Rhodesian Air Force Publicity Photos

FIREFORCE PAINTINGS

SOUTHERN AFRICAN MILITARY KIT CIRCA 1970s

Michael Ian Upton BCR

Mike Upton was a Flight Sergeant when I first joined 7 Squadron and was brilliant at drill. He was also a very experienced operator during the bush war leaving the Rhodesian Air Force as a Master Sergeant and earining a Bronze Cross for his bravery in action.
This is a recent photo taken from ORAFS of Mike at a recent Anzac parade.

Rhodesian Military mineproofing soloutions

Rhodesian Army Quarter-Master General, Colonel I.R. Stansfield faced what appeared to be an insolvable problem. First, United Nation sanctions isolated Rhodesia from world markets and restricted him from purchasing the armor from which he might fashion MRAP vehicles. Second, Rhodesia could not afford to buy the armor even if he could gain access to the world markets. These circumstances forced Rhodesia to design, build and field an MRAP vehicle fleet alone.


And less than six years after the first mine strike in April of 1971, the Rhodesians succeeded in transforming their entire vehicle fleet from an unprotected liability into an offensive capability that restored tactical and operational mobility to the Fire Force, virtually eliminated mine related deaths and significantly reduced mine related casualties. Following is a brief synopsis of how this small, financially constrained country sanctioned off from the rest of the world developed an MRAP fleet of vehicles over 25 years ago that, unbelievably, are more survivable than any comparable vehicle produced by the U.S. today.


To counter the successful fire force tactics, the communists began an offensive unconventional mine warfare campaign in 1971. Using mines they quickly began to exploit the unprotected Rhodesian infrastructure, laying mines along roads, city streets, and random open areas of the countryside surrounding farms and villages. In order to protect its citizens and maintain its legitimacy, the government formed a mine warfare committee that included the federal government, police, civil vehicle organizations and private companies. According to Stansfield, the committee’s most important and far reaching decision was to make survivability the most important aspect of mine and ambush protection, [emphasis added] and they laid down very specific criteria for crew protection.i


Next, Stansfield combined Rhodesia’s exacting and exhaustive mine casualty records with the mine warfare committee’s extensive vehicle blast tests to determine the major kill mechanisms associated with mines. Then he used this information to design and build special-purpose vehicles to effectively counter the kill mechanisms.ii Stansfield categorized the principles of mine protection under primary, secondary and tertiary kill mechanisms.

Primary kill mechanisms included acceleration, fragmentation and overpressure. Acceleration is the dynamic vertical acceleration resulting from a mine blast that often produces permanent or fatal neck and spine injuries. Fragmentations are the pieces from the mine itself or other debris propelled by the mine blast that cause massive soft tissue damage primarily to the head, heart and lungs. Blast overpressure is the sudden violent pulse of air generated by the mine blast that destroys the circulatory and respiratory system.

Secondary kill mechanisms resulted from vehicle parts failing under the stress of the mine blast and causing traumatic injury to the occupants. Tertiary kill mechanisms resulted from the various traumatic injuries produced by a vehicle crash often resulting from a mine blast.iii


Successful mine and ambush strikes also score a psychological mobility kill because they degrade the morale and confidence of offensive-minded forces. Successful mine attacks create hesitation, and sluggishness that degrade operational maneuver, while the confidence and high morale derived from knowing the operating force is protected from mine attacks is immeasurable. Stansfield recognized this fact and set about developing a fleet of vehicles capable of defeating each of the mine kill mechanisms listed above. In addition to protecting the operating forces, these vehicles actually changed the character of Rhodesian countermine warfare from passive defense in terms of neutralizing and avoiding mines and ambushes to an active offensive strategy of seeking them out.


The Rhodesians progressed quickly through first and second-generation field expedient and bolt-on protection like the U.S. Army attempted in Vietnam. The Rhodesians understood these methods did not afford them the protection they needed, reduced load carrying capacity, and cost prohibitively. Their third generation vehicles consisted of deep v-shaped blast deflecting hulls welded onto existing truck frames. These vehicles yielded substantial increases in protection from mines and small arms with the added benefit of protecting the occupants during rollovers from vehicle accidents.


