overflights into Mozambique. Renamo promised not to attack the corridors and a Joint Verification Commission (JVC) chaired by the Italian Ambassador to Mozambique was set up to supervise the partial cease-fire²⁹. The JVC comprised members from Kenya, Portugal, the United States, Zambia, the Congo, France, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom. The negotiations that followed resulted in the total cease-fire agreement signed in Rome in October 1992. The Rome agreement ended the Mozambican civil war. Zimbabwe withdrew its forces from Mozambique in April 1993. The end of the Zimbabwean withdrawal from Mozambique was marked by a farewell parade at Chimoio and welcome parades at Mutare and Chiredzi that were all held on the 14th April 1993. President Joaquim Chissano officiated and gave a farewell address to the Zimbabwean troops at Chimoio, while President Robert Mugabe gave a welcome address to the troops at the Mutare parade³⁰. Thereafter, a United Nations force comprising troops from Italy, Zambia and Botswana took over the guarding of the three corridors, Beira, Limpopo and Tete. Other UN forces later joined in to supervise Mozambique's first multi-party elections, which took place in 1994 and in which Renamo participated as the main opposition political party.

10: Conclusion

Although politics played a big role, the ZDF went into Mozambique mainly to protect Zimbabwe's trade routes, which were being sabotaged by Renamo. That military involvement was further justified by a formal request from the Frelimo government for a regional force that included Tanzania, Malawi and Zimbabwean forces and which was backed by the SADCC. The regional planners saw this as a continuing fight against the regional stranglehold by apartheid South Africa on regional trade routes for political reasons. It was also part of the Cold War between East and West in the sense that Renamo claimed to be fighting against Communism and for that reason received aid from western countries especially the United States of America. In the process of protecting their trade routes, the ZDF literally joined the Mozambican civil war on the side of the Mozambican Government and ended up involving at least 30 000 Zimbabwean troops. They conducted military operations against Renamo throughout the length and breath of Mozambique. Sometimes these operations were conducted jointly with the FAM, but in most cases the Zimbabweans acted on their own. More than 40 FireForce and StrikeForce operations were conducted including the twice recapturing of the Renamo Headquarters at Cassa Banana in the Gorongossa Mountains in 1985 and 1986.
These operations stretched the ZDF's capabilities to the limit, literally halting all other military activities in Zimbabwe including training. The ZDF put in all available equipment and manpower. The operations were also very expensive in monetary terms, although there are no accurate financial records to quantify the total expenditure. There were a lot of accidents, some of which could have been avoided with proper training and strict adherence to standard operational procedures. The Army did not bother to count the equipment that they lost during operations. The Air Force lost seven aircraft, which were completely written off, and 100 aircraft accidents were recorded. The Army recorded 296 soldiers dead and 623 injured while the AirForce recorded 24 deaths and 12 injuries. The actual casualty figures are probably higher because records were not kept for the first three years of operations.
Even with such a heavy military commitment, the ZDF failed to destroy Renamo, and the war escalated into what some critics have called "Zimbabwe's Vietnam". Central to the ZDF failure to contain Renamo was the failure by the FAM, to hold any of the bases captured by the ZDF for any length of time. This was mainly because of the FAM's low level of training, lack of motivation and lack of adequate logistical support. It is also true to say that the Mozambican civil war could not have ended sooner than it did because of its Cold War and South African connections. Both the Cold War and apartheid ended almost at the same time, and by 1990 it was possible for the warring parties to pursue a negotiated settlement to the Mozambican crisis. The Rome agreement of October 1992 made possible the withdrawal of Zimbabwean forces from Mozambique, which started in November 1990 and ended on the 14th of April 1993.

Bibliography And Footnotes

¹ See Mlambo,N. The Costs of Reopening Zimbabwe�s Trade Routes through Mozambique: 1980-1990, Unpublished B.A. Hons Dissertation (University of Zimbabwe, 1991).
² Blake,R., A History of Rhodesia (Methuen, London, 1977), p.83.
³ Griffiths, I., �The Quest for Independent Access to the Sea in Southern Africa�,
The Geographical Journal, Vol.155(3) (November 1989), p.384.
⁴ Hanlon,J., Beggar your neighbours: Apartheid power in Southern Africa (Catholic Institute for International Relations, James Currey and Indiana University Press, London, 1986), p.187.
⁵ Pangeti,E., �Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference: The Art of the Possible?�, paper presented at the Tenth International Economic History Conference, Leuven, Belgium, August 1990.
⁶ Nsekela,A., Southern Africa: Towards Economic Liberation (Rex Collings, London, 1981)
⁷ Johnson,P. and Martin,D., Apartheid Terrorism: The Destabilisation Report (The Commonwealth Secretariat, James Currey and Indiana University Press, London, 1989).
⁸ The Herald, 2 October 1981.
⁹ The Washington Times, 1 July 1986 and Africa Confidential, 9 June 1989.
¹⁰ Johnson,P. and Martin,D., Destructive Engagement: Southern Africa at War (Zimbabwe Publishing House, Harare, 1986), p.71.
¹¹ Johnson and Martin, Destructive Engagement, p.71.
¹² Hanlon, Beggar your neighbours, pp.185-192.
¹³ The Herald, 19 July 1984.
¹⁴ Stoneman,C. and Cliff,L., Zimbabwe: Politics, Economics and Society (Pinter Publishers, London, 1989), p.187.
¹⁵ G/2/3, Report � Operation Grapefruit, Army HQ, Harare, August 1985.
¹⁶ AFZ Board of Enquiry, December 1985.
¹⁷ MI/5/3 Perintreps, Mozambique, December 1985.
¹⁸ Report on the Attack on Marromeu, 4 February 1986.
¹⁹ HQ/C2/6/AIR, Air Force of Zimbabwe file, 1986.
²⁰ Report on the Attack on Marromeu, 4 February 1986.
²¹ Report on the Attack on Marromeu.
²² Report, Operating Zero, 1986.
²³ HQ/C2/6/AIR, Mozambique Operations, 1986-90
²⁴ Report, Operation Ndonga Chirenje, June 1990.
²⁵ HQ/C2/6/AIR, Mozambique Operations, 1986-90.
²⁶ Fin/25/6/1, Costings: External Operations, 30 August 1990.
²⁷ The Herald, 18 April 1988.
²⁸ Hume,C., Ending Mozambique�s War: The role of mediation and good offices (United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington D.C., 1994), p.xi.
²⁹ The United Nations and Mozambique 1992-1995 (UN Department of Public Information, New York, 1995).
³⁰ A(PS)/1/1, Program of Events for the Withdrawal of Zimbabwean Troops from Mozambique, 7 April 1993.

The Southern African Centre for Defence Information (SACDI) is a joint project between the Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR) and the Institute for

UNCONVENTIONAL BUSH WARFARE

2010-11-12T03:06:00.003-08:00

UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE LESSONS FROM THE SELOUS SCOUTS

By Leroy Thompson

To understand the Selous Scouts’ methods, one must first understand the Selous Scouts’ mission. The Scouts evolved to varying extents from the Tracker Combat Unit of the Rhodesian Army, the CIO (Central Intelligence Organization), and the Special Branch of the BSAP (British South Africa Police). When Major Ron Reid Daly was given the mission of forming the Scouts, Rhodesia’s borders were becoming less and less secure, as ZANLA and ZIPRA terrorists infiltrated in greater and greater numbers. Though the cover mission for the Selous Scouts remained the tracking of terrorists, in reality the unit was a pseudo-terrorist unit, using turned terrorists and Black soldiers from the Rhodesian African Rifles, as well as White soldiers in black face make-up from the Rhodesian SAS, Rhodesian Light Infantry and other units. These pseudo groups would infiltrate terrorist areas of operation, passing themselves off as terrorists and attempting to subvert the terrorist infrastructure.

In many ways, the Selous Scouts learned from US counter- insurgency successes in Vietnam, drawing on the examples of the Phoenix Program, the Kit Carson Scouts and the Road Runner Teams. Even more did they resemble the successful pseudo teams which had been active earlier in Kenya. Constantly adding turned terrorists, the Scouts kept abreast of current terrorist terminology, identification procedures, and operations; often they were better informed about terrorist procedures than the terrorists themselves.
As the Selous Scouts evolved, they undertook other missions such as cross-border raids, assassinations, snatches, raids on terrorist HQs in Botswana or elsewhere, long-range reconnaissance, and various other types of special operations. One early raid typical of this kind of Scouts’ mission was the snatch of a key ZIPRA official from Francistown, Botswana, in March 1974. These direct action operations resembled in many ways the MAC V/SOG operations in Vietnam. The number of Vietnam veterans in the Rhodesian security forces, in fact, had a substantial influence on the conduct of the war and on slang that was used. Terrorists, for example, were often called ‘gooks’. The Scouts lured terrorists into ambushes, from which few terrorists normally walked away; captured terrorists and then turned them to serve in one of the Scout pseudo groups; or turned them over to the BSAP for interrogation. The Scouts were very successful in gathering intelligence, at least in part from captured diaries and letters. This is an important element of counter*insurgency operations. Due to the fragmented nature of their operations, guerrillas rarely have ready access to communications equipment. As a result, they may rely on written communication, leaving much open to capture. Few guerrillas are sophisticated enough to use ciphers, either, so often captured communications are ‘in the clear’. Many politically inspired guerrillas are actually encouraged to keep diaries documenting their political development, and these also frequently include valuable intelligence information. Third World insurgents are generally much less security conscious than organized military forces about documents; hence, captured written material can be an excellent intelligence source, especially for order of battle data.
The Selous Scouts’ training and operational doctrine inculcated audacity. At various times, for example, White Selous Scouts posed as the ‘prisoners’ of Black Selous Scout ‘terrorists’, and were escorted into terrorist strongholds, where White prisoners were highly prized. At the appropriate moment, the Selous Scouts turned their weapons on the terrorists, wreaking havoc from within. The classic example of audacity was the Selous Scouts raid on the large ZANLA terrorist camp at Nyadzonya Pungwe in August 1976. Using Unimogs and Ferrets painted in FRELIMO camouflage, eighty-four Selous Scouts penetrated Mozambique and drove directly into a large terrorist camp. Thousands of terrorists were in camp preparing for morning formations, when the Scouts opened up with 20mm cannons, .50 MGs, 12.7mm MGs, 7.62mm MGs and rifles. Estimates of the number of terrorists killed run as high as 1,000, all for five slightly wounded Selous Scouts. As the Scouts retreated to Rhodesia they blew up the Pungwe Bridge behind them, frustrating pursuit.
Audacity does not, of course, mean foolhardiness, but the importance of audacious small unit offensives has been proved again and again in counter*insurgency operations by the SAS in Malaya, Borneo and Oman; by Special Forces in Vietnam; and by Selous Scouts in Rhodesia. Reportedly, some of the Soviets’ best successes against Afghan guerrillas were achieved by small Spetsnaz units carrying out similar operations. Because guerrillas tend to think of themselves as the aggressors who take the war to the capitalist fat cats, they are often themselves extremely complacent in their ‘safe’ areas. By showing the terrorists that they were never safe from the ‘Skuz’apo’ (as the terrorists called the Selous Scouts) the Scouts had a psychologically debilitating effect quite out of proportion to their numbers. It was not uncommon, for example, for two groups of terrorists to begin shooting at each other out of fear that the other group was the Selous Scouts.
Various lessons can be learned from this aspect of Selous Scouts operations. First, calculated audacity will often allow a small counter-insurgency force to inflict casualties quite out of proportion to the numbers of men involved. Secondly, terrorists, who rely heavily on fear as a weapon, can themselves be rendered psychologically impotent through fear when they become the prey of an enemy who appears, hits hard, and then vanishes; who, in effect, turns their own weapons against them.
Selous Scouts relied heavily on unconventional selection and training procedures. Unconventional, but they worked and turned out some of the finest counter-insurgency warriors of all time. Selous Scouts couldn’t count on ready resupply, for example, so early on the fledgling Selous Scout had to learn to take his food how and when it came. During initial selection the Selous Scout was given one ration pack, but not told what to do with it. As the next days passed, that transpired to be the only food that would be provided. Some Scouts foraged around the training area to supplement that initial ration. Before long, an instructor shot a monkey and hung it in the middle of camp, where during the next few days of training it became riper and riper, its smell soon pervading the camp. Finally, after days of rigorous training the now ravenous trainee Selous Scouts were treated to the sight of the maggot-infested carcass being cooked to provide their first meal in days. Most managed to get it down, in the process learning that if one is hungry enough, protein can be provided from tainted meat, or even maggots. They also learned that even tainted meat is edible if thoroughly boiled, though it should not be reheated a second time. The obvious lesson here is that those being trained to survive under harsh conditions must be trained harshly.

