AK 47 ASSAULT RIFLE

Technical description for the AKM assault rifle:
The AKM is a gas operated, selective fire assault rifle.

The gas operated action has a massive bolt carrier with a permanently attached long stroke gas piston. The gas chamber is located above the barrel. The bolt carrier rides on the two rails, formed on the receiver walls, with the significant clearances between the moving and stationary parts, which allows the gun to operate even when its interior is severely fouled with sand or mud. The rotating bolt has two massive lugs that lock into the receiver. Bolt is so designed that on the unlocking rotation it also makes a primary extraction movement to the fired case. This results in very positive and reliable extraction even with dirty chamber and cases. The rotation of the bolt is ensured by the curved cam track, machined in the bolt carrier, and by the appropriate stud on the bolt itself. The return spring and a spring guide are located behind the gas piston and are partially hidden in its hollow rear part when bolt is in battery. The return spring base also serves as a receiver cover lock. The cocking handle is permanently attached to the bolt carrier (in fact, it forms a single machined steel unit with carrier), and does reciprocate when gun is fired.

The receiver of the AKM is made from the stamped sheet steel, with machined steel inserts riveted into the place where required. Earliest AK-47 receivers were also made from the stamped and machined parts, riveted together, but this soon proved to be unsatisfactory, and most of the AK (made between 1951 and 1959) rifles were made with completely machined receivers. The receiver cover is a stamped sheet metal part, with stamped strengthening ribs found on the AKM covers.

The relatively simple trigger/hammer mechanism is loosely based on the 1900's period Browning deigns (much like the most other modern assault rifles), and features a hammer with two sears - one main, mounted on the trigger extension, and one for the semi-automatic fire, that intercepts the hammer in the cocking position after the shot is fired and until the trigger is released. Additional auto sear is used to release the hammer in full auto mode. The AKM trigger unit also featured a hammer release delay device, which is served to delay the hammer release in the full auto fire by few microseconds. This does not affects the cyclic rate of fire, but allows the bolt group to settle in the forwardmost position after returning into the battery. The combined safety - fire selector switch of distinctive shape is located on the right side of the receiver. In the "Safe" position (topmost) it locks the bolt group and the trigger, and also served as a dust cover. The middle position is for automatic fire, and the bottom position is for single shots. The safety / fire selector switch is considered by many as the main drawback of the whole AK design, which is not cured in the most of derivatives until now. It is slow, uncomfortable and sometimes stiff to operate (especially when wearing gloves or mittens), and, when actuated, produces a loud and distinctive click. There's no bolt stop device, and the bolt always goes forward when the last shot from the magazine is fired.

AKM is fed from the 30 rounds, stamped steel magazines of heavy, but robust design. Early AK magazines were of slab-sided design, but the more common AKM magazines featured additional stamped ribs on the sides. Positive magazine catch is located just ahead of the trigger guard and solidly locks the magazine into the place. Insertion and the removal of the magazine requires slight rotation of the magazine around its front top corner, that has a solid locking lug. If available and required, a 40 round box magazines of similar design, or the 75 rounds drums (both from the RPK light machine gun) can be used. Late in production plastic magazines of the distinctive reddish color were introduced.

AKM rifles were issued with wooden stocks and pistol handles. Late production AKM rifles had a plastic pistol grip instead of wooden one. The wooden buttstock has a steel buttplate with mousetrap cover, that covers the accessory container in the butt. The AK buttstock are more swept-down than the AKM ones. The folding stock version had been developed for the airborne troops and its had an underfolding steel shoulder stock. These modifications of the AK and AKM were designated the AKS and AKMS, respectively. AK were issued with the detachable knife-bayonets, and the AKM introduced a new pattern of the shorter, multipurpose knife-bayonet, which can be used in conjunction with its sheath to form a wire-cutter. All AK and AKM rifles were issued with the canvas carrying slings.

The sights of the AKM consist of the hooded front post and the U-notch open rear. Sights are graduated from 100 to 1000 (800 on AK) meters, with an additional "fixed" battle setting that can be used for all ranges up to 300 meters.

AKM rifles also can be fitted with the 40mm GP-25 grenade launchers, that are mounted under the forend and the barrel. Grenade launchers had its own sights on the left side of the unit.

ROLE OF AIRPOWER IN RHODESIAN BUSH WAR

The Role of Airpower in the
Rhodesian Bush War, 1965-1980
Lt Col Stuart Pettis

Overview
Between 1965 and 1980, the vastly outnumbered military forces of Rhodesia, now Zimbabwe, fought a counterinsurgency (COIN) against rebel forces infiltrating the country on three sides. Although ultimately unsuccessful, the Rhodesians developed many innovative and unique COIN tactics, at both the operational and tactical levels. Many of these tactics involved their robust air force which included close air support, air mobility, and command and control (C2) aircraft. Today the United States finds itself fighting a COIN campaign with a small ground force and is incorporating very advanced air forces from several nations into this fight. The Rhodesians were able to develop numerous innovations which are applicable to today’s conflict.

Background
The country of Rhodesia is approximately the size of Montana. It is bordered by Botswana and the Kalahari Desert to the West, Zambia and the Zambezi River to the North and a band of low mountains which forms the border with Mozambique to the East. It shares a border with South Africa to the South. The country’s relatively high altitude gives it an overall pleasant, Mediterranean-like climate.

The modern era of Zimbabwe’s history begins in 1890 when Cecil John Rhodes, a ruthless and cunning mining executive, negotiated rights from the tribal king to bring miners into the area. In 1893, white settlers intervened in a dispute between two tribes, the Shona and Ndebele, using it to seize the best grazing and agricultural areas from the Ndebele. Displaced Shona and Ndebele were relegated to “tribal trust areas,” akin to Native American Reservations in the United States. The new country was named Southern Rhodesia and in 1923 became a self-governing British colony.

Despite Rhodesia’s filial ties with her mother country, following World War II the white rulers of the country were increasingly at odds with Britain over expanding suffrage to include the majority native-African population in the political process. At the time, approximately 80,000 white Rhodesians held all real power and the 2.5 million native-Africans held almost none. As a result of this, on 11 November 1965, Rhodesia issued a Unilateral Declaration of Independence, or “UDI.”

The UDI made Rhodesia a pariah and the subject of United Nations trade sanctions which were enforced by Great Britain and others. The sanctions would limit the import of war material, forcing the Rhodesians to become exceptionally self-sufficient. With majority participation in government now unlikely, various insurgent groups began a military effort to meet their objectives. This was the start of what Rhodesians called “The Bush War” and Zimbabweans call the Second Chimurenga or Liberation Struggle.1

The Opposing Forces
Several types of forces were arrayed against each other during the war. On the Rhodesian side were small but capable military and police forces. Due to the small white population, these forces were well integrated and used a national combined operations center and five regional joint operations centers which focused efforts of the Army, Air Force, and police. The Army consisted of several units which had legacies going back to the First World War including the Rhodesian African Rifles, the Rhodesian Light Infantry, and armored car, artillery, and horse-borne scout units. They also had two elite units, the Selous Scouts and the Rhodesian Special Air Service (SAS). The Selous Scouts were an elite unit of trackers who specialized in operating in small units to hunt down and kill guerillas. This feared unit also contained a large number of former guerillas who had changed sides.2 The Rhodesian SAS began as C Squadron of the British SAS. It specialized in reconnaissance and clandestine operations, especially across borders in supposedly neutral border nations.3 The police, formally known as the British South African Police, were a paramilitary organization with a large reserve which combined both policing and internal security functions. It is important to note that all but a few of these units included both white and native-African members.4 In fact, the term “native African” is deceptive since many of Rhodesia’s white inhabitants were from families that had lived in Africa for generations.

As a former part of the British Commonwealth, the Rhodesian Air Force (RhAF) of 1965 was robust by African standards, second only to South Africa in sub-Saharan Africa. The RhAF consisted of 71 aircraft, including 12 Hawker Hunter fighter-bombers, 17 Canberra light bombers, 14 Vampire bombers, eight C-47 Dakota transports, 12 Provost T-52 trainers, and eight Alouette III helicopters. They also had a reserve of civilian aircraft (Cessnas) which were used for reconnaissance. Despite international sanctions which severely limited the availability of spare parts and new aircraft, by 1980 the RhAF had 132 aircraft, most of the additional aircraft being helicopters.5 The RhAF was composed of approximately 1,300 personnel trained in the British manner, which had all members of the crew, operational as well as support, performing very sophisticated maintenance. The personnel were highly motivated and by 1978, the aircraft still had an 85% serviceability rate, despite shortages.6

Despite having a common goal and enemy, insurgent forces were divided into two factions which roughly corresponded with the tribal groupings within the country. The factions were the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) and the Zimbabwe People’s Liberation Army (ZIRPA). ZANLA was a Shona-based organization ultimately led by Robert Mugabe. It initially operated out of Zambia but shifted its focus to Mozambique after that country won its independence from Portugal in 1975. ZANLA had Chinese support and conducted its operations as a classic Maoist people’s struggle. Its forces consisted of small bands which infiltrated into safe areas in Rhodesia from which it conducted terrorist and insurgent attacks. ZIRPA, which operated from Zambia, was a Ndebele-based organization led by Joshua Nkomo. With advisors from the Soviet Union, ZIRPA built up a large motorized conventional force which it coupled with marginally effective guerillas operating within Rhodesia. ZIRPA’s war-time strategy was to allow the Rhodesians and ZANLA to fight each other to a standstill before committing its motorized forces to achieve its victory.7