Rhodesian design culminated with fourth generation MRAP vehicles designed from the ground up to protect against all three mine kill mechansims. These MRAP vehicles significantly expanded the offensive force options available to the Fire Force. In fact, they were so robust and survivable the Rhodesian Army began using them as offensive mobile fire support platforms in addition to their other logistical and transportation duties. The MRAP vehicles were so well protected and mobile that by the time the third and especially the fourth generation MRAP vehicles were fielded, the Rhodesians no longer attempted to detect and avoid the killing ground of an ambush, they detected and attacked directly into it.iv The Rhodesians had in effect turned an enemy strength into an exploitable vulnerability because the level of protection they enjoyed enabled them to literally drive through an ambush unharmed, then turn and destroy it.


The Rhodesian MRAP efforts to reduce casualties through survivability clearly speak for themselves. Their extremely detailed mine casualty records indicate unprotected vehicles suffered a 22 percent kill rate, while 1st and 2nd generation MRAP vehicles only suffered 8 percent casualty rate. However, 3rd generation MRAP fatality percentages drops to 2 percent while 4th generation falls below 1 percent. Rhodesian MRAP vehicles immediately restored the tactical mobility, and operational maneuver critical to the Fire Force while virtually eliminating casualties. The Rhodesians had effectively defeated the mine and ambush threat with mild steel, a sound design, and a philosophy that protecting their forces to improve their mobility was the key to victory.

Tactical victories, one might add. Still the ability of the Rhodesian to give their troops the tactical and strategic mobility back was certainly amazing given the dire overall ressources. A good deal of the AO in Afghanistan are more difficult to navigate and enforce greater compromises. But it doesn't seem to be that the British Mod has only recently learned the most important lesson: High mine protection is not something you slap on the next vehicle you come across!


Extracted from: http://www.defencetalk.com/forums/ar...dates-7467-11/

Rhodesian External Operations

Rhodesian Externals

This was only the begin of problems for the regime in Maputo. Namely, to counter Machel government’s support to insurgents of Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), and its armed wing, Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA), which were waging a war against the white regime in Rhodesia, the Rhodesian Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO) conceived a strong insurgency movement becoming operational inside Mozambique. Thus the Rhodesians joined a number of loosely-organized bands of resistance fighters into what officially became known as Resistencia Nacional de Mocambique – RENAMO. This title was not very well-known in the public of the time, however, which was the reason that for most of the late 1970s, Mozambiquan insurgent-movements were more usually referred to as “Mozambican National Resistance” (MRM) or the “Mozambican National Resistance” (MNR). The first RENAMO leader was André Matsangaisse, an ex-FRELIMO platoon commander, punished for theft and expelled from FAM before being placed in a re-education camp at Gorongosa. Matsangaisse joined the rebellion out of nationalist motives upon escaping from detention to Umtali. Recognized by Rhodesians as a strong leader, one of his first actions was to lead a raid against the detention camp at Gorongosa from which he escaped, freeing over 500 prisoners, most of them ex-FRELIMO fighters. At least 300 decided to join and followed him back into Rhodesia.

Right from the beginning, the CIO agents understood that the anti-regime sentiment was still too weak. The agency therefore set up a powerful 400kW radio station – nick-named “Big Bertha” – the Voz da Africa Libre (“Voice of Free Africa”) and begun transmitting anti-government propaganda in Portuguese from a transmitter in Gwelo. The new radio station soon became so popular with Mozambicans, that the Government sought the assistance of East German technicians to jam it. The powerful transmitter, however, defied all such efforts: step by step, Voz da Africa Libre was successful in focusing anti-regime sentiment and bring ever more disaffected FRELIMO fighters back to bush.