Selous Scouts weapons training was intense and practical. Because they operated as terrorists, the Scouts were normally armed with Eastern Bloc weapons. The AK-47, RPD light machine gun and SVD sniper’s rifle were all widely used. Since the Scouts often concealed pistols about their persons, a substantial amount of handgun training was included. CZ75s and Beretta 951s were popular, as were Makarovs due to their Warsaw Pact origins.
Among the very practical training techniques used to make the Scouts proficient with their weapons was an extremely effective counter-ambush drill. Scouts were trained, when under fire from ambush, immediately to direct short bursts of fire at all likely places of concealment for ambushers within their arc of fire. The effectiveness of this maneuver could only be appreciated after seeing a well-drilled stick of Selous Scouts quickly sterilize 360 degrees of an ambush site. Fire discipline was important in this drill, but the Scouts had it. One Selous Scouts training officer also developed the technique of using mannequin targets dressed in terrorist attire and for ‘no shoots’-security forces uniforms. These mannequins incorporated a system of balloons (for head and torso), arranged so that a critical hit would cause the target to fall, while a non-critical hit had to be followed up to drop the target. The lesson to be remembered here is that military personnel likely to use their weapons in quick reaction ambush/anti-ambush situations must be trained to shoot in such circumstances. Obvious? Not to high-ranking officers in a lot of armies.
Many Selous Scouts operations were actually what might be called ‘sting’ operations. The use of European Selous Scouts ‘kidnapped’ by Black Selous Scouts ‘terrorists’ to infiltrate terrorist camps has already been mentioned. The Scouts carried out other classic stings, such as snatching high-ranking ZIPRA officers in Botswana by posing as Botswana Defense Force soldiers there to arrest them. To be accepted by terrorist groups the Scouts often staged fake attacks on farms, or fake hits on Special Branch informers to establish their credentials. So convincing were they that some Selous Scouts pseudo groups became legendary among the terrorists for their ferocity against Rhodesia. On the individual level, Selous Scouts were not above running cons such as convincing a terrorist that a command-detonated claymore mine was a radio, and sending him into a nest of terrorists to radio a message. Only pieces got through! Some of the really classic Selous Scouts’ cons must remain shrouded in secrecy, but even after Robert Mugabe assumed power and after the Selous Scouts were supposedly disbanded, a secret Scouts base continued to operate, from which much equipment and many weapons were evacuated to South Africa. Once again, the lesson to be learned from the Selous Scouts’ sting operations is that sometimes audacity is both more deadly to the enemy, and safer for the operators, than caution in unconventional warfare.
Under Chris Shollenberg, a former Rhodesian SAS officer, a reconnaissance troop was formed as part of the Selous Scouts. This recon unit proved what has been the case in virtually every war in history: small, highly-skilled recon units are among the most efficient and cost-effective intelligence tools in existence. After lying hidden near large terrorist camps for days, the Selous Scouts recon troops operated ahead of Selous Scouts raiding columns, or called in air strikes. The lesson here is simple: no matter how effective electronic intelligence devices become, LRRPs remain an extremely important element in modern warfare, especially counter-insurgency warfare.
Another important element of the Selous Scouts experience which is less obvious is the necessity for a degree of egalitarianism in small elite units. Despite the underlying racism of Rhodesia at that time, the Scouts were a racially mixed unit, each member of which had to rely on the others, and were aggressively non-racist. Black Scouts were naturally aware of their differences in color and culture, as were White Scouts, but neither was treated as superior or inferior. Because of the nature of Scouts operations, all members of the units had to trust each other implicitly, especially when the added element of turned terrorists amongst the Scouts was added. Therefore there could be no hints of racism within the Scouts. Anyone displaying such an attitude did not become or did not stay a Selous Scout.
One method of achieving the closeness and egalitarianism necessary for the Selous Scouts to function was requiring every aspirant Scout to learn the regimental songs during the final portion of the selection course. Sung a cappella, these functioned in lieu of a Selous Scouts band, but also, since the songs were traditional African songs — often terrorist songs at that, the words altered to fit the Selous Scouts - they formed a bond between Black and White.
The Selous Scouts system worked. The closeness of the members of the unit -even the tamed terrorists was tested many times but rarely found wanting. In April 1975 a turned terrorist betrayed a pseudo group, resulting in the deaths of seven of them. This event is most noteworthy because it was so unusual. The closeness of the Selous Scouts continued even after the end of the war, when the White Scouts realized the danger their Black comrades in arms would face in Zimbabwe. When the White Selous Scouts went to South Africa they took many of the Black Scouts and their families along with them, and fought to have them incorporated into No. 5 Recce Commando by their sides.
The lesson to be learned here is one that successful special operations units find obvious, but conventional military commanders can never grasp. Small, close-knit elite units function best when run in an egalitarian manner. David Stirling made this a precept of the SAS when he formed it, and it remains a key element in SAS successes today. There is a chain of command in good special operations units, but no one works hard at wielding power. Nevertheless, things get done and done right. That’s why the selection course is so important.
Another important lesson to be learned from the Selous Scouts experience can be applied to police or military covert operations. So successfully did the Selous Scouts pass themselves off as terrorists that they were frequently in more danger from Rhodesian security forces than from real terrorists. As a result, when a Selous Scouts pseudo team was working an area it was ‘frozen’ and declared off limits to any other security forces operations. This same lesson can be applied to police undercover operations or military covert, false flag, ‘sheep dip’ or deception missions.
Unfortunately, the greatest lesson to be learned from the Selous Scouts is that no matter how competent and effective a military unit is, political considerations can render it impotent. As Rhodesia became Zimbabwe, the Selous Scouts, though never defeated on the battlefield, were defeated at the bargaining table. The con men of the Selous Scouts were, in fact, conned out of existence by the British, the Americans, the UN and Robert Mugabe. Of course, throughout the history of counter-insurgency warfare, the failure to establish political goals has rendered military operations ineffective. (END)
***Source*** This article was obtained from the book: DIRTY WARS- elite forces vs. the guerrillas. By Leroy Thompson. Printed 1988.

CHITEPO INFO

2010-11-11T23:22:00.000-08:00

Herbert Wiltshire Chitepo (15 June 1923 - 18 March 1975) led the Zimbabwe African National Union until he was assassinated on March 1975. Although to this day we still do not know the truth about who his murderer was, the Rhodesian author Peter Stiff reveals that a former British SAS soldier, Hugh Hind was responsible. ^[1]

Chitepo became the first black citizen of Rhodesia to become a barrister. ^[2]

1. Early years

Chitepo was born in Watsomba village in the Inyanga District of Southern Rhodesia, now Zimbabwe. His family came from the Manyika clan (Samanyika) of the Shona people. He was educated at St David's Mission School, Bonda, St Augustine's School, Penhalonga and then at Adam's College, Natal, South Africa, where he qualified as a teacher in 1945.

2. Career

After teaching for a year, he resumed his studies to graduate with a BA degree from Fort Hare University College in 1949. He qualified as a Barrister-at-Law, and called to the bar by Gray's Inn, alumni included Winston Churchill. Further still whilst in London as a research assistant at the School of Oriental and African Studies. He was the first African in Southern Rhodesia to qualify as a Barrister. In 1954 Chitepo became Rhodesia's first black lawyer (a special law was required to allow him to occupy chambers with white colleagues). ^[3] On returning to Rhodesia in 1954, he practised as a Lawyer and defended many African nationalists such as Ndabaningi Sithole in court. In 1961, he served as legal adviser to Joshua Nkomo, founder of the Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU), at the Southern Rhodesia Constitutional Conference in London. In the same year (1961)he was also appointed to the Board of Governors of Bernard Mizeki College. Ian Smith's government did not detain him as he did not come out in the open as an official of the nationalist movement and the regime also feared that being the first lawyer, Chitepo was too internationally well-known to be locked up.

3. ZANU

In May 1962 ZAPU was banned because of militarism and Chitepo was persuaded to go into voluntary exile to escape possible detention. He became Tanganyika's first African Director of Public Prosecutions. The Ndabaningi Sithole and Joshua Nkomo factions of ZAPU split apart in July, 1963. Nkomo's supporters founded the PCC-ZAPU (later just called ZAPU again) and favoured a more militaristic approach. As the more moderate faction, Chitepo sided with Sithole and was elected Chairman of ZANU ( having defeated Nathan Shamuyarira ) from its foundation. He held this post until 7 December 1974, when the Lusaka Accord was signed.

Both parties vied for domination but in 1964 both were banned and the leaders were all arrested. Both parties chose to leave the country and reorganize and form armies from outside Rhodesian borders, although they chose different countries to make their base. ZAPU based itself in the West and Zambia where it organized ZIPRA (the Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army.) They allied with the Soviet Union and organised a vanguard of highly trained soldiers. ZANU, however, moved into Tanzania and then to Mozambique and set up ZANLA (Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army) which concentrated more on mobilizing the masses in the countryside in a method pioneered by the Chinese.

In January 1966 Chitepo resigned as Director of Public Prosecutions and moved to Zambia in order to concentrate on the armed struggle. He toured world capitals canvassing support for ZANU and for the enforcement of total economic sanctions against Rhodesia. With his friendly disposition, he was very effective and earned for ZANU international recognition and respect.

Sithole and others prepared a comprehensive document giving powers to Chitepo to lead ZANU while Rev. Sithole was in detention and specifically authorising him to carry out the armed struggle. Accordingly, Herbert Chitepo with the military supremo Josiah Tongogara from the Karanga ethnic community,organised and planned successful military guerilla attacks and underground activities in Rhodesia from 1966 onwards. In 1972, he co-ordinated war operations with FRELIMO and opened up the North Eastern region of Zimbabwe as a new and effective war front.

4. Assassination

Chitepo died at 8:05am on March 18, 1975 in Lusaka, Zambia when a car bomb, placed in his Volkswagen Beetle the night before, exploded. He and Silas Shamiso, one of his bodyguards, were killed instantly. Sadat Kufamadzuba, his other bodyguard, was injured. The explosion sent part of the car onto the roof of his house and uprooted a tree next door. Hours later one of his neighbors died of injuries he sustained in the explosion. ^[4] ZANU at the time blamed Rhodesian security forces.

Zambian president Kenneth Kaunda commissioned an inquiry into Chitepo's death. Documents released in October, 2001, placed the blame on ZANU infighting. However, in his biographical account, The Legend of The Selous Scouts, Lt Col Ron Reid-Daly, Officer Commanding, Selous Scouts Regiment, Rhodesian Security Forces, clearly states that the Rhodesian Central Intelligence Organization (CIO) under the leadership of Director General Ken Flower, masterminded the assassination of Herbert Chitepo, subsequently planting documentary evidence blaming ZANU members.

"The decision by Ken Flower...to assassinate Herbert Chitepo, head of the ZANU War Council, now showed how badly Flower has misread the ZANU/ZANLA situation. The death of Chitepo purged ZANU of its many dissenting factions and a new and highly successful leader emerged. Robert Mugabe gave ZANLA the means to consolidate its efforts by providing ZANLA with an indispensable factor - unity." [pg. 173 The Legend of The Selous Scouts]

5. References

Mugabe still fears Chitepo's legacy Institute for War and Peace Reporting
Preston, Matthew. Ending Civil War: Rhodesia and Lebanon in Perspective, 2004. Page 98.
Time Magazine ,Monday, Mar. 31, 1975
White, Luise. The Assassination of Herbert Chitepo: Texts and Politics in Zimbabwe. Page 1.

6. External links

Categories: 1923 births, 1975 deaths, People from Manicaland, Alumni of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of Fort Hare alumni, Zimbabwean revolutionaries, Assassinated Zimbabwean politicians, Zimbabwean people murdered abroad, People murdered in Zambia

DEATH OF TONGOGARA

2010-11-11T23:19:00.000-08:00

Josiah Magama Tongogara (1938 - December 26, 1979) was a commander of the ZANLA guerrilla army in Rhodesia. He attended the Lancaster House conference that led to Zimbabwe's independence and the end of white minority rule. Many expected him to be the first president of Zimbabwe, with Robert Mugabe, head of Zanla's political wing, ZANU, as prime minister.

Six days after the Lancaster House Agreement was signed Robert Mugabe, on the Voice of Zimbabwe radio station, conveyed "an extremely sad message" to "all the fighting people of Zimbabwe": the forty one year old Tongogara was dead, killed in a car accident in Mozambique on December 26, 1979.

Josiah Tungamirai, the ZANLA High Command's political commissar relates that on the night of the fatality, he and Tongogara had been travelling with others in two vehicles from Maputo to Chimoio. Tungamirai said he was in the front vehicle. It was dark and the roads were bad. Tungamirai's car passed a military vehicle that had been carelessly abandoned, with no warning signs at the side of the road. After that, he could no longer see the headlights of the following car in his rear view mirror. Eventually he turned back, and, as he had feared, they found Tongogara's car had struck the abandoned vehicle. Tongogara was sitting in the front passenger seat. Tungamirai told me that he had struggled to lift Tongogara out of the wrecked car. He said that as he was doing so, Tongogara heaved a huge sigh and died in his arms. ^[1]

Margaret Dongo was one of the last people to see him alive. "We were eighteen girls who were having a function and he came to say a few words to bless the occasion."

ZANU released an undertaker's statement saying his injuries were consistent with a road accident, but no autopsy results or pictures have been released(the undertaker who gave the report was indeed Mr K.J Stokesand not Mr R Silke).