Overview of the War
The Bush War can be divided into two distinct phases. The first phase, which took place between 1964 and 1972, consisted of amateurish incursions by insurgent forces infiltrating from Zambia. The insurgent forces, although operating from the same host country, were divided into the two factions as described above. They also lacked adequate and even standardized training. For example, in one ZANLA platoon three men had been trained in Cuba, two in Algeria, another in Zambia, and their commander in Russia.8

Tellingly, the first “battle” of the war, the “Battle of Sinoia,” was a police action in April 1966 against a group of insurgents who were attempting to conduct terrorist attacks against white farmers and incite the majority population to join the insurgency. However, Rhodesian security forces detected the group and the “battle” was in fact simply the killing of seven insurgents with no casualties for the Rhodesians. Although not a significant battle, the anniversary of the event is celebrated today as “Chimurenga Day.” “Chimurenga” is the Shona word for struggle.9

Strategically, the defining feature of this first phase of the war was that Rhodesia only faced infiltration from one front, the border with Zambia, and had sympathetic regimes to their south with South Africa and to the east with Portuguese-controlled Mozambique. This allowed the Rhodesians to focus their limited manpower exclusively in one area. Also, because the various insurgent groups allied themselves with South Africa’s African National Congress, the apartheid-era South African government covertly assisted the Rhodesians with manpower, logistical support, and military equipment.10

Insurgent objectives in this phase of the war were fairly modest - to attack white-owned farms and to cut the oil and power line link to Mozambique.11 The guerrillas made little effort to co-opt the local populace, which would have given them sanctuary.12 The insurgents also faced a natural barrier, the Zambezi River, as well as flat, open terrain which enabled Rhodesian Security Forces to detect infiltrators. This forced the insurgents to break into small groups to avoid detection and weakened them militarily.13

Even with their small numbers, the Rhodesians were the clear-cut winners of the first phase of the war. By the late 1960s, they had hunted down and eliminated insurgent forces within the country, effectively sealing the border with Zambia. They also felt confident enough to allow the release of leaders jailed early in the conflict, including Robert Mugabe.14 By the end of this phase, the insurgents had retreated back to their sanctuaries, were licking their wounds, and started retraining for a new phase of the conflict.

The Rhodesian Government’s euphoria was short-lived, however. The second phase of the war, running between 1972 and 1979, saw a complete reversal. Unfortunately, the Rhodesians’ earlier success caused them to overlook the insurgents’ growing menace. The rebel groups spent 1969 in intense training with Soviet, Cuban, and Chinese advisors.15 The Chinese advisors to the ZANLA would be of particular importance since they advocated a Maoist “People’s War” which would lead ZANLA to establish extensive strongholds in the countryside. The Soviet advisors to ZIRPA would help create an extremely formidable conventional threat, but it would ultimately prove ineffective.

A second event helped change the nature or the war. ZANLA’s undisciplined conduct led to expulsion from Zambia, but ZANLA ultimately found a new sanctuary in Mozambique.16 Although nominally under Portuguese control, vast areas of Mozambique’s territory were under the control of the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO), Mozambique’s indigenous insurgent group. With common objectives, both FRELIMO and ZANLA cooperated and created large bases in the border areas with Rhodesia. Coupled with the existing ZIRPA infiltration routes from Zambia, this added an additional 1,231 kilometers of border for the Rhodesian Security Forces to cover. Once FRELIMO won their war in 1975, this support for ZANLA became overt.17

Beginning in 1971, Rhodesia had to commit all of its security forces to battling the insurgents. The tactics of the rebel groups continued to be small hit-and-run raids, but now with much larger formations of up to 100 insurgents. Their targets remained isolated farms and infrastructure with farm workers often bearing the brunt of their attacks. However, they also conducted reprehensible terrorist attacks such as the shooting down of civilian airliners with SA-7 surface-to-air missiles and the subsequent slaughter of crash survivors in 1979.18

Adding to Rhodesia’s woes, South African forces were withdrawn in the face of international criticism and Botswana was added as an insurgent sanctuary. Facing attacks from three fronts forced Rhodesia to cede control of the Northeastern Tribal Trust lands as well as most rural areas to the insurgents. As in Vietnam, they controlled the day but the insurgents controlled the night. Despite these limitations, the Rhodesians fought an exceptionally innovative campaign in an attempt to limit the number of insurgents within Rhodesia. The tactics they employed included using groups of former insurgents emulating insurgent groups to draw out real insurgents.19 They also used very advanced air-mobile operations known as “Fire Force” missions to rapidly engage insurgents with their limited available forces. Finally, they flagrantly ignored international borders to engage insurgent base camps in neighboring countries. While militarily sound, these attacks were countered in the international media by the insurgents, who characterized them as attacks on refugee camps.20

Although winning battles, by 1979 the Rhodesians were being swamped by insurgents crossing from three different countries. As early as 1976 the Rhodesian government realized they needed some form of majority rule. Despite high kill ratios, the continued effect of extended military call ups and sanctions had their effect. In 1979, Bishop Abel Muzorewa, a moderate African leader, was elected Prime Minister of the country, now referred to as “Zimbabwe Rhodesia.” The new constitution allowed for greater participation in elections but was far short of what ZANLA and ZIRPA wanted. Therefore, the war continued. In response, the Rhodesian SAS conducted a spectacular campaign against Zambia’s infrastructure, cutting all trade routes and crippling their economy. With Mozambique knowing it was next, both countries urged ZANLA and ZIRPA to sign an accord, which they did on December 20, 1979. The next year, Robert Mugabe became Prime Minister after Zimbabwe’s first election with universal suffrage.21

The Role of Airpower in the Conflict
Airpower played a central role throughout the war. Strategically, covert airlift was used to violate sanctions and bring much-needed hard currency and military supplies to the country. In addition, the RhAF played a key role in the collection of intelligence, using Canberras supplemented with civilian Cessnas for photo reconnaissance and one of their venerable C-47 Dakotas, nicknamed “Warthog,” as an electronic intelligence collector. This aircraft collected and analyzed electronic communications as well as missile and surveillance radar data. Given the remoteness and the lack of friendly forces in areas where insurgents established bases, the strategic importance of these intelligence platforms cannot be understated.22 However, the RhAF had its greatest impact at the operational and tactical levels.

Operationally, the RhAF used airpower to overcome the Rhodesian Security Forces’ lack of manpower. With a total of 42,800 security forces (including reserves) to cover 409,542 square kilometers of territory, the RhAF used airpower to rapidly bring combat power to bear on insurgents. It provided vitally needed reinforcements and close air support for the small formations of soldiers operating in the bush. Airpower was also often employed to provide needed killing power or to maneuver insurgents into infantry-based kill zones. Finally, with limited long-haul communications, airpower provided high-level command and control, especially during cross-border operations.

The Rhodesians used air mobility primarily for Fire Force operations. The geography of Rhodesia includes rock formations known as “kopjes,” isolated steep-sided prominences, similar to the mesas of the American Southwest. Many of these kopjes had vegetation and made outstanding observation posts. When one of these posts located a target, a three-helicopter force consisting of two “G-Car” troop helicopters would deploy two “sticks” of four soldiers each onto the target. Later a “K-Car” or “killer” attack helicopter was added to the formation.23 Until 1976, the G-Cars were armed with a machine gun operated by their technician. After 1976, the single machine gun was replaced by twin machine guns. The K-Cars were armed with a 20 millimeter cannon.24

While eight soldiers seems small, early in the conflict when insurgent formations were small, it was more than adequate. At other times, when facing a larger formation of insurgents, a mortar team would be deployed via helicopter to attack the insurgents. Operating from the RhAF’s many forward airfields, these forces were able to rapidly respond to contacts.25 To extend the range of their helicopters, forward refueling points were established using a convoy of tankers drive to within 10 minutes of the target area. If this wasn’t possible, C-47s would air drop fuel drums along the helicopters’ flight path.26

With the success of these operations, paratroop drops and fixed-wing close air support were added to the mix. In the paratroop drops, the sticks of troops from helicopters would establish blocking positions to stop the insurgents from escaping. Paratroopers would then deploy from C-47s, the same aircraft used in the World War II Normandy invasion, to flush insurgents into open area killing zones.27

Fixed-wing aircraft were also often used to pin down insurgents or to drive them into blocking positions. An example of this type of operation took place in April 1979. After Rhodesian intelligence identified a large ZANLA logistics base across the border in Mozambique, the military planned an operation to destroy the base and accumulated supplies, as well as to capture several members of the ZANLA hierarchy. The RhAF started the attack with air strikes by Hunter aircraft dropping traditional bombs and strafing, accompanied by Canberras dropping cluster bombs. The air strikes served as cover for the insertion of troops by helicopter on the outskirts of the camp. As dazed ZANLA insurgents took stock after the air strikes, they were stunned to see a line of Rhodesian troops sweeping through their camp.28

In addition to direct insertions, the RhAF used C-47s to deliver troops to areas inaccessible by their helicopters, especially during cross-border strikes. The Rhodesians were particularly fond of airdrops and consequently the entire SAS and approximately half of the rest of their forces trained as paratroopers.29 Aircraft were also used to extract isolated sticks of troops in emergency situations. Troops operating outside of Rhodesia wore special harnesses which they could quickly attach to trapeze bars lowered from helicopters to rapidly hook up and depart under fire.30 Airdrops were also used to resupply troops operating away from supply areas.