When the war began, the FAM had no defined COIN doctrine. Of course, the military attempted to address security management problems, but it failed to accomplish even this task: the FAM did not manage to maintain overland communications in order to enable troop movement and re-supply; it failed to contain the spread of RENAMO operations; and its capability to counterattack RENAMO forces remained limited at best until well into the mid-1980s.

Aside from facing an internal insurgency, the regime in Maputo and the FAM found themselves also on the receiving end of a whole series of Rhodesian strikes against ZANLA and camps of the Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) in the country. The first significant cross-country strike flown by the Rhodesian Air Force (RhAF), occurred on 28 February 1976, when Hawker Hunters attacked the ZANLA base in Pafuri, in the frame of Operation “Small Bang”, a raid by Rhodesian African Rifles and Selous Scouts. In late May 1976, the RhAF also struck at a ZIPRA arms depot. On 9 August, Rhodesian Selous Scouts attacked a ZANLA camp on the bend of the Pungwe River tributary, killing 600 personnel and causing the reminder to flee in Operation “Eland”.

A whole series of raids of different scale in size and ferocity followed between October 1976 and mid-May 1977. The RhAF English Electric Canberras and Hunters, helicopters as well as various units of Rhodesian Army – including Special Air Service (SAS), Rhodesian Light Infantry (RLI), and Selous Scots – were deployed to hit various targets. The situation culminated with the Operation “Aztec”, when Selous Scouts hit ZANLA targets around Mapai, intending to restrict organisation’s movement into south-eastern Rhodesia. While the Rhodesians have lost a number of RhAF and civilian aircraft while fighting guerrillas insider their own borders, during the mid-1970s, the first RhAF loss during operations inside Mozambique occurred on the evening of 30 May 1977, when C-47A “R3702” was shot down following an attack on ZANLA guerrillas in the frame of the Operation Aztec. The starboard engine of the aircraft was hit by an RPG-7 during depart from Mapai airfield, and the plane crashed, killing Flt.Lt. Collocott, one of crewmembers. On the following morning, Hunters of No.1 Squadron RhAF carried out attacks on FRELIMO and ZANLA bases around Jorge de Limpopo, but were unable to spot enemy mortar positions. Aztec ended on 2 June, with limited Rhodesian success.

In autumn 1978, Rhodesian SAS was deployed in a number of missions well inside Mozambique. Usually, the operators were parachuted in to find targets and designate them for Hunter- and Canberra-strikes. Some of these combined operations, foremost “Melon” and “Dingo”, resulted not only in considerable losses for ZANLA and ZIPRA, but also in heavy losses and destruction of several FAM units. In late November, Operation Dingo was launched against targets in Zambia before the Rhodesian Hunters and Canberras returned to hit the ZANLA camp at Tembue, NE of the Cabora Bassa lake, in Mozambique. Although equipped with a significant number of anti-aircraft artillery pieces and SA-7s, the Mozambiquan military, ZANLA and ZIPRA rebels proved practically defenceless against Rhodesian strikes. They have lost immense amounts of arms and suffered considerable casualties causing negligible Rhodesian losses in exchange. This was later to become the direct reason for establishment of the Mozambiquan Air Force as an armed branch.

The process of founding the Mozambiquan Air Force proved to be a lengthy and complex task, however, and was to take years to accomplish. Before it was so far, therefore, the most the Mozambiquans and the rebels they supported could to was to fire increasing numbers of SA-7s at RhAF aircraft attacking them. Due to excellent training of Rhodesian pilots, very few of MANPADs came anywhere near their targets, however, and most of the strikes flown during the next Rhodesian offensive into Mozambique were practically unopposed. The situation changed completely during the last large-scale Rhodesian incursion, Operation Uric. This brought savage attacks of RhAF Hunters and Canberras against targets in Mapai area, on 5 September 1979, including FAM radar stations, anti-aircraft gun emplacements and warehouses: immense damage was caused to several installations used for supporting infiltrations into Rhodesia. However, this operation signalized also the “beginning of the end” for Rhodesians, then it was not considered as success, especially as the later began to suffer unacceptably high losses. A RhAF Alouette III was shot down already on the first day of the offensive, by an RPG-7, and a South African Air Force Puma transport helicopter involved in supporting the Rhodesian operation was brought down on the following day, killing 12.