TEKERE BOOK: Last updated: Thu, 12 Nov 2009 14:59:45 GMT AS I have mentioned before, Chimoio was a complex of camps, rather than a single entity, scattered around Chimoio Town to a radius of 40 km. So the Chimoio attack was not one, but a series of simultaneous attacks on all our camps. On the day of the Chimoio massacre, I was in Maputo, to attend a meeting with most of the senior commanders, including Tongogara. The attack began at dawn at dawn, on 23 November 1977, and Samora Machel came to inform us, telling us not to go there yet, as people were still being killed. It was only three days later that we were allowed to return. Later, it became clear that someone had informed the Rhodesians that all the people meeting in Maputo would actually be at Chimoio, and I was also told that a helicopter was hovering over my hut, calling on me to come out.

During the attack, Frelimo moved in to support us, and gave us weapons from their armouries. This angered the Russians, who supported ZAPU/ZIPRA and did not want their weapons used by ZANLA. At one point, Frelimo even asked the Russians to collect their arms and leave Mozambique.

After three days, we returned and began the grim task of picking up the dead and injured. At least 1200 people had been killed. Our people flooded Chimoio Hospital. Since our headquarters had been destroyed, we established another which we called MuGomba (in the pit), because it was literally down in a pit. We would have been extremely vulnerable if the Rhodesians had attacked again.

Among those who died in the attack was Serbia, who had been my instructor, and my major source of inspiration. She had been a commander in Tete, where she headed and commando unit of some 99 men. She was the only woman there. The commandos did not fight regular battles, but were called upon to break through particularly difficult points. She was a priceless soldier.

She had come to Chimoio to get supplies for her unit, and was killed in the maize field. It was sad that such a great fighter did not go down in battle, but we had no option but to bury her where she lay.

Lazarus Mandeya was a transport operator and well known in business circles, but he had decided to join those who were leaving for Mozambique. When Mugabe and I arrived in Chimoio, he was already there with his wife and son, John. He was extremely valuable in our transport camp.

As the attack approached, he went away and watched it from afar. As it drew nearer, he tried to go to his hut to rescue his wife and son, and, resisting the others who tried to hold him back, rushed back into the thick of the attack. Meanwhile, his son and wife were safe, hiding behind a reed bed. He was killed, and buried where he fell.

Ruvimbo, my wife, survived by hiding in a pit latrine. The attack lasted for three days, and three nights, and afterwards it took some time before Tongogara’s team heard her cries and were able to pull her out.

In order to continue, while so many terrible deaths surrounded us, we had to develop a certain frame of mind. Experiences could not be personalised, which meant that even the death of your own child could not be placed above the welfare of the whole group. And nobody wept, not a tear was shed. Even now, people who went through the war do not cry when a relative dies.

After seeing the aftermath, I went to Maputo and commanded all our medical people to come to Chimoio. Didymus Mutasa at first refused to let his wife go, saying, “musukuru unoda kuti ndifire futi ndirimugota here? Handidi muzukuru” (My nephew, you want me to lose another wife? I’ve had enough! I don’t want!). Mutasa had been widowed once, and he was afraid to lose this, his second wife, but she eventually came. While in Maputo, I gave a report on the massacre to President Mugabe. Two thirds of our dead were women. He said to me, “You know what, I am beginning to wonder whether this is worthwhile, with all these people dying.” But I replied that we must go on to the end. His remark aroused in me a mixture of anger and disgust.

After reporting to Mugabe, I had the difficult task of informing Simon Muzenda about the death of one of his daughters, Teresa. He did not take it badly. The matter of how we were going to report to the parents of all those who died was a real problem. We eventually agreed that within the first three months of gaining our independence we must summon all the chiefs and give them the full report, which they would carry to their villages.

But when independence was finally won, we did not do as we had resolved. Instead of restoring the chiefs’ honour, lost during white rule, we began ill-treating them. This was wrong. As secretary general, it was my responsibility to organise this, and we decided to hold the gathering of chiefs at Chishawasha, at a ceremony that would take three days and three nights. I went and informed Mugabe when all preparations had been made, so that he could plan to be free at that time. He responded with, “I am the Minister of Defence, I am the commander of the armed forces, and I am busy with the integration of the army!”

I told him that I had consulted with all the ZANLA and ZIPRA commanders from the war days, to which he retorted, “There is no such thing as a ZANLA or ZIPRA Commander, it’s not your responsibility to deal with them!” This made me so angry that I was ready to spit in his face, and I called him ugly names, finishing with, “If that’s the way you are going to be, you will need lots of luck!” At which I stormed out of his office, banging the day.

Since independence, many people have asked why there was no cleansing ceremony after the war, and many of the ills which subsequently fell upon Zimbabwe have been attributed to this fact. Even the Mozambican people asked why we hadn’t held a ceremony at Chimoio. Well, this is how it happened. Mugabe decided that no cleansing was necessary in Zimbabwe.

Following the massacre, I was summoned from Chimoio to Maputo by President Machel, in true military style. I felt as thought I was being put under house arrest. A squad of soldiers marched into where I was working, and ordered me, “Para Maputo!” I arrived by plane from Beira at about 8.00 in the evening, and we spent the whole night in discussion, reviewing the situation. Eventually, we agreed we agreed that we would meet again the following night, each accompanied by a military delegation. And Machel said to me, “I respect Mugabe, but he does not measure up to this scale of military operation and planning. He does not belong as a soldier.” In fact, the military Machel did not much like Robert Mugabe.”

I immediately requested that Tongogara be brought form Tete. In fact I summoned him just as Machel had summoned me: “Para Maputo!” Having once been detained in Lusaka, he must have thought that it was all over again.

The second night’s discussion was more detailed. We were planning a counter-response to the Chimoio massacre. After the meeting, I said to Tongogara,

“Look here, you are going to see President Mugabe to make a courtesy call, but don’t give him a lot of details about this meeting.” Tongogara leaped to his feet.

“Now you have heard it yourself! You are the one who brought a sell-out here. Look how many of the people have been killed!” He continued, “I told you not to bring him here - but you only believe what I said now because Machel has told you!” I did not react, but was shocked at the extent of Tongogara’s anger against Mugabe.

Sometime later, I brought up the subject again with Tongogara. “Are you saying I brought a sell-out?” This time the two of us analysed the situation and realised that we were both equally apprehensive that Mugabe might let us down. After this, we began to isolate our dependable commanders, and tried to discover how many of us were still committed to the war. But this filled us with sadness.

Tongogara and I worked very well together, and through this we also became close friends. Both of us felt the need for someone who could be depended upon entirely, and so came about what I call “The Covenant”, which was our vow of rededication to the war, just between the two of us. One evening, we went upstairs to my bedroom, which had only one chair to sit on apart from the bed. We set out a bottle of whisky, and sat down facing each other. “Tongogara,” I asked, “Are you still committed, are you really?” Tongogara in turn asked me the same question, and we both affirmed that we were totally committed. Now we were to make our vows of total commitment. I called to the guards outside to bring us our AK47s, cocked and loaded. The young men must have been very worried as to what we were about to do. Were we going to shoot each other?

Guns in hand, we stood up, facing each other. “You swear, you are committed unto the end. If you show any hesitation, I’ll shoot you with my AK47. We each gave each other a military salute, gun at the ready, hand across the heart and took our oaths of total re-commitment. The young men were relieved when we called them to take away our guns.

Tongogara continued the process of isolating the dependable commanders. Some of those excluded would be detained for the duration of the offensive in case they caused trouble. Josiah Tungamirai was one who feared battle. But there were a number of good soldiers, including Mark Dube, Rex Nhongo, Tonderai Nyika, Morgan Mhaka, Sarudzai Chinamaropa and Justin Chauke. It was sad that Serbia had died during the attack.

We bided our time, waiting for the enemy to relax into thinking that they had destroyed us at Chimoio. When we eventually began the offensive it was very successful. While Tongogara was responsible for coordinating the attack, in the middle portion of my border, my responsibility was for the northern part, operating from Tete. Our forces pushed ahead fast, eventually reaching as far as Musana Communal Lands and Mazowe Valley, which was very close to Harare. This caused Ian Smith to say that his people could not win the war. When he was accused of weakness, he tried to retract the statement by saying he had not said they would lose - just would not win!

A Lifetime of Struggle by Edgar Tekere is published by Sapes Books in Harare. The book was edited by Ibbo Mandaza. Also in the series is The Story of My Life by Joshua Nkomo, also published by Sapes.

3. 1. Theories on death

A CIA intelligence briefing of 28 December 1979 said Tongogara was a potential political rival to Mugabe because of his .. ambition, popularity and decisive style. On the same day, the US embassy in Zambia reported: Almost no one in Lusaka accepts Mugabe's assurance that Tongogara died accidentally. When the ambassador told the Soviet ambassador the news, the surprised Soviet immediately charged 'inside job'. ^[2]

Ian Smith also insisted in his memoirs that Tongogara's "own people" killed him, and that he had disclosed at Lancaster House that Tongogara was under threat. "I made a point of discussing his death with our police commissioner and head of special branch, and both assured me that Tongogara had been assassinated," Smith wrote. ^[3]

A former Detective in the Law and Order Section of the now defunct BSA Police ( now Zimbabwe Republic Police ) saw photographs of Tongogara's body. There were three wounds, consistent with gun shot wounds, to his upper torso. The undertaker's statement (described above) was not a formal autopsy report and as such was dismissed by all but the senior politburo of ZANU.

In spite of all these rumours, Mr. R. Silke, the pathologist for Mashfords Funeral Home in Zimbabwe, confirmed, in a television documentary in 1982 called "Tongo", that this theory of gunshot wounds on Tongogara's body was false as he personally inspected the body. He confirmed that the injuries he found were consistent with road accident trauma.

Jungle Dweller who was also at Chimoio on the day of the attack said, he was shocked by the death of Josiah Tongogara. Most comrades were shocked and blamed Mugabe for the death of the great fighter. Most comrades thought Cde Tongo's death was a plot by Mugabe and his close allies. However, the fighters feared to say it out because he Mugabe was feared by most fighters even the leadership feared him too. Cde Tongo was loved by most fighters because of his style of leadership. " Tears flew down my cheeks when I heard of his death and I new the war was over because he used to address us informing us that many will be cheated to death few hours before our independence" said Comrade John mambewu (Jungle Dweller. Cde Jungle Dweller when asked to narrate his history could be seen sighing each time he mentioned names of deceased friends in arms. " Actually I was born in the district of Bikita from a poor family of eight boys and two girls. I attended my primary school at Chamburukira Lower Primary School up to grade 5. I worked as a cotton picker at farms 10, 8, and 9 in Chiredzi. I also worked for Peter WenningHam's Farm again as a cotton picker. This is where I experienced the worst cruelity I have ever seen in my life resulting in me joining the Chimurenga in 1976 Through Chikwekwete border post. I with Amos Mugwadi and Daniel Mukwena walked from our home area i.e. Musuzwa Kraal/Chamburukira Matuzu hill via Gudo,Mutsviri,Mabhiza School,Chibuwe,Maria/Cheche,Muumbe village, crossed Bhinya road into Mozambique Chikwete border post. We walked for two days before we crossed the border. I can't mentioned all the difficulties we faced on our way to Mozambique but really we had many problems. On our way we met Rhodesian soldiers several times and they questioned us and I remember we told them that we were looking for our lost cattle each time we met them. I also remember it started raining and lighting struck a tree in front of us while we were watching. My brother Daniel Mukwena started to have problems with his right eye. The eye swell, turned red and he started to cry but we said no going back lets move. I had never crossed a big river like Save(Sabi). When we arrived at the river, it was full and flowing hushly. We had no option but to swim across. we were helped by two men to cross over. I remember we lay down after we had seen a convoy of vehicles and horses patrolling along Bhinya road. I felt cold when two of the horses crossed two metres in front of me but I was never spotted. After the patrol convoy passed we crossed bhinya road and straight into Mozambique.

We were spotted by camaradas who took us to chikwekwete. At Chikwekwete we stayed for about a week before being taken to Sipunga Beira Via Mude Camp up to chigayo i.e. Chimoio. While we were at Chikwekwete we received news that our fellow cdes at Nyadzonya have been attacked and massacred. I also witnessed a capricon being axed behind the neck by the camaradas while tied beneath a mango tree. At chimoio we stayed for 3 weeks waiting for dodges to come and collect us to an unknown destination. We had count masters who would take our strength thrice a day. In the morning, afternoon and evening we would gather taken strength and then sing and dismissed to different position. I remember the situation was quiet tense because of the Nyadzonya attack which was still very fresh to every cde. All guerrilas were very vigilant to the extend that every recruit was escorted where ever he/she was going even to the toilet. When having lunch or supper you were forced to sit or kneel down while surrounded by armed trained guerrilas.