The RhAF also used airpower in more traditional roles. When patrols encountered formations larger than they could handle, they would call in close air support to deliver needed killing power. For example, in November 1977, an SAS patrol operating in Mozambique set up a mine-triggered ambush along a known ZANLA and FRELIMO supply route. However, when the supply convoy arrived, it consisted of over 400 troops supported by anti-aircraft artillery (AAA), a far too formidable target for either the fifteen men in the SAS patrol or helicopters. Fortunately for the SAS, the ZANLA stayed in place after the lead vehicle in the convoy struck a mine, giving the RhAF time to bring in Hunter aircraft and let the SAS stay hidden.31

Similar to this were the “pseudo-gang” operations of the Selous Scouts. As former guerillas themselves, the Selous Scouts would emulate legitimate guerilla groups. Originally these missions were to gather intelligence. However, they would also identify targets for Fire Force missions or air strikes.32

Air strikes were also used in classic interdiction roles to destroy known fixed targets, often in conjunction with ground forces who swept through camps to capture or kill survivors and to gather intelligence and weapons. For example, in November 1976, the Rhodesians planned a large attack against a ZANLA camp complex housing over 8,000 inhabitants near Chimoio, Mozambique. The plan called for paratroopers from the Rhodesian Light Infantry (RLI) and SAS to take up blocking positions on two sides while 40 helicopters placed RLI troops on a third side. The fourth side would be covered by K-Car attack helicopters, completely boxing in the insurgents. Close air support was used to cover the air assault, and these strikes would also drive the insurgents into the blocking positions around their camp. The air strikes were in turn covered by a civilian DC-8 airliner which flew over the camp to condition the insurgents to the sound of aircraft and keep them from scattering when they heard the RhAF aircraft.33

Initial air strikes were planned to coincide with the morning parade at 0800. As planned, the insurgents fled to trenches when the civilian DC-8 flew overhead and had just returned to their formations when the Hunters struck. A total of eight Hunters, six Vampires, and three Canberras conducted repeated strikes over the course of the day. As the initial air strikes were ongoing, the paratroop drops took place, allowing the fighter-bombers to suppress AAA fire. Also as expected, insurgents fled from the camp and into the killing zones of the waiting Rhodesian forces. The operation, code-named Dingo, was a complete success with over 2,000 enemy killed. The camp was destroyed along with vast amounts of supplies and weapons. Rhodesian losses were one airman, who was killed as a result of crash landing his Vampire in Rhodesia, and one soldier.34 However, this was a temporary success, since the camp was soon rebuilt requiring a similar but less successful attack in 1979.35

The Rhodesians also developed several innovative tactical uses for airpower. One example was the use of long-range dog handling. Early in the war when security forces were often tracking one or two guerillas, tracking dogs were used to hunt them down. To increase their range and mobility, security forces outfitted tracking dogs with harnesses carrying two-way radios and an orange panel. The dog’s handler would then watch the dog from a helicopter which also held a team of soldiers. By listening to the dog’s breathing and heartbeats, the handler could follow the hunt, giving commands by radio as needed. Once the dog had cornered its quarry, the soldiers on board the helicopter would be employed to deal with the insurgents. This tactic was successful early in the war before insurgent bands became larger.36

The RhAF also used modified C-47s as “Command Daks,” airborne command posts, similar to the EC-130 Airborne Battlefield Command and Control Center (ABCCC). While helicopters were used for command and control throughout the conflict, their limited dwell time and range required the RhAF to retrofit a C-47 with additional communications and other command systems. The Rhodesian innovation with these aircraft wasn’t in the concept, but in the employment. Unlike the ABCCC, which was a forward extension of the Air Operations Center with a lieutenant colonel as the senior passenger, the Rhodesian Commander of Combined Operations (analogous to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) and the RhAF Director of Operations (analogous to the Chief of Staff of the Air Force) were often the passengers on Command Daks. While it put two irreplaceable leaders in harm’s way, it also gave them unprecedented ability to control operations. Operating Command Daks with these passengers became standard practice, especially during cross-border operations, given the limited range of land-based communications.37

A final tactical innovation was in the use of indigenously-built weapons systems. Given international sanctions, the Rhodesian military was forced to create whole classes of weapons themselves, all of which were built to kill as many insurgents as possible. One of these weapons was the “alpha bomb,” a completely spherical cluster munition. Upon impact, it compressed and bounced, creating an airburst effect. Canberra bombers carried up to 300 alpha bombs in hoppers allowing them to saturate areas. Another innovation was the frangible tank, nicknamed the “frantan,” an elongated (with fins), napalm-delivery system built from plastic resin. The RhAF believed this design gave the weapon a better flight profile than normal tanks and the plastic construction ensured that it shattered on impact, dispersing its payload. Another innovative weapon was the “golf bomb,” a small munition designed for small aircraft such as Lynx helicopters. It was a cylinder filled with nitrate fertilizer and diesel fuel for explosive.38

COIN Lessons From the Conflict
The extreme lack of manpower and military resources forced the Rhodesians to optimize how they employed their resources at the operational and tactical levels. They also had fifteen years of confronting two very different foes during which to refine their tactics. Although this conflict took place over twenty-five years ago, we can still draw lessons from it.

The best example of innovation was the establishment of unified commands, which fused police, ground, and air commanders at local levels. While a unified command is common in COIN operations it is unusual for unified commands to exist below the operational level. For example, currently in Iraq, while Airmen are assigned to multi-national divisions, they fill specific roles in intelligence and close air support. The first place where a true joint command exists is at Multi-National Forces-Iraq. However, just as in Rhodesia, local conditions create vastly different combat environments throughout the country. For example, in Iraq in 2007, conditions in Al Anbar Province were vastly different, focused more on reconciliation, than those prevailing in other parts of the country. By creating joint commands at local levels, the Rhodesians were able to adapt their efforts to their particular adversary in their region.

Authors James S. Corum and Wray R. Johnson in their book Airpower in Small Wars, identified the need for joint operations in COIN campaigns. As they stated, “We cannot emphasize enough that successful counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations are joint operations.”39 Corum and Johnson expand their model of joint operations to include police forces and civilian intelligence services as well as military and civilian civic action teams; however, they do not discuss at which level this integration should take place, probably to allow for adaptation to the specific conditions of the conflict.40

Army and Marine Corps COIN doctrine echoes the need for planning at low levels, stating, “COIN planning is often fluid and develops along short planning and execution timelines, necessitating informal and formal coordination and integration.”41 The Air Force’s irregular warfare doctrine, while acknowledging the need for integration at low levels, diverges from this idea by arguing, “IW [irregular warfare] requires a planning structure that is equally focused at the local level and attuned to the dynamic environment. Airmen appropriately positioned at the lower levels with respective input and reachback to the AOC [Air Operations Center] may allow more effective use of airpower at the tactical level freeing other assets to conduct other operational level operations.”42 Air Force doctrine assumes that a small body of planners at local levels, who are, in practice, close air support and intelligence specialists, can fully integrate airpower into COIN planning with reachback to the AOC. The Rhodesian experience does not reflect this and reinforces the need for joint planning at low levels in COIN campaigns. Their success in rapidly responding to local events is a direct result of this integration.

The second innovation worthy of praise was in the use of airpower as the dominant combat force for engagements where the insurgents vastly outnumbered Rhodesian forces. These engagements ranged from the small SAS patrols on the tops of kopjes to the large cross-border operations in Mozambique. In these scenarios, smaller Rhodesian forces were able to call in airpower on insurgent patrols to destroy larger forces while ground units provided blocking positions, keeping the insurgents in the killing zone and preserving the Rhodesian’s limited manpower.

On the surface these operations resembled the beginning of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan where tactical air control parties operating with Special Forces teams called in air strikes on Taliban and Al Qaeda forces. However, these operations were used in conjunction with irregular forces to take territory.43 The Rhodesians used these operations in an economy of force mission to disrupt the insurgents in areas which they didn’t intend to retake. In addition, these operations enabled the Rhodesians to provide combat presence over a larger ground area and provided extremely lethal killing power, which made up for the limited ground combat power. These concepts can be applied to ongoing operations in sparsely populated areas to disrupt insurgent lines of communications and sanctuaries.

While not an innovation, air mobility once again proved its value in allowing the Rhodesians to rapidly move their small ground forces around the country. Coupled with innovations such as fuel moved forward by either land convoys or airdrops, this enabled the Rhodesians to cover large areas with their small land forces. Both Air Force and Army/Marine Corps doctrine echo this requirement. Air Force doctrine states, “Rapid repositioning of small teams through the air allows for a greater chance of tactical surprise across great distances and difficult terrain. Air mobility permits leaner ground-based operations, improving force protection during transport.”44 Similar statements can be found in Army/Marine Corps doctrine: “Airlift provides a significant asymmetric advantage to COIN forces, enabling commanders to rapidly deploy, sustain and redeploy land forces… airlift bypasses weaknesses insurgents have traditionally exploited.”45

A final lesson learned from this conflict is that innovative tactics and methods should be encouraged. These innovations included remote-controlled tracking dogs, C-47s modified into national-level aerial command posts, and unique weapons systems. Each of these innovations, forced upon the Rhodesians by embargoes and lack of resources, serves as a reminder that COIN operations require outside-the-container thinking. Corum and Johnson echo this when they endorse the low-key aspect of airpower in small wars. As they point out, “Air forces with limited resources have often devised new and ingenious uses for civilian and obsolete military equipment in small wars.”46

Conclusion
While a little-remembered conflict, the Rhodesian Bush War remains a fascinating subject for study, due to the length of the conflict, the differing doctrines of the two insurgent groups, and the disparity in the size of the opposing forces. Throughout the COIN campaign airpower played a key role. Given the current conflict and the push in the Air Force to optimize the role of airpower in this conflict, we should incorporate the hard learned lessons of the Rhodesian military. Their conflict demonstrated that airpower can provide extremely lethal effects if integrated into joint planning at local levels. It also reinforced the need for innovation and the key role that air mobility plays in COIN operations.

Notes

1. Maj Charles M. Lohman and Maj Robert I. MacPherson, “Rhodesia: Tactical Victory, Strategic Defeat” Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 7 June 1983, http://www.rhodesia.nl/Rhodesia%20 Tactical%20Victory.pdf.