Between 28 September and 3 October 1979, Canberras and a Hunters flew a series of strikes against the huge base at Chimoio, holding some 6.000 ZANLA guerrillas, as well as a FAM column moving towards Rhodesian border. Although the main base was eventually occupied and destroyed, during bitter fighting on 30 September, resulting in most of it’s the rebels in situ being either dead or wounded, the Rhodesians were not successful in the end. The approaching FAM column proved a particularly tough nut to crack, then a Canberra and a Hunter each were shot down, with the loss of all crewmembers, including the Hunter-pilot, Flt.Lt. Brian Gordon. This was also the last Rhodesian operation of this kind in Mozambique: only two months later a cease-fire was agreed, and the war in Rhodesia ended.

Rhodesian Army Minedog

1978 Keith Nelson RHODESIA

January 23, 1978 Vol. 9 No. 3 A U.S. Mercenary Maimed in Rhodesia Bravely Accepts the Cost of His CallingBy Frank W. Martin
Only a year ago Keith Nelson left his home in little Sycamore, Ill. to fight guerrillas in Rhodesia as a soldier of fortune. He was 25 years old. "Our society had grown complacent, and our lives were predictable," he explains. "I wanted to experience life outside of that—not just read about it in books." For six months, as a corporal in the Rhodesian infantry, Nelson worked as a medic near the border of Mozambique where guerrillas are bivouacked. Caring mainly for black Africans blasted apart by mines was "ugly work," he recalls, "but you did the best you could, and the more you saw the more callous you got. It was a job."

Nelson was eagerly awaiting transfer to Rhodesia's elite Selous Scouts when in June, on patrol with his combat squad, he tripped a mine loaded with six and a half pounds of TNT. "Three guys ahead of me apparently stepped over it," he recalls. "I stepped squarely on it. It was like jumping off a 70-foot ledge and hitting belly first. I tried to move my legs and couldn't. My right arm was torn up at the elbow and my little finger was gone."

Clinging to consciousness, Nelson gave his buddies first-aid directions and told the doctor from nearby Mtoki how to dress the wounds until he could be airlifted to the capital city of Salisbury. Doctors there managed to save Nelson's mangled arm, but the blast had disintegrated his right leg from the knee down, his left from midcalf. Surgery was followed by five months of grueling daily therapy and an agonizing withdrawal from morphine. But Nelson was determined to be home for Christmas, and walking again—on artificial legs.

That he succeeded testifies not only to his own stubborn courage but to the loving care of his Rhodesian girlfriend, Mary Winship, a 2l-year-old civil service clerk who visited him in the hospital constantly, then took him into her parents' home and "treated me as a person—not as a cripple." But how does one explain Nelson's undimmed sense of war as adventure—even as recalled from a wheelchair? "Combat is the ultimate game," he insists. "You're not playing for points but for lives. I'm still enthralled and excited by it." He was one of an estimated 100 Americans in a foreign force of 1,000.

In retrospect Nelson seems an improbable soldier of fortune or, more pejoratively, a mercenary. The eldest of six children, he enjoyed hunting and camping with his podiatrist father, but, as one high school friend remembers, "he just wasn't the military type." A late bloomer physically, he shunned school sports—partly because he disliked authority—and had few friends. Adrift after graduation in 1969, he fetched up in Alaska as a surveyor's assistant, then began feeling restless again. His enlistment in the U.S. Army in 1970 was sudden and impulsive. "I wanted to get some experience in something," he says.

By that time Nelson had begun to enjoy testing his growing physical powers, and basic training provided a challenge. Soon, despite his lifelong fear of heights, he volunteered for Special Forces and compulsory jump school. Nelson eventually logged 200 jumps and, as the medic in his 12-member combat team, saw action in Southeast Asia. "My job carried a lot of respect," he says, and he enjoyed being "around a group of men who were physically fit, intelligent, trustworthy and able to work as a team."