Yes, you need a complete book to get into finer details. The dodges came we were loaded into them like sadines. Our strength had much increased. The vehicles were much full such that some were standing on top of others. The drivers drove through dust roads very speedy. I remember as we travelled to our destination one recruit had his eye blown off after it was hit by a tree branch. The recruit cried helplessily but the vehicle never stopped until we reached where we were introduced as Doroi Masengere/Caitono. Some called the area matanga enguruve. The trained personnel took the injured recruit to MOs of course I never saw him again. At doroi, this is where I experienced the worst in my life. I don't think I will ever experience such experiences. There was no food. We had no blankets, no warm clothes, no medication everything was just bad. The jiggerfleas,lice,hunger and diseases started to affect us. The clothes and shoes I had were taken away by other trainados and I was given tattered and torn clothes. I cried one night, I was already thinking home, thinking of my mother,father,brothers and sisters. The detantee had affected all the camps. No clothes were given to us. The area was a wet area. It could rain any time. We slept as the rain flows beneath us. Many cdes fell ill and died because of shortage of food,clothes etc. Daniel was also affected and died. I cried but there was no help. I thought Another theory is that he was killed by the Rhodesian SAS.

Edison Sithole

2010-11-11T23:11:00.001-08:00

Edison Sithole’s remains found

Friday, 27 August 2010 11:31

Decades-long mystery resolved as . . .

Zivisai Chagaka, Staff Reporter

THE remains of national hero, Edison Sithole, who disappeared without trace following his abduction by suspected Rhodesian forces at the height of the country’s liberation struggle could soon be exhumed for reburial following revelations of the discovery of where his body was dumped, ending more than two decades of a historic search.
Sithole was snatched, along with his young secretary, Miriam Mhlanga, outside a Harare hotel on October 15 1975 and later declared dead, but his body was never found.
According to the Fallen Heroes Trust, a group composed of mainly war veterans that has been identifying, exhuming and reburying fallen liberation war fighters, the place where the veteran politician’s body was dumped by the colonial regime’s agents is now known, but finer details will only be released after his next of kin have been informed.
Speaking during a media tour of a mass grave at Mukaradzi about 10km outside Mt Darwin, the Trust’s chief exhumer, Jimmy Motsi could only say Sithole’s body and that of his secretary were dumped in Harare province.
In a separate interview with this paper, Eddison Sithole Jr, the late firebrand politician’s son who was Zimbabwe’s highest qualified legal expert at the time, said the Sithole family was “very receptive to any information that comes our way as far as this issue is concerned”.
“But at the moment, our major focus is on recovering his remains or at least identify the way he might have been killed taking into account that there are other theories that are suggestive of the notion that he was dissolved in acid,” said Sithole Jr who was only three months old when his father disappeared.
“This name that I carry is like a curse on me — it’s like an oxymoron. First, because it has certain privileges attached to it, but these privileges are outweighed by the curse effect it carries as long as the mystery remains unsolved.”
A lawyer by profession, the late national hero obtained a BA in Law from University of London while in detention in 1962, becoming the second black person in Zimbabwe to be a lawyer after veteran nationalist and hero, Herbert Chitepo.
In 1965 he obtained a Master of Law (LLM) and later an LLD, making him the first black person in the entire southern African region to attain that qualification.
Writer and lecturer, David Martin, claimed in 1993 that Sithole and his secretary were kidnapped by Rhodesian secret services, the Rhodesian Special Branch, and disposed of by the notorious Selous Scouts using lethal injection.
His car was reportedly found by police two days later in Mutare (then Umtali) near the railway station to give credence to suggestions that he had skipped the border to join the war.In an article which appeared in the British Sunday Express newspaper on January 18 1976 quoting the Edinburgh newspaper, The Scotsman, “one witness, an African (black) soldier, sought refuge in Malawi pending a Rhodesian High Court action, which Sithole’s family is bringing for habeas corpus”.
A private investigator, hired by Sithole’s father, John Taylor, had managed to find two witnesses to the abduction and obtained two sworn affidavits indicating that two members of the Rhodesian Special Branch — DR Hart and DSO Mitchell — were involved in the abduction.
The article — which carried the heading “We saw (Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian) Smith’s men grab Sithole — Police accused of abduction” — said that one of the private investigator’s witnesses was a Catholic priest, Brother Arthur, of the Justice and Peace Commission.
Part of the article reads: [[Brother Arthur says he saw a group of men accost Dr Sithole outside Salisbury’s (now Harare) Ambassador Hotel on the evening of October 15.
He claims he heard Dr Sithole say to one of them: ‘Special Branch . . .’ Then he adds: The man produced a wallet, which he opened for Dr Sithole to see. The man spoke again and I heard Sithole say: ‘Oh no, it’s not necessary; it’s alright . . .’
Another affidavit is by an African member of the Rhodesian African Rifles who says he saw Dr Sithole getting out of a car at Nkomo Barracks (sic), the regiment’s headquarters near Salisbury. . . Mr Taylor flew this key witness out of Rhodesia on Boxing Day (1975) for safe refuge.
It was the intention that he should go to Tanzania via Malawi, but Malawian airport officials became suspicious and placed the witness and one of Mr Taylor’s assistants in custody.
On January 5, the secretary-general of (Bishop Abel) Muzorewa (faction of the) ANC (African National Council), Dr Gordon Chavunduka, flew to Blantyre (Malawi) to secure the witness’ release — and found himself in the same hotel as a senior member of the Rhodesian Special Branch, a Mr Guiness. This witness is still in Malawi awaiting the Rhodesian High Court case.
But . . . the case is now being delayed because the ANC is having difficulty raising the reward money to pay Mr Taylor. . . . an emissary has left Rhodesia on a fundraising tour, carrying documents on the case.]]
The ANC had offered a reward of R87 000 to anyone providing information disclosing Sithole’s whereabouts.
Sithole entered into politics in the early 50s when he, James Chikerema and George Nyandoro formed the City Youth League political party in the then Salisbury, now Harare. At the time of his abduction, Sithole was publicist secretary for Muzorewa’s faction of the ANC.
This reporter can also reveal that the mass grave at Mukaradzi, which is situated at a former training camp for guerrillas, Tigere Base, has been invaded by gold panners who are desecrating the place in search of the mineral.
The remains of those who perished at the place during the Rhodesian regime’s brutal campaign against freedom fighters are wasting away on the surface of the scorched earth.
Motsi said there are over a 100 people whose remains remain uncollected at the place.
The Fallen Heroes Trust national chairperson and veteran politician, George Rutanhire, called on the government to seriously look into the issue of those freedom fighters whose remains lay unburied or are in mass graves. He said it is government’s business and not of children of fallen heroes to see to it that they help the relatives of the fallen fighters in reburying them.

BRITAIN TWISTS THE SWORD -JAVELINS IN NDOLA

2010-11-11T23:02:00.001-08:00

29 Squadron RAF (Gloster Javelin) deployed from RAF Akrotiri, Cyprus to Ndola to provide air defence following the announcement of Unilateral Declaration of Independence by the Rhodesian government. Air defence radars and ancillary equipment were flown into Zambia by No.114 and No.267 Squadrons (Armstrong Whitworth Argosy). No.29 Squadron returned to Akrotiri in August 1966.
They flew south with a full load of six external tanks, raising a protest from the Egyptian government when they simply overflew Egyptian airspace to get there. Conditions were primitive, with one Javelin losing a Firestreak missile when a nest of termites crawled up the landing gear and ate the solid propellant out of the missile.
Air defence radars and ancillary equipment were flown into Zambia by No.114 and No.267 Squadrons (Armstrong Whitworth Argosy). No.29 Squadron returned to RAF Akrotiri in August 1966.
One of the aircraft from 29 Squadron, XH890, forced landed at Ndola and was damaged beyond economical repair, the aircraft was moved to a children’s playground in Ndola. Photos can be seen below.
Of interest, Salisbury Radar controlled all airspace in the region, after take-off the Royal Air Force flight leader would contact the ‘rebels’ in Salisbury Radar, Salisbury Airport for clearance to fly a border patrol along the Zambia/Rhodesia border.
I was at Ndola airport at least four or five times a week during the squadrons stay in Zambia and I don't know anything about the squadron’s activities in Lusaka. I did some research on the internet and the RAF History does not make mention of Lusaka. I did find a photo, though, taken from someone straddling the cockpit of a Javelin with the old Lusaka terminal in the background. The words LUSAKA are clearly visible on the roof of the terminal. The planes were definitely based in Ndola for the duration, however may have visited Lusaka on a regular basis. After all it took a Javelin approx. 30 minutes to fly there from Ndola to Lusaka.
Excerpt from Time magazine:
"Harold Wilson offered to send a token force—a squadron of R.A.F. fighters and a battalion of the Royal Scots—to the copper belt, some 250 miles north of the dam. Kaunda accepted the air protection (Zambia has only ten military aircraft of its own), but rejected the offer of troops unless they were sent directly to the dam. Into the copper-belt centre of Ndola at week's end swooped ten British Gloster Javelin jet fighters, accompanied by big-bellied Argosy and Beverley transports carrying the squadron's maintenance supplies. A brace of Bristol Britannia turboprop transports arrived at Lusaka itself. To the south, Smith was sardonically amused. "It is in our interest to have law and order maintained in Zambia," he deadpanned in a television interview."
To Quote Air Chief Marshall Sir Jock Kennedy GCB AFC of the Royal Air Force:
“They made telephonic contact with our jets to offer our men best wishes and suggested that it would be fun to meet in the air. Our pilots needed no second invitation. On a few occasions Hunter’s or Canberra’s met the Javelins to fly along the Zambezi River in formation with crews waving and taking photographs of each other”. The odd pilot happened to stop over in Salisbury, allegedly taking leave to visit South Africa. Their passports were never stamped and a number of them met with our Prime Minster, Ian Smith. When, in August 1966, the British Government announced the withdrawal of the Javelin squadron, Rhodesians gave the RAF lads a grand farewell party at Victoria Falls."
Courtesy of Mervyn Blumberg.

HMS TIGER INFO

2010-11-11T22:58:00.000-08:00

HMS Tiger was a conventional cruiser of the Royal Navy
Royal Navy
The Royal Navy of the United Kingdom is the oldest of HM Armed Forces . From the beginning of the 19th century until well into the 20th century it was the most powerful navy in the world, playing a key part in establishing the British Empire as the dominant world power from 1815 until the early 1940s...
, one of a three ship class known as the Tiger class

Tiger class cruiser

The Tiger-class helicopter cruisers were the first of such a type in the Royal Navy, and the last cruisers built for the Royal Navy. They were originally designed to be Minotaur-class light cruisers...

Construction, redesign and commissioning

Tiger started out as Bellerophon laid down in 1941 at the John Brown Shipyard as part of the Minotaur class of light cruisers. They had a low construction priority due to more pressing requirements for other ship types during World War II
World War II
World War II, or the Second World War , was a global military conflict lasting from 1939 to 1945 which involved most of the world's nations, including all of the great powers, organised into two opposing military alliances: the Allies and the Axis...
, particularly anti-submarine craft. Bellerophon was renamed Tiger in 1945, and was launched, partially constructed, on 25 October 1945. She was christened by Lady Stansgate, the wife of William Benn
William Wedgwood Benn, 1st Viscount Stansgate
Air Commodore William Wedgwood Benn, 1st Viscount Stansgate PC, DSO, DFC was a British Liberal politician who later joined the Labour Party. He was Secretary of State for India between 1929 and 1931 and Secretary of State for Air between 1945 and 1946...
, the Secretary of State for Air
Secretary of State for Air
The Secretary of State for Air was a cabinet level British position. The person holding this position was in charge of the Air Ministry. It was created on 10 January 1919 to manage the Royal Air Force...
, and mother of MP Anthony Wedgewood Benn. However, work on Tiger was suspended in 1946, and she was laid up at Dalmuir
Dalmuir
Dalmuir is an area on the western side of Clydebank, in West Dunbartonshire, Scotland.-Location:It is neighboured by the village of Old Kilpatrick, the Mountblow and Parkhall areas of Clydebank, as well as the town centre...
.

Construction of Tiger resumed, but to a new design, with Tiger becoming the name ship of the class. The new design was approved in 1951, but construction did not resume until 1954. She would have semi-automatic guns in twin high-angle mounts with each gun capable of shooting 20 rounds per minute, and a secondary battery of fully-automatic guns which delivered 90 rounds per minute per gun. She would have no lighter anti-aircraft armament or torpedo tube

Torpedo tube

A torpedo tube is a device for launching torpedoes in a horizontal direction.There are two main types of torpedo tube:*Those designed to operate below water level, as fitted to submarines and some surface ships...

s. Air conditioning

Air conditioning

An air conditioner is a home appliance, system, or mechanism designed to dehumidify and extract heat from an area. The cooling is done using a simple refrigeration cycle. In construction, a complete system of heating, ventilation, and air conditioning is referred to as "HVAC"...

was fitted throughout the ship, and a 200-line automatic telephone

Telephone

The telephone , commonly referred to as a phone, is a telecommunications device that transmits and receives sound, most commonly the human voice. Telephones are a point-to-point communication system whose most basic function is to allow two people separated by large distances to talk to one another...

exchange was installed. Each 6 inch and 3 inch mounting had its own director, linked to a dedicated radar on the director. Tiger was finally commissioned on Clydebank in March 1959.
Career

The early part of Tigers first commission was spent, under Captain RE Wasbourn, on trials trying to make her new armament actually work. After workup under Captain R Hutchins Tiger went on a round of autumn flag-showing visits to Gdynia, Stockholm, Kiel and Antwerp. At the end of 1959 she deployed to the Mediterranean for a year as Fleet Flagship, under Admiral

Admiral

Admiral is the rank, or part of the name of the ranks, of the highest naval officers. It is usually considered a full admiral and above Vice Admiral and below Admiral of the Fleet/Fleet Admiral. It is usually abbreviated to "Adm." or "ADM". Where relevant, Admiral is a 4 star rank...