2. Ibid.

3. Barbara Cole, The Elite: The Story of the Rhodesian Special Air Service, (Transkei, South Africa: Three Knights, 1984), 7-13.

4. Lohman and MacPherson, “Rhodesia: Tactical Victory, Strategic Defeat.”

5. Roy Nesbit and Dudley Cowderoy, Britain’s Rebel Air Force: The War from the Air in Rhodesia 1965-1980, (London, UK: Grub Street, 1998), 5-12.

6. J. R. T. Wood, “Rhodesian Insurgency,” http://www.rhodesia.nl/wood1.htm.

7. Lohman and MacPherson, “Rhodesia: Tactical Victory, Strategic Defeat.”

8. Ibid.

9. Nesbit and Cowderoy, Britain’s Rebel Air Force, 29-33.

10. Lohman and MacPherson, “Rhodesia: Tactical Victory, Strategic Defeat.”

11. Ibid.

12. Nesbit and Cowderoy, Britain’s Rebel Air Force, 38.

13. Lohman and MacPherson, “Rhodesia: Tactical Victory, Strategic Defeat.”

14. Ibid.

15. Ibid.

16. Nesbit and Cowderoy, Britain’s Rebel Air Force, 55.

17. Karl P. Magyar and Constantine P. Danopoulos, eds., Prolonged Wars: A Post-Nuclear Challenge, (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 1994), 220-221.

18. Lohman and MacPherson, “Rhodesia: Tactical Victory, Strategic Defeat.”

19. Ibid.

20. Nesbit and Cowderoy, Britain’s Rebel Air Force, 55.

21. Ibid., 38.

22. Ibid., 76-80.

23. J. R. T. Wood, “Fire Force: Helicopter Warfare in Rhodesia 1962-1980,” http://www.rhodesia.nl/ firefor1. htm.

24. Nesbit and Cowderoy, Britain’s Rebel Air Force, 34-45.

25. Ibid.

26. Wood, “Fire Force: Helicopter Warfare in Rhodesia 1962-1980.”

27. Nesbit and Cowderoy, Britain’s Rebel Air Force, 34-45.

28. Wood, “Fire Force: Helicopter Warfare in Rhodesia 1962-1980.”

29. Nesbit and Cowderoy, Britain’s Rebel Air Force, 76-88.

30. Wood, “Fire Force: Helicopter Warfare in Rhodesia 1962-1980.”

31. Cole, The Elite, 163-169.

32. Magyar and Danopoulos, Prolonged Wars, 207-208.

33. Cole, The Elite, 169-177.

34. Nesbit and Cowderoy, Britain’s Rebel Air Force, 103-106.

35. Ibid., 44-45.

36. Ibid., 80-81.

37. Ibid., 68-70.

38. Ibid.

39. James S. Corum and Wray R. Johnson, Airpower in Small Wars: Fighting Insurgents and Terrorists, (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 2003), 433.

40. Ibid.

41. Field Manual (FM) 3-24 / Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 3-33.5, Counterinsurgency, December 2006, E-4.

42. Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2-3, Irregular Warfare, 1 August 2007, 67.

43. Steve Call, Danger Close: Tactical Air Controllers in Afghanistan and Iraq (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2007), 16-24.

44. AFDD 2-3, Irregular Warfare, 16.

45. FM 3-24 / MCWP 3-33.5, Counterinsurgency, E-4.

46. Corum and Johnson, Airpower in Small Wars, 431-432.

Why was it not in his interest at the time?

Mr. Gerald Hawkesworth HC Deb 10 July 1973 vol 859 cc334-5W 334W

§ Mr. Soref asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what efforts were made during the visit 335W to London of Mr. Herbert Chitepo, the head of Zanu, to discover the whereabouts of Mr. Gerald Hawkesworth, a British subject who is a prisoner of Zanu, believed to be in Tanzania.

§ Mr. Anthony Royle Since Mr. Hawkesworth's abduction we have continued to make inquiries of Governments of countries neighbouring Rhodesia. We have not approached Mr. Chitepo. We do not consider that it would be in Mr. Hawkesworth's best interests to do so

JAMES CHIKAREMA

James Chikerema
Firebrand revolutionary who was a catalyst in the transformation of Rhodesia into Zimbabwe
April 2, 1925 - March 22, 2006
WHEN the 30-year-old James Chikerema addressed onlookers in the rough recreational halls in Salisbury’s townships in 1955, he shocked them not only with his incendiary delivery, but also with his use of an expression they had never heard before: “one man, one vote”.
He was the prototype firebrand militant in post-Second World War Rhodesia where black political leaders had never asked for more than better pay, the right to stand in the same queue as whites in the post office and to be able to buy alcohol. Rule by the white man was regarded as unquestionable, and black politicians wanted only to be governed well by administrators they routinely addressed as “our fathers”.

Chikerema was the first of a generation of African revolutionaries to articulate the notion of black majority rule in Rhodesia, and was the catalyst that launched nearly two decades of civil unrest and seven years of guerrilla war that ended with the independence of the state of Zimbabwe in 1980.

Uniquely, he lacked the blinding ambition for absolute leadership that has littered postcolonial Africa with failed states controlled by unbalanced despots — including his cousin, Robert Mugabe. Chikerema was committed to “the struggle” and had a rare willingness to play second fiddle to political leaders he believed were more able than him.

To whites, he was a dangerous, offensive, inflammatory rabble-rouser. His surname means “scoundrel” in Shona. The rangy, bearded, pipesmoking troublemaker with his jackal-pelt cap inspired black Rhodesians with his effrontery to white administrators.

Chikerema was non-conformist, non-doctrinaire and cared little what others thought of his utterances. His apparently unreconcilable political methodologies were exemplified by the two cheap copper plaques fixed to the mantelpiece of the fireplace in his ample, run-down Harare home — a model of an AK47 rifle next to the emblem of Tiny Rowland’s Lonrho corporation.

His independence and affable frankness eventually had him sidelined from major office as the nationalist movement grew into a government. Before and after independence he was a dabbler in lost causes, surviving on the patronage of Rowland, who bankrolled most of Zimbabwe’s senior black politicians.

James Robert Dambaza Chikerema was born in 1925 at the Kutama Mission in an African reserve, about 50 miles west of Salisbury, where his father taught at the school under the severity of the Catholic Marist Brothers. He and Mugabe were fellow students. They herded the family’s cattle together, but Chikerama had little in common with his aloof relative.

After primary school he went to St Francis College at Mariannhill in Natal, South Africa, one of a handful of educational institutions in southern Africa open to blacks. Chikerema quickly absorbed the political atmosphere of the upper forms and was an adherent of the African National Congress by the time he left for Cape Town, where he worked as a waiter by day and attended night classes in history and English.

He came into contact with Nelson Mandela, Walter Sisulu and other established ANC activists, whose focus was on the agitations of Kwame Nkrumah in the Gold Coast (now Ghana) and Jomo Kenyatta in Kenya. Chikerema joined the banned South African Communist Party and organised protests with other black Rhodesians against plans to unite Southern and Northern Rhodesia in a federation. Inevitably, the South African security police came for him but did not recognise the African foreigner when they turned up at his lodgings to arrest him. They asked him if he had seen James Chikerema. “He just left,” said the fugitive who immediately fled back to Rhodesia.

A job as chief clerk in a factory outside Salisbury ended after he organised a strike, and he turned to selling insurance, and circulated with a group of young radicals, most of whom had also just returned from other parts of Africa with the stirrings of black nationalism.

In 1955 Chikerema and his friends founded the City Youth League in Salisbury and launched themselves on to the quiescent townships. They clamoured for universal suffrage and fulminated against the white man’s laws.

A year later the Youth League was formalised with Chikerema as its president. They raised their campaign with protests and civil disobedience, particularly against the Land Husbandry Act which they believed would force Africans out of their traditional rural homes.

Later in the year, authorities raised bus fares in Salisbury, and Chikerema organised a bus boycott. The roads were thronged by thousands of blacks, watched by uneasy policemen, as they walked the six miles from their townships into town. Youths stoned a bus that tried to defy the boycott. That night the townships erupted in violence and mobs went on the rampage.

Troops and reservists were called out to quash the commotion. The British governor, Sir Peveril William-Powlett, declared a state of emergency. But radical black nationalism had slapped the face of white authority and shown its efficacy. The bus fare increase was dropped.

The Youth League escalated its offensive. Rallies were held in townships every Sunday with exultant support, while police wrote down every word of Chikerema’s speeches, arresting him whenever his tirades were judged seditious.

Chikerema realised the impetus of support was enough now to carry the campaign out of Salisbury and across the country, but did not believe he had the prestige and dignity for a national leader. After a few failed approaches, Joshua Nkomo, a social welfare officer in the railways, was recruited.

In 1957 the Southern Rhodesian African National Congress was launched in Salisbury. September 12 was deliberately chosen because it was Pioneer Day, commemorating the arrival of the first white pioneers in 1890. Nkomo, an Ndebele, was president, and the Shona Chikerema his deputy, representing a balance between the two tribal groups.

Their manifesto was simply to secure the swift transfer of power to the African majority. They swept into Rhodesia’s countryside, urging people to flout the law, and organised boycotts and worked to undermine the authority of white native commissioners who controlled the tribal areas.

Chikerema was accused of slandering the Minister of Native Affairs, Sir Patrick Fletcher, by calling him “a thief”. Chikerema’s claim that he had said “chief” was not accepted by the magistrate who fined him the immense sum then of £100.

The unrest stirred up by Nkomo and Chikerema in 1959 brought another state of emergency, from Edgar Whitehead, the Prime Minister. Chikerema was among the first victims of new repressive laws of detention without trial.