When his hitch was up in 1973, Nelson decided to go home and begin pre-med studies. For the next four years he worked toward a college biology degree, compiling an A-minus average. But then his veteran's benefits ran out, and he began to doubt he would get into med school. Sparked by letters from jump school friends already in Rhodesia, his wanderlust returned, and he was lured by his old love of battle. "Many people today see professional soldiers as the scum of the earth," he says. "The Green Berets are considered killers and baby eaters. But it's just like any other job that requires intensive training."

Although Mary Winship was wary of becoming involved with a soldier, she was attracted to the quiet American. "Keith was different," she says. "He understood politics and talked about lots of things—not just the army." His allegiance may have been bought and paid for by the white-minority Rhodesian regime (Nelson received about $1,000 a month), but he believed fervently in the cause that he served. "The press makes it a race issue," he says, "but only 10 percent of the people support the terrorists, who are Communist-supplied and Communist-financed."

Though his recovery continues, Nelson must still use a cane and needs help with stairs and physical chores. But movement in his right arm is improving, though, as he puts it, "What do you need a little finger for anyway?" His psychological scars are more subtle. Mary complains that he neglects ordinary please-and-thank-you politeness and tends to male chauvinism. Nelson, however, believes he is coming around. "Like most people," he says, "as I get older I get less dramatic and use more common sense."

Despite the fact that time is running out on white rule in Salisbury, Nelson and his bride-to-be will return there next week—she to her old job, he to the University of Rhodesia Medical School, which accepted him shortly before his return to the U.S. They plan to make Salisbury their permanent home—even under eventual black-majority rule. "I just hope it will be representative for whites and blacks alike," he says. "Nobody should be oppressed by anybody else." As for the terrible personal price he has paid, Nelson is proud of his anti-terrorist service, and willingly accepts the role of the stoic. "I was doing a job, and I knew the consequences," he says. "I have no regrets."

LANDMINE CASEVAC

COUNTERSTRIKE

COUNTERSTRIKE
Description:
Fireforce as a military concept dates from 1974 when the Rhodesian Air Force (RhAF) acquired the French MG151 20mm cannon from the Portuguese. Coupled with this, the traditional counter-insurgency tactics (against Mugabe’s ZANLA and Nkomo’s ZIPRA) of follow-ups, tracking and ambushing simply weren’t producing satisfactory results. Visionary RhAF and Rhodesian Light Infantry (RLI) officers thus expanded on the idea of a ‘vertical envelopment’ of the enemy (first practiced by SAS paratroopers in Mozambique in 1973), with the 20mm cannon being the principle weapon of attack, mounted in an Alouette III K-Car (‘Killer car’), flown by the air force commander, with the army commander on board directing his ground troops deployed from G-Cars (Alouette III troop-carrying gunships and latterly Bell ‘Hueys’ in 1979) and parachuted from DC-3 Dakotas. In support would be a propeller-driven ground-attack aircraft armed with front guns, pods of napalm, white phosphorus rockets and a variety of Rhodesian-designed bombs; on call would be Canberra bombers, Hawker Hunter and Vampire jets.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

About The Authors:
DR. RICHARD WOOD, born in Bulawayo, Rhodesia, is a Commonwealth Scholar, Fellow of the Royal Historical Society and a graduate of Rhodes and Edinburgh universities. He has enjoyed sole access to the hitherto closed papers of Ian Smith to write this book. So Far and No Further! complements his definitive The Welensky Papers: A History of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland: 1953-1963 and The War Diaries of André Dennison.



CHRIS COCKS was born in Salisbury, Rhodesia in 1957. He now lives in Johannesburg. He is a partner in the recently established South African publishing house, 30° South Publishers. He is the author of Fireforce (now in its fourth edition); Cyclone Blues; and is the editor and compiler of The Saints—The Rhodesian Light Infantry. He is currently writing the biography of his childhood, of growing up in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, and the subsequent adjustment to life in the rebel colony of Rhodesia

Beaver Shaw
I participated in the DVD and explained Fireforce from the Airforce view and went through what it was like to be a helicopter crewman during the Rhodesian Bush war.