Michael Pollock

Admiral of the Fleet Sir Michael Patrick Pollock, GCB, LVO, DSC was a British officer in the Royal Navy who rose to become First Sea Lord from 1971 to 1974...

.

She took part in operations in the Far East during the Indonesian Confrontation in the early 1960s. In 1966, she hosted talks between Prime Ministers Harold Wilson

Harold Wilson

James Harold Wilson, Baron Wilson of Rievaulx, KG, OBE, FRS, PC was a British Labour politician. One of the most prominent British politicians of the latter half of the 20th century, he served two terms as Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, firstly from 1964 to 1970, and again from 1974 to 1976...

(UK) and Ian Smith

Ian Smith

----Ian Douglas Smith GCLM ID served as the Prime Minister of the British self-governing colony of Southern Rhodesia from 13 April 1964 to 11 November 1965...

of Rhodesia

Rhodesia

. The latter had unilaterally declared independence from Britain

United Kingdom

due to Britain's insistence on the removal of white minority rule. Tiger was placed in reserve in 1966 before undergoing conversion to a "helicopter and commando cruiser" from 1968-72 in HMNB Devonport

HMNB Devonport

Her Majesty's Naval Base Devonport , is one of three operating bases in the United Kingdom for the Royal Navy . HMNB Devonport is located in Devonport, in the west of the city of Plymouth in Devon, England...

Conversion, obsolescence and decommissioning

This reconstruction included replacing the after 6 inch mount and 3 inch mounts with a flight deck and hangar to operate 4 Wessex (and then later Sea King) helicopters. She also had new radar

Radar

Radar is an object detection system that uses electromagnetic waves to identify the range, altitude, direction, or speed of both moving and fixed objects such as aircraft, ships, motor vehicles, weather formations, and terrain. The term RADAR was coined in 1940 by the U.S. Navy as an acronym for...

s, Sea Cat anti-aircraft missiles, and taller funnels. She had excellent command, control, and communications facilities installed, and found use as a flagship

Flagship

A flagship is the lead ship in a fleet of vessels, a designation given on account of being either the largest, fastest, newest, most heavily armed or, for publicity purposes, the best known. In military terms, it is a ship used by the commanding officer of a group of naval ships...

to task groups. The refit was very expensive; some say the many millions to convert Tiger, as well as her sister ship Blake to helicopter cruisers drained much needed resources better used elsewhere. She was recommissioned in 1972. Her large crew made her an expensive ship to operate and maintain. When the economic difficulties of the early seventies came around this led to a defense manpower drawdown that resulted in manpower shortages, although Tiger remained in service long enough to take part in the 1977 Silver Jubilee

Silver Jubilee of Elizabeth II

The Silver Jubilee of Elizabeth II marked the twenty-fifth anniversary of Queen Elizabeth II's accession to the throne of the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and other Commonwealth realms...

Fleet Review in celebration of Queen Elizabeth II. In 1978 Tiger was placed in reserve, subsequently being placed on the disposal list in 1979. Both Tiger and sister-ship HMS Blake

HMS Blake (C99)

HMS Blake was a guided missile cruiser of the Tiger class of the Royal Navy, the last of the Royal Navy cruisers. She was named after Admiral Robert Blake, a 17th century admiral who was the "Father of the Royal Navy". She was ordered in 1942 as one of the Minotaur class of light cruisers...

were listed as part of the Standby squadron, and stored at HMNB Chatham. When the Falklands War

Falklands War

The Falklands War , also called the Falklands Conflict/Crisis, was fought in 1982 between Argentina and the United Kingdom over the disputed Falkland Islands and South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands...

broke out in late March 1982, both ships were rapidly surveyed and it was determined both were in good enough material shape that both were drydocked (Tiger in Portsmouth and Blake at Chatham) and recommissioning work was begun, as it was deemed that their 6" guns would be useful for shore bombardment. By late-May it was realized that neither could be made ready in time for deployment and work was stopped. Though Chile showed a faint interest in acquiring Tiger (and sister-ship Blake

Blake

Blake is a surname or a given name which originated from Old English. Its derivation is uncertain; it could come from "blac", a nickname for someone who had dark hair or skin, or from "blaac", a nickname for someone with pale hair or skin. Another theory is that it is a corruption of "Ap Lake",...

), this did not get past the discussion stage, and Tiger lingered on tied to a mooring buoy in Portsmouth Harbour. Tiger existed in a slowly deteriorating condition until mid-1986, when she was sold for scrap. She was towed to Spain and scrapping started in October 1986.

The source of this article is wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. The text of this article is licensed under the GFDL.

HMS TIGER

2010-11-11T22:49:00.000-08:00

ON BOARD THE TIGER

THE Rhodesian issue dominated two conferences of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers during 1966. The first, at Lagos in January, produced the remarkable prediction in its communique:

The Prime Ministers noted the statement by the British Prime Minister that, on the expert advice available to him, the cumulative effects of the economic and financial sanctions against Rhodesia might well bring the rebellion to an end in a matter of weeks rather than months.

Some of the delegates found this difficult to swallow, for the passage went on:

While some Prime Ministers had misgivings in this regard, all expressed the hope that these measures would result in the overthrow of the illegal regime in Rhodesia within the period mentioned by the British Prime Minister.

The Lagos conference also produced a sixth principle to be added to the other five as a basis for an Independence Constitution:

The need to ensure that, regardless of race, there is no oppression of majority by minority or of minority by majority.

Rhodesia had little quarrel with this sentiment, provided it could work both ways. Experience in other African states had shown that while the whites bent over backwards to treat the Africans fairly, the opposite did not hold true once the Africans took over the reins of government. The second conference, at Marlborough House, London, in the following September saw the African Prime Ministers at their intemperate worst. They concentrated entirely on the Rhodesian issue, to the disgust of the more responsible Commonwealth statesmen who were anxious to discuss other matters of general concern. The agenda was disrupted as the Africans demanded direct action in Rhodesia, particularly the use of force. After nine days of bitter debate a communique was issued which showed that the 22 participating countries had failed to agree on a common policy and had split on racial lines - the Africans demanding an end to negotiation and the British Prime Minister and his supporters rejecting the use of force and insisting on another attempt to negotiate.
Immediate steps were taken to hold further talks, and a stream of British Ministers and top officials visited Salisbury to discuss points of difference with the Rhodesian Prime Minister. But they got nowhere. The British terms were unacceptable with their insistence on smooth transition to majority rule, and the Rhodesian insistence on a braking mechanism was equally unacceptable to the visitors. No progress seemed possible.
Then, on December 1, Rhodesians were electrified by the news that at 5.30 that morning Ian Smith and his Minister of Information, Mr. Jack Howman, together with Sir Humphrey Gibbs and Sir Hugh Beadle, had boarded an R.A.F. Comet to fly to the Mediterranean to meet the British Prime Minister and his Commonwealth Secretary. Their destination turned out to be Gibraltar, where they were to board the cruiser, H.M.S. Tiger, for talks that would be conducted in the strictest secrecy.
While H.M.S. Tiger cruised through the choppy waters of the Mediterranean, the atmosphere on board her soon assumed the character of the weather. Mr. Wilson opened the first meeting quietly enough. His difficulty, he explained, was the time factor. Britain could not wait any longer before proceeding to carry out the commitments she had made to the Commonwealth regarding further action on Rhodesia. The African states were arguing that the British had not hesitated to use force to put down previous rebellions when the rebels were black, but when it came to Rhodesia, which was white-dominated, they hesitated.
Ian Smith replied that he appreciated Britain's position, but her trouble was that she was working to a time schedule dictated by others. The other Commonwealth countries should not be allowed to interfere when there was a possiblity of a settlement, even if it took two more months.
There was no question of waiting another two months, Wilson retorted. Negotiations had gone on long enough, and Britain's relations with other countries were being poisoned by her failure to deal successfully with the Rhodesian problem. An immediate settlement was imperative.
Ian Smith's eye had a glint in it as he objected to the proposal that Rhodesia would have to give up her independence before any new constitution was agreed upon, without any guarantee at this stage that it would be granted. He could not make a final decision on a vital point like this on his own - he would have to consult his Cabinet colleagues.
Harold Wilson blew up. The terms of the invitation to join him aboard the Tiger, he said, were that Smith should have a completely free hand to confirm or reject a settlement.
lan Smith replied that he could not accept this version of the invitation. He had had a very limited time in which to consult his Cabinet before leaving Salisbury, and he was certainly not in a position to finalize the terms of a settlement without further reference to his colleagues. New factors had been introduced and his Cabinet would have to be put in the picture.
When the two Prime Ministers met at 11.45 p.m. for their third meeting on December 2, Wilson pressed Smith to give an unqualified "yes" or "no" to the proposals. lt was essential that he should give a definite answer to the British Cabinet on his return to London. In an effort to assist he had ordered the Tiger to head back to Gibraltar so that Smith could return to Salisbury to discuss the proposals with his Cabinet.
Alternatively, he suggested that Mr. Howman should return to Salisbury and take the proposals with him to put before the Rhodesian Cabinet. But lan Smith refused to agree to this.
Harold Wilson turned on the heat. lf Rhodesia did not agree to a settlement, Britain would go to the United Nations for selective mandatory sanctions, and his undertaking to the Commonwealth Conference would be enforced - that if agreement were not reached by the end of the year any previous undertaking that independence would be granted before majority rule would fall away and Rhodesia would never get her independence on any other basis than immediate majority rule.
Ian Smith replied stiffly that threats were of no consequence to him - he was concerned only with principles.
All right, said Mr. Wilson, in that case they should meet again the following morning. In the meantime Mr. Smith should telegraph his Cabinet to stand by to consider the working document as soon as it had been transmitted to Salisbury. The Rhodesian Ministers must give an unqualified "yes" or "no" before midnight on Sunday, December 4.
The next morning Ian Smith said that the proposals regarding a return to constitutionality were the main stumbling block, but that agreement on the constitutional arrangement was in sight.
Mr. Wilson said his main worry was that during the interim period the Rhodesians might embark on a second UDI, in which case Britain would feel free to take what military action she thought necessary. It was also possible that after independence was granted a white-dominated Government might overthrow the Constitution, and therefore Britain wanted certain external guarantees. He suggested a treaty and also a defence agreement and he wanted to give the Governor greater power over the police and military.

The British Government would have to be satisfied on the use that would be made of the Rhodesian forces and the police during the interim period and a British representative on a Defence and Security Council under the control of the Governor would be able to keep us informed.

Mr. Smith objected on the ground that this meant keeping Rhodesia under supervision, and when Wilson confirmed this he said the whole proposal represented an alarming change in the British attitude. When the full conference resumed on the Saturday afternoon, a Working Document incorporating the British proposals was presented, and the meeting adjourned while the Rhodesians considered it. When they met again that evening Mr. Wilson urged Mr. Smith to sign an undertaking that he would "commend it to his colleagues in its entirety." This Ian Smith refused to do because it was not acceptable to him.
The undertaking was then altered to read:

Mr. Smith undertakes to inform his colleagues that it is acceptable to Her Majesty's Government as a settlement of the Rhodesian problem.

This Mr. Smith accepted. While the new undertaking was being typed, Mr. Wilson was called away because "something of importance had occurred".
When they met again at nine o'clock that evening Mr. Wilson's whole demeanour had changed. Jack Howman described the scene to the Rhodesian Parliament after their return:

We came into the Admiral's day cabin to find Mr. Wilson in an absolute fury. I have never seen a man exhibit such malevolence as he did at that moment.