He was released in 1963 to find the SRANC had been banned. Its latest incarnation, the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (Zapu), was splitting into two tribally based factions, one led by the Ndebele-speaking Nkomo and a Shona group called the Zimbabwe African National Union (Zanu), of which Mugabe was one of its most provocative officials.

Violence erupted, mostly in Salisbury’s townships as the two factions went to war with firebombs, stones, cudgels and spears. In 1964 the Government of Winston Field rounded up almost the entire ranking membership of the African nationalist movement, running into thousands and including Nkomo and Mugabe, and put them away in prisons and remote restriction camps. Chikerema and a few others were able to flee and Rhodesia’s townships were relatively calm for the next ten years.

Chikerema remained loyal to Nkomo. He set up a Zapu headquarters-in-exile in Dar es Salaam but angered President Nyerere of Tanzania when he promised in 1965 “a reign of terror” against whites in Rhodesia if Ian Smith’s new Government carried out its threat to declare independence unilaterally.

The Zapu offices were moved to Lusaka, the Zambian capital, where Chikerema was part of a “war council” to prepare for the battle for Rhodesia. As a military strategist, he was a failure. The few guerrilla groups Zapu dispatched into Rhodesia were almost all caught not long after they crossed the border.

He also got into trouble with President Kaunda of Zambia for taking a BBC television crew around a Zapu guerrilla training camp.

By 1971 Chikerema had lost influence in the exiled Zapu leadership and, with a few other disaffected black nationalists, founded the Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe (Frolizi), to unite the guerrillas of Zapu and Zanu into a single army. That too failed.

He attended the first talks between Smith and senior representatives of all the black nationalist groups on a train on the middle of the bridge over the Victoria Falls, on the Zambia-Rhodesia border. The talks ended in failure.

Chikerema’s hopes for a military role faded in 1975 when the men in the largest guerrilla camp, in Mgagao, Tanzania, signed a document of no confidence in him, and declared their loyalty to Mugabe.

He returned to Rhodesia and joined the “internal settlement” between Smith and Bishop Abel Muzorewa that in 1979 won him a Cabinet post in Muzorewa’s ten-month rule. Frustrated with Muzorewa’s poor leadership, he joined a group of rebel parliamentarians to form the Zimbabwe Democratic Party. It was only a few months before it was overtaken by the Lancaster House agreement in December 1979 that bore independence in April 1980.

He all but disappeared from the political scene thereafter, working for Lonrho, making one last, unsuccessful stab in an election in 1995 for the shortlived Forum Party, and he spent the rest of his time as something of a gentleman farmer on a property he bought near his home at Kutama.

Shortly after Mugabe mounted his seizure of white-owned land in 2000, he also had Chikerema’s listed for seizure. “It’s a punishment,” said Chikerema. “Because I stood against him and have never been a member of his party.”

He died in Indianapolis in the US where he had gone for medical treatment.

He leaves his wife, Philda, and seven children.

James Chikerema, political activist, was born on April 2, 1925. He died on March 22, 2006, aged 80.

COUNTERSTRIKE

The Rhodesian All-Arms Fire Force in the War in the Bush 1974–1980
J.R.T. Wood with Chris Cocks

ISBN: 9781920143336
Paperback+DVD& slipcase
£32.50 delivered
approx 256 pages & 45-minute DVD 192 x 135mm 5 x 7¾
>100 colour & b/w photos, maps, diagrams



The militarily acclaimed Fireforce concept



Fireforce as a military concept dates from 1974 when the Rhodesian Air Force (RhAF) acquired the French MG151 20mm cannon from the Portuguese. Coupled with this, the traditional counter-insurgency tactics (against Mugabe’s ZANLA and Nkomo’s ZIPRA) of follow-ups, tracking and ambushing simply weren’t producing satisfactory results. Visionary RhAF and Rhodesian Light Infantry (RLI) officers thus expanded on the idea of a ‘vertical envelopment’ of the enemy (first practised by SAS paratroopers in Mozambique in 1973), with the 20mm cannon being the principle weapon of attack, mounted in an Alouette III K-Car (‘Killer car’), flown by the air force commander, with the army commander on board directing his ground troops deployed from G-Cars (Alouette III troop-carrying gunships and latterly Bell ‘Hueys’ in 1979) and parachuted from DC-3 Dakotas. In support would be a propeller-driven ground-attack aircraft armed with front guns, pods of napalm, white phosphorus rockets and a variety of Rhodesian-designed bombs; on call would be Canberra bombers, Hawker Hunter and Vampire jets.



Military historian, wargamer, military modeller? This one’s for you – keep checking in to see when this scholarly work will arrive in the UK.

THE SELOUS SCOUTS

"The Selous Scouts"
I used to sit by the water's edge & watch the campfire glow
& I'd listen to the night-birds cry & feel the breezes blow.
My belly full of the meat I'd shot, I'd sit for hours & muse
As the moon came up & the shadows changed to many different hues.

I used to roam through this country wide in search of game so fleet
& I'd listen to the lions roar as they too searched for meat.
I'd make my camp on the grassy plain or in the mountains tall
& I'd friends at every farm & store & every native kraal.

But now when I near a river's edge or roam this country wide
I've a lot of men to back me, & I think of them with pride.
They're a scruffy lot to look at, but they've a tracker's skill;
They're damned fine men in a follow-up, & damned good at a kill.

The Scouts they're called, & well-named, too, for the man whose name they bear
Was the greatest hunter in this land, & these men fear no dare!
For the game they hunt is vermin that would pillage, plunder and maim.
& they do their job efficiently, with never thought of fame!

SPONSORSHIP TO TERRS DURING RHODESIAN WAR

The World Council of Churches (WCC) in February 1974 approved the distribution of R300 000 to 29 organizations on six continents of which half (R149000) was to be channelled to terrorist movements in Southern Africa and another R67 000 (the largest amount) to the movement fighting against Portuguese forces in Portuguese Guinea. Prior to this the WCC had disbursed a total of R402 000 - more than 60 per cent of it to Southern African terrorists. The organization's financial support to terrorism in the four years, 1970-74, thus exceeds R700 000.

The WCC has concentrated its activities in this regard on Southern Africa (with which it has grouped for convenience Portuguese Guinea) and its adoption of sponsorship of terrorism has undoubtedly had far-reaching impact on the stance adopted by official and unofficial bodies in the Western world. The certificate of respectability given by the highest organized body grouping major churches of the world to those who seek to attain their political objectives by violent means has stimulated others to increase (and sometimes initiate) their own sponsorship of terrorism.
Impetus in West
Prior to 1970 the bulk of the financial support accorded to terror movements in Southern Africa came from Russia, Communist China and other countries behind the Iron Curtain although finance was also arranged within Africa and by various non-Communist governments notably those in the Scandinavian countries. After the World Council of Churches started financing terrorism in 1970 there was a substantial increase in the scale of contributions towards terrorism from non-Communist and non-African sources.

The World Council of Churches has itself claimed to have stimulated and encouraged financial support for terrorism. "The Fund has acted as a leverage, particularly in the case of liberation movements in Southern Africa. Several governments, churches, organisations and many groups and individuals have been influenced by the WCC decision and have made grants to liberation movements", according to Document 40 (d), being a Report on the WCC Central Committee Meeting at Utrecht in August 1972.

Prior to the advent of the WCC into the terrorist supporters club, sponsorship for terrorism in the West came from the radical left. Prominent in this sponsorship was the highly organized anti-South African lobby in Britain. The Defence and Aid Fund, for example, collected R400 000 in 1968 - R60 000 within Britain and the remainder from other sources including a donation of R80 000 from the Swedish Government.
Scandinavian support
The Swedish Government, along with other Scandinavian governments, was prominent on its own account in supporting terrorism. In 1969, for instance, after having given support to terrorists for some years Sweden stepped up her aid and decided to grant financial assistance to the extent of R142 760 a year to terrorists in Portuguese Guinea and R103 200 a year to terrorists in Mocambique. A further escalation occurred in 1973-74 with total Swedish governmental aid to terrorists in Africa reaching R5 million, one-third of this going to rebels in Portuguese Guinea. The 1974-75 Swedish allocation to terrorism was a staggering R7 million. Private Swedish organizations which have donated funds to terrorists include the Swedish International Development Association which gave an amount of R27 000 in 1973-74. A propaganda campaign in Sweden also forced a Swedish corporation to withdraw from participation in the Cabora Bassa project in Mocambique.

In 1970 came WCC involvement in terrorism and immediately there was a stimulation of support for terrorism from Western sources. As indicated above, the Swedish Government increased its annual contribution from about R250 000 before the first WCC grant in 1970 to R7 million thereafter. Other governments were quick to follow the green light of the WCC and Scandinavian countries were well to the fore.

In 1971 the Norwegian Government pledged R70 000 to the OAU for distribution to terror groups and the following year announced an increase in its aid to terrorism but no figures were given. In 1974 Norway announced a R1,5 million grant to terrorism.

The Danish Government earmarked R150 000 to terrorism in 1971 stipulating that it should be for "educational and humanitarian purposes" only and in 1972 raised its contribution to R700 000.

Finland was donating R130000 to terrorists in Southern Africa by 1974 but the scale of previous donations is not known.