BOB THOMPSON MFC 8 SQN RHAF

My fellow Squadron mate Bob Thompson succumbed to cancer just recently and I am saddened by this brave man's passing.
Bob you fought for your cause and later on in life against that dreaded cancer which ravaged your body.
On sending Pam your sister my condolences this is the poignant reply:-
Thanks so much. We did not realise how many chums Bob had out there. It has been terrific to hear from so many of you who served with Bob. He was a good man and fought very hard for life. Alas, he won the battles along the way but not the war. A bit like you chaps, really?

Kind regards

Pam
Can someone who has a photo of Bob please send me a copy to post here?
Beaver

INSURGENCY

OPEN SOURCE INSURGENCY >> How to start
Superempowerment -- an increase in the ability of individuals and small groups to accomplish tasks/work through the combination of rapid improvements in technological tools and access to global networks -- has enabled small groups to radically increase their productivity in conflict. For example, if a small group disrupts a system or a network by attacking systempunkts, it can amplify the results of its attacks to achieve as much as a 1,400,000 percent return on investment.

Open source warfare is an organizational method by which a large collection of small, violent, superempowered groups can work together to take on much larger foes (usually hierarchies). It is also a method of organization that can be applied to non-violent struggles. It enables:
High rates of innovation.
Increased survivability among the participant groups.
More frequent attacks and an ability to swarm targets.
Here are some suggestions (this is but one of many methods based on recent history, I'm sure that over time a better method will emerge) for building an open source insurgency:

A)The plausible promise. The idea that holds the open source insurgency together. The plausible promise is composed of:
An enemy. The enemy serves as the target of attacks. This enemy can either be either received or manufactured (any group or organization that can be depicted as a threat). The enemy can be any group that currently holds and exerts power: invader, the government, a company, an ethnic group, or a private organization.
A goal. This objective animates the group. Because of the diversity of the groups and individuals that join together in an open source insurgency, the only goal that works is simple and extremely high level. More complex goal setting is impossible, since it will fracture/fork the insurgency.
A demonstration. Viability. An attack that demonstrates that its possible to win against the enemy. It deflates any aura of invincibility that the enemy may currently enjoy. The demonstration serves as a rallying cry for the insurgency.
B)The foco. Every open source insurgency is ignited by a small founding group, a foco in guerrilla parlance. The foco sets the original goal and conducts the operation that provides the insurgency with its demonstration of viability. It's important to understand that in order to grow an open source insurgency, the founding group or individuals must follow a simple path:
Relinquish. Give up any control over the insurgency gained during its early phases. In practice, this means giving up control of how the goal is achieved, who may participate, how to communicate, etc. The only control that remains is the power of example and respect gained through being effective.
Resist (temptation). Stay small. Don't grow to a size that makes the original group easy for the enemy to target (very few new members). Further, don't establish a formal collection of groups, a hierarchy of control, or set forth a complex agenda. This will only serve to alienate and fragment/fork the insurgency. In some cases, it will make the foco a target of the insurgency itself. It will also slow any advancement on the objective since it limits potential pathways/innovation.
Share. Provide resources, ideas, information, knowledge, recruits, etc. with other groups and individuals that join the insurgency. Share everything possible that doesn't directly compromise the foco's integrity (operational security and viability). Expect sharing in return.