He stormed at lan Smith. The British Government was no longer prepared to wait for a Rhodesian answer. lf Smith did not give it now he would withdraw the whole document. He was at liberty to leave the ship immediately. He (Wilson) had been in touch with his colleagues in London that afternoon and some of them were very disturbed. "The British Government refuses to be pushed around any longer", he declared. lan Smith told him with equal vehemence that he was not prepared to sign. He would take the document back to Salisbury and give it further study, but if Wilson insisted on an answer now it would have to be "No."
Then Wilson really lashed out. The situation was an intolerable humiliation for him. Here was Rhodesia, which represented only one-tenth of one per cent of the Commonwealth, creating a situation which might result in a split of the Commonwealth itself. He had all along understood that Smith would attend the Tiger meeting with plenipotentiary powers to make decisions. But if he insisted on consulting his colleagues he must conclude that Smith never intended to reach a settlement.
After further exchanges and a consultation which Mr. Wilson held with Sir Humphrey Gibbs and Sir Hugh Beadle, the British Prime Minister agreed that they shoud both take the document back to their respective Cabinets for discussion and decision. The answer would have to be a straight "Yes" or "No''. He would also postpone the deadline for a decision by 12 hours, so he would therefore expect Mr. Smith's answer by 12 noon Salisbury time on Monday, December 5.
The Rhodesian party returned to Salisbury and Mr. Smith immediately went into session with his Cabinet. Mr. Wilson had returned to London and held a meeting with his Cabinet, which accepted the terms. At the end of the meeting, it was reported, the Ministers emerged "grim faced", indicating that Britain had made some unpalatable concessions.
The Rhodesian Cabinet, however, sat right through Monday. The noon deadline came and went. Then, at 8.30 p.m., lan Smith emerged from the Cabinet room and told the waiting crowd that the proposals had been rejected.
He said that while Rhodesia was prepared to accept proposals fulfilling Mr. Wilson's six principles as the basis of a constitution for an independent Rhodesia, they could not accept the abandonment of the 1965 Constitution before a new constitution had been finally secured and put to the test of public opinion. They also rejected the British proposals for a "return to legality", which involved major departures from the principles of parliamentary government which Rhodesia had enjoyed for 43 years.

The Rhodesian Government is, of course, anxious to remove the differences that have existed over the past year between Rhodesia and Britain. Nevertheless, the Rhodesian Government cannot be expected to yield such fundamental principles and in a manner which amounts to surrender and the submission of power.

lan Smith concluded his statement:

The fight goes on.

The Tiger negotiations might well have succeeded had Mr. Wilson not made the mistake of leaving no room for manoeuvre on the details of the return to legality - they had to be accepted in their entirety, without argument, with no possibility of amendment. Faced with such an ultimatum the Rhodesians, determined to follow the course they had set, reacted in the only predictable way. Their decision caused shock and dismay among their many countrymen who had been hoping for a settlement, an end to sanctions, a return to the community of nations, so that they could get on with the vital job of developing the country. But after mature reflection many of them concluded that the rejection had been justified. And that the man responsible for the failure had not been Ian Smith but Harold Wilson.
Immediately after Rhodesia's rejection Britain took the independence issue to the United Nations despite Mr. Wilson's earlier contention that it was a matter entirely for Britain and Rhodesia to settle between them. Since her independence had not been internationally recognized and she had no seat in the United Nations. Rhodesia's application to state her case was refused.
It was ironic that just as the Rhodesian issue came up for discussion in the Security Council. the General Assembly adopted a resolution calling for

the immediate cessation of intervention in any form whatsoever in the domestic affairs of states and peoples.

In his anger at Rhodesia's rejection of the Tiger proposals, Harold Wilson declared: "No Independence Before African Majority Rule". If anything was calculated to stiffen the Rhodesian backbone it was NIBMAR. It united the white Rhodesians, and a great many of the black Rhodesians as well, solidly behind the Government's determination not to give in. The British Prime Minister was a poor psychologist. It was nearly two years before the British and Rhodesian Prime Ministers met again. There had been little contact during the interval and it seemed that all prospect of further negotiations had been abandoned. Then, suddenly, on October 9, 1968, it was announced that the Rhodesian Prime Minister and a strong team had departed the previous evening in an R.A.F. Britannia to meet Mr. Wilson and a British team on board H.M.S. Fearless at Gibraltar.
It was a different Mr. Wilson who met the Rhodesians this time. He was courteous and considerate and evidently prepared to be reasonable. But he made it clear in a television interview before the meeting that the biggest issue at the talks would be the creation of a "blocking quarter" of elected Africans able to veto any retrogressive amendment to a negotiated constitution, and also that agreement would have to be within the limits of the six principles laid down by Britain.
Both sides were genuinely anxious to reach a settlement, but once again the differences between them were too great What particularly stuck in the Rhodesian gizzard was a British requirement regarding possible amendments to the entrenched clauses of the Constitution - that if such an amendment were found by the Constitutional Council to be unjustly discriminatory between the races, the Council could refer it to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, which would have the final say.
The Rhodesians argued that this provision opened the door to outside interference in the country's affairs, that the Privy Council would be called upon to make political rather than judicial decisions, and that the Appellate Division of the Rhodesian High Court was the proper body to hear appeals of this kind.
The negotiations failed. To their mutual regret, Britain and Rhodesia continued to be at loggerheads.

UDI RHODESANS RALLY

2010-11-11T22:46:00.000-08:00

THE RHODESIANS RALLY

During the ten days preceding the Declaration, signs were not lacking that something momentous was in the wind. The Government declared a state of emergency, on the ground that saboteurs from outside the country's borders were becoming active and the national security was threatened. All public meetings were banned, no large gatherings were permitted, swift action could be taken against any hint of subversion. At about the same time import controls were introduced to safeguard Rhodesia's foreign exchange and economic well-being. Immediately after Ian Smith made his declaration, the Government issued its UDI Proclamation.
Public reaction on the whole was restrained. There was some celebration, but the business men of Salisbury and Bulawayo, Gwelo and Umtali, did not celebrate. They took the threat of sanctions seriously and feared for their future. They could not understand why this step should have been taken just as they were climbing out of the trough following the break-up of the Federation. Now they would have to tighten their belts against the prospects of shrinking markets. The markets they were worried about were those immediately to the north - Zambia and Malawi, which since the dissolution of the Federation had imposed tariffs on goods manufactured in Rhodesia. It was only to be expected that they would seize on Rhodesia's illegal act to raise those barriers still further.
The initial reaction of dismay on the part of many Rhodesians was swiftly followed by another. The step had been taken. The die had been cast. Every patriotic Rhodesian agreed that the country was entitled to her independence, far more so than the black states to the north who had had it thrust upon them with such indecent haste. They might not agree with the way it had been achieved, but now that we had it we would have to see that we retained it. Because the alternative was too awful to contemplate. If Rhodesia collapsed, if she had to beg for clemency from an outraged British Government, there could be no doubt what sort of government world be imposed. It would be black majority government almost right away.
Therefore, there could be no question of actively opposing the Government's decision, of organizing a political opposition. Rhodesia and her future came first. Ian Smith could be assured of their loyalty and support in facing the challenge, in meeting the dangers ahead.
The African population took the declaration calmly. A planned outbreak of violence was expected, but there were only a few instances of attempted rioting and intimidation, mostly in Bulawayo, and these were promptly stamped out by the police. An attempt to organize a general strike, again mostly at Bulawayo, produced little or no response. As long as the tenor of their daily lives was undisturbed, the mass of the Africans was unconcerned.
The Governor, Sir Humphrey Gibbs, was in an agonizing position. As a highly respected Rhodesian of long standing, and the first Rhodesian to hold the office of Governor, he must have agreed that Rhodesia was entitled to her independence. But he could not possibly agree with the manner in which it had been obtained. At the same time as Ian Smith issued his Proclamation of Independence, Sir Humphrey issued his own proclamation declaring the Government illegal and removing Mr. Smith and his Ministers from office.
But censorship had been introduced that morning, and the Governor's proclamation was neither published nor broadcast within Rhodesia. But, since the censorship did not apply to outgoing messages, it was published in the Press in South Africa and Britain and it was broadcast by the BBC, so that a number of Rhodesians knew about it. Ian Smith was quick to take action.
He issued a statement on November l 5 describing his meeting with Sir Humphrey on the morning of November 11 when he had told him of his intention to broadcast his Declaration of Independence at lunch-time. Sir Humphrey, he said, had been expecting this.

He said he believed my decision was wrong in that if we were not able to negotiate with the British Government we should maintain the status quo. He acknowledged that it was not possible to convince me of his way of thinking, and added that although he was opposed to my decision, once UDI was a fait accompli all good Rhodesians should stand together in the interests of Rhodesia. He assured me that he was a good Rhodesian.

Following Sir Humphrey's proclamation, he had paid him another visit.

l found that he had changed his stand and had obviously received instructions from London. I pointed out to him that his constitutional position was quite untenable, and I suggested that he should ask Her Majesty to relieve him of his position. This he was not prepared to do.

The Prime Minister went on to explain that the message purporting to have come from the Queen dismissing him and his Ministers had, in fact, emanated from the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations. It was clear that Sir Humphrey was not representing the Queen so much as the British Prime Minister. When Sir Humphrey refused either to resign or to leave Government House, the Government withdrew the trappings of office, such as the Police Guard, and refused to pay the salaries of members of the staff who remained with him. Sir Humphrey was permitted to go on living at Government House, but as a private citizen at a rental of £250 a month.
Simultaneously with the Independence Proclamation, a new Constitution was given the country to supersede that of 1961. One of its provisions was the appointment of a Governor- General by the Queen on the advice of "her Rhodesian Ministers". Since this was not possible, it was necessary to appoint an Officer Administering the Government to carry out his functions, and the Deputy Prime Minister, Mr. Clifford Dupont, was appointed to the office.
Mr. Dupont was M.P. for the Salisbury constituency of Arundel, and when he resigned his seat to take up his new post there was speculation about a possible by-election. There was none. So solid was public opinion behind the Government on the independence issue that a contest would have been a waste of time, and the Rhodesian Front candidate was returned unopposed.
Any discussion about the new Constitution in the Press was effectively stifled by the censorship regulations. The Rhodesian Front had all along made no secret of its detestation of the Rhodesian Printing and Publishing Company's newspapers, particularly the two dailies, which were opposed to the Government's policies, and the regulations were severely applied.
The editors retaliated by leaving blank spaces where reports and leaders had been censored, and most issues carried large white spaces on the main pages. A censorship aimed at preventing the leakage of information on Rhodesian moves to counter sanctions was understandable, but critical opinion and information on other aspects of Rhodesian affairs also came under the censor's pencil, and the system aroused widespread resentment. When the regulations were withdrawn in April, 1968, both Press and public were relieved.
In an attempt to counter the censorship, the British Government erected a radio transmitting station at Francistown, close to the Rhodesian border in Botswana. Its object was to put over a "peace aims" offensive which the British hoped would topple the "Smith regime". Its presence was resented in Francistown and British troops were posted to guard it. It was a costly undertaking - and it was completely ineffective. Its broadcasts were jammed, it created no stir of interest in Rhodesia and the few messages that did get through were largely ignored. It was an expensive failure, and when it was closed down in March, 1968, there were no regrets.
The only real trouble in Rhodesia occurred in the only place where the emergency regulations could not be promptly applied - the campus of the University College in Salisbury. In the beginning discontent over UDI was confined to the campus itself, but on March 17, 1966, it erupted into noisy demonstrations by a large group of African students who treated the Principal, Dr. Walter Adams, and other faculty members with gross disrespect. Not all the African students took part, and some of those who did alleged that they had been intimidated into doing so.
As the trouble mounted on the third day the police intervened to prevent further demonstrations and meetings were banned. This led to 25 lecturers going on strike and walking out of a combined faculty meeting addressed by Dr. Adams because "we feel our freedom has been infringed upon and the university's charter violated by the imposition of police control."
The trouble died down temporarily on March 23, when the executive committee of the college council recommended that Dr. R. Birley, a visiting professor at the Witwatersrand University, Johannesburg, should investigate the causes of the disturbances and also the machinery for liaison between the administration, the staff and the students. The lecturers returned to their duties, the striking students went back to their classes and the police were withdrawn.
But the trouble flared up again, this time due to an act by Dr. Adams himself. An African student who had been restricted for his subversive activities arrived on the campus and frankly admitted that he had walked out of the restriction area at Gonakudzingwa. Dr. Adams decided not to inform the police or to allow them to arrest him as long as he remained on the campus.
This caused such public indignation that the Principal offered to resign, and later, when he was appointed Director of the London School of Economics, he did so. Other members of the staff also resigned, most of them from the faculties of Arts and Social Studies.
The climax came at the graduation ceremony on Saturday, July 16. A crowd of about 50 African students deliberately insulted the guest of honour, Dr. J. P. Duminy, Principal of Cape Town University, calling him a "Boer" and urging him to "go back to Verwoerd". The venerable Rhodesian statesman, Lord Malvern, was jostled in spite of his 83 years, and two Cabinet Ministers were jeered at. The main speeches were delivered against a constant uproar and the ceremony was carried out only with the greatest difficulty. Some of the white students linked arms to keep the demonstrators away from the platform, and the police were called in.
The left-wingers had overstepped the mark. At dawn on July 28 the police arrested nine Arts and Social Studies lecturers and an Asian student under detention orders. The lecturers were five British, one Canadian, an Italian, a Norwegian and a Rhodesian. Nine students were placed in restriction - five Africans, three Europeans and one Asian. A couple of days later it was announced that the eight non-Rhodesian lecturers were to be deported.
Parliament was told that they had been actively engaged in subversion. Some of them had been open about their Communist affiliations. Their plan had been to create conditions

which would lead to the closure of the university and result in a state of affairs which might, in their minds, justify intervention by Britain.