PROMINENT SUPPORTERS OF TERRORISM
International organizations: The United Nations, Organization of African Unity
Churches and Church movements: World Council of Churches, All-Africa Conference of Churches, Lutheran World Federation, British Council of Churches, National Council of Churches of America, United Presbyterian Church of America, Reformed Churches of the Netherlands
Governments: Russia, Communist China, East Germany, Roumania, Bulgaria, North Korea and various other Iron Curtain regimes; Tanzania, Zambia, Algeria, Egypt, Ethiopia, Libya and various other African regimes; Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Britain, West Germany, the Netherlands
Private organizations: Defence and Aid Fund, Anti-Apartheid Movement and various other radical groupings in London; Oxfam and War on Want; Evert Vermeer organization
Individuals: Queen Juliana, ex-President Heinemann, King Hassan


Other governmental aid
The Government of the Netherlands decided in 1974 to donate up to R3,3 million to terrorism. Smaller amounts came from other countries. In September 1970 Guyana donated R18000 to the so-called "Liberation Committee" in Dar es Salaam and in 1972 the Jamaican Government contributed R25 000 to the OAU terror fund. The West German Government announced a R17000 contribution in September 1973 for "humanitarian aid to victims of apartheid" following a firm offer of support the previous month to terrorism from the ruling Social Democratic Party. Canada announced in 1973 that she would intensify her "bilateral and multi-lateral" aid to terrorist movements but did not give a figure. India also joined the terrorist supporters.

In June 1971 the Israeli Government announced that it had granted the equivalent of R2 000 to terrorism following an appeal by the Secretary-General of the United Nations for support for an OAU appeal for funds for terror movements. Israel said that this money would be used for "a variety of purposes - medical, educational, social welfare and others".

The Israeli decision caused a furore in South Africa because of the close friendship ties between the two countries. Dr D.F. Malan, then Prime Minister of South Africa, had been the first head of a foreign government to visit Israel after its establishment in 1948 and his name stands inscribed in Israel's Golden Book.

After the Six Day Middle East War in 1967 R21 million was collected in South Africa for Israel and the South African Government granted special permission for the transfer of funds.
Non-governmental support
In addition to the West German Social Democratic Party other prominent Western political parties which have sponsored terrorists include the Labour Party in Britain which decided in May 1971 to give aid to terrorist forces because, according to its general secretary, it was "in danger of losing friends on the African continent".

Reacting to this decision the South African Prime Minister, Mr John Vorster, said "What Africa needs is not support for terrorists by the British Labour Party but co-operation between African states aimed at peace and prosperity in the continent" while the Leader of the Opposition, Sir de Villiers Graaff, said: "This horrifying decision to support felony and murder comes from the alternative government in the United Kingdom. It is not only irresponsible but dangerous in the unsettled world of to-day." Sir de Villiers issued a warning that this support for the overthrow of governments by insurrection and violence could boomerang on Western governments in unexpected ways. In 1971 the Labour Party in Britain announced a gift of R2 000 to terror groups. Before the 1974 General Election the Labour leader, Harold Wilson, announced that a Labour Government would aid terrorists.
Church involvement
The lead given by the World Council of Churches was quickly followed by individual churches. In 1970 the Lutheran World Federation decided to endorse the WCC participation in terrorism and in 1971 allocated R65 000 in aid to Mopambique terrorists.

Other significant amounts contributed to terrorism have come from the United Presbyterian Church of America and the National Council of Churches of America. (It was the United Presbyterian Church which contributed $10000 for the defence fund of Angela Davis, a self-confessed Communist charged with complicity in the murder of a judge and three others during an attack on a courthouse by Black militants.)

The Evangelical Churches of Germany donated R137 000 to terrorism in Southern Africa in 1971 and in 1974 the Reformed Churches in the Netherlands gave their first donation, of R14000, to terror groups in Southern Africa. Other support from church organizations has come from the British Council of Churches (which endorsed terrorism in October 1971), the All Africa Conference of Churches and the Christian Peace Conference.

The double standards applied by many radical churchmen within and outside the WCC was illustrated by two statements made in a Press interview by Mr D.W. Bleakley, an Irish representative to the Anglican Consultative Council in Limuru, Kenya, in 1971.

Statement Number One:

"Christians must be united on the issue in search of satisfactory grounds to assist freedom fighters in Southern Africa".

Statement Number Two: (after being asked whether the WCC's gift to terror groups would be followed by a similar donation to the Irish Republican Army):

"I think that would be the ultimate indiscretion".
Private donations
In April 1971 the Rowntree Social Services Trust established by the chocolate king Joseph Rowntree donated R50 000 to terrorists in Mozambique as a "spontaneous gesture"; in May 1971 the World University Service, an international student staff organization with an annual budget of R340 000, pledged its support to terrorist training in Africa and elsewhere;in 1971 Oxfam and War on Want contributed to the Mozambique Institute, a clearing house for terrorist programmes; in 1971 the Socialist International decided to give financial aid to terrorists; in April 1972 the Lions Club of Uganda donated R520 to a Uganda Government Fund to be handed to the "Liberation Committee". In the Netherlands, the Evert Vermeer organization began collecting funds for terrorism in co-operation with other leftist groups and in Washington the Committee for Liberation Movements donated R20 000.
United Nations
UN agencies such as UNESCO and the I LO had for many years been in the vanguard of anti-South African activity; in Lusaka in April 1972, Mr Salim Ahmad Salim of Tanzania, speaking as the chairman of the UN Decolonization Committee, said that his Committee would institute a massive campaign of aid to terrorists - the United Nations, he said, had not done enough.

In November 1972 the United Nations General Assembly approved a resolution calling on all states and UN agencies to aid "freedom fighters in colonial territories", in particular movements in Africa in consultation, as appropriate, with the Organization of African Unity".

Sections 3 and 4 of Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations read as follows:

All members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered.

All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.
Individuals
Prominent individuals who have given support to terrorists operating against the governments and peoples of Southern Africa include Queen Juliana of the Netherlands on whose behalf it was announced in 1971 that she had granted an undisclosed amount for "the combatting of racism" (the terminology employed by the World Council of Churches in its fund-raising propaganda), the then West German head of state, Gustav Heinemann, who donated R30 000 and King Hassan of Morocco who personally pledged R770 000 to "the liberation of Southern Africa" in 1972.
Africa's role
Because of the fact that much of the money which is channelled from Western sources to terrorist movements in Southern Africa is not disclosed it is impossible to arrive at an exact figure of the amount of money raised in the West. However, a conservative estimate based on the research findings reported above would give a figure in excess of R23 million.

Thus the funds derived from the Western world for the waging of terrorism in Southern Africa are substantially higher than those raised within the continent itself. Pledges by members to the OAU terrorist fund are estimated (again because much of the money is not disclosed publicly) at R14t5 million. To the figure for the West of R23 million and for Africa of R14,5 million (a total of R37,5 million) must be added the multi-million rand outlay on terrorism in Southern Africa by Iron Curtain countries. Again it is impossible to arrive at the precise amount thus expended but the extent of the Communist armaments captured from terrorists by the governments of Southern Africa and the evidence of training received by terrorists from Africa behind the Iron Curtain indicates that the Communist sponsorship of terrorism in Southern Africa has been a particularly substantial one in financial terms. Certainly there would seem little doubt that, as in the case of Western aid to terrorism in Southern Africa, the African contribution in money terms is far less than that of the Communist world; furthermore, Iron Curtain countries have provided the bulk of the armaments used by terrorists in Southern Africa as well as much of the training (although training and camp facilities have also been provided by African countries such as Algeria, Tanzania and Zambia).

There is no certainty that all the R14,5 million which it is estimated African states have pledged to provide, through the OAU, for the terrorist campaigns has reached OAU headquarters. In fact, few OAU states have met their "dues" regularly in full and in time. Not even the doubling of the budget for terrorism during the Rabat Summit of the OAU in 1972 and a personal pledge of R770000 by King Hassan jolted the African defaulters. By the end of 1973, arrears of OAU members to the terrorist fund were estimated at R9 million (including Egypt R900000, Zaire R430000, Nigeria R850 000, Morocco R704 000 - despite Hassan's personal commitment in public in 1972 - Algeria R58 000, Libya R99000 and Ghana R75 000).
WORLD COUNCIL OF CHURCHES
In view of the encouragement which the involvement of the World Council of Churches in terrorism in Southern Africa has given others in the Western world and the substantial sponsorship of terrorism that has come from Western sources, it is necessary to give a brief review of the involvement of the WCC in support of terrorism.

The WCC was formed in Amsterdam in 1948 in a bid to heal the age-old divisions within Christendom. The single word "oikoumene" on its badge and in the cable address of its Geneva headquarters bears testimony to the original ecumenical intent of its founding fathers. In the first phase of its existence, and apart from its ecumenical work, the Council performed significant humanitarian services in such areas as bringing relief to millions of the world's homeless and hungry people.
Advent of Eastern Churches
In 1961, Metropolitan Nikolai, second in command of the Russian Orthodox Church, an avowed enemy of the United States in particular and the man who accused the American Army in Korea of burying women and children alive, ushered into full membership of the WCC Russian-approved churches from the Soviet Union, Roumania, Bulgaria and Poland. Claiming a total of 70 million adherents, the new members swiftly brought change to the Council's balance of power and within a few years the WCC's first phase of ecumenical and humanitarian work had given way to a second phase of militant and revolutionary action.

At its Assembly in New Delhi the WCC set up a Secretariat on Racial and Ethnic Relations - its first intervention in the field of race relations. Race relations were strongly emphasized at-the Uppsala Assembly (1968) and the Netting Hill Consultation (1969) and shortly afterwards the Central Committee met at Canterbury and resolved:

We call upon the churches to move beyond charity, grants and traditional programming to relevant and sacrificial action leading to new relationships of dignity and justice among all men and to become agents for the radical reconstruction of society. There can be no justice in our world without a transfer of economic resources to undergird the redistribution of political power and to make cultural self-determination meaningful. In this transfer of resources a corporate act by the ecumenical fellowship of churches can provide a significant moral lead.