Stigmergy and the Selous Scouts in Rhodesia

Author, Andrew Yeoman, founder of the Bay Area National Anarchists, and the original link of publication, at http://www.rosenoire.org/articles/rhodesian_scouts.php
(EXCELLENT ARTICLE ANDREW)


Stigmergy is scientifically defined as, "a mechanism of spontaneous, indirect coordination between agents, or actions, where the trace left in the environment by an action stimulates the performance of subsequent actions by the same or different agents. This swarming effect is a form of self-organization that produces complex, apparently intelligent structures. There is no need for any planning, control, or even communication between the agents. Stigmergy is derived from the Greek words stigma (sign) and ergon (action), and captures the notion that an agent's actions leave signs in the environment. These signs are then sensed by the agent, and determine the agents subsequent actions. While loaded with occult connotations, in this essay we will explore stigmergy as applied to human conflict, specifically the Selous Scouts of Rhodesia.

In warfare, the first and most difficult task of a combatant is to find the enemy. In a large country consisting of thousands of square kilometers of a diverse and varied landmass, such an endeavor can cause even the most expert warriors to become desperate when up against an enemy who cannot - and does not want - to be found. Such was the case in Rhodesia in 1973 in that nations struggle against Marxist terrorists. The terrorists preferred tactic consisted of randomly attacking and murdering farmers throughout the country. Police units like the Special Branch received incidental bits of information about what was happening in their sectors. Unfortunately, the information the authorities wanted most was the most elusive: the location of the enemy personnel and their intentions. This is referred to as a problem of HUMINT, the human intelligence aspect of military intelligence operations. It took the civil authorities of Rhodesia years to admit that the problem the country was facing could no longer be contained through law enforcement. With great protest the police resisted the idea that the problems facing the country could be solved with anything other than standard police work. However, events forced the police commissioners to admit that the game had radically changed for the worse.

Once reliable sources of information dried up amidst intimidation by communist forces among the African population. As communists ranks swelled in the early 1970s, the situation became even more difficult.

Among Rhodesians, whose full citizens never numbered more than two hundred and seventy thousand people, a standing army built along the lines of the British Army (complete with Light Infantry and SAS formations) was implemented in the uncertain times of colonial authorities in the 1950s. The armed forces primarily consisted of white careerists and a small proportion of Africans. Even up until this day, military scholars often write of the high level of professionalism and outstanding service displayed by the men in uniform. These soldiers exemplary conduct is nearly universally acknowledged twenty-nine years after the fall of Rhodesia. Few people know that a primarily African regiment was among the most skilled and effective fighting force of the all white Rhodesian government. In 1973 a regiment was commissioned called the Selous Scouts, which by the year 1979, when the war had peaked, accounted for 68% of confirmed terrorist kills. The Selous Scouts were referred to as a pseudo gang and were deployed in the bush as fake terrorists. To the chagrin of the more conventional officials in the government, most of the African members of the regiment were recruited from captured terrorists who switched sides when given an offer they couldn't refuse. (The charge of terrorism was a capital offense.)

The regiment was led by white officers who often hid their appearance with blackface that they would remain in for weeks at a time. The Selous Scouts had a unique operational campaign that crossed national boundaries and brought the fight to the enemy, man to man.

An explanation of who the Rhodesian people were fighting is necessary to understand why the Selous Scouts were formed. In the civil war, Rhodesia was facing two primary opponents. The two groups were referred to by their initials: ZANLA and ZIPRA. Both were communist-funded and communist-trained. The USSR and China jockeyed for influence in the region. Secondary opponents existed in the international arena. The governments of the UK and USA were openly hostile to Rhodesia and used organizations such as the UN against the Rhodesians as much as possible. Although the focus of this article is on the mixed fighting units on the ground, it cannot be stressed enough that the eventual defeat of Rhodesia lay in the complacent hands of the USA and UK. These two nations enacted complete trade embargoes against Rhodesia through the UN. They were hell-bent on bringing egalitarian democracy to the entire population of Rhodesia. In actual practice, this meant giving the country to the Communist forces waiting in neighboring countries. The uncompromising intent of these foreign powers led directly to Robert Mugabes seizure of power in 1980 (which he has held onto ever since).