Justification for these allegations came when one of the lecturers was charged with contravening the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act. He was found guilty of possessing Russian hand grenades and other "offensive materials" for use against the European community, and of having kept in contact with terrorists who had infiltrated into the country. He was sent to prison for 20 years after pleading guilty to six counts of conspiring to commit terrorist acts. With the removal of the trouble-makers, U.C.R. settled down to its job of educating Rhodesia's youth of all races. Dr. Adams was succeeded as Principal by Professor T. G. Miller, of Reading University, who took up his duties in November, 1967. His liberal views, however, soon brought him into conflict with the authorities and less than two years later he resigned and left the country.

He was succeeded by Professor Robert Craig, Professor of Theology at U.C.R., who has had many years' experience of Rhodesian conditions and is well qualified to guide the university's future development.

RHODESIAN FARMER ROLL OF HONOUR

2010-11-11T22:39:00.001-08:00

Roll of Honour

In memory of members of the Rhodesia National Farmers' Union, their wives, sons and daughters, killed in the terrorist war.

At the going down of the sun and in the morning we will remember them.
(Laurence Binyon)

Major E. C. Addams, Odzi, 14/8/74.
Mr L. Ashby, Mzingwane, 7/7/76.
Mr J. Ashworth, Umtali, 18/1/78.
Mr R. Abbot, Odzi, 10/4/78.
Mrs K. Backe-Hansen, Matetsi, 9/9/76.
Mr D. Bashford, Karoi, 24/12/76.
Mr A. Bathhurst, Karoi, 24/12/76.
Mr R. A. Barton, Melsetter, 6/4/77.
Mr J. Blignaut, Ayrshire, 17/6/77.
Mr A. P. Burger, Matetsi, 12/6/77.
Mr A. Barclay, Gwanda/West Nicholson, 12/8/77.
Mr D. Barclay, Ayrshire, 7/12/77.
Mr B. Brakenridge, Gadzema, 6/1/78.
Mr B. Brakenridge [Son], Gadzema, 6/1/78.
Mrs S. Brakenridge [Sen.], Gadzema, 6/1/78.
Mr P. Bezuidenhout, Nuanetsi, 14/2/78.
Mr D. C. Bagnall. Headlands, 14/3/78.
Mr K. H. Bicknell, Selous, 10/4/78.
Mr H. Blignaut, Doma, 20/4/78.
Mr I. D. Black, Odzi, 17/5/78.
Mr D. Burton, Lonely District, 25/5/78.
Mrs E. Botha, Gazaland, 6/6/78.
Mr P. Bouwer, Tengwe, 13/7/78.
Mr O. Bordini, Shamva, 31/7/78.
Mr C. Brent, Marula, 20/10/78.
Mr A. Beamish, Horseshoe, 2/11 /78.
Mr S. H. Barnard, Cashel, 6/12/78.
Mr W. Bezuidenhout, Gazaland, 20/12/78.
Mr J. A. Bennett, Shamva, 23/12/78.
Mrs M. Bennett, Shamva, 23/12/78.
Bennett [Minor], Shamva, 23/12/78.
Bennett [Minor], Shamva, 23/12/78.
Mr L. L. Brooks, Darwin, 19/3/79.
Mr I. R. Brown, Sipolilo, 28/3/79.
Mr M. Brooke-Mee, Gwelo, 30/3/79.
Mr B. Couve, Shamva, 6/6/73.
Mr N. Campbell, Marandellas, 23/5/76.
Mr D. Carshalton, Gazaland, 27/8/76.
Mr C. M. Cloete, Filabusi, 31/10/76.
Mrs M. Cloete, Filabusi, 31/10/76.
Mr A. Cumming, Matetsi, 5/11/76.
Mr P. Crouch, Ayrshire, 17/12/76.
Mr W. P. Cremer, Bindura, 26/1/77.
Mr D. Cookson, Centenary, Feb. 1977.
Mr C. A. Capell, Shamva, 9/3/77.
Mr C. Chapman, Melsetter, 22/5/77.
Miss C. Chessworth, Figtree, 14/8/77.
Mr E. Claasen, Odzi, 29/9/77.
Mr J. F. Coomans, Cashel, 6/12/77.
Mrs S. A. Cumming, Norton, 7/1/78.
Miss S. C. Cumming, Norton, 7/1/78.
Mr D. L. Courtney, Mrewa, 6/4/78.
Mr D. I. Crombie, Macheke, 8/8/78.
Mr P. J. Cloete, Centenary, 8/8/78.
Mr K. Cremer, Gazaland, 18/8/78.
Mr V. Conlon, Mazoe, 11/1/79.
Mr G. Crane, Goromonzi, 19/3/79.
Mr M. D. Cleave, Juliasdale, 1/5/79.
Mr M. J. Chance, Bindura, 15/5/79.
Mr J. S. Donald, Umtali, 26/4/76.
Mr S. L. J. Davies, Gwaai Valley, 26/7/76.
Mr D. Dodd, Ayrshire, 6/4/77.
Mr D. W. S. Dunn, Shamva, 13/9/77.
Mr C. A. Delaney, Melsetter, 3D/9/77.
Mr B. J. Dean, Melsetter, 30/9/77.
Mr D. de Coupelay, Macheke/Virginia, 4/6/78.
Mr S. Donnelly, Karoi, 21/6/78.
Mrs F. M. du Toit, Gutu, 23/7/78.
Mr C. J. J. Davies, Umtali, 20/8/78.
Miss J. Douglass, Melsetter, 22/8/78.
Mr A. de Nadai, Mayo, 21/8/78.
Mr H. du Plessis, Gazaland, 28/1/79.
Mr T. H. Elton, Cashel, 19/5/78.
Mr I. J. Eksteen, Inyazura, 11/1/79.
Mrs J. M. Eksteen, Inyazura, 11/1/79.
Mr T. V. Forbes, Mount Darwin, 23/4/73.
Mr E. Fletcher, Centenary, 17/2/74.
Mrs B. Fletcher, Centenary, 17/2/74.
Mr G. Farge, Gazaland 24/10/76.
Mr H. Fenzel, Melsetter, 16/4/78.
Mr F. Falzoi, Karoi, 12/6/78.
Mr H. Franken, Selukwe, 17/7/78.
Mr F. N. J. Fourie, Tengwe, 14/8/78.
Mr P. H. Fairbanks, Gazaland, 2/9/78.
Mr B. T. Furber, Gwanda, 16/4/79.
Mr T. Greyvenstein, Mayo, 16/9/76.
Mr D. R. C. Greef, Plumtree, 15/5/77.
Mrs M. A. Greef, Plumtree, 15/5/77.
Miss N. Glenny (Baby), Melsetter, 29/9/77.
Mr F. A. Grobler, Matopos South, 17/6/78.
Mrs A. E. Grobler, Matopos South, 17/6/78.
Mr K. Gifford, Gazaland, 6/7/78.
Mr P. J. Gunn, Middle Sabi, 5/10/78.
Mr D. A. Galloway, Melsetter, 24/10/78.
Mr A. V. Howe, Umvukwes, 24/6/75.
Miss M. Habig, Gazaland, 6/6/76.
Miss L. Habig, Gazaland, 6/6/76.
Miss Y. Habig, Gazaland, 6/6/76.
Mr J. E. Hudson-Beck, Melsetter, 12/8/76.
Mr H. T. J. Hastings, Shamva, 11/3/77.
Mrs M. H. Hastings, Shamva, 11/3/77.
Mr A. Hill, Wedza, 26/6/77.
Mrs A. C. Horton, Nyamandhlovu, 29/8/77.
Mr P. L. Hanson, Melsetter, 20/10/77.
Mr H. Holstenberg, Melsetter, 20/10/77.
Mr R. C. Hunt, Melsetter, 20/10/77.
Mr H. J. Hurley, Centenary, 21/12/77.
Mr J. Henry, Gazaland, 31/12/77.
Mr E. J. Hards, Shamva, 10/4/78.
Mr A. A. Hess, Karoi, 25/5/78.
Mr J. R. Hill, Tokwe, 11/12/78.
Mr D. B. Hutchinson, Lalapanzi, 29/12/78.
Mrs D. I. Hutchinson, Lalapanzi, 29/12/78.
Master B. Hutchinson (6 yrs), Lalapanzi, 29/12/78.
Master V. Hutchinson (3 yrs), Lalapanzi, 29/12/78.
Mrs R. Hacking, Odzi, 8/1/79.
Mr P. Hovell, Mazoe, 13/1/79.
Mr T. Hulley, Tengwe, 23/2/79.
Mr W. Houston, Inyanga, 14/3/79.
Mr L. M. Jellicoe, Centenary, 4/2/73.
Mr A. Joubert, Wedza, 30/3/73.
Mr D. C. James, Gwelo, 27/4/76.
Master I. Johnson, Umvukwes, 26/12/77.
Mr L. M. Jellicoe, Centenary, 9/7/78.
Mr G. D. Joubert, Ayrshire, 22/12/78.
Mrs I. Kleynhans, Centenary, 24/1/73.
Mr P. J. O. Knight, Doma, 17/5/75.
Mr T. F. Koen, Centenary, 2/2/78.
Mr P. Kenchington, Mid-Sabi, 3/2/79.
Mr B. J. S. Kearns, Bindura, 15/4/79.
Mr M. Langeman. Melsetter, 22/1/77.
Mr W. P. Lilford, Karoi, 9/11/77.
Mr S. Le Vieux, Chiredzi, 7/2/78.
Mr R. J. Liebermann, Marandellas, 4/6/78.
Mr J. H. C. Liddle, Bindura, 1/10/78.
Mr P. Lentner, Shamva, 18/2/79.
Mrs M. E. G. Liebenberg, Shangani, 11/4/79.
Mrs L. M. McFedden, Plumtree, 7/9/76.
Mr D. H. MacKay, Melsetter, 1/1/77
Mr D. G. MacKenzie, Shamva, 1/2/77.
Mr G. J. Myburgh, Mayo, 26/1/77.
Miss S. G. McRoberts, Shamva, 11/3/77.
Mr G. I. Murdoch, Selous, 18/6/77.
Mr K. Mrowic, Que Que, 25/5/78.
Mr H. M. Meyer, Plumtree, 29/9/78.
Mrs E. L. Meyer, Plumtree, 29/9/78.
Mr F. J. Mee, Inyanga, 26/10/78.
Mrs M. A. Mee, Inyanga, 26/10/78.
Mr T. Margarson, Gwelo, 15/11/78
Mr D. Moorcroft, Bindura, 15/12/78.
Mr G. J. Muller, Centenary, 25/12/78.
Mr D. S. Muir, Mount Darwin, 13/5/78.
Mr S. P. Naude, Somabula, 17/10/76.
Mr A. C. Newman, Melsetter, 15/10/76.
Mr P. S. Naude, Centenary, 21/10/76.
Mr M. Nielsen, Karoi, 17/12/76.
Mr F. J. Nel, Tengwe, 23/11/77.
Mr C. D. Northcroft, Shamva, 20/12/77.
Mrs Y. Nicol, Gazaland, 17/3/78.
Mr J. D. Nicholson, Nyamandhlovu, 25/5/78.
Mr P. A. J. Oberholtzer, Melsetter, 4/7/64.
Mr C. Ogilvy, Shamva, 13/9/77.
Mr C. H. Olivey, Melsetter, 15/5/78.
Mr F. J. Oosthuizen, Gwelo, 26/9/78.
Mr F. Pitcher, Bindura, 14/6/76.
Mrs W. Palmer, Mrewa/Mtoko, 19/10/76.
Mr N. G. Payne, Bindura, 26/1/77.
Mr K. Prinsloo, Chiredzi, 16/4/77.
Miss L. A. Philips, Insiza, 12/7/77.
Mr N. H. E. Prince, Tengwe, 23/3/78.
Mr F. Pretorius, Nuanetsi, 18/4/78.
Mr P. Potgieter, Doma, 9/7/78.
Mr T. M. S. Peech, Macheke/Virginia, 13/7/78.
Mr J. F. B. Payn, Matopos South, 21/9/78.
Mr R. W. G. Puckrin, Insiza, 30/10/78.
Mrs F. I. Pearson, Selukwe, 28/12/78.
Mr P. Purcell-Gilpin, Headlands, 4/3/79.
Mr A. Purcell-Gilpin, Headlands, 4/3/79.
Mr P. Rouse, Centenary, 18/2/74.
Mr E. A. Richardson, Belingwe, 24/3/77.
Mr A. J. Ritson, Selukwe, 6/8/77.
Mr A. Robertson, Gwelo East, 21/8/77.
Mrs E. M. Rushmore, Myamandhlovu, 6/9/77.
Mr W. E. Read, Gatooma, 15/1/78.
Mr N. J. Royston, Karoi, 18/2/78.
Mr J. Reyneke, Gazaland, 8/3/78.
Mr I. Rosenfels, Marula, 29/3/78.
Mr J. Roberts, Penhalonga, 22/4/78.
Mr P. J. Richards, Gwanda, 27/11/78.
Mr D. C. Rosenfels, Marula, 8/2/79.
Mr C. Rosenfels, Kezi, 24/4/79.
Mr D. M. Stacey, Karoi, 9/3/73.
Mr V. Stockil-Gill, Marandellas, 27/10/74.
Mr P. Snyders, Vumba, 9/10/75.
Mr R. M. Smith, Insiza/Shangani, 28/7/76.
Mr L. R. Shakespeare, Karoi, 23/8/77.
Mr J. Stopforth, Gwelo East, 23/9/77.
Mr A. Stander, Nuanetsi, 22/2/78.
Mr J. N. Strydom, Headlands, 9/3/78.
Mr C. A. Steyn, Cashel, 4/4/78.
Mr J. U. Stanley, Tengwe, 5/4/78.
Mr G. Swartz, Gazaland, 12/4/78.
Mr R. Swemmer, Macheke/Virginia, 3/6/78.
Mr H. Stander, Nuanetsi, 5/8/78.
Mr A. Stander, Beit Bridge, 15/8/78.
Mr E. Swanepoel, Melsetter, 22/8/78.
Mr J. K. G. Syme, Melsetter, 13/9/78.
Mrs H. A. Syme, Melsetter, 13/9/78.
Mr R. S. Smallman, Melsetter, 11/9/78.
Mr F. C. Steyn, Cashel, 18/12/78.
Mr J. Souter, Nuanetsi, 23/1/79.
Mr J. Smit, Beatrice, 30/1/79.
Mrs C. Smit, Beatrice, 30/1/79.
Mr J. Strydom, Inyanga, 2/2/79.
Mrs M. O. A. Scott, Gwelo, 7/2/79.
Mr P. Steyn, Odzi, 13/2/79.
Infant Son G. P. Starling, Mtepatepa, 30/3/79.
Master C. C. Tilley, Mashonaland South, 11/1/78.
Mr C. C. Tompson, Nuanetsi, 14/2/78.
Miss C. C. Tilley, Mashonaland South, 3/9/78.
Mrs V. E. Trinder, Nyamandhlovu, 3/9/79.
Mrs H. Turner, Gazaland, 9/1/79.
Miss S. Turner, Gazaland, 9/1/79.
Mr J. H. Viljoen, Gadzema, 16/5/66.
Mrs Viljoen, Gadzema, 16/5/66.
Mr D. J. Vincent, Centenary, 3/4/73.
Mr J. J. F. Van Vuuren, Matopos South, 22/5/76.
Mr M. J. Van Vuuren, Matopos South, 22/5/76.
Mr O. P. Valentine, Melsetter, 12/8/76.
Mr K. D. Viljoen, Melsetter, 1/10/77.
Mrs E. A. Viljoen, Melsetter, 1/10/77.
Mr J. J. F. Van Maarseveen, Cashel, 4/12/77.
Mr B. Vermeulen, Headlands, 11/1/78.
Mr J. l_. S. Vorster, Melsetter, 23/1/78.
Mr M. A. Van Aard, Macheke/Virginia, 30/1/78.
Mr S. P. Van Blerk, Headlands, 26/5/78.
Mrs G. Van Blerk, Headlands, 26/5/78.
Miss L. Van Blerk, Headlands, 26/5/78.
Miss M. A. Van Reenen, Macheke/Virginia, 15/9/78.
Mr S. Van der Merwe, Nuanetsi, 15/2/79.
Mr R. C. Vassard, Chipinga, 12/5/79.
Mr G. West, Gazaland, 12/11/76.
Mr J. Wright, Odzi, 10/9/77.
Mr N. Willis, Shamva, 14/2/74.
Mr R. S. Williams, Inyanga, 17/1/78.
Mr J. F. Wolfaard, Nuanetsi, 9/2/78.
Mrs C. J. Willers, Gazaland, 10/6/78.
Mr D. Ward, Mazoe, 23/6/78.
Mr B. H. Williams, Inyati, 3/8/78.
Master M. Wilger, Nyamandhlovu, 3/9/78.
Miss L. Wilger, Nyamandhlovu, 3/9/78.
Mrs S. Watkins, Nuanetsi, 29/12/79.
Mr C. A. S. Young, Melsetter, 29/4/75.
Mr S. Ziegler, Marandellas, 16/1/78.