The "radical reconstruction of society" for which the WCC wanted the churches to "become agents" was to be through a Special Fund to Combat Racism which would be part of the Programme to Combat Racism (PCR). It is this Special Fund which is used to make donations to terrorists in Southern Africa. From the outset the Special Fund and the PCR dileanated two areas for priority attention:

(i) the so-called "White" world
(ii) Southern Africa

The official WCC publication Programme to Combat Racism: 1970-1973 declares of the background to the establishment of the Special Fund:

It became clear that racism is not confined to certain countries or continents, but that it is a world problem. White racism is not its only form. It is recognized that in some areas there are other forms of racism, and ethnocentrism. It is the coincidence, however, of an accumulation of wealth and power in the hands of the white peoples, following upon their historical and economic progress during the past 400 years, which is the reason for a focus on the various forms of white racism in the different parts of the world.

And, again;

White racism in its many organized ways is by far the most dangerous form of present racial conflicts.
Major WCC target
Having thus defined "white racism" as the major target of its attack, the WCC's PCR then - despite its own admission as given above that there are "various forms of white racism in the different parts of the world" - selected Southern Africa as a particular priority target:

...laying special emphasis in the struggle for liberation in Southern Africa. (Programme... op cit.)

Again, in a report on the Utrecht meeting of the Central Committee in August 1972, the WCC notes:

the situation in Southern Africa is recognized as a priority due to the overt and intensive nature of white racism and the increasing awareness on the part of the oppressed in their struggle for liberation.

The PCR gives token support to such causes as "the exploitation of Indians in Latin America and developed programmes designed to support the struggle of the indigenous peoples not only in Latin America but also in the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand" to quote the Programme to Combat Racism: 1970-1973 but in its funding and in the publicizing of its activities the PCR concentrates on support for terrorist movements in Southern Africa.

For instance, of its 1974 allocations $322000 went to Southern African terror groups (the Portuguese Guinea movement known as PAIGC being included by the PCR in Southern Africa) while $50000 was granted to North America, $25000 to Latin America, $20000 to Europe and $10000 to Asia. In addition $28 000 was allocated to "support groups", most of them anti-Southern African extremist groups such as the Anti-Apartheid Movement.

Not a single dollar was allocated by the World Council of Churches to any religious or other group opposed to Communist dictatorship behind the Iron Curtain: and this despite its pledge that "We believe that for our time, the goal of social change is a society in which all the people participate in the fruits and the decision-making processes, in which the centres of power are limited and accountable, in which human rights are truly affirmed for all, and which acts responsibly toward the whole human community of mankind, and towards coming generations" ("Violence, Non-violence and the Struggle for Social Justice", The Ecumenical Review, October 1973.) - F.R.M.

From: Africa Institute Bulletin, 1974, Vol. XII, no. 5

ALLAN SAVORY

September 15, 2001

Ramblings
Allan Savory

As the events of the 11th unfolded I found myself so overwhelmed that for an hour or two I simply pulled out of the important planning meeting in which we were engaged. I needed to sit quietly with my thoughts. In my youth, growing up in Rhodesia after World War II, I somehow recognized that guerrilla warfare would be the future form of warfare and I began studying and later fighting for over twenty years in such a war. I mention this past briefly because as this week unfolded, having gone through much of my life in senseless guerrilla warfare, I began to see the past floating before my eyes.

What I saw was not the endless showing of the towers being hit and then crumbling, followed by the anguish of family and friends of the dead but something sinister and frightening. I felt an emptiness not because of the tragic loss of life of so many Americans and others, including we think five of my countrymen, but because of the television interviews of leaders and public figures. I could not help but notice that all talked of America's strength and resolve, war and revenge. Not one leader replied in the manner I would have found myself responding in my anger and grief. The President has called it a new form of war and named it the First War of the 21st Century. He has pledged to win it at a time and place of our choosing. Although this pledge is understandable in terms of prevailing emotions, it is about as meaningful in real terms as the many pledges to win the war against drugs. America and the western nations, whose way of life is under attack, will need far deeper understanding for peace and what we all value in our way of life to be safeguarded. This is not a new form of warfare - it is one of the oldest forms of warfare that, due to technological advances, is capable of wreaking unbelievable damage.

Nothing I write should be construed as not having feelings for the dead and suffering - I only risk writing at such a sensitive time because my feelings run deep, and after living so much of my life with violence I want desperately to see an end to such suffering. America will be called upon for international leadership in this hour of need. Is America up to that responsibility and what does that leadership entail?

Let me make a few basic points. People waging guerrilla warfare try to undermine their enemy by actions designed to cause a spread of terror, over-reaction, economic damage, etc. Commonly they hit soft (not military) targets that will inflame emotions simply because they do not have the military strength to do otherwise. If skillful they strike in such a manner that their more powerful opponent will fan the flames and spread terror, lack of confidence in the economy, etc., and do the job for them. A mistake made by most governments is to call their opponents 'terrorists'. The constant use of the word 'terrorist' while televising dramatically the damage and suffering makes their action several million times more damaging. If you want to spread terror use the word terrorist repeatedly, associated with terrifying pictures, and low and behold you do spread terror. I watched Ian Smith do this repeatedly in Rhodesia's long struggle for independence. Long ago in that struggle I said publicly that if I was a guerrilla I would pray that my opponents would call me a terrorist to further my aims. The Smith government made that mistake and repeatedly attacked me as an army officer and Member of Parliament for using the name guerrillas instead of trying to understand the form of warfare they faced. Smith, his generals and media gurus, through ignorance about guerrilla warfare guaranteed their own political defeat. I am not indulging in hindsight as many times on the public platform I said that Mugabe's greatest allies were Ian Smith and his generals who, while waging a 'war against terrorists', were winning political victory for Mugabe and ensuring the end of democracy for years to come.

Secondly I see in America floating before my eyes once again something I lived through. Our strength is our greatest weakness. What do I mean by this? In Rhodesia we had an extremely capable and efficient army for bush warfare. We knew it and were intensely proud of our army. We never lost a single encounter or battle no matter what the odds, but that, as I pointed out many times during the conflict, guaranteed we would lose the 'war'. I say this simply because these situations are not 'wars' requiring military solution, but situations requiring civilian policies that deal with the root cause of people's frustrations and suffering. Because we white Rhodesians were so strong our government, under a political leader rather than statesman, was unwilling to even contemplate seeking the necessary solution that would preserve the democracy we valued. That, after all, would appear 'weak' to the bulk of the electorate who wanted tough-talking generals and politicians. When, as leader of the opposition in Parliament, I said (to Smith), "You are going to have to talk to the guerrilla leaders." I was branded a coward and traitor in public. When I said on one occasion, "If you want to win this 'war' you need to understand your opponents and to understand why someone like me would say, "If I had been born a black Rhodesian, instead of a white Rhodesian, I would be your greatest terrorist." I lost the support of even my own party and ended up in exile.

I use the similarities with Rhodesia because only the scale differs. America's leaders would be wise not to treat this as a 'war' but rather as a serious wakeup call to look at an extremely broad and comprehensive strategy involving our foreign and domestic policies as well as our education and business systems.

Right now there is a need to motivate people to unite. And there is a need, that the President and his advisors are tackling well, to collaborate with other nations and go after the perpetrators determined to bring them to justice. However, this should be done without setting our people up for war and retaliation. There is a need, while unity and determination still hold, to initiate the moves to bring about a civilian strategy to win the peace we all seek. If we rely solely on our military strength in retaliating, far from ending the war "in a place and time of our choosing," we will bring about counter retaliation at some time. This has been the most massive guerrilla attack ever staged, but it will pale into insignificance with future nuclear or biological attacks unless our leaders act with understanding and wisdom as well as determination.

There have always been evil people and will continue to be such people. We need of course to share intelligence between nations and root them out. But at the same time we need also to address the causes to which they attach themselves and to dry up their source of recruits. I am sorry that many in this nation are focused only on America and seeing this as an attack on this nation and on democracy. It is not a war in which 'they' are trying to conquer America or defeat democracy. Public memory can be short. It was but months ago that thousands of peace-loving people (including prominent Americans) brought the World Trade Organization Conference in Seattle to a halt. Now, this strike at the World Trade Center as the principal target by ruthless people exploiting grievances for their own ends should have conveyed a message to all developed nations - America, Britain, France, Germany, Japan and others. If America is to provide the leadership the world is crying out for, we would be wise to try to understand how and why the Bin Laden's of the world can have such a pool of angry young people to call on who are prepared to give their lives so readily. We need to understand and heed the cries of people displaced by massive dam construction in India or Africa, or the bulk of the Mexican population who deplore the loss of their way of life and all they value most dearly as we pursue policies like NAFTA. We need to understand that we cannot call on people in poor countries to be good capitalists and then go to war against them for supplying our people with drugs they seek at any cost. We need to understand that when we ban chemicals because they are known to be damaging to humans that we should not allow multi-national corporations to increase their manufacture and sale to third world countries so we can profit. We need to understand that we cannot take thousands of years of careful nurturing of genetic material by simple people and patent the genes for the profits of our corporations and shareholders. We need to understand that in many ways it is not democracy that is under attack but rather certain aspects of our lives that others see as causing their poverty and suffering.

I know many Americans, including good friends of mine, will immediately say, "But our policies are not harming them." I am afraid if others even perceive our policies as harmful to their culture and way of life that becomes the political reality in such situations. It is essential that we look at our policies in our own enlightened self-interest as they affect our environment and other people - as we do with Holistic Management policy formation.