On the ground the Selous Scouts were organized as an elite unit and much of their existence was classified. As their mission was top secret, their official cover was that they existed as a group dedicated to tracking enemies by the trail said enemies left in the African bush. Black and white operators were trained to live off the land, become expert trackers of game, and to become more ferocious than the prey they hunted. Remarkably few casualties were the result of superb training, the caliber of men in the units ranks, and the element of surprise that the men invariably employed when contact with the enemy commenced. A typical operation consisted of a team of four to eight operators searching for terrorists in a given district. The team members carried the same weaponry and equipment as the terrorists, and would develop trust with locals. The locals would then arrange meetings with the real terrorists. Depending on the mission, engagements with guerrilla forces took place either ad hoc or planned in conjunction with other units. With the help of these secondary units, a net would be created from which the terrorists could not escape. White Rhodesian personnel were expected to remain behind the scenes or literally hidden most of the time they were in the field. The whites were often proficient in the local language and customs of the tribal people and would never venture out into the bush without the complete respect of the men with whom they served. The black pseudo-terrorists were paid the same wage as the whites. Black personnel also had their immediate families provided for with housing and medical care. Both of these practices were unusual.

This regiment is an example of a type of stigmergic process. With little or no intelligence information, regiments would approach a local population and seek information on "comrades" that they could link up with. With guile and the knowledge of terrorist practices (most of the Scouts had been terrorists a short time before), the members of the regiment would be introduced to local terrorists. The enemy personnel would then be eliminated, sometimes in coordination with the military. This practice of posing as terrorists and gaining the trust of the local population greatly confused the terrorist forces, who soon began to distrust any other groups that came into their areas. The results were often lethal. Morale plummeted in terrorist circles, as friends turned upon friends and desertion soared.

In a backhanded compliment, the Scouts were called in the Shona language 'Skuz'apo.' This was a nickname given them by the terrorists. Skuz was a corruption of the English 'Excuse me' & 'apo' is a Shona word meaning here. Hence, the phrase might be translated as, 'Excuse me for being here. However, the phrase was the type used by a pickpocket who bumps into you and mutters 'Skuz'apo' as he smiles and makes off with your wallet!

The most celebrated operation undertaken by the Scouts was the 1976 Nyadzonya raid in Mozambique. About seventy Scouts wore the uniform of the communist government of Mozambique and infiltrated into the country one morning. They set off in a caravan of vehicles painted in the same colors as the opposition. They cunningly made their way to a camp that consisted of over five-thousand terrorists. As the inhabitants of the camp jubilantly welcomed the Scouts, the order was given to commence fire. The devastation that resulted was so great that the terrorists successfully bade the United Nations to list the camp as a refugee station.

The experiences of the Selous Scouts illustrate the metapolitical character of political struggles. They also reveal the process of turning weakness into strength. In the case of the Scouts, small teams often consisting of no more than four men, became super-powered. They radically increased productivity in conflict by adopting and improving the modus operandi of the enemy. This allowed high rates of innovation, increased survival among friendly groups, more frequent attacks, and the ability to swarm targets. These are traits characterized by the term "4th Generation Warfare" that even modern militaries in the present day have yet to fully understand.

Sources:

http://www.acfnewsource.org/science/swarm_war.html

Rhodesia: Tactical Victory, Strategic Defeat Major Charles M. Lohman, USMC
Major Robert I. MacPherson, USMC 7 June 1983

Selous Scouts Top Secret War Lt. Col. Ron Reid Daly, Peter Stiff

Pawme Chete Lt. Col Ron Reid Daly

OPEN SOURCE INSURGENCY >> How to start John Robb http://globalguerrillas.typepad.com/globalguerrillas/2008/03/starting-an-ope.html

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stigmergy

More details of the Nyadzonya raid can be seen at http://au.youtube.com/watch?v=Vs7V_IBQcDg

A poem by Chas Lotter

A footslogger’s feet are as vital to him as the rifle he carries.

He cares for them both with equal devotion

Which, perhaps,

It is why

A dead soldier’s boots

Draped out of a chopper

With the toes turned out

Is the saddest sight of them all.