Most recent deaths

Mr R. D. Kennedy, Mzingwani, 7/5/79
Mr K. F. Hogg, Fort Victoria, 19/6/79
Mr S. J. Stander, Beitbridge, 19/6/79
Mr P. J. D. Breytenbach, Headlands, 25/6/79
Mr C. P. Beale, Nyamandhlovu, 27/6/79
Mrs M. Hofmeyr, Fort Victoria, 6/7/79
Mr J. M. Jeffreys, Marandellas, 7/7/79
Mr T. Hartley, Headlands, 8/7/79
Mrs S. Bother, Somabula, 18/7/79
Master A. Smit, aged 2 years, Somabula, 18/7/79
Mr I. D. N. McGiles, Penhalonga, 21/7/79
Mr R. Beamish, Sipolilo,
Mr T. Speight, Umvukwes,
Mr E. Volker, Arcturus, 5/8/79
Mr W. A. Reinsford, Nyamandhlovu, 10/8/79
Mr B. L. T. Eastwick, Centenary, 17/8/79
Mr D. A. Baker, Macheke, 18/8/79
Mr B. S. Bassett, Rusape, 19/8/79
Mr J. E. Oostindien, Macheke, 15/8/79
Mr S. Edridge, Wedza, 11 /9/79
Mr F. Forward, Sinoia, 16/9/79
Mr J. D. Jordaan, Odzi, 17/9/79

The Roll of Honour does not include the names of the sons of farmers killed on active duty with the Security Forces.

RHODESIAN FARMER DEFENCE OF FARMS

2010-11-11T22:36:00.000-08:00

Rhodesian Farmers Defensive Arrangements

I knew many Rhodesian farmers and have visited many farmsteads over the years. At every farm, defensive arrangements were made up to suit their particular situation and infrastructure. The following would be a general overview:

1) Most farmers fitted hand-grenade grills to the outside of all windows. Doors leading outside were likewise security grilled.

2) Many farmers built thick walls about a meter in front of bedroom windows to stop bullets, but particularly to deal with RPG 7`s. Beds were never placed against the outside walls of a farmhouse.

3) It was usual to have a designated safe room within the farmhouse that could be defended until support arrived. Sometimes this was a central corridor that allowed the farmer to move into other rooms to attack those outside through the windows. In the loft or ceiling over the safe room, some farmers laid sand bags to deal with possible mortar attack.

4) Every farmhouse in a given area was linked by a radio system called “Agric Alert”. This allowed radio contact with other farmers who formed their own defence units, usually under the umbrella of PATU (Police Anti-Terrorist Unit), which would react to a call from one of their neighbours for assistance. Another means of alarm raising was the use of a signal rocket - The Agric-Alert system was not done away with after the war, such was the lack of trust in Mugabe`s promises. It performed admirably as well when dealing with criminal activity such as stock theft. The alert system arranged for all farmers to check in with each other at a given time in the morning and evening as a means of monitoring their status.

5) Around all farmhouse gardens were erected security fences with barbed wire (or razor wire) and which often had simple alarm systems built into them. Some I believe were electrified, if not before the end of the war, certainly afterwards. Within the fence boundary, every farmer usually had a couple of large dogs. The dogs were fed their largest meal in the morning instead of the evening, in order to help keep them awake at night. Other farmers had geese or ducks, which made excellent guard “dogs.” Gardens were kept deliberately trim so as to keep clear fields of view and fire etc. The farm houses also had outside flood lighting erected in such a way as to blind those outside the fence, but not to interfere with the vision of those within the farmhouse.

6) All farmers and their wives were armed with an assortment of weapons, and most farmers were trained military men. They had at least one assault rifle, usually an FAL 7.62, assorted shot guns, .303 hunting rifles and so forth. It was also not unusual for wives to carry Uzi`s around with them, or other equivalents such as the Rhodesian Cobra. All members of the family were trained on the various weaponry available to them, including the kids. In one famous incident a child successfully fought off the attacking terrorists after both of his parents were wounded. The main defensive weapons were at all times within immediate reach of the adult farmhouse occupants, and were placed next to the bed at night.

7) Some farmers used mine protected vehicles, as a favourite of terrorists was to landmine the driveway outside the fence. A great deal of time was spent looking at the dirt roads for freshly dug earth points and so forth when driving around the farm.

8) Some farm gardens and particular points external to the fence were wired with home-made claymore like devices strategically placed in areas where attackers were likely to take cover. In a few instances farmers deliberately erected “cover positions” for the terrorists to use outside the fence, which were then blown up upon attack. A particular favourite was a section of plastic piping filled with nails, nuts, bolts, screws and so forth. I witnessed tests with these and the tubes cleared large areas of their intended aiming point of all bush cover and leaves from trees etc for about 30 meters into the bush. By placing a number of figure 8`s in front of these tests, it was apparent from the strike patterns that not one of them would have walked again had they been terrorists.

9) Some farmers also hired soldiers on leave to guard their premises at night. Usually these were men looking for extra “beer” money. They were called Bright Lights, and often ended up in fire fights with the terrorists, where they came as a nasty surprise to the terrs when the latter were expecting a nice soft hit and run. Like all farmers in an area, Bright Lights would participate in the support of other farmers when the situation required.

10) Good relationships with farm labour, particularly the house staff, very often warned of problems before they occurred. All of us who grew up in the country have fond memories of those employees who took care of us as kids, and who often placed themselves at great risk for doing so.

I.R.

CHOPPERTECH

BLOOD THE INK FOR MY AUTOPSY

HERBET CHITEPO ASASSINATION INFO

FIRST COPY OF CHOPPERTECH PRINTED

ANC ZIPRA BATTLE AGAINST RHODESIANS IN WANKIE AREA

DOCUMENTARY CHOPPERTECH AND POLL?

CHOPPERTECH LIFE LESSONS

ZIPRA CAMPS REVISITED

303 BSAP BY MIMI CAWOOD

FOREWARD OF CHOPPERTECH BY DON PRICE BCR OC 3 Cdo RLI

AN INTERESTING LINK ON FIREFORCE

The Chimurenga war in a nutshell

Rhodesian Bush War

Background

Perceptions

Rhodesian Security Forces

Rebel/Guerilla Forces

ZANLA

ZIPRA

Civil disobedience (1957–1964)

First phase (1964–1972)

Second phase (1972–1979)

Resolution

Aftermath

See also

External links

Externals- SLATED BY TIME

RHODESIA: Smith Takes a Dangerous New Gamble

ZAF raids into mozambique

RAIDS ON GORONGOSSAZimbabwe's Military Involvement in Mozambique1982 - 1992

by NORMAN MLAMBO

1: Introduction

2: The Political Economy Of Zimbabwe's Trade Routes

Table 1: Rhodesia�s Transport Corridors, 1974

Table 2. Comparison of Transport Costs: Durban/Beira to Zimbabwe

3: The Three Corridors - Beira, Limpopo And Tete

3.1 The Beira Corridor

3.2 The Limpopo Corridor

3.3 The Tete Corridor

4: Raids On Gorongossa

4.1 The First Raid on Gorongossa.

4.1.1. The Impact of the First Raid on Gorongossa

4.2. The Second Raid on Gorongossa

5: Other Operations 1986 - 1990 23

6: The Air Element 25

6.1. Routine Operations

6.2. Aircraft Accidents

7: ZDF Expenditure In Mozambique

7.1. The Zimbabwe Defence Budget

Table 3. Zimbabwe�s Defence Expenditure and Armed Forces, 1981-1994

7.2. Army Expenditure 26

Table 4. ZNA and AFZ Expenditure in Mozambique 1985 � 90

7.3. Air Force Expenditure

8: Casualties

Table 5: ZDF casualties in Mozambique, 1984-1990

9: Withdrawal Of Zimbabwean Troops From Mozambique

10: Conclusion

Bibliography And Footnotes

UNCONVENTIONAL BUSH WARFARE

CHITEPO INFO

1. Early years

2. Career

3. ZANU

4. Assassination

5. References

6. External links

DEATH OF TONGOGARA

3. 1. Theories on death

Edison Sithole

Edison Sithole’s remains found

BRITAIN TWISTS THE SWORD -JAVELINS IN NDOLA

HMS TIGER INFO

Construction, redesign and commissioning

Career

Conversion, obsolescence and decommissioning

HMS TIGER

ON BOARD THE TIGER

UDI RHODESANS RALLY

THE RHODESIANS RALLY

RHODESIAN FARMER ROLL OF HONOUR

RAIDS ON GORONGOSSA
Zimbabwe's Military Involvement in Mozambique1982 - 1992

5: Other Operations 1986 - 1990 ²³

6: The Air Element ²⁵

7.2. Army Expenditure ²⁶

At the going down of the sun and in the morning we will remember them.
(Laurence Binyon)