I am not a politician. I only went into politics in my country as a junior army officer with a deep knowledge of guerrilla warfare to try to end a senseless war of self-destruction. But over the twenty years that I have been a 'political has-been' I have never ceased to try to think of ways nations might end such violence. And I have never ceased to work on the causes underlying most worldwide violence. I don't know who originally said it, but I have long believed that, "Until all people feel secure and well governed, none are." No nation can be an island unto itself in the modern world. In America we may feel secure and well governed but are we? Clearly by this definition we are not. When the towers were first hit and blame started to fly, more than one person raised the question - are we sure this time that it is not Americans? Looking at our government I do not see representation of many Americans. We don't even have a Parliamentary opposition in the sense I understand- we have a government formed from alternatively one or other of two wings - left and right - of the same corporate party, managed by a mature and often insensitive bureaucracy. As a consequence, millions of Americans are politically emasculated and apathetic, feeling a deep sense of hopelessness. The present catastrophe will unite all Americans as never before and that is good. But the unity will not last. If our leaders cannot see what is happening in our own country, what hope have we of understanding the frustrations of millions who are daily affected by the policies of the US, and our fellow western powers that support corporations with economies and powers greater than whole nations. The focus will be on America as the single super power, but Britain, France, Germany and other countries are as much part of what many millions of people see as the ugly side of capitalism. Focus is on us because we are seen as having a small percentage of the world's population consuming a very high percentage of the world's resources resulting in vast impoverishment for others.

It cannot be repeated too often- poor land leads to poverty, disease, social breakdown, abuse of women, increasing violence and genocide - and ultimately war. One has only to look holistically at the many resource management policies of America, or the World Bank and other governments and organizations heavily influenced or dominated by American money and university graduates, to see that we are guaranteeing an increasingly violent future for our children and our allies.

As I write, the President is sitting with his National Security Council to decide how to respond. They are intelligent people who will advise on all aspects of security within the comprehension of their professions - military, economic, political analyst or whatever. Probably the President could not put together a more competent team if we were at war. However if one understands the nature of how wholes function I would wager a bet that the same NSC with its heavy regular military bias will be ill-suited to forming a strategy to win the peace. Building our response on a war analogy is dangerous in the extreme. While the President will politically have to respond with force in some form right now, it would be wise to look beyond starting right now. I believe to win the peace the NSC should be expanded to include men and women who understand the effects on millions of ordinary peace-loving people of such things as our agricultural policies and NAFTA as well as the actions of not only American but also multi-national corporations. Conventional economists have almost no comprehension of the effects of for instance agricultural policies on rural American families let alone families in India, Pakistan, Mexico and Africa.

When faced with situations of such enormous magnitude, where it is always easy to be a critic but never as easy if actually having to handle the full responsibility, I have a habit of asking myself, "If faced with this responsibility what would I do?"

In this instance I would do the following. No one has the answers, least of all me, but these actions would lead us toward finding solutions, I believe:


I would recognize the need for statesmanship rather than gut-level politics.

I would do all in my power, working with our allies, to bring the perpetrators of the current violent actions to face international justice.

I would not call it a war but rather focus on this as a struggle for worldwide peace involving our leadership of all nations.

I would treat it with the utmost urgency, as this horrifying act has been a bigger blow than was the strike at Pearl Harbor.

I would recognize that failure of the developed nations to address worldwide biodiversity loss, desertification and global climate change and social injustices will result in ever more horrifying events involving nuclear and biological weapons.

I would put the situation on a 'war footing' in terms of seriousness and allocation of funds and people - no price is too high to pay and, as in war, I would go beyond using only establishment bureaucrats and experts.

I would task an expanded NSC with developing a comprehensive civilian and military strategy and monitoring system to address over time the root cause of most worldwide violence.

I would, as my duty to the nation, insist that this expanded NSC have free reign to investigate all aspects of our political, economic, educational, trade and business systems - there would be no sacred cows.

To the expanded NSC I would appoint people who have a track record of understanding the underlying problems, social and economic ramifications of destructive agricultural and land management policies, trade policies, and more that lead to poverty, frustration, displacement, disease and violence (there are many such people in America and Europe consistently ignored at present). And I would include people with a sound knowledge of guerrilla warfare as well as conventional warfare.

I would urge all politicians to accept the recommendations of such a strategic group in a non-partisan manner so that implementation could proceed rapidly in the interests of all nations.


In short, I believe the surest way to guarantee Americans a future of severely restricted liberties and fear of violence is to treat this as a war that can be won with economic and military might. The war analogy focuses on what the enemy is doing when we need to focus on what we are doing to ourselves. The possibility of even more horrific acts is increased when rogue religious groups such as the Taliban (most Muslims, as well as the Koran, preach peace and harmony), and individuals like Bin Laden, can recruit people willing to commit suicide and align themselves with genuine grievances for their own ends. To let such evil people put up a smokescreen that clouds our vision and draws our attention away from addressing the real grievances of millions of peace-loving people would be the greatest tragedy and play into the hands of future Bin Ladens.

This is a battle for peace that can be won by statesmanship that ensures that while containing present violence to the best of our ability we at the same time start to address the things needed to ensure that all people feel secure and well governed.

Allan Savory is the Founder of the Savory Center for Holistic Management, Albuquerque, New Mexico (www.holisticmanagement.org) and Chairman, Africa Centre for Holistic Management, Victoria Falls Zimbabwe (www.africansojourn.com).

KEN FLOWER

REVELATIONS RE RHODESIA FROM 1978 ARCHIVES

KEN FLOWER A `DOUBLE AGENT' AND HICKMAN A WOULD-BE `TURNCOAT'

At last, when most adult and middle-aged Rhodesians who lived through the eventual political and military turbulance of a bush war at the climax of the Rhodesian crisis - which began with Smith's UDI in November 1965 - are dead, I have lived to hear Matthew Parris and David Owen confirm what we `white liberals' suspected, but would not have dared to suggest. Ken Flower, the CIO boss and the military man, Col. John Hickman were no friends of Ian Smith, although at the time, this was not well known.
The opening up of new files (1978) at the British national archives has enabled these sensitive secrets to move into the public domain.
Martha Carney's UK Confidential programme on Radio 4 hosted two men (why never any women, Martha?) who were involved in Rhodesia's history in one way or another. She gave space to Lord Owen (Dr David Owen, the former British Foreign Secretary, as we white liberals knew him when we met him in Rhodesia in 1978), and Matthew Parris (whose mother Terry was partially responsible for setting me on my political path in Rhodesia in 1966). The program was given advance notice of these archival revelations and my ears were bent firmly towards the radio, only to hear mighty little of Rhodesia's history other than the features outlined here, but it was enough. Speculation has given way to documented proof.
Researching through the few books I was able to bring with me into exile in England I find that Godwin and Hancock's " `Rhodesians Never Die' " (Oxford, 1993) were aware of these little hidden truths and gave them their first airing, but with some caution.
I never met Hickman although my husband was at school with his rival, General Peter Walls and knew him well as a boy). But we were friendly with Ken Flower in a careful sort of way (we played tennis on his Hoggerty Hill tennis court, but never discussed politics). His daughter will forgive me for this commentary because she probably knows that I was among those who persuaded her late father to write his memoir `Serving Secretly' about his work as a top man in Rhodesia's Central Intelligence Organization who went on to serve Bishop Muzorewa and eventually Robert Mugabe. (He died before this latter individual turned really nasty). My favourite story about Ken is of how I met up with him during the Independence party to host Prince Charles at Government House in Rhodesia in 1980. He and Emerson Mnangagwa were a little tiddly, to use a polite expression, and were hanging on to a tent pole in a great Marquee, reminiscing over their top security roles on either side of the Liberation Struggle. I boldly asked if they would help me to have access to their files so that I could write more biographies of the leading lights among the political and military of Zanu PF and ZANLA.

They fell about laughing, clutching the tent pole. I don't remember which it was but one of them gasped "We got a lot of our information from your published Whos Who!"
Ah well, so much for all that and God rest you, dear Ken Flower.

TRAITORS IN RHODESIA

From 1973 to 1979, a few hundred thousand white people attempted to save the white-
controlled nation of Rhodesia from African totalitarianism and racist barbarism. All
world’s governments supported hundreds of thousands of Soviet-trained terrorists,
who attacked Rhodesia from all directions. Still, the Rhodesians might have won
the war (they were terrific fighters, see Parade Grounds of the Dead) if there were not
traitors sabotaging the national war effort from within, at the highest levels of
Rhodesian Military and Intelligence authority. This book describes some of the terrible
machinations of Rhodesia’s traitors.
Review Table of Contents
”Upon certain occasions during the Rhodesian War it appeared as if Rhodesian Combined Operations Headquarters
was pointedly attempting to hamstring Rhodesian desant operations. During a successful Rhodesian SAS operation in
Mozambique's Gaza Province in late 1979, for example, Com Ops suddenly changed the plans. "In view of political
considerations, the plans were changed too often at the last minute and as a result, the end plan was too rushed and not
as thorough as it should have been. They had not stuck to their original aim of disrupting the Gaza lines of
communications. It had been changed to that of destroying Mapai. The destruction of the bridges became secondary,
and they did not go back to finish the Barragem Bridge demolition. There was much heated argument and harsh words
behind closed doors at Com Ops among several personalities as to where the responsibility lay for getting planners to
change their aim. One man denied the aim had been changed. The matter was never resolved and the controversy still
rages.'
Thus the Rhodesians were forced to send their light infantry, "against a large well defended conventional position...it
was soon evident that Mapai could only be taken with very heavy security force casualties...For the first time in the history
of the war, the Rhodesians had been stopped dead in their tracks." Traitors inside Com Ops had meant for Rhodesia's
desant capability to be destroyed in the open fields before Mapai.”

CHOPPERTECH

The book Choppertech is being edited at this time and hopefully will be ready for publishing later this year.
To those who have contacted me; your names have been noted and I will contact you as soon as we go to